Sustainable and responsible preventive medicine: Conceptualising ethical dilemmas arising from clinical implementation of advancing medical technology by Getz, Linn
Sustainable and responsible
preventive medicine
Conceptualising ethical dilemmas arising
from clinical implementation of advancing
medical technology
Doctoral thesis
for the degree of philosophiae doctor
Trondheim, June 2006
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Faculty of Medicine 
Department of Public Health and General Practice
Linn Getz  C`ee>\kq
JljkX`eXYc\Xe[i\jgfej`Yc\
gi\m\ek`m\d\[`Z`e\
:feZ\gklXc`j` ^\k_`ZXc[`c\ddXjXi`j`e^
]ifdZc`e`ZXc`dgc\d\ekXk`fef]X[mXeZ`e^
d\[`ZXck\Z_efcf^p
;fZkfiXck_\j`j]fik_\[\^i\\f]G_`cfjfg_`X\;fZkfi
;\gXikd\ekf]GlYc`Z?\Xck_Xe[>\e\iXcGiXZk`Z\#
Efin\^`XeLe`m\ij`kpf]JZ`\eZ\Xe[K\Z_efcf^p#
Kife[_\`d#EfinXp%
Xe[
CXe[jg`kXc`Le`m\ij`kp?fjg`kXc
I\pbaXmb
@Z\cXe[
I\pbaXmbXe[Kife[_\`d)''-
I n n o v a t i o n  a n d  C r e a t i v i t y
NTNU
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Doctoral thesis
for the degree of philosophiae doctor
Faculty of Medicine 
Department of Public Health and General Practice 
© Linn Getz
ISBN 82-471-7984-9 (printed version)
ISBN 82-471-7983-0 (electronic version)
ISSN 1503-8181 
Doctoral theses at NTNU, 2006:113
Printed by NTNU-trykk
“Du skal skrive ditt fag”
Per Fugelli
To Iðunn and Jan
TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
ABSTRACT	 9
PREFACE	AND	ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	 12
1		INTRODUCTION	 17
1.1 Outline of this thesis 17
1.2 Voices of concern 21
1.3 Definition and goals of medicine 24
1.3.1 Curative versus predictive and preventive medicine  25
1.3.2 Discourse on medical risk 26
2		THEORETICAL	PERSPECTIVES	 30
2.1 Conceptualising health 30
2.1.1 The Goals of medicine project’s health definition 31
2.1.2 Antonovsky’s model of salutogenesis 32
2.1.3 Van Hooft’s framework on subjectivity and health 34
2.1.4 Situatedness, embodiment and health 36
2.1.5 The health benefits of a narrative 41
2.2 The nature of medical knowledge and ‘evidence’ 43
2.2.1 Mainstream biomedical research 43
2.2.2 Is medical progress stagnating? 45
2.2.3 The biomedical disease model and its limitations 47
2.2.4 How medical doctors think – reflections by 
 McWhinney and  Cassell 48
2.2.5 Call for new approaches: complexity science 
 and syndemiology 50
2.2.6 Objectivity critique and the patient-centred clinical 
 method  51
2.2.7 Evidence-based medicine 57
2.3 Conceptualising medical ethics 63
2.3.1 Principlistic American bioethics and its shortcomings 64
2.3.2 Current trends in European bioethics 67
2.3.3 ‘True’ knowledge and social awareness as crucial 
 dimensions of medical ethics 67
2.3.4 “Primum non nocere” and “think harm always” 69
2.3.5 “Corruptio optimi pessima” and the power(s) 
 of goodness 76
2.4 The nature of medical technology 79
2.4.1 Conceptualising medical technology 79
2.4.2 Heidegger on technology: Questioning builds a way 81
2.4.3 Technology and values 83
2.4.4 Ways in which technology is value-laden 84
2.4.5 Who is in control – the doctor or the tool? 86
2.4.6 Introduction of new medical technology 
 – a history lesson by Ann Oakley 89
3		THREE	CLINICAL	ARENAS	STUDIED	IN	THIS	THESIS	 90
3.1 Antenatal screening and diagnosis by ultrasound 90
3.2 Prevention of cardiovascular disease in clinical practice 91
3.3 The medical consultation in primary care 94
4		AN	ANALYTICAL	FRAMEWORK	TO	GUIDE	
FURTHER	DISCUSSION		 97
4.1 On the moral responsibility of medical professionals  97
4.1.1 What does it mean to be a professional?  97
4.1.2 The reflective practitioner 101
4.1.3 “Once the rockets are up – who cares where they 
 come down”: on the moral responsibility of scientists 102
4.1.4 Heidegger on causality and responsibility 103
4.1.5 Einstein: a man of conscience 105
4.1.6 Hans Jonas on medicine, technology 
 and responsibility 106
4.2 The concept of sustainable development 107
4.2.1 Historical background and definition 107
4.2.2 General prerequisites for sustainable development 109
4.3 Man as ‘standing-reserve’? 111
5		LIST	OF	PAPERS	 116
6		AIMS	OF	THE	STUDY	 116
7		MATERIAL	AND	METHODS	 118
7.1 Outline of the premises of my research process 119
7.1.1 Exploration of the scientific literature  119
7.1.2 Arenas for critical reflection and ‘respectful dialogue’ 120
7.1.3 “Conversations with the situation” 122
7.2 Methodological information pertaining to the individual 
 studies not outlined in the published papers 124
7.2.1 Paper I 124
7.2.2 Paper II 128
7.2.3 Paper III 132
7.2.4 Papers IV and V  132
8		RESULTS	 136
8.1 Synopsis of Papers I-IV 136
8.2 Overview of the results 142
9	DISCUSSION	AND	IMPLICATIONS	 145
9.1 Medical responsibility – promoting just and fair healthcare  145
9.2 Criteria for sustainable and responsible preventive 
 medicine  148
9.3 Balanced theoretical approach  150
9.3.1. The characteristics of humane medicine  151
9.3.2 From ‘evidence-based’ to ‘adequate’ 
 recommendations? 153
9.3.3 From Cartesian dualism to the Lived body 155
9.4 Environmental precaution: minimising adverse effects 
 of medical activity 157
9.5 Equity: balancing the doctor’s and the patient’s agenda  161
9.5.1 The ‘carrying capacity’ of the consultation 162
9.5.2 Patients and doctors as moral strangers? 163
9.6 Democratic goal-setting, participation and policy 
 integration 166
9.6.1 Before choosing health, choose your philosophy 167
9.6.2 Defining visions, goals and means for preventive 
 initiatives 168
9.6.3 Evidence-based guidelines versus reality-based 
 ‘mindlines’ 171
9.6.4 Some notes on the process of guideline development 174
9.7 Planning for the future: closing remarks 179
EPILOGUE		 184
On existential ground 184
10		LITERATURE	 188
11		PAPERS		I-V		
Paper I 213
Paper II 227
Paper III 235
Paper IV 239
Paper V 247 
12		APPENDICES	 253
12.1 English translation of relevant HUNT 2 survey questions.  253
12.2 From antiquity to the foundations of EBM: some 
 historical notes and personal reflections on the premises 
 for contemporary medical consultations 254
12.3 Ultrasound screening for Down syndrome: a brief 
 historical overview 269
12.4 Cardiovascular disease prevention in clinical practice: 
 historical time-line 274
ABSTRACT
Background	and	setting  Health care has become one of the most ex-
pansive activities in contemporary societies, and technology is one of its 
most influential factors. The modern medical-technological enterprise is 
however facing unprecedented practical, ethical and epistemic challenges. 
This thesis arises from a well-founded concern that medicine in general, 
and individually targeted preventive medicine in particular, may be about 
to become technified and dehumanised to an extent where its integrity and 
therapeutic as well as preventive potential may deteriorate.
Aims  The paramount objective of this project is to contribute to critical 
reflection and theory building in medicine by performing a systematic 
documentation, analysis and conceptualisation of possible unacknowl-
edged ethical dilemmas arising from implementation of advancing, pre-
ventive, individually targeted medical technology in clinical practice. A 
secondary aim is to present “sustainable and responsible development” 
as a potential framework for addressing ethical and practical challenges 
of this kind. 
Theory,	methods,	and	material  Medicine is a moral enterprise. This 
renders all medical research and practice basically value-laden activi-
ties. The important implications of this fact are currently not fully recog-
nised among medical researchers and clinicians. This thesis represents 
an integration of five different studies into a theoretical reflection con-
cerning the inevitable and partly neglected value-ladenness of medicine. 
According to this position and following the tradition of the humanities, 
the researcher’s frame of references is presented first, indicating the per-
spectives from where she wants her work to be regarded. The argument 
departs from the definitions and goals of medicine and comprises six 
fields of knowledge relevant for a theoretical exploration of the these 
goals: the concept of ‘health’; the nature of medical knowledge and 
‘evidence’; the notion of ‘medical ethics’; the characteristics of medical 
technology; and finally, the topics ‘professional responsibility’ and ‘sus-
tainable development’. The studies together address three distinct areas 
of clinical practice: ultrasound screening for chromosomal aberrations 
in the fetus, cardiovascular disease prevention in clinical practice, and 
the consultation in primary health care.
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Results  All five studies in this thesis demonstrate that implementation 
of new, preventive medical technology at the interface between individu-
ally and population-oriented care can bring forth important and complex 
ethical dilemmas and even harmful consequences. The results of the pa-
pers can be condensed under the following headings: 1. issues related to 
the theoretical foundation of contemporary, individually based, preven-
tive medicine; 2. topics inherent to applying evidence-based medicine 
to individual patients; 3. issues related to practical sustainability and the 
carrying capacity of the healthcare system; and 4. issues of professional 
responsibility for both knowledge production and implementation of re-
search findings in clinical practice, – the latter heading representing a 
meta-perspective.
Discussion  The results of the five papers are introduced and discussed 
with reference to teachings and concepts originating from philosophers 
and medical scholars, such as Martin Heidegger, Hans Jonas, Michel 
Foucault, Charles Taylor, John Rawls, Arthur Frank, Drew Leder, Ian 
McWhinney and Eric Cassell. Furthermore, the findings are discussed 
within a framework that outlines a series of prerequisites for a sustain-
able and responsible preventive medicine: 
- A balanced theoretical approach to medical practice implies that 
a comprehensive body of medical knowledge about the human 
condition must build upon both the natural sciences and the hu-
manities. 
- Environmental precaution means, in this context, that potential 
detrimental side-effects of medical activities must be systemati-
cally anticipated, supervised and kept at a minimum. 
- Equity addresses, in this context, the importance of keeping a 
sound balance between doctor-initiated, technological preventive 
activities aiming at ‘population care’ and medical activities that 
are directed by the expressed problems, concerns or wishes of 
people seeking care or advice. 
- Democratic goal-setting, participation and policy integration 
mean that all relevant stakeholders should be involved in defin-
ing, coordinating and evaluating the overall vision, philosophy 
and strategies of preventive medicine. Preventive recommenda-
tions in particular areas need to be harmonised and prioritised in 
accordance with an overall vision, and the expected impact of new 
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recommendations on clinical practice should be estimated before 
guidelines are issued. 
- Planning for the future means, in the current context, that we 
should remember that our priorities and actions ought to appear 
justifiable and reasonable, not only from the point of view of evi-
dence-based medicine as it appears here and now, but also as re-
garded from a more distant or even global perspective, or by the 
generations that will follow us who are making medical reality 
today. To achieve this, we need to continuously consider to what 
extent the scientific questions we ask and the decisions we make 
as professionals are concordant with what rings true and is impor-
tant to us as fellow human beings. 
Key	messages	and	implications  The knowledge foundation of modern 
preventive medicine, targeting individual persons/patients in the context 
of the traditional clinical encounter, is currently too limited and thus an 
inadequate basis for clinical action. Ethical deliberation regarding the 
medical activities explored in this thesis has also been deficient. Despite 
the medical profession’s explicit intention of doing good, these two fun-
damental shortcomings imply a potential for inflicting medical harm. 
This inherent danger imposes the imperative of a paramount respon-
sibility on medical researchers, administrators and practitioners. The 
practical and ethical impact of technological innovations in preventive 
medicine should be subjected to systematic and comprehensive analy-
sis. Each particular new technology ought to be evaluated as for its own 
characteristics and consequences. It should also be measured against the 
overall goals, means and priorities of preventive medicine. These ought 
to be clearly defined and made accessible to critical scrutiny and open 
debate. 
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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
When I decided to study medicine in 1982, I envisioned the discipline 
as majestic and humble. Today, I still think medicine is an impressive 
and powerful enterprise. But rather than humble, I have come to see it 
as self-assertive and expansive, and to a greater extent than I believe is 
good for human health. As a result, I feel professional unease. 
This PhD thesis builds on a synthesis of experience-based, reflection-
based and empirically-based knowledge development. This method-
ological approach has posed a challenge, as will be described in the 
methods section. I have often wondered why I had to embark on such a 
complicated project, instead of doing mainstream research which makes 
for a smooth career. The best explanation I can come up with is that I 
was brought up by a father who encouraged me to think rationally and 
independently, even in the face of expert opinion, whilst my mother, on 
the other hand, taught me the importance of relation, dialogue and intu-
ition (see Epilogue). 
This thesis ends with a set of voluminous appendices presenting histori-
cal facts, events and trends in the three clinical fields that are explored 
in the five studies. It would not have been possible to conceptualise ethi-
cal dilemmas in contemporary medicine in the absence of considerable 
knowledge about the clinical activities in question. As I explored these 
areas to considerable depth, I made notes – mainly for my own sake. My 
supervisors, however, found the resulting documents interesting and ad-
vised me to make them accessible to interested readers. The appendices 
should be regarded as ‘working documents’ and not as strictly scientific 
presentations.
The origins of this project
The person who first woke my interest in academic medicine at the inter-
face between mathematics and meaning was Steinar Westin, professor 
of social medicine at Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
(NTNU). He taught us students – in a manner that I still find memorable 
– how cultural reality can be mirrored in medical statistics: The details 
of the mortality figures from the Titanic’s shipwreck make no sense un-
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less you consider the impact of social class and gender on people’s des-
tiny. After that lesson, Steinar became my mentor.
This entire project was originally planned to be about prenatal diagnosis; 
an arena where facts and meaning are more closely interwoven than per-
haps anywhere else in medicine. The idea of investigating the topic of 
soft markers for fetal anomaly was my own. I nevertheless want to thank 
Rigmor Austgulen, Berge Solberg and my colleagues at the Department 
of Public Health and General Practice at NTNU for encouraging me to 
investigate the esoteric knowledge field of fetal soft markers. 
As can be seen from the list of papers, the present thesis is not only 
about prenatal diagnosis. This is because some of the key actors in the 
field of prenatal medicine – whom I would depend on cooperation with 
– did not accept the way I conceptualised ethical challenges. To make 
a long story short, I decided it would not be wise to pursue my ideas 
related to prenatal diagnosis further. So I called the project off. In con-
nection with this difficult decision, I met with Gunnar Bovim and Tore 
Lindmo as representatives for my employer NTNU. I was received in 
a very respectful and trusting manner. This inspired me to look for a 
revised project. 
Before closing the project on prenatal diagnosis, I completed the com-
prehensive theoretical analysis I had already embarked on (which is 
Paper I in this thesis). And whilst this work was done, Kjell Åsmund 
Salvesen, who was at the time working at the National Centre for Fe-
tal Medicine in Trondheim, helped me sort out the numerous technical 
questions I had regarding the issue of soft markers for fetal anomaly. 
Supervisors and collaborators on the revised project
When I left the prenatal diagnosis project, I started in my current posi-
tion as a staff physician at the Landspítali University Hospital in Reyk-
javík. Shortly thereafter, Irene Hetlevik and Niels Bentzen – whom I 
did not really know then – invited me to present a keynote lecture at the 
12th Nordic Congress in General Practice in Trondheim in 2002. The 
resulting collaboration was inspiring and resulted in Papers II and III 
in this thesis. Then, in 2003, Irene contacted me and said she had come 
to realise that my recent writings could in fact be seen as constituting 
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a whole, if regarded from a theoretical rather than a clinical viewpoint. 
She suggested I conduct two studies on cardiovascular disease preven-
tion, and the list of papers would be complete. She offered to be my 
supervisor. I immediately liked her idea, and suggested that Anna Luise 
Kirkengen co-supervise the project. Thereby, the research triangle, Aca-
demia Mobile, was established. 
Academia Mobile (Irene, Anna Luise and I) have met to collaborate 
intensively on two occasions. In 2004, we spent a week in Tolfa, Italy; 
and in the winter of 2005, we spent a short week in Budapest. These aca-
demic workshops have combined penetrating discussions, long walks, 
cultural activities and culinary highlights. These have been the most 
creative experiences of my professional life. During the long periods 
in between when I have worked on my own, Irene’s clear vision, down-
to-earth approach and admirable determination have helped me stay on-
target. In daily life, I have often consulted Anna Luise as an academic 
mastermind, both via e-mail and personal meetings. The combination of 
Irene’s steady, gentle and determined pull and Anna Luise’s formidable 
knowledge and generosity resulted in the best supervision any PhD can-
didate could wish for. But I also want to acknowledge the assistance 
from my co-workers on papers IV and V: Professor Jostein Holmen and 
researcher Solfrid Romundstad at the HUNT Research Centre in Verdal, 
as well as my husband Jóhann Ágúst Sigurðsson, professor in Family 
Medicine at the University of Iceland. Without Jóhann’s magic blend of 
supportive academic interest and practical assistance, this thesis would 
not have been written. 
Other supportive individuals and environments 
Due to my relative isolation during the writing process and the some-
what controversial nature of my academic activities, it has been essen-
tial for me to feel part of a greater whole. As will be outlined in the 
methods chapter of this thesis, I have, between 2001 and 2005, been 
greatly inspired by the Rosendal seminars, arranged by Filosofisk po-
liklinikk in Bergen. In a similar manner, I have benefited from partici-
pating in two congresses of philosophy in medicine (Krakow 2000 and 
Barcelona 2005). Discussions with fellow speakers and participants in 
these settings have meant a lot to me. For the last couple of years, I have 
also been a member of the Bioethics Research Group at NTNU, and 
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this resourceful, interdisciplinary academic network has been an inspir-
ing link to NTNU. I also want to acknowledge the support from fellow 
members of the Nordic Risk Group (NRG, established in 2003), which is 
a group of academically active Nordic general practitioners sharing the 
vision “to promote general practice which is salutogenic, empowering 
and sustainable.” 
Many individuals come to mind whom I would in particular like to 
thank. But I would hardly know where to stop if I started listing names. 
Many colleagues and co-workers in clinical practice and academic set-
tings have inspired and encouraged me, in big and small matters. I am 
also sincerely grateful to several researchers in other disciplines, in par-
ticular philosophers, who have opened my eyes to other academic uni-
verses. 
Financial support 
The original project received a research grant from the Norwegian Uni-
versity of Science and Technology (NTNU) in 1999. From 2001 through 
today, I have been employed as a staff physician at the Landspítali Uni-
versity Hospital in Reykjavik, and Papers II-V have all been written in 
my spare time. As I approached the closing phase of the project in 2005, 
I received a grant from the Norwegian College of General Practitioners 
(NSAM – allmennpraktikerstipend) as well as a grant from Nidarosfon-
det til fremme av allmennmedisinen i Midt-Norge. This made it possible 
for me to take some time off from my hospital work to complete this 
thesis. This project has also received financial support from The Ice-
landic Family Physicians Research Fund in Iceland and The Bioethics 
Research Group at NTNU. I thank my current employers at Landspítali 
University Hospital for giving me the flexibility needed to complete this 
work and for giving me access to the hospital’s excellent library services 
throughout the whole project. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Health care has become one of the most expansive activities in contem-
porary societies, and technology is one of its most influential factors. The 
modern medical-technological enterprise is however facing unprecedent-
ed practical, epistemic,1 and ethical challenges. Many scholars and writ-
ers have, for different reasons and from different perspectives, called for 
systematic, critical reflection on the theoretical foundation, goals, means 
and limits of medicine (see, for instance, Skrabanek 1994; the Goals of 
medicine project, edited by Callahan in 1996; le Fanu 1999; Porter 1997; 
Murphy 1997; Kirkengen 2001; Abramson 2004; Tallis 2004). 
1.1	Outline	of	this	thesis
This thesis arises from a solidly founded concern that medicine in gen-
eral, and individually targeted preventive medicine in particular, may 
be about to become technified and dehumanised to the extent that its 
integrity and therapeutic as well as preventive potential may deteriorate. 
Despite what appears on the surface to be the best of medical intentions 
– to prevent people from falling ill – the medical profession may be run-
ning the risk of undermining its own credibility and legitimacy in this 
important field. In this thesis, I will present a combination of theoreti-
cal reflections and empirically based writings concerning this issue. The 
paramount aim is to define, analyse and conceptualise unacknowledged 
ethical dilemmas which I perceive in relation to the clinical implementa-
tion of advancing preventive, individually targeted medical technology. 
A secondary aim of this study is to suggest an analytical framework for 
further discussion of this topic. 
It is sometimes assumed that if one is not an unequivocal defender of rea-
son, science and technology, then one is against them.2 Opposition is far 
1  Epistemology, from Greek epistEmE knowledge, from epistanai to understand, know, from epi- + histanai 
to cause to stand (Merriam-Webster’s dictionary 2005). The theory of knowledge; the branch of philosophy 
concerning the definition of knowledge, and the establishment of criteria for evaluating claims that something 
is known. See Ashcroft’s paper Current epistemological problems in evidence based medicine (2004).
2 In his Letter on Humanism, German philosopher Martin Heidegger regretfully notes how culture critics 
like himself tend to experience that “People ... immediately assume that what speaks against something is 
automatically its negation and that this is ‘negative’ in the sense of destructive (...) But does the ‘against’ 
which a thinking advances against ordinary position necessarily point toward pure negation and the nega-
tive? (...) Concealed in such a procedure is the refusal to subject to reflection this presupposed ‘positive’ in 
which one believes...” (The full quote appears in a paper titled Escaping technological nihilism, see Milch-
man and Rosenberg 2003:55).
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from my position. I fully acknowledge that modern medicine possesses 
an unprecedented capability for saving people from untimely death and 
for improving the lives of people suffering from chronic disease and 
disability. The therapeutic revolution in modern medicine represents an 
impressive human endeavour. In a sense, I personally owe my life to the 
advances of medical technology, and I am gratefully aware of this.3 The 
potent and truly benevolent powers of modern medicine are, however, 
not the topic of this study. This is a thesis about problematic issues in 
modern preventive medicine.
Many scholars, researchers and clinicians have written that they see de-
humanising, medicalising, coercive, and even corrupting forces in mod-
ern preventive medicine (Illich 1976; Skrabanek 1994; Moynihan and 
Smith 2002; Moynihan, Heath and Henry 2002; Abramson 2004; Angell 
2004). I do not aim to present an extensive overview of this critique 
here. I will simply set the scene by quoting a short series of authorita-
tive voices lending breadth, weight and legitimacy to my professional 
concerns. 
The rest of this introductory part will be devoted to theoretical perspec-
tives, concepts and discourses to help readers see that the five papers in 
this thesis rest on common theoretical grounds. The papers refer to three 
different clinical ‘scenarios’; ultrasound screening for fetal anomaly, 
cardiovascular disease prevention, and the clinical encounter in primary 
health care. They also represent five different genres of scientific writ-
ing. However, if regarded from a theoretical viewpoint, they deal with 
common epistemological and ethical topics, as can be seen from the 
schematic overview of results in chapter 8.2. I follow the tradition of 
the humanistic sciences as I begin by introducing my own theoretical 
position, and from this position, the theoretical viewpoints from which I 
would like my work to be regarded. I then, present the research as such. 
The organisation of this thesis is illustrated in Figure 1. 
  
3 See the Epilogue to this thesis.
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Figure	1. The organisation of this thesis. 
The format of this PhD thesis is unusual in the biomedical context. 
The reason is that it contains critical reflections in relation to modern 
preventive technologies. Such reflections can hardly be put forward 
meaningfully in a format which has been developed to accommodate, 
hand-in-glove, the scientific premises that are laid out by the very same 
technology. My decision to go theoretically and methodologically “off 
the beaten track” can, as I see it, find support in the thoughts of German 
philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), one of the 20th century’s 
most influential thinkers regarding modern technology (see further de-
scription in chapter 2.4.2). In his 1953 essay The Question Concerning 
Technology (Heidegger 1977:35), Heidegger stated:  
Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflection 
upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, 
on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology, and on the other, fundamentally 
different from it. 
In the same essay, Heidegger stated that “questioning builds a way” for 
those who, like him, feel an urge to reflect upon what modern technol-
ogy means to human beings, for better or for worse. This thesis can best 
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be characterised as an example of ‘Heideggerian questioning’ of con-
temporary, individually based, preventive medical technology. 
As said above, I intend to emphasise the interrelatedness of the five 
papers in this thesis. Therefore, I will focus on theoretical perspectives 
rather than chronological developments in this introduction. I have how-
ever paid considerable attention to chronology and historical develop-
ments when preparing this thesis. Interested readers may find notes from 
my “field works regarding chronology” in the appendix section. 
The theoretical discourses and concepts covered in the following intro-
ductory chapters, include: 
• the concept of ‘health’, 
• the nature of medical knowledge and ‘evidence’,
• the notion of ‘medical ethics’, and
• the characteristics of medical technology.
Towards the end of this chapter on theory, three scenarios, represent-
ing three distinct fields of clinical practice of the above-mentioned top-
ics, are presented. These clinical scenarios are analysed in Papers I-V 
in this thesis. Each of these fields has its own historical background, 
chronological development and body of scientific literature, and this is 
addressed in appendices 2-4. 
Since one aim is to suggest an analytical framework for further discus-
sion and tackling of the dilemmas that are described in the five papers, 
the final entry in the theoretical section will present the concepts of 
• professional responsibility, and 
• sustainable development. 
An analytical framework based on responsibility and sustainability 
might, in my opinion, help medical professionals and healthcare admin-
istrators acknowledge, understand and tackle some of the challenges 
that modern preventive medicine is currently facing. These concepts 
will therefore structure the discussion part of this thesis. 
The term sustainable development (see chapter 4.2) should not be un-
familiar to Norwegians. It was brought to world-wide attention in 1987 
in the World Commission report Our Common Future (1987), better 
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known as “the Brundtland Report” after former Norwegian Prime Min-
ister Gro Harlem Brundtland, medical doctor and chairman of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development. In its time, Our com-
mon future focused political attention on the concept of sustainable de-
velopment as an analytical tool to guide discussions about growth and 
development. Since then, sustainable development has been explored 
from various perspectives by different academic disciplines. However, 
the medical community has hardly addressed the topic. The only sys-
tematic attempt to do so that I have come across stems from medical 
philosopher Daniel Callahan and co-workers, who have outlined some 
general characteristics of a sustainable medicine, with particular refer-
ence to the US context (see Callahan 1996 and, in particular, Callahan 
1999).
1.2	Voices	of	concern
Several scholars have pointed out that contemporary medicine appears 
to be losing sight of its goals and limits. In 1997, Roy Porter, professor 
in the social history of medicine, published a widely appraised book 
titled The greatest benefit to Mankind. A medical history of humanity. 
The last phrase of Porter’s book reads as follows (Porter 1997:718): 
The close of my history suggests that medicine’s finest hour is the dawn of its di-
lemmas. For centuries medicine was impotent and thus unproblematic. From the 
Greeks to the first World War, its tasks were simple: to grapple with lethal diseases 
and gross disabilities, to ensure live births and manage pain. It performed these 
with meagre success. Today with ‘mission accomplished’, its triumphs are dissolv-
ing in disorientation. Medicine has led to inflated expectations, which the public 
eagerly swallowed. Yet as those expectations become unlimited, they are unfulfill-
able: medicine will have to redefine its limits even as it extends it capacities. 
On January 14th 2006, the British Medical Journal featured a series of 
articles regarding implementation of new interventions in health care. 
It is acknowledged that “technological innovations drive modern health 
care at an accelerating pace,” and that introduction of medical technolo-
gy can suffer from both too much too soon and too little too late. Careful 
monitoring of the transition zone between technological development 
and clinical implementation is therefore important. As Gabbay and Wal-
ley (2006) state: 
The social processes of diffusion can turn “technology creep” into widespread 
practice before health technology assessors can even define, let alone evaluate, 
new healthcare interventions; but those same processes can result in important de-
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velopments being ignored and underused…. Conflicting interests with deeply held 
values inevitably affect every stage of healthcare innovation.
In 2005, the newly appointed editor of the British Medical Journal Fiona 
Godlee expressed explicit concerns over current developments in pre-
ventive medicine in the journal’s column Editor’s choice, under the title 
Prevention makes us miserable (BMJ, April 23rd 2005):
The old adage – prevention is better than cure – is one we have heard so often that 
it’s hard to shift from our minds. It is intuitively powerful. It just seems to make 
sense. But shift it we must, for it fuels (...) “the excessive self confidence of preven-
tive medicine,” which is making us ill and miserable. 
Several scholars have noticed that, at some point, more medicine may 
become worse medicine. In 1999, US researchers Elliott Fisher and H. 
Gilbert Welch published a seminal paper in the Journal of the Ameri-
can Medical Association, where they claimed that (Fisher and Welch 
1999): 
While the benefits of more medical care are widely recognised, the possibility that 
harm may result from growth has received little attention. Because harm from more 
medical care is unexpected, findings of harm are discounted or ignored. We sug-
gest that such findings may indicate a more general problem and deserve serious 
consideration. 
Various authors have pointed out that there is a need for integration of, 
and a clearer philosophy in relation to, preventive medical activities. 
Two quite different papers can illuminate this topic. In 2003, an Ameri-
can research group published a modelling study documenting the aggre-
gated impact of providing all recommended services, as outlined by the 
US Preventive Services Task Force. The finding was that implementation 
of these recommendations would require no less than 7.4 hours of each 
primary care physician’s working day (Yarnall et al. 2003). In 2002, two 
professors of public health published a paper in The Lancet where they 
called for the deliberate use of philosophy in relation to planning strate-
gies to improve population health (Roberts and Reich 2002): 
Public health today grapples with issues rife with ethical dilemmas and politi-
cal conflict (...) Yet public health professionals have minimal training in ethical 
analysis. If health professionals are to develop coherent positions on these issues, 
and contribute to democratic deliberation about public policies, then they need 
enhanced skills in applied philosophy. Understanding alternative ethical arguments 
has become as important as knowing the advantages and disadvantages of different 
epidemiological techniques.
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In modern medicine, the notion of risk is central. The risk discourse 
stands in a somewhat paradoxical relationship to the honoured notions 
of freedom and autonomy. At the Norwegian conference Cultural per-
spectives on risk, preventive medicine and health promotion in 2003 
(proceedings edited by Grimen and Elvbakken 2003), Swedish sociolo-
gist Eva Palmblad spoke about a phenomenon which she called “the 
art of social engineering”. Social engineering, she claimed, used to be 
implemented by paternalist, expert dictate. In contemporary society, 
however, it has come to operate in the name of freedom, autonomy and 
self-techniques. In accordance with French intellectual and historian 
Michel Foucault’s (1926-1984) theory on medical policing (Foucault 
1975), Palmblad perceives that people may thereby currently be sub-
jected to new and subtle forms of social control (Palmblad 2003): 
It is said that today’s citizen has attained a historically unique right to make his or 
her own choices with a bearing on health and well-being. It may concern everything 
from eating and exercise habits to sexuality and childbirth. For example, today we 
can choose not only if and when we want children; with the aid of fetal diagnosis 
we are also in position to consider whether we want that particular child. 
But something happens: As soon as we have been granted the right to choose, 
it tends to change into a duty to choose – and furthermore to make rational choices, 
seen in relation to the general good of the society and succeeding generations. 
Freedom seems, in this way, often to be defined instrumentally, in such a way that 
it becomes a pre-condition for the success of health policy.
This calls to mind the writings of Czech toxicologist, and later Professor 
of Community Health in Dublin, Petr Skrabanek. In 1990, he asked Why 
is preventive medicine exempted from ethical constraints? (Skrabanek 
1990). He believed that healthy people taking part in preventive mass 
interventions are in fact “subjects of large-scale population experiments 
of uncertain outcome and potential harm”. So why are these interven-
tions not evaluated by ethical committees? Skrabanek points to histori-
cal and political reasons for what he calls “the ethical vacuum of pre-
ventive medicine”. Early preventive medicine in the 19th century dealt 
with contagious diseases and was synonymous with medical policing. 
Skrabanek’s opinion was that modern preventive programmes are of a 
completely different nature, thus calling for original ethical analysis.
Only a few days before his death from aggressive prostate cancer at the 
age of 53, Skrabanek finished the manuscript of his book The death of 
humane medicine and the rise of coercive healthism (Skrabanek 1994). 
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He wrote: 
The pursuit of health is a symptom of unhealth. When this pursuit is no longer a 
personal yearning but part of a state ideology, healthism for short, it becomes a 
symptom of political sickness (...) All totalitarian ideologies use the rhetoric of 
freedom and happiness, with false promises of a happy future for all.
Two sociologists recently published a comprehensive analysis of the 
development of the doctor-patient-relationship. They claim that super-
ficiality is a characteristic of contemporary medical practice (Potter and 
McKinlay 2005):
Compared to the 20th century where doctor-patient relationships could be charac-
terised by depth and history, the 21st century relationship between a doctor and a 
patient can increasingly be characterised by superficiality and focused on the here 
and now.
In 2004 Samuel LeBaron, Director of the Center for Education in Fam-
ily and Community Medicine at Stanford University School of Medi-
cine, published a paper titled Can the future of medicine be saved from 
the success of science? (LeBaron 2004). He notes: 
…an emphasis on the achievements of biomedical science has contributed to loss 
of human understanding and increased cynicism and dissatisfaction in medicine. 
A balanced approach to health care requires attention to both the biological and 
humanistic aspects of our patients’ lives. 
1.3 Definition and goals of medicine
According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2005), medicine is de-
fined as 
the science and art dealing with the maintenance of health and the prevention, al-
leviation, or cure of disease. 
This definition is congruent with my own view. I am also willing to 
regard “prevention, alleviation, or cure of disease” as summing up the 
paramount goals of medicine as a whole.
In the following, the term ‘medicine’ will be applied in two different but 
interconnected ways: 
1. to designate a moral, altruistic institution – existing for the pur-
pose of helping people. The medical profession and its associated 
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organisations and practices are thereby conceptualised as an ab-
stract, yet morally responsible, ‘agent’. 
2. to designate a circumscribed body of theoretical assumptions, fac-
tual knowledge and research methods, together encompassing the 
so-called “biomedical paradigm”. 
1.3.1 Curative versus predictive and preventive medicine 
The idea that prevention is better than cure appears intuitively attractive, 
and hardly in need of philosophical or scientific defence. And in fact, 
the most renowned ideologist ever in the area of preventive medicine, 
epidemiologist Geoffrey Rose, anchored his vision in a very common-
sense way as he said (Rose 1992): 
It is better to be healthy than ill or dead. That is the beginning and the end of the 
only real argument for preventive medicine. It is sufficient.
It is important, however, to acknowledge the fundamental difference 
between curative and predictive-preventive medicine. Furthermore, as 
underlined by Petr Skrabanek, traditional preventive medicine is some-
thing distinctly different from more recent preventive activities, which 
he designated as “anticipatory care”, “proactive medicine” and “health 
maintenance.” To traditional preventive medicine he assigned vaccina-
tions, pasteurisation, and stopping the spread of contagious disease.4 
Prevention of this kind is cause-specific and empirically and pragmati-
cally based. Modern proactive medicine, on the other hand, is aimed 
at multifactorial conditions and is based on theoretical calculations of 
risk (prediction). Intervention in relation to disease risk evokes many 
metaphysical questions that are not raised by curative medicine and tra-
ditional preventive medicine. 
It may well be that Skrabanek’s nuanced vocabulary would help us ad-
vance the discussion of ethical dilemmas relating to preventive medicine. 
It has however not entered mainstream medical language, so I decided 
to use only the terms preventive (synonym: preventative) or predictive 
medicine in this thesis.5 
4 This thesis does not address preventive interventions of this type.
5 I will make no sharp distinction between the terms predictive and preventive. Predictive medicine may be 
a better term to designate personalised interventions related, for instance, to genetic testing, fetal ultrasound 
screening with computerised risk estimates, or application of a cardiovascular disease risk calculator. The 
term predictive also circumvents the verbal dilemma arising in relation to prenatal diagnosis, where the most 
common intervention is termination of the pregnancy.
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This study addresses preventive medical activities involving stan-
dardised measurement, evaluation and counselling related to selected 
parameters known to vary between individuals. Examples of such vari-
ables are the biological parameters of blood pressure, cholesterol, bone 
mineral density, and fetal nuchal translucency.
As previously pointed out, the moral foundation for preventive/pre-
dictive initiatives aiming at improving health among people who are 
currently free of symptoms is different from the moral foundation of 
curative medicine that is offered to patients seeking medical help for 
problems they are currently experiencing (Skrabanek 1990; Ewart 2000; 
Mallia and Ten Have 2003). In a paper called The arrogance of pre-
ventive medicine, David Sackett – founding father of evidence-based 
medicine (EBM) – has emphasised that preventive and curative medical 
activities are “absolutely and fundamentally different in their obliga-
tions and implied promises to the individuals whose lives they modify” 
(Sackett 2002). 
1.3.2 Discourse on medical risk
As outlined by Armstrong (1995), medicine’s primary focus, in the pre-
ceding 300 years, has gone through various stages. Eighteenth century 
bedside medical practice relied on symptoms and aimed at dealing with 
the patient’s subjective illness. Nineteenth century hospital medicine 
and early 20th century medicine in general was mainly concerned with 
signs and focused on the objective disease hidden in the patient’s body.6 
In the late 20th century, medicine became gradually more concerned with 
threats of future disease, and thereby started to conceptualise the notion 
of medical risk. 
Since the 1970s, a phenomenon which Norwegian scholar John-Arne 
Skolbekken has termed a “risk epidemic” has developed in biomedical 
research and publishing (Skolbekken 1995). Understanding the occur-
rence of disease in terms of risk is a modern phenomenon (Ogden 1995; 
Armstrong 1995; Kavanagh and Broom 1998). It can be seen as a partic-
ular manifestation of the general risk discourse characterising modern, 
industrialised societies, and perhaps even more, the post-modern world 
we can currently be seen as living in (Blaxter 2004).
6 See Appendix 2 for further description of this historical development.
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In 1992, German Professor of Sociology Ulrich Beck coined the de-
scriptive term risk society (Beck 1992). Beck suggests that we live in 
a society which is increasingly interdependent and increasingly vulner-
able to international catastrophe and to the risk management of organi-
sations over which we have no control. Health risks – especially eco-
logical, genetic, nuclear, but also economic risks associated with global 
economies – are in the hands of experts whose manner of assessment we 
may not even understand, and whom we may not trust. The erosion of 
trust is fostered by the growing recognition that these risks are often ulti-
mately unknowable. Mildred Blaxter, UK professor of social medicine, 
emphasises that there is, of course, nothing new about the fact that life 
presents continual risks to the life and health of the individual. What is 
new, however, is that the imposition of technological risks is recognized, 
publicized, feared and resisted by the population (Blaxter 2004). 
In the modern, as opposed to what is now called the post-modern, world, 
risk was mainly a basic concept of epidemiology in the form of statistical 
risk factors for morbidity and mortality (Blaxter 2004). This approach 
saw risk as a technical matter to be tackled with more science and better 
public information. From this point of view, a basic premise was that 
all risks are measurable and possible to control. And towards the end of 
the 20th century, a whole industry developed, concerned with risk, risk 
assessment and risk intervention. Risk assessment gradually became a 
key element of public health, and risk discourse became “the language 
of health education” (Blaxter 2004). The interest in risk has also had a 
profound impact on clinical medicine (for a critical perspective of this 
development in the Norwegian medical context, see, for instance, Hol-
men 1994). Appreciation of risk is, to an increasing extent, the means by 
which each individual is encouraged to evaluate and regulate his or her 
life and body, and this encouragement is associated with ideas of choice 
and individual responsibility. 
In general, lay people’s ways of understanding risks tend to differ from 
those of experts. The psychology of risk perception and the relationship 
between lay and expert perceptions of risk has thereby become a pro-
lific field of research (Blaxter 2004). Ample research shows that the risk 
concept is hard to handle, also in the particular context of medicine. It is 
complex, relatively poorly understood by health professionals, and cor-
respondingly difficult to communicate to the individual patient (person) 
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in a meaningful way (see, for instance, Hetlevik 1999; Lewis et al. 2003; 
Michie et al. 2005; Herxheimer 2005).7 In relation to preventive medi-
cine, the notion of health currently represents an increasing epistemo-
logical challenge. Blaxter observes that the presence of statistical risk 
factors, such as smoking, overweight and a sedentary life style, is about 
to become equivalent to a diseased state – calling for individual thera-
peutical intervention. Correspondingly, the traditional terms ‘normal’, 
‘at risk’, ‘abnormal’ and ‘pathological’, so essential to modern medical 
discourse (Canguilhem 1966; Hofmann 1995; Horton 1995; Adelsvärd 
and Sachs 1996; Trnka 2003), are becoming blurred (Armstrong 1995; 
Blaxter 2004). Papers I, IV and V of this thesis address this topic. In 
particular, Papers IV and V show how the risk definitions in the cur-
rent guidelines on cardiovascular disease prevention (de Backer et al. 
2003) render it normal (i.e., the most common or ‘average’ state) to have 
an unfavourable risk profile. In the context of one of the world’s most 
long-living and healthy-living populations (Norway), this finding poses 
fundamental questions: What are the ultimate goals of individual versus 
collective preventive medicine? To what extent is such an interpretation 
of human health basically sound, pragmatically sustainable and morally 
responsible? 
In everyday primary medical care in the Western world, there is little 
doubt that resources have recently, and to an increasing extent, moved 
from currently sick people to people who are currently free of symptoms, 
with the aim of preventing future disease. To illustrate this, I will quote 
a UK general practitioner who recently wrote to the British Medical 
Journal (BMJ) (Spence 2005):
This pursuit of risk avoidance has become the mantra of health care and is now a 
political manifesto pledge. Indeed the new GP contract is a distillation of risk man-
agement, neatly reinforced by rigorous cost-benefit analysis.
Individually oriented preventive medical initiatives that are founded on 
risk calculations are typically characterised by fragmentation (Getz 
2001 i), biological monitoring and technological interventions. They 
may be of proven efficacy in the research setting, but there may still 
7  There are many references to the topics of risk perception and communication. Three examples are Skolbek-
ken J-A. Communicating the risk reduction achieved by cholesterol-reducing drugs (BMJ 1998;316:1956-
8), a BMJ theme issue Communicating risks: illusion or truth (27 Sept 2003), and Halvorsen P, Sønbø 
Kristiansen I. Decisions on drug therapies by numbers needed to treat. Arch Intern Med 2005;165:1140-6.
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be limited – or even no – evidence of their effectiveness in ‘free-living 
populations’ (Hetlevik 1999; Lindeberg 2005). In terms of consequenc-
es for the individuals, the healthcare system, and society-at-large, there 
has been very little debate about the ‘down-stream’ effects of medicine’s 
massive ambitions to modify risk factors among currently healthy, or at 
least asymptomatic, individuals (Grimen and Elvbakken 2003; Hetlevik 
2004).
I will close this general introduction with a quote from Norwegian schol-
ar Bjørn Hofmann. Along lines similar to my argument, Hofmann em-
phasises that in comparison to curative medicine, predictive-preventive 
medical testing “represents a fundamental epistemological and evalua-
tive change in medicine”. He thereby supports my claim that we need 
to scrutinize modern preventive medicine from an ethical viewpoint. In 
the same paper, which is titled On the value-ladenness of technology in 
medicine, Hofmann continues by saying (2001:338): 
Medicine’s independence of the patient’s illness gives health care unrestricted 
power to prescribe treatment. Misuse of such power is not hard to imagine, and 
how to manage this power is obviously an evaluative challenge.
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2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
2.1.	Conceptualising	health
In Western countries, medicine is practiced in the context of a “health-
care system.” In the conclusion to his thesis The technological inven-
tion of disease – on disease technology and values (2002), Hofmann 
notes that this system might more appropriately be termed a “disease 
control, illness and sickness rights system” (Hofmann thesis 2002:57), 
since modern medicine does not rest on any comprehensive theory of 
the nature of human health. 
Health, like faith, love, beauty and happiness, is a metaphysical concept 
eluding all attempts of objectification. It is something we learn to appre-
ciate fully only when it is no longer there. Petr Skrabanek put this no-
tion to its limits as, shortly before his death, he maintained that “healthy 
people do not think about health” (Skrabanek 1994). In her 2005 book 
Health, Mildred Blaxter notices that “Health may be defined differently 
by doctors and their patients, and over time and place...” She discusses 
how health can be conceptualised and ‘operationalised’ in various ways: 
as the absence of illness, the ability to function, balance or homeostasis; 
as a biomedical construct or a social construct (Blaxter 2004). It is also 
relevant to note that what constitutes a ‘good’ definition of health may 
depend on context. A comprehensive and visionary definition of health 
may, for instance, serve certain political and strategic purposes, whilst 
appearing utopian in relation to the health of any particular individual. 
The controversial definition issued by the World Health Organisation in 
1948 can be regarded as an example of this: 
Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely 
the absence of disease or infirmity. 
I will not discuss this WHO definition further here. 
Several philosophers have presented their personal definitions of health 
throughout the years. Among them is the Swede Lennart Nordenfeldt 
who in 2001 defined health in the following manner (quoted in Grimen 
and Elvbakken 2003:55): 
Health is the bodily or mental state of a person which is such that he or she has 
an ability to realize vital goals, given standard or otherwise acceptable circum-
stances. 
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What characterises Nordenfeldt’s definition, alongside with other defi-
nitions of health presented by philosophically trained thinkers, is that it 
emphasises subjective human aspirations, resources and possibilities, 
whilst downplaying scientific biomedical evaluations of diseases, dis-
abilities and diagnoses. 
It is not an aim of this thesis to go deep into theories regarding health. 
All its five sub-studies, however, highlight that in contemporary clini-
cal practice, significant dilemmas are bound to arise if one regards ab-
sence of disease as a basic premise for health and, perhaps, even goes 
so far as to extend the notion of health to include the absence of signifi-
cantly elevated risk for future disease, as defined in biomedical terms. 
The main title of Paper II (“A matter of heart”) was deliberately chosen 
to capture the tension between an immediate “disease-and-risk” versus 
a “health-and-resource”-oriented approach to one particular individual 
in clinical practice. “A matter of heart” refers, on the one hand, to “the 
body of correct biomedical evidence regarding secondary prevention of 
heart disease” and, on the other, to “the doctor’s disheartening feeling 
of having inflicted existential injury on his patient by application of the 
best medical evidence.” 
In order to illuminate the epistemological roots of this tension, I will 
now review some definitions, models and conceptual frameworks shed-
ding light on health. It is evident that these models differ fundamentally 
from mainstream biomedical reasoning. 
2.1.1 The Goals of Medicine Project’s definition of health
In 1996, the prestigious U.S Hastings Centre’s ambitious, international 
and interdisciplinary “Goals of medicine project”, directed by philoso-
pher Daniel Callahan (Callahan 1996), published the following defini-
tion of health – an academic challenge to biomedicine:
Health is the experience of well-being and integrity of mind and body. 
The definition may appear intuitively attractive and innocent. However, 
closer consideration of it shows that it is alien to the theoretical knowl-
edge base of medical doctors who have learnt to consider health in terms 
of the absence of biological dysfunction. The notion of “experiencing 
well-being” is an entirely subjective and individual position about which 
knowledge collected by methods striving for objectivity and generalis-
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ability can say very little. The incompatibility increases by adding the 
term “integrity”, which is an existential dimension and a philosophi-
cal concept belonging to the academic realm of the humanities. In the 
biomedical context, the concept of ‘mind’8 also makes limited sense, 
except that it points in the direction of brain. The difference between 
mind and brain is, however, that mind encompasses the experience of 
meaning, purpose, and ambivalence. It also gives room for existential 
categories, such as shame, despair, conflict, love, jealousy and hatred. 
Brain is defined in terms of matter only, i.e., neural centres, pathways 
and transmitters. 
2.1.2 Antonovsky’s model of salutogenesis
The second conceptualisation of health which I will present was devel-
oped by American-Israeli sociologist Aron Antonovsky in the 1970s and 
1980s (Antonovsky 1987).9 Antonovsky was interested in what keeps 
people healthy (salutogenesis), as opposed to the origins of disease 
(pathogenesis). Antonovsky was not interested in particular illnesses; 
he focused on factors that could describe a general ability to manage 
tension and stress, which he believed to be omnipresent in human ex-
istence. Originally, Antonovsky conceptualised this in terms of general 
resistance resources (GRRs). Subsequently, he developed his theory 
further and introduced the concept Sense of coherence. Antonovsky for-
mulated sense of coherence (SOC) as (Antonovsky 1987):  
…a global orientation that expresses the extent to which one has a pervasive, en-
during though dynamic, feeling of confidence that one’s internal and external envi-
ronments are predictable and that there is a high probability that things will work 
out as well as can be reasonably expected.
The key feature of salutogenesis is thereby a general orientation towards 
problem solving and identification of available resources. Antonovsky 
conceptualised coherence as consisting of three dimensions: 
– Comprehensibility, meaning that the world appears ordered and 
understandable, as opposed to chaotic, arbitrary or inexplicable.
– Manageability, referring to a feeling that problems have solutions, 
and that life’s demands can be tackled. 
8 Definition of mind: “the element or complex of elements in an individual that feels, perceives, thinks, wills, 
and especially reasons” (Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, 2005).
9 To get a brief overview of and introduction to Antononvsky’s original works, one may start by reading 
Lindström B, Eriksson M. Salutogensis. J Epidemiol Community Health 2005;59:440-2.
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– Meaningfulness, the experience that life is challenging, and that 
things are worth investing energy in.
Antonovsky perceived that a strong sense of coherence was likely to 
lead a person to engage in constructive behaviours which promote health 
per se. But he also believed that a sense of coherence would affect the 
body’s endocrine and immunological systems, thereby mobilising fun-
damental bodily resources (Antonovsky 1987): 
My hypothesis then is that the strength of the sense of coherence has direct physi-
ological consequences and, through such pathways, affects health status. 
Antonovsky did not see SOC as basically an inherited personality trait; 
rather, he saw it as a dispositional orientation strongly dependent on 
social circumstances and the socialisation in the individual’s childhood 
and youth. 
Based on his theory of health, Antonovsky developed a questionnaire 
which he called the “Orientation to life”, or Sense of Coherence Scale 
(SOC scale), (Antonovsky 1993). By statistical standards, the scale has 
been found both valid and reliable. It exists in several versions and has 
been translated to more than 30 languages. It has been applied in vari-
ous health research projects, investigating the relation between SOC, on 
the one hand, and psychological health, stress and behavioural aspects, 
physical health, biological measures,10 on the other. A low SOC has re-
peatedly emerged as strongly associated with poor mental health, partic-
ularly measured as anxiety or depression. No consistent relationship has 
however been documented between SOC and physical health (Bengel 
et al. 1999). A Danish–Israeli research team has recently reviewed the 
conflicting results of research on the relation between SOC and physi-
cal health. They concluded that the SOC concept is in fact likely to be a 
valid theory of health, but that its ‘operationalisation’ – the SOC scale 
– is technically biased so as to measure mostly the psychological and 
emotional dimensions of health (Flensborg-Madsen et al. 2005 i and 
ii).
Since it was launched, the SOC theory has become a well-known concep-
10 Since the aetiology of cardiovascular disease is discussed in this thesis, it is worth mentioning that a 
relation was found between dyslipidemia and low sense of coherence in the women’s health study in Lund, 
Sweden. (See Svartvik L et al. Scand J Prim Health Care 2000;18:177-182.)
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tual framework in relation to population health. The clinical relevance 
of focusing on individual people’s health-related resources, not only 
their disease-related risks, is also receiving increasing attention among 
general practitioners. In 1989, Canadian professor of family medicine 
Ian McWhinney wrote (McWhinney 1989): 
As family physicians, interested in health as well as diseases, we should also think 
in terms of factors that increase host resistance and strengthen resistance against 
noxious stimuli. 
More recently, professors of general practice Hanne Hollnagel (Den-
mark) and Kirsti Malterud (Norway) have made important academic 
contributions to this developing field (Hollnagel and Malterud 2000). 
Hanne Hollnagel has also, alongside several other researchers, docu-
mented that an individual’s subjective evaluation of his or her health is a 
strong predictor of survival – measured by ‘hard’ mortality data, for in-
stance, in the field of coronary heart disease (see Møller et al. 1996). We 
cannot know, however, whether confidence in one’s own good health 
leads to good health by itself, or whether a person who later becomes 
sick has an inkling at an early stage making him or her predict an un-
favourable course. The studies about self-assessed global health, how-
ever, indicate that lay individuals do have information about their health 
which cannot (as yet) be elicited by technological surveying of under-
lying medical conditions and risk factors (see, for instance, Idler and 
Benyamini 1999; Hollnagel and Malterud 2000; Bardage et al. 2001; 
Heidrich et al. 2002; Benjamins et al. 2004).
2.1.3 Van Hooft’s framework on subjectivity and health
One final, comprehensive conceptualisation of human health and dis-
ease will be outlined here. It departs from the notion of human subjec-
tivity. This analytical framework is developed by Australian philosopher 
Stan van Hooft11 (van Hooft 1997). He departs from the previously men-
tioned philosopher Heidegger, who perceives that humans are the only 
beings for whom being is an issue. Van Hooft writes: 
The fundamental, primordial, and inchoate impetus that undergirds human life is 
the drive towards being, towards “realising” ourselves and our possibilities. Sub-
jectivity is this impetus. The mode of being that we participate in as human beings 
is that of striving and seeking, struggling and willing (...) fulfilling our potential. 
11 I am grateful to Associate Professor of General Practice in Bergen Edvin Schei, who introduced van 
Hooft’s thoughts to me.
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Van Hooft underlines that our human existential struggle should not be 
seen as a purely mental or emotional phenomenon; it also involves our 
bodies. At this point, he leans to the arguments of French philosopher 
Merleau-Ponty who sees our bodies as the very expression of this quest. 
With this is mind, van Hooft finds it helpful to elaborate a model of hu-
man subjectivity comprising four levels of functioning. The model is to 
be understood in a dynamic, not in a hierarchical, sense: 
1. The biological level, i.e., the level of the organism: This involves a 
socio-biological “will to live”; van Hooft perceives weeds break-
ing through the concrete of a car park as a clear example of this. 
At this level we find the most basic and intrinsic of the subjective 
values, survival. 
2. The relational level. This is the level of cognitive and affective 
reaction to the world around us. At this level, a pre-conscious 
structuring of the world takes place. We recognise things for what 
they are, respond to them, and make esthetical judgements. At this 
level, we can experience the value and joy of being alive. 
3. The pragmatical level. This involves consciousness in the fully 
self-aware form, allowing us to think, consider and plan how we 
can meet our needs and fulfil our desires. At this level we seek ex-
planations for the phenomena we see and the things that happen, 
and we solve problems.
4. The integrative level. This involves our human primordial need to 
find meaning in our lives, expressed in beliefs and commitments 
that are central to our integrity and sense of self. At this level we 
have moral and religious beliefs; we search for pure knowledge 
and invest in a shared culture. When it comes to appreciating hu-
man health and illness, van Hooft sees this fourth level of subjec-
tivity as not only the most distinctive but also the most neglected, 
in the context of the Western healthcare system. 
Whatever we experience as human beings will have significance at all 
levels. Thereby, a person’s ideals, practical goals, comforts and success-
ful bodily functioning are all equally intrinsic health values. 
Van Hooft claims that the concepts of disease and illness can be mapped 
onto his model in a fairly straightforward way. This means that the con-
ceptual framework on subjectivity can be linked up to the biomedical 
paradigm which addresses health from the perspective of biological 
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functioning. Biomedical disease, understood as organic imbalance/dys-
function, enters at level one of van Hooft’s model. Subjective illness 
enters at level two. At this point, van Hooft refers to US philosopher 
Drew Leder who describes how the body ‘disappears’ in health and re-
emerges as a problem in illness. Van Hooft formulates this in the fol-
lowing way: 
Whereas in health our awareness flows through our body, as it were, without hin-
drance, and on to the things and people in the world with which we are practically 
concerned, in illness, the flow of our agency is interrupted and hindered, if not 
stopped altogether, by our bodily condition. 
I personally see another advantage of van Hooft’s model of health as 
subjectivity: it provides analytical space for important medical evidence 
that does not currently fit under the term ‘evidence based medicine’. If 
we want to be truly scientific in the human domain, we must also strive 
to include under this term ‘evidence’ about the particular individual’s 
psychosocial and cultural environment and biography (Engel 1997). 
Van Hooft’s model thereby points in the direction of George Engel’s 
bio-psycho-social medical model (Engel 1980, see chapter 2.2.6). This 
approach is often presented as an ideal, holistic approach. Despite En-
gel’s good intentions, however, the concepts, theories and knowledge 
from biomedicine, psychology and sociology do not fit into one coher-
ent theoretical framework. It can thereby be hard to apply the bio-psy-
cho-social model in clinical reasoning and decision-making. 
2.1.4 Situatedness, embodiment and health
A common theme in the five sub-studies in this thesis is that preventive 
medicine is becoming increasingly fragmented, decontextualised, and 
– as a consequence – dehumanised. In accordance with the teachings 
of scholars, such as George Engel, Ian McWhinney, Drew Leder (1990 
and 1992), Eric Cassell (1993 and 1997), Anna Luise Kirkengen (2001), 
Kirsti Malterud (2002) and sociologist Dorte E. Gannik (2005), I am 
nevertheless convinced that an individual’s social and cultural situat-
edness is highly relevant when it comes to predicting health outcomes. 
This can be demonstrated by way of ‘hard’ biomedical endpoints, such 
as mortality and morbidity, as well as in the distribution of ‘surrogate’ 
end points, such as biological risk factors.12 Reflecting this evidence, the 
12 A comprehensive list of scientific documentation in this field can be found in Anna Luise Kirkengen’s 
book Hvordan krenkede barn blir syke voksne (Kirkengen 2005).
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notion of embodiment is currently entering the vocabulary of epidemi-
ology, as a conceptual tool to facilitate scientific reasoning around the 
fact that human beings are simultaneously social beings and biological 
organisms. In the words of Harvard Professor Nancy Krieger, embodi-
ment “insists on bodies being active and engaged entities.” 
Krieger explains how the notion of embodiment advances three critical 
claims (Krieger 2005):
1. bodies tell stories about – and cannot be studied divorced from 
– the conditions of our existence;13
2. bodies tell stories that often – but not always – match people’s 
stated accounts; and 
3. bodies tell stories that people cannot or will not tell, either because 
they are unable to, forbidden to, or choose not to tell.14
With reference to the field of surgery, New Zealand physician Grant Gil-
lett claims that conventional biomedical science has fundamental limita-
tions as a scientific paradigm. He writes (2004):
The discourse of mechanistic natural sciences serves certain purposes and sees 
people in certain ways. These significations obscure the function of the person as 
a holistic, subjective, moral and interactive being whose being-with and belong-
ing-to relationships, replete with issues of power and resistance, are vital to their 
health. Thus, orthodox medical science is partial and accurate in terms of its own 
agenda but mistaken when it claims exclusivity or priority for the type of knowl-
edge in which it trades.
According to a similar chain of arguments, Jonathan Mann – physician, 
the first director of WHO’s Global Programme on AIDS, and founder of 
Harvard University’s Center for Health and Human Rights – outlined hu-
man dignity as a crucial element of health15 (see Mann 1998; his thoughts 
were later reviewed by Richard Horton in 2004). Mann categorised four 
13 This might be exemplified by one epidemiological study which illuminates the impact of existential situ-
atedness, although not explicitly saying so: In Denmark it has been found that the death of a child was as-
sociated with an overall increased mortality both from natural and unnatural causes in the bereaved mothers 
between the 10th and 18th year of follow-up. The cause of maternal death was usually unrelated to the cause 
of the child’s death, so an inherited biological susceptibility is unlikely to suffice as an explanation (Li et 
al. 2003).
14 This is the topic of Anna Luise Kirkengen’s work Inscribed Bodies. The impact of childhood sexual abuse 
(2001).
15 Quite a lot has been written about human dignity in medical settings that I will not review here. Mann’s 
thoughts, however, appear to be directly relevant to this thesis.
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types of dignity violations: not being seen; being seen, but only as a mem-
ber of a group; invasion of personal space; and humiliation. He believed 
that dignity violations can be understood as reducing human resistance, or 
the capacity to respond adaptively to external stresses. He thought that our 
current vocabulary and categories related to health and disease are simply 
too narrow to recognize the impact of dignity violations on human health. 
Mann’s view was that damage to human dignity may turn out to have seri-
ous adverse effects on physical, social, and mental well-being that – from 
a public health perspective – equals that of the impact of viruses and bac-
teria. Mann’s paper from 1998 closes with the words: “The universe of 
dignity and health now awaits full discovery, and its Copernicus, Galileo 
and Newton” (Mann 1998).
In the following, I will point to three major research projects which, 
from different perspectives and by use of different epidemiological ap-
proaches, document the relation between social and relational situated-
ness, on the one hand, and health status (measured in terms of biomedi-
cal endpoints), on the other. Each of the projects has resulted in a series 
of high-quality scientific papers (see Medline or the respective project 
websites).
i. A negative health impact of social deprivation, social inequalities, 
and holding an inferior position in a social hierarchy has repeatedly 
been documented, after controlling for known confounding factors. The 
impact of social situatedness has repeatedly been documented in the 
Whitehall studies, in particular, the Whitehall II Study (http://www.ucl.
ac.uk/whitehallII/), which was set up to address this topic specifical-
ly.16 Leading Whitehall epidemiologist Sir Michael Marmot has written 
much on the subject of social inequalities and health.17 An excerpt from 
a radio interview in 2002 summarises the findings of the Whitehall stud-
ies as well as Marmot’s reflections on them:18
16 The ‘Whitehall II’ study originated from the first Whitehall study of 18,000 men in the UK Civil Service, 
set up in 1967. ‘Whitehall I’ showed that men in the lowest employment grades were much more likely to die 
prematurely than men in the highest grades. ‘Whitehall II’ started in 1985 and was set up to determine what 
underlies the social gradient in death and disease and to include women. As before, the study population 
consisted of administrative employees. The appendix on cardiovascular disease contains references to some 
of the publications of the Whitehall II Study. 
17 A paper on the links between social processes and human physiology is Marmot MG. Understanding 
social inequalities in health. Persp Biol Med 2003; 46 (3 Suppl): S9-S23.
18 Sir Michael Marmot interviewed by Robert Paterson: Conversations with History; Institute of Interna-
tional Studies, UC Berkeley, 2002. 
http://radio.weblogs.com/0107127/stories/2003/01/26/marmotOnHierarchywhitehall.html
3
The lower you were in the hierarchy, the higher the risk. (…) it applied to all the 
major causes of death – to cardiovascular disease, to gastrointestinal disease, to 
renal disease, to stroke, to accidental and violent deaths, to cancers that were not 
related to smoking as well as cancers that were related to smoking – all the major 
causes of death. (…) Human values, I think, are absolutely crucial here. But I’m 
also interested in empirical demonstration of how they translate into pathology, 
because in the end people go and get sick, and a value sounds like something rather 
abstract – that it’s the mind, where, in fact, what happens in the mind has a crucial 
impact on what happens in the rest of the body. The mind is part of our biologi-
cal makeup as well. So the empirical study is how the sets of values translate into 
people’s perception of reality, and that, in turn, changes physiology and leads to 
risk of disease. So we’re trying to deal in a crude way with a mind/body question 
of how the one translates into the other. (...) the whole idea that lack of control over 
your life, lack of opportunity to participate socially in a meaningful way, could 
affect whole societies, not just people, depending on where they were within the 
gradient within a society, was really rather powerful. It suggested that the way we 
ought to think about health policy should change.
An interesting, emerging concept, which may help us understand and 
explore the link between situatedness and health, is allostasis, meaning 
“maintaining stability through change.” This refers to adaptive physio-
logical processes through which organisms actively adjust to both pre-
dictable and unpredictable challenges or threats, including social conflict. 
Secretion of glucocorticosteroids and activity of other mediators of al-
lostasis, such as the autonomic nervous system, CNS neurotransmitters, 
and inflammatory cytokines, wax and wane with allostatic load. Serious 
pathophysiology has been shown to occur if chronic allostatic overload is 
not relieved (McEwen and Wingfield 2003). Chronic overproduction of 
cortisol can lead to several destructive paths due to the inadequate regula-
tion of glucose and lipids, resulting in obesity, increased blood pressure, 
glucose intolerance, and bone mineral loss. Here we might find a key for 
making sense of studies documenting intriguing associations between 
severe diseases: linking severity of arthritis to the degree of bone loss 
independently of steroid-medication; linking low mineral density to high 
levels of anxiety and depression; linking phobic anxiety and panic attacks 
to coronary heart disease and sudden cardiac death; linking osteoporo-
sis to atherosclerosis; linking depression and inflammation to coronary 
heart disease; linking metabolic syndrome to inflammation and dementia; 
linking sexual abuse experience to hypertension, hyperlipidemia, obesity, 
and abdominal adiposity; and linking lifetime violation experience to low 
socioeconomic status and early onset of menopause (see further the pre-
sentation and references in Kirkengen 2005).
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ii. In accordance with the above-mentioned findings, it has been found 
that racism and other forms of systematic social discrimination appear 
to have both direct (psycho-physiological) and indirect (unfavourable 
life style, poorer access to health care) detrimental effects on health (Mc-
Kenzie 2003). The direct effects of racism – such as increase in blood 
pressure among people experiencing degrading treatment but rarely 
having an opportunity to challenge it – has been specifically addressed 
by the U.S. Coronary Artery Risk Development in Young Adults (CAR-
DIA) Study,19 (see www.cardia.dopm.uab.edu/index.htm). Another US 
study from 2004 estimated that elimination of racial disparities in the 
US was likely to save more lives than any global attempt to perfect the 
technology of care throughout the healthcare system – first and foremost 
by reducing what is perceived to be a preventable excess of mortality 
among African Americans (Woolf et al. 2004).
iii. The third and final project I will mention in relation to situatedness 
and existential life premises is the US Adverse Childhood Experiences 
(ACE) study.20 The ACE study indicates that adverse childhood experi-
ences are major risk factors for the leading causes of disease and death 
as well as for poor subjective quality of life in the United States (Good-
win and Stein 2004). 
In this study, the so-called ACE Score is used to assess the total amount 
of certain kinds of stress during childhood. Seven categories of adverse 
childhood experiences were studied: psychological, physical, or sexual 
abuse; violence against mother; or living with household members who 
were substance abusers, mentally ill or suicidal, or ever imprisoned. The 
number of categories of these adverse childhood experiences was then 
compared to measures of adult risk behaviour, health status, and disease. 
Logistic regression was used to adjust for effects of demographic fac-
tors on the association between the cumulative number of categories of 
childhood exposures (range: 0–7) and risk factors for the leading causes 
of death in adult life (Felitti et al. 1998). 
19 The CARDIA study examines how heart disease develops in adults. It was initiated in 1986 with a group 
of 5115 black and white men and women, aged 18-30. The CARDIA study is funded by the US National 
Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute of the National Institutes of Health.
20 The Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) Study is a collaboration between the Center for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention in Atlanta and Kaiser Permanente’s (KP) Health Appraisal Clinic in San Diego. Over 
17,000 KP members underwent a comprehensive physical examination between 1995-1997 and provided 
detailed information about their childhood experiences of abuse, neglect, and family dysfunction. To date, 
over 30 scientific articles have been published from the study.
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It has demonstrated that as the number of ACE increase, the risk for the 
following health problems increases in a strong and graded fashion: 
It has also been found that as the number of ACE increases, the number 
of co-occurring or “co-morbid” conditions increases (see http://www.
cdc.gov/nccdphp/ace/index.htm). In 2002, Vincent J. Felitti, internist 
and one of the two leading ACE study researchers, summarised the proj-
ect’s findings in these words (Felitti et al. 1998 and 2002): 
The ACE Study reveals a powerful relation between our emotional experiences as 
children and our adult emotional health, physical health, and major causes of mor-
tality in the United States. Moreover, the time factors in the study make it clear that 
time does not heal some of the adverse experiences we found so common in the 
childhoods of a large population of middle-aged, middle-class Americans. (…) What 
do these findings mean for medical practice and for society? Clearly, we have shown 
that adverse childhood experiences are both common and destructive. This combina-
tion makes them one of the most important, if not the most important, determinants 
of the health and well-being of the [US] nation. Unfortunately, these problems are 
both painful to recognize and difficult to cope with. Most physicians would far rather 
deal with traditional organic disease. Certainly, it is easier to do so, but that approach 
also leads to troubling treatment failure and to the frustration of expensive diagnostic 
quandaries where everything is ruled out but nothing is ruled in.
2.1.5 The health benefits of a narrative
Before closing this brief introduction to the nature and origins of health, 
I will mention the concepts of narrative-based medicine and psychoneu-
roimmunology. Narrative-based medicine has recently become a well-es-
tablished term in the medical vocabulary (Greenhalgh and Hurwitz 1998 
and 1999; Greenhalgh 1999; Charon 2004), but its fundamental implica-
tions are seldom discussed in the everyday clinical reality I have experi-
enced.21 Patients’ personal narratives of illness provide a framework for 
• alcoholism and alcohol abuse 
• illicit drug use 
• smoking
• chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease (COPD) 
• ischemic heart disease (IHD) 
• liver disease 
• risk of intimate partner violence 
• multiple sexual partners 
• sexually transmitted diseases 
(STDs)
• unintended pregnancies 
• fetal death 
• health-related quality of life 
• depression
• suicide attempts 
21 The reason for this is probably linked to the lack of clarity of the concept patient-centred medicine, which 
I will come to later:  Since we are as doctors trained to interpret all information (words, symptoms and find-
ings) within a biologically defined frame, we have never learnt to discern and conceptualise how a patient’s 
story of illness can be regarded as embedded in a meaningful context where the breakdown of health, and/or 
the person’s experience of suffering may often become understandable.
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approaching their problems more adequately than the biomedical model 
does in isolation. The stories provide meaning, context and perspective 
on the patient’s predicament. The narrative approach may help a clinician 
who has been taught and trained in it, address existential qualities, such 
as inner hurt, despair, hope, grief and moral pain, which frequently ac-
company, and may even constitute, peoples’ illness. Listening carefully 
– with an open and prepared mind – to the patient’s story, what is being 
said and how, and what is not being said, may thereby uncover diagnos-
tic and therapeutic options that would otherwise be missed (Greenhalgh 
and Hurwitz 1999). I realise that I am now touching upon an important 
as well as controversial topic that has hardly been acknowledged and ex-
plored scientifically in medicine. I am speaking of what might be called 
existential logic and the kind of medical reasoning which German-Nor-
wegian physician and researcher Anna Luise Kirkengen has described in 
her seminal work Inscribed bodies (Kirkengen 2001). I will not go further 
into the issue of narrative-based medicine here; the point I want to make is 
that there appears to be a growing scientific and clinical awareness that a 
doctor attending seriously to the patient’s story is more likely to facilitate 
problem-solving, healing and maturation than a doctor who does not truly 
listen (Frank 1995 and 1998). 
It has been empirically documented in various contexts that the process 
of constructing a coherent story, orally or in writing, entails objective 
health benefits. That this ‘making of meaning’ also manifests itself and 
can be measured on a biochemical level, has been shown by research-
ers in the field of psychoneuroimmunology (Pennebaker 2000; Flesh-
ner and Laudenslager 2004; Glaser 2005). This fact indirectly validates 
Antonovsky’s previously mentioned theory that experiencing a sense 
of coherence in one’s life is linked to health, all the way down to the 
level of cellular biology. There is in my mind no doubt that the process 
of establishing a sense of meaning, where a person could previously 
see only apparently fragmented and meaningless events or experiences, 
involves healing potential. However, this does not make much sense in 
the current biomedical model of man (Bateson and Bateson 1987; Eke-
land 1997 and 1999; Moerman and Jonas 2002). Since UK professor of 
general practice Trisha Greenhalgh presented an overview of current 
knowledge in the field of writing as therapy in 1999, ‘therapeutic writ-
ing’ appears to have become a widely established therapeutic tool. But 
as far as I know, it is rarely used in general medical settings.  
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The main reason that I want to introduce the topics of narrative based 
medicine and psychoneuroimmunology here is that I am concerned that 
medicine tends to ignore the scientific knowledge we already have about 
the impact of emotions and relations on physiology. This is something 
I address in all the papers in this thesis, from various angles: In paper 
I, I discuss the potential impact of maternal distress on the biological 
development of the child-to-be; Papers II, IV and V consider the links 
between emotional well-being, self-image, and cardiovascular disease; 
and Paper III addresses the question of whether an increasing doctors’ 
agenda may eventually divert the dialogue between patient and doctor 
from other topics of fundamental relevance to the patient’s health and 
potential for healing. My concern is that we might be throwing the baby 
out with the bath water here: the rapid introduction of new technologies 
into the consultation invites us to ignore the fundamentally important 
link between human relations and health. If we do not really listen to 
what the patients have to say, not only do we deprive them of the re-
warding and facilitating experience of being seen and respected for who 
they are, but we also turn our backs on the medical fact that human rela-
tions appear to have healing potential, as well as a potential for inflicting 
harm, all the way down to a biological level. 
2.2	The	nature	of	medical	knowledge	and	‘evidence’
Medicine presents itself as a science-based practice, with the moral aim 
to relieve human suffering caused by disease (See Paper III; Cassell 
1997; Heath and Sweeney 2005). Its activities embrace both the treat-
ment of disease when it occurs, and efforts to protect individuals from 
predictable disease. Both these enterprises, however, are informed by a 
conceptualisation of disease, based on a model of knowledge that is nor-
mative for the natural sciences (Gillett 2004). According to the Western 
professional medical tradition, i.e., biomedicine, this knowledge refers 
to an objective and universal description of nature which is thought to 
exist independent of the observer (Malterud 2002).
2.2.1 Mainstream biomedical research
Orthodox medical science has, in spirit at least, aimed to follow the Hip-
pocratic healing ethos and model of science aiming at gaining knowledge 
from the systematic appraisal of careful and cumulative experience in the 
domain of clinical practice (see Appendix 2). However, given what many 
scholars see as intrinsic authoritative powers attached to academic and 
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institutionalised medicine, medical science has become bound in a highly 
positivistic22 theoretical mode. Consequently, knowledge gained accord-
ing to the methods of the natural sciences has a tendency to occupy “the 
epistemic high ground.” (see for instance Malterud 2001; Dean 2004). 
In the biomedical research paradigm, experimental design is considered 
the ‘golden standard’ for obtaining evidence (see for instance Gordon 
1988; Cassell 1997; Hetlevik 2004). Furthermore, amongst experimen-
tal studies, there is also a hierarchy of truths: Observational studies, 
where “free-living subjects” are investigated in their natural settings, are 
generally considered a lower form of research inquiry than experimental 
studies on subjects that have been allocated to experimental and control 
groups. Also, the application of methodologies other than those of the 
natural sciences is regarded as inferior and even more unreliable. Thus, 
philosophical analysis, critical theory, humanistic psychology, sociology 
and historical investigations are regarded as soft or optional approaches, 
whilst ‘real medicine’ lies in anatomy, physiology, biochemistry and sta-
tistical method (Gillet 2004). 
Correspondingly, medical scientists are used to making a distinction be-
tween ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ data. This terminology usually implies a judge-
ment about their relative value. From an epistemological viewpoint, 
however, this involves the comparison of two categories of data that 
are not comparable. Data from the natural sciences are about the world 
of the senses; whilst data from the human sciences are about the world 
of meaning. What doctors are accustomed to calling scientific knowl-
edge is knowledge of abstractions, whilst hermeneutical23 knowledge 
is knowledge of concrete experience as it is lived through. Both types 
of data can be verified, but the means of verification are different (Mc-
Whinney 1989). Many scholars currently believe that quantitative and 
qualitative research methods need to be more systematically integrated 
for medicine to make progress (see for instance Malterud 2001). 
22 Somewhat simplified, positivist science regards a human being as a complex biomechanical system whose 
attributes can be objectively measured in such a way that these measurements define reality. Because it as-
sumes that there exists a uniquely correct or most basic representation of reality, the positivistic view tends 
to exclude alternative conceptualisations. A distinction between knowledge which is derived from empirical 
observations and abstract concepts is one of the two central dogmas of positivistic science. The other is 
reductionism. These two dogmas have come to establish a split between abstract reasoning and empirical 
observation, and the positivist model holds that certain knowledge can be obtained only from observations 
made by experimental research (Gillett 2004).
23 Hermeneutical stems from the Greek hermEneuein, which means to interpret.
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2.2.2 Is medical progress stagnating?
“Knowledge is power”. The saying comes from Francis Bacon (1561-
1626), one of the central thinkers of the Scientific revolution (see Appen-
dix 2). Bacon believed that knowledge contained the power to conquer 
man’s vulnerable and helpless natural condition24 (Zaner 2003:161 and 
199). The period after 1940 was characterised by a remarkable “medi-
cal therapeutic revolution” which can, in a sense, be seen as unleashing 
dormant therapeutical potential contained within the enormous amount 
of biomedical knowledge that was collected in the centuries around 
and after Bacon (see Appendix 2). The rapid and remarkably varied se-
quence of breakthroughs characterising the rise of modern medicine in 
the second half of the 21st century has been adeptly presented by physi-
cian-writer James le Fanu in his 1999 book The Rise and Fall of Modern 
Medicine (le Fanu 1999). As indicated in the book’s title, however, le 
Fanu perceives that medical therapeutical progress has stagnated since 
the 1980s. His list of major breakthroughs ends in 1984, when a young 
Australian physician turned medical dogma on its head25 and proved that 
Helicobater pylori is a chief cause of peptic ulcers.
Historically, every scientific discipline has gone through its golden peri-
ods. Twentieth century physics, to take one example, went through an era 
of major scientific breakthroughs, followed by a relative decline, seen in 
relation to its funding. Several scholars believe that biomedical progress 
is currently halting in a similar (relative) fashion (see for instance Mur-
phy 1997; le Fanu 1999; Gillett 2004; Dean 2004; Charlton and Andras 
2005; Deyo and Patrick 2005) 26. They believe that progress is currently 
inhibited by a “mass cultural belief in medical breakthroughs” among 
the medical profession and note that although contemporary research is 
conducted on an ever more impressive scale, it has a tendency to rep-
resent “more of the same.”27 As an example of this type of argument, I 
24 Norwegian philosopher Hans Skjervheim addresses this positivistic conception of knowledge as an in-
strument to predict and control our surroundings, in his essay Tillit til vitskapen og tillit til mennesket (See 
Skjerveim 2002).
25 When Barry Marshall (b. 1951, Nobel Prize laureate 2005) submitted an abstract about H. pylori to the 
annual meeting of the Australian Gastroenterology Association in 1983, it was rejected (www.medscape.
com/viewarticle/514219_1).
26 To give an example, the total investments in biomedical research in the USA rose from 37.1 billion dollars 
in 1994 to 94.3 billion dollars in 2003. This represents a doubling when adjusted for inflation. Moses H et 
al. Financial anatomy of biomedical research. JAMA 2005;294:1333-42.
27 The ever increasing size of research projects addressing cardiovascular disease risk and prevention is il-
luminated in the historical time-line in Appendix 4.
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will mention a paper titled Life on the exponential curve – time to rattle 
the academic cage?, by UK general practitioner David Kernick (2005). 
He believes that current biomedical research on medical interventions 
operates “on the flat of the curve” and thereby yields marginal returns in 
terms of improved health care delivery. He states that while “clinicians 
have kept their heads down”, in recent years the academic/researcher 
community has been busy “developing unworkable solutions in a volu-
minous literature that few read”, based on (Kernick 2005:2-3):
models and metaphors that sit within a positivist approach. Research is seen as 
enhancing prediction and control over a given phenomenon. The focus is on reli-
ability, validity and generalizability. Systems are viewed as linear (there is a simple 
relationship between inputs and outputs), reductionist (a system can be understood 
by breaking it down into its component parts) and deterministic (a knowledge of 
the component parts will predict the future). Research is an objective, value-free 
and essentially technical process through which researchers reveal or discover 
knowledge that can be made explicit. The truth is out there. All that is needed is 
more studies and bigger research grants. 
The previously mentioned Goals of medicine project group described 
this in 1996 in terms of “the expansive, ambitious, open-ended pursuit 
of progress – the battles against illness that are never quite won – that has 
been the mark of medicine over the past 50 years [and] may now have 
reached the boundaries of perceived affordability in many countries” 
(Callahan 1996:S4). Referring to the military metaphors so prevalent in 
medicine, a US specialist in cancer epidemiology warns that “search and 
destroy” attitudes are not necessarily the optimal strategy for enhance-
ment of public health (Welch 2005). 
Paper V in this thesis illustrates how a large-scale, recent European proj-
ect addressing the complex problem of cardiovascular disease (CVD) 
from the traditional and simplified perspective of conventional risk fac-
tors, can be seen as contributing little that is new to our understanding of 
and ability to tackle this problem. The main implication of the most re-
cent (2003) European guidelines on CVD prevention in clinical practice 
(DeBacker et al 2003), on which papers IV and V in this thesis focus,28 
is that there is “evidence that the majority of the Europeans should take 
their future risk for cardiovascular disease seriously” (Lindberg 2005). 
It has however been known for decades that CVD is the main cause of 
28 The findings of papers IV and V have been verified in two other studies published in October 2005 (Neu-
hauser et al. 2005, Hartz et al. 2005), as will be outlined in the discussion chapter.
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death in Europe. Nevertheless, for some unknown reason, the size of 
the ‘high risk’ group that should receive maximal clinical attention ac-
cording to the guidelines, must have come as a surprise to the guideline 
authors. In a letter submitted to the BMJ in July 2005, they stated that 
the high-risk group would represent “a small proportion” of European 
populations.29 On the other hand, we should not forget that CVD mor-
tality rates have declined steadily in Western Europe during the last 30 
years (see figures in chapter 3.2), and that from an overall perspective, 
some of the so-called CVD ‘high-risk regions’ (including Norway) ex-
hibit populations that are among the world’s longest- and healthiest-liv-
ing, according to WHO statistics.
2.2.3 The biomedical disease model and its limitations
In her seminal text Tenacious assumptions in Western medicine, US 
medical anthropologist Deborah Gordon documents that biomedical 
thinking has developed in close interplay with Western culture and so-
ciety-at-large (Gordon 1988). In accordance with Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn 
1962; see also Appendix 2), Gordon argues that our preconceptions of 
what should be regarded as ‘correct’ ways of obtaining knowledge are 
heavily influenced by socially constructed tenets and beliefs. Those are 
in turn rooted in Western philosophy, in particular the canons of the sci-
entific revolution and the Enlightenment. Appendix 2 contains a series 
of notes on the historical development of modern medical reasoning, 
from the times of antiquity to the foundations of the reductionistic, bio-
medical paradigm as we know it today, established in the beginning of 
the 1900s.
The value-laden foundation of biomedical theory is rarely acknowl-
edged within the medical community. It is widely maintained that medi-
cal facts represent a morally neutral description of reality. In a paper 
called Reflexivity and metapositions (2002), Kirsti Malterud emphasises 
29 In a rapid response to a BMJ editorial about Paper IV of this thesis by Westin & Heath, the authors of 
the 2003 European guidelines wrote: “Finally, if our Norwegian colleagues (Getz et al.) have identified an 
appreciable proportion of their population with less than ideal serum cholesterol and blood pressure levels, 
they should be congratulated for identifying an opportunity to further improve the health of their people. 
This could be achieved through reinforcing existing public health messages with regard to nutrition, weight, 
exercise and smoking for these, the vast majority of who will be healthy. For the small proportion that 
already have established vascular disease or are at very high multifactorial risk, more intensive advice and 
evidence based drug therapies might be required”. (See the Rapid response by Graham IM, de Backer G and 
Pyörälä K following Westin S, Heath I. Thresholds for normal blood pressure and serum cholesterol. BMJ 
2005;330:1461–1462. Access through www.bmj.com).
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that healthcare professionals have to acknowledge their situated posi-
tions as ‘knowers’. She writes:
Potential biases affect the way in which evidence is gathered and used. When cli-
nicians are not committed to appraising the evidence constituting the foundations 
of their enterprise, quality assessment of clinical practice becomes causal and un-
reliable. (…) Evidence-based medicine in the original sense requires that doctors 
reflect upon their own positions as knowers, in the process of situated knowing, 
where certain rhetorical spaces30 rule.
Along the same lines, US professor emeritus of sociology Renée C. 
Fox claims that authors of medical textbooks often emphasise that doc-
tors need cultural competence in order to deliver effective clinical care. 
However, she claims “such authors almost invariably fail to recognize 
that their own [medical] culture also merits enlightened examination, 
for it is far from a neutral background against which other cultures may 
be measured” (Fox 2005). As has been pointed out, for instance by Mal-
terud, every clinician and medical researcher is trained, socialised and 
situated in a professional culture31 rendering him or her far from equally 
attentive to all types of scientific ‘evidence’. In the minds of most medi-
cal professionals, medical knowledge gathered from the perspective of 
the natural sciences, systematically ranks higher in clinical practice than 
other kinds of knowledge in a hierarchy of what is considered relevant 
(Gordon 1988; Malterud 2001 and 2002). Some aspects of the particular 
culture pertaining to the fetal medicine expert community when I inves-
tigated that area is outlined in Paper I of this thesis.
2.2.4 How medical doctors think – reflections by McWhinney and Cassell
Doctors come to individual clinical encounters with a basic ‘biomedical 
knowledge and preconception kit’ guiding their work. Canadian profes-
sor of family medicine Ian McWhinney has adeptly summarised this 
‘biomedical way of thinking’ as follows (McWhinney 1989): 
Patients suffer from diseases which can be categorised in the same way as other 
natural phenomena. A disease can be viewed independently from the person who is 
suffering from it and from his or her social context. Mental and physical diseases 
can be considered separately, with provision for a group of psychosomatic diseases 
30 The concept ‘rhetorical space’ refers to social locations whose tacit rules structure and limit what can be 
said, with a reasonable expectation of being heard, understood and taken seriously. In these spaces, certain 
utterances are not acknowledged, not because they are false, but because of power-induced practices that 
disqualify certain speakers. See Malterud (2002).
31 Psychiatrist and medical anthropologist Arthur Kleinman speaks of “the biomedical culture.” 
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in which mind appears to act on the body. Each disease has a specific causal agent32 
and it is a major objective of research to discover them. Given a certain level of 
host resistance, the occurrence of disease can be explained as a result of exposure 
to a pathogenic agent.33 The physician’s main task is to diagnose the patient’s dis-
ease and to prescribe a specific remedy aimed at resolving the cause or relieving 
the symptoms. (...) The physician is usually a detached observer and the patient a 
passive recipient in this process.
Appendix 2 in this thesis presents some historical, philosophical and 
methodological milestones, which, according to my understanding, lead 
up to this particular way of reasoning about disease and suffering. A 
medical model conceptualising the human body as nature can obviously 
be adequate in many instances, and it has sufficed to solve many tech-
nical challenges in medicine. As a general theory of human health and 
disease, it is however not scientific enough, in my opinion. It does not 
allow the clinician to develop what Malterud calls the ‘fresh clinical 
knowledge’ needed to solve the problems of particular patients as they 
are encountered in daily practice (Malterud 2002; Kirkengen 2002). 
In one of his most influential books, Doctoring – the nature of primary 
care medicine (1997), US physician and clinical emeritus professor of 
public health Eric J. Cassell draws up a picture of the “medical para-
digm” similar to that of McWhinney. Cassell then draws the following 
conclusion (1997:46): 
The belief that medicine involves the application of impersonal acts to an objective 
problem that can be seen separately from the person who has it, is the cardinal and 
emblematic error of twentieth-century medicine.
Cassell’s observations related to primary health care include: 
Many of the functions we want primary care physicians to perform do not logi-
cally follow from or are contradicted by medical science as it is taught to students 
(1997:44). 
Knowledge of the particular patient is, in fact, necessarily the exact opposite of 
scientific knowledge (1997:45). 
32 Note by LG: The causal agent may be for instance a gene, a biochemical or neurophysiological aber-
ration, or a microbe. In 2006 it appears correct to presume that several causal agents may interact, but 
everyday clinical reasoning in relation to causality is nevertheless simple, linear, and in accordance with 
McWhinney’s argument.
33 Note by LG: In the context of the germ theory, virulence is defined as the relative capacity of an infectious 
agent to overcome host defences. Research has focused far more on disease agents than on host defences or 
the interaction among biological, psychological and social influences that are involved in the protection and 
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The only instrument that can come close to knowing a person is another person 
(1997:45).
I would like all papers in this thesis to be read in light of these observa-
tions, which I believe we have to consider seriously. 
2.2.5 Call for new approaches: complexity of science and syndemiology
As previously mentioned, linear reasoning related to conventional bio-
medical risk factors has come to dominate research in preventive medi-
cine. The risk concept as such, and the methods used to investigate risks 
and outcomes, are, however, rarely scrutinized (Taubes 1995). One ba-
sic problem is that these methods rely on risk ratios relating exposure to 
outcome, with no elaboration of intervening pathways. Biological risk 
markers, however, are rarely ultimate causes. Rather, they are outcome 
variables resulting from interactions between other variables. It may 
thus represent a rather crude scientific approach to act upon risk fac-
tors in isolation.34 Furthermore, the factors predicting health in a given 
population are not necessarily the best predictors of health for individu-
als (Rose 1985; Poortinga 2005). There is therefore increasing interest, 
also among epidemiological researchers, to develop more sophisticated 
scientific methods to address the major health problems of our times 
(Taubes 1995; Arnetz 1996; Dean 2004; Gatrell 2005). 
During the last 5-6 years, the terms complexity, non-linearity and dy-
namic systems have appeared ever more frequently in the scientific lit-
erature (Mikulecky 2001). This can be exemplified by a series of papers 
in the British Medical Journal in 2001 (among these: Wilson et al. 2001; 
Plsek and Greenhalgh 2001; Fraser og Greenhalgh 2001), as well as 
papers in several other influential scientific journals, such as Social Sci-
ence and Medicine (Mechanic 1995; Gatrell 2005). Complexity can ap-
parently be understood in various ways. Anthony Gatrell at the Institute 
of Health Research in Lancaster, UK, writes (2005): 
Complexity is about relationships that cannot be reduced to simple linear models 
or their variants (such as logistic regression). 
He goes on to say: 
34 Simple risk algorithms (as described in paper V) can be seen as included in this critique of ‘crude’ scien-
tific approaches.
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If one lesson has emerged from the spectacular failure of Western medicine to 
eradicate certain diseases, it is that diseases cannot be reduced to a single cause 
or explained within a prevailing linear scientific method: complexity is their hall-
mark. 
Another recent scientific concept, in many ways related to complexity 
theory, is syndemiology. Syndemiology refers to the fact that many risk 
factors are “not merely concurrent, not wholly separable, but closely 
linked and interdependent threats to health and well-being” (Singer and 
Clair 2003). The ‘syndemic’ approach first arose as a method to model 
the emergence and uncontrollable spread of global epidemics of infec-
tious disease, such as AIDS and drug-resistant tuberculosis. Syndemiol-
ogy currently appears to gain more general attention among experts of 
public health (Gerberding 2005). As previously outlined, there is an in-
creasing body of evidence that all the major health problems in contem-
porary societies are closely interwoven with potent societal enhancers, 
such as social disparity, child abuse and neglect, discrimination, poverty 
and structural violence (Farmer 2005; Mustillo et al. 2004).35 
2.2.6 Objectivity critique and the patient-centred clinical method 
Drew Leder is perhaps the philosopher of medicine who has most ele-
gantly formulated what Cassell called “the emblematic error” of modern 
medicine. In 1990, he wrote (Leder 1990): 
In seeking to escape all interpretative subjectivity, medicine has threatened to ex-
punge its primary subject – the living, experiencing patient. 
35 An example of syndemiology: The increased morbidity and mortality among people reporting adverse 
childhood experiences, including sexual abuse, is well documented (see the presentation of the ACE study 
in chapter 2.1.4). It is, however, a great methodological challenge to conceptualise, investigate, and suggest 
adequate preventive measures related to the various causal “webs” that may underlie this relation. Several 
examples of ‘syndemic reasoning’ can be found in Anna Luise Kirkengen’s works. Here is one (Kirken-
gen 2005:160): Persons who report having experienced sexual abuse in childhood/adolescence tend to lead 
more unstable and ‘unhealthy’ lives, including smoking, alcohol and drug use, compared with persons with 
no such experience. Statistically, abuse is also linked to an earlier sexual debut, more partners and more 
unprotected sex – which increases the risk for sexually transmitted disease, including Human Papilloma 
Virus (HPV) infection. HPV is a central causal factor in the development of cancer of the cervix. It is also 
known that smoking has biological effects directly increasing the carcinogenic potential of HPV infection. 
Furthermore, it is known that chronic detrimental emotional stress, more often present in people with a 
history of abuse than among others, leads to allostatic overload (overactivity of the hypophysis-pituitary-
adrenal axis). Allostatic overload appears to reduce the human immune system’s cellular defence against 
cancer development. It is also documented that women with a history of abuse are more reluctant to undergo 
gynaecological examinations than other women. They are thus overrepresented among the non-participants 
in cervical cancer screening programmes. This increases the risk that their cancer will be detected at a later 
stage, with a worse prognosis.
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Swedish general practitioner and researcher Carl Edvard Rudebeck has 
expressed similar concerns, i.e., he perceives that the doctor’s aware-
ness of the possible disease is often more immediate than his or her 
awareness of the person sitting opposite him in the consultation room 
(Rudebeck 2000). 
In scientific disciplines other than medicine, including physics, theory 
of science, anthropology, sociology or linguistics, the notions ‘factual 
truth’ and ‘scientific objectivity’ gradually lost their meaning after the 
Second World War (see Meland et al. 2000). In Norway, the most emi-
nent representative of this so-called objectivity critique was philosopher 
Hans Skjervheim (1926-1999). The question of what a human being is, 
and is not, runs through Skjervheim’s works, which contain a general 
and eloquent critique of the claims of objectivity in philosophy, the sci-
ences, and the science-based professions.36 
In France, the birthplace of the scientifically based clinical method as 
we know it in Western biomedicine around 1820 (see Appendix 2), Mi-
chel Foucault later came to present a critical analysis of the striving for 
objectivism in medicine. In 1963, he first published a renowned book, 
titled The Birth of the Clinic. An archaeology of medical perception 
(Foucault 1975). Foucault’s aim is to demonstrate how much of what 
we think of today as ‘pure science’ is, in fact, owed to social and cultural 
trends and attitudes, such as the climate of the French Revolution and 
Paris hospital medicine.
Foucault notes how becoming a patient means becoming vulnerable and 
involves a diminution of social and political status. He links this to a 
concept which he calls “power/knowledge” (see Milchman and Rosen-
berg 2003). He describes how medical doctors have developed a par-
ticular discourse where speech (French: parole) and observation (sur-
veillance) collapse into one act: the gaze (regard). The gaze involves an 
act of objectification. This concept, “le regard médical” – better known 
in English as “the medical gaze” – is situated at the core of Foucault’s 
teachings about medicine. He himself introduced The birth of the clinic 
as a book about “the act of seeing, the gaze.” Among the essential state-
ments in this book, is:
36 Skjervheim’s essay Det instrumentalistiske mistaket (The instrumental mistake), first published in 1972, 
is probably his best-known contribution to the ‘objectivity critique’ in Norway. The essay can be found in 
Skjervheim’s book Mennesket (2002).
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The clinical gaze is a gaze that burns things to their furthest truths (p. 120).
The historical roots of the medical gaze are outlined in Appendix 2.37 
According to Foucault, the all-seeing medical gaze – revealing what is 
considered to be the simple, scientific truth38 – can also come to function 
as an instrument of professional control, what he calls a disciplinary 
technology. He described this as “a policy of coercions that act upon 
the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its be-
haviour.” He noted that “the human body was entering a machinery of 
power that explores it, breaks it downs and rearranges it” (Milchman 
and Rosenberg 2003:63). In his works, Foucault investigated the con-
crete historical developments of techniques related to organization, ad-
ministration, surveillance, examination and documentation in medicine 
(as well as other contexts) and demonstrated an increasing emphasis on 
‘normalization’ and ‘standardization’ of populations as time went by. 
According to Foucault, the medical gaze not only had an impact on 
medical practice; it has also came to construct society’s general view of 
a wide range of phenomena. The labels ‘health’ and ‘illness’ can serve as 
remarkable de-politicizers of an issue. By focusing the source and treat-
ment of problems on the individual, other levels of understanding and 
intervention are effectively closed. Furthermore, by defining something 
as an illness, the issue becomes not whether it is desirable and defend-
able to deal with the problem, but rather how and when. Foucault de-
scribed a ‘medicine of the species’, which involves diagnosis and treat-
ment of disease, making the individual body an object for observation 
and treatment by the medical profession. However, referring to preven-
tion, he also described a ‘medicine of social spaces’, where public health 
is subjected to regulation by the state. 
37 As an example of how Foucault worked, he used historical material containing scientific descriptions of 
phenomena relating to the human body as nature developed in a highly selective way. Lacking a perceptual 
base, early medical observations (Foucault uses an example from 1769) appeared in what he calls “a lan-
guage of fantasy.” But gradually, as a result of the meticulous investigations in pathology and physiology, 
these descriptions attained a distinctly new quality. By the early 1800s (Foucault gives an example from 
1825), the reader’s attention is directed into “a world of constant visibility” (the gaze). Medical science had 
thereby established the tradition for describing medical facts in terms of patho-anatomical descriptions – as 
we still know them today. 
38 Martin Heidegger made a major point of the transition from the Greek to the Roman perception of ‘truth’ 
and noted that this represented a decisive event in the history of Western countries. The Greek word was 
a-letheia (unconcealment, a rather open and creative concept), whilst the Romans introduced the word 
veritas (meaning “the correspondence of matter to knowledge”), which was a strict and calculative, one 
might say technologically oriented, concept. See Milchman and Rosenberg 2003. 
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Mainstream medical research and practice was never profoundly affect-
ed by the objectivity critique put forward by Foucault and other thinkers. 
Scottish psychiatrist Ronald Laing (1927-89) can however be mentioned 
as an exception to this rule. Influenced by the existential philosophers, 
Laing wrote several books, including The Politics of Experience (1967). 
It contains a profound critique of medicine’s affection for the concept 
of normality in relation to the human state and behaviour. Concerns that 
the biomedical paradigm – useful as it may be in many circumstances 
– ultimately represents a de-humanised way of looking at the human 
condition also came to generate concern among ambitious and academi-
cally oriented doctors in the field of primary health care, most notably 
in Great Britain and Canada. During the 1950s, psychoanalyst Michael 
Balint worked with groups of British general practitioners to explore 
the nature of the doctor-patient relationship. Balint was struck by the 
inadequacies of the conventional method for reaching what he called a 
deep understanding of the patient’s illness (Balint 1964). Michael Balint 
is said to have been the first scholar to apply the term patient-centred 
medicine39 (Meland, Schei et al. 2000). Balint also introduced other ana-
lytical concepts, such as attentive listening and the drug doctor – the 
latter referring to the physician as a powerful diagnostic and therapeutic 
‘tool’. This choice of perspective again highlighted the importance of 
self-knowledge in the physician. 
Inspired by objectivity critique and systems theory,40 psychoanalytically 
trained internist George L. Engel presented the previously mentioned 
bio-psycho-social model of illness in the late 1970s (Engel 1977 and 
1980). The model received considerable attention, and Engel’s teach-
ings are still widely honoured in the medical curriculum. Nevertheless, 
as previously outlined, bio-psycho-social approaches, such as the dis-
course on ‘human situatedness’ have not as yet come to influence med-
icine in any fundamental sense. Philosopher Drew Leder has pointed 
39 A similar trend took place in clinical psychology in the 1950s, as Carl Rogers developed a method called 
person-centred therapy. In the essay Om mentorskap og medisin (Getz 2004), I have reflected on my own 
clinical experience in light of Rogers’ person-centred method. Norwegian general practitioner and research-
er John Nessa also writes about the Rogerian tradition in his book Medisin og eksistens (2003). 
40 In the second half of the 21st century, systems theory was launched in response to the limitations of 
19th-century science. It was apparent that the mechanistic worldview and reductive methods of this ap-
proach were unable to deal adequately with organic phenomena like organisation and growth. Reductionistic 
method deals with problems by cutting them down to size, separating them from their surroundings and 
reducing them as far as possible to simple, linear, causal chains. Systems theory seeks to do the opposite, 
i.e., to approach problems by considering all their significant relationships.
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out that bio-psycho-social medical practice is no easy task. He explains 
how “Cartesian dualism has fractured the language of the self” (Leder 
1998:128), and, in fact, we do not have any consistent medical theory to 
direct a “bio-psycho-social” clinical approach. More than a decade after 
he launched his model, Engel described the current state of affairs in 
medical research as follows (1992):
The exclusion of nonmaterial human phenomena mandated by medical science’s 
continuing allegiance to a 17th century scientific world view has constituted a ma-
jor obstacle to medicine’s scientific maturation as a human discipline. But 20th 
century conceptual changes even in physics (not to mention the influence of the 
theory of evolution) now renders that exclusion untenable and in effect legitimizes 
efforts to devise scientific means appropriate for the human domain. 
Around this time, Ian WcWhinney at McMaster University presented 
his patient-centred clinical method (Levenstein et al. 1986; McWhinney 
1989). His Textbook of family medicine rapidly became a classic, having 
a strong impact on general practice ideology, particularly in Canada, the 
UK and the Nordic countries. McWhinney writes that his ideas and clin-
ical approaches are directly influenced by the works of Balint, Engel, 
and also those of Harvard psychiatrist and Professor of anthropology 
Arthur Kleinman.41 McWhinney describes the patient-centred clinical 
method in the following manner: 
Its essence is the physician’s attempts to fulfil a twofold task: understanding the 
patient and understanding the disease. From this understanding flows the manage-
ment of both patient and disease (1989:111).
In practicing the patient-centered clinical method, the physician attaches equal 
importance to following the traditional medical agenda and to understanding the 
meaning the illness has for the patient. This involves understanding the patient’s 
expectations, feelings, and fears. Reaching this understanding should be an objec-
tive in every clinical encounter (1989:118).
Since the concept patient-centred medicine was launched, referrals to 
“patient-centred clinical care” have spread rapidly throughout medicine. 
The term is currently a word of honour in major policy documents, is-
sued by, for instance, WHO.42 There is, however, still no formal con-
41 Among Kleinman’s renowned works are Patients and Healers in the Context of Culture (1981) and The 
Illness Narratives: Suffering, Healing, and the Human Condition (1988).
42 One example is a WHO document titled Preparing a health care workforce for the 21st century. The chal-
lenge of chronic conditions (2005). The first among five core competencies listed as essential for health care 
workers to have, is the ability to “provide patient-centred care”.
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sensus among scholars as to exactly what patient-centered clinical 
practice encompasses (Mead and Bower 2000). Most writers appear to 
agree that, in essence, patient-centred care acknowledges the patient as 
a person with a unique life-history and needs, and that patient-centred 
interactions can be seen as “those in which the patient’s point of view 
is actively sought by the physician” (Zandbelt 2005). The concept of 
patient-centeredness, however, appears to have different connotations 
to different scholars when going into specific detail. Researchers trying 
to operationalise and measure the phenomenon of patient centeredness 
in an ‘objective’ manner, evidently face a scientific challenge. Zandbelt 
(2005) has summed up research on the effects of patient-centeredness on 
clinical practice. Not unexpectedly, the results have been contradictory. 
Some researchers have found that patient-centred communication pro-
motes a positive relationship between doctor and patient and enhances 
patients’ recall of received information, adherence to medication and 
satisfaction and also their ‘objective’ state of health. Other studies have 
found no or even a negative relationship between “patient-centeredness” 
and health outcomes, patients’ satisfaction and doctors’ satisfaction. The 
reason for these apparent contradictions is most likely that patient-cen-
teredness has been operationalised and evaluated differently in differ-
ent studies. There is indeed an old adage which says ”whoever sets the 
frame, sets the game.”
 
The inherent tension between ‘doctor-centred’ and ‘patient-centred’ 
medical care is an implicit or explicit topic in all the five papers in this 
thesis. It is most explicitly addressed in Papers II and III, which describe 
how a humanistically oriented primary care clinician, striving to take the 
patient’s agenda seriously and also wishing to apply medical evidence 
which does not pertain to the narrow paradigm of evidence-based medi-
cine (EBM), can face fundamental ethical dilemmas. This is because the 
tradition of EBM has come to define the current ‘golden standard’ for 
what healthcare personnel, in general, and doctors, in particular, should 
be occupied with, and for what should be regarded as relevant and im-
portant in the clinical encounter (Hetlevik 2004). To put it another way, 
EBM has, as I see it, come to demarcate the scientific arena within which 
the individual patient is invited to exercise his or her autonomy and right 
to make ‘informed choices’. 
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2.2.7 Evidence-based medicine
The first Medline citation of “Evidence based medicine” (EBM) ap-
peared in 1992. In 2004, the number of citations numbered more than 
13 000 (Straus 2004). Several visionary and enthusiastic individuals 
contributed to the foundations of EBM. Among them were Archie Co-
chrane (key word: summarising of evidence), Alvan Feinstein (defining 
principles of quantitative clinical reasoning) and David Sackett who, 
together with a team of close co-workers at McMaster University in 
Canada, contributed tremendously influential innovations in relation to 
teaching of bedside critical appraisal skills (Sackett et al. 1997). 
As far as I can judge the intentions of the researchers and clinicians 
founding EBM, they were driven by a strong sense of professional re-
sponsibility to avoid inflicting harm on patients (Ashcroft 2004). In its 
original formulation, EBM can be said to have begun as a radical and 
anti-authoritarian grass-roots movement aiming to counteract the det-
rimental influence of unsystematic clinical experience, biased expert 
reviews, and uncritical use of pathophysiological rationale43 as a basis 
for clinical interventions. EBM aimed at helping practicing clinicians 
evaluate the best available medical evidence in relation to therapeuti-
cal interventions. EBM should thus ‘empower’ individual clinicians to 
stand up to authorities and develop independent views regarding medi-
cal claims and controversies. 
In the introduction to the textbook How to practice and teach evidence 
based medicine (1997), David Sackett and co-workers explain what 
EBM is: 
Evidence based medicine, whose philosophical origins extend back to mid-19th 
century Paris and earlier,44 is the conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current 
best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients.
One of the most cited accounts of EBM is the following (Sackett, Rosen-
berg et al 1996): 
43 An example of harmful application of pathophysiological rationale: It was presumed that suppression of 
ventricular arrhythmias in patients who have suffered a myocardial infarction would reduce their subsequent 
risk of death due to arrhythmia. The CAST study, however, documented that patients who were treated with 
antiarrythmica had a 2.5-fold increase in mortality, compared with the placebo group (Rogers WJ et al. N 
Engl J Med 1989;321:406-12). At the peak of their use in the late 1980s, it has been estimated that anti-ar-
rhythmic drugs caused 20.000-70.000 premature deaths per year in the US alone (Peter Götzsche, Nordic 
Cochrane Centre, pers. comm., 2003).
44 The roots of EBM can however hardly be called philosophical; their nature is rather methodological. 
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The practice of evidence-based medicine means integrating individual clinical ex-
pertise with the best available external clinical evidence. By individual clinical ex-
pertise, we mean the proficiency and judgement that individual clinicians acquire 
through clinical experience and clinical practice. 
The wish to dismantle the tradition of expert-based, authoritarian med-
icine is apparent in a humoristic paper by David Sackett in the BMJ 
(2000), where he publicly resigned from an academic position which he 
found quite intolerable. During the previous decade, he had paradoxi-
cally risen to the position as “an expert on EBM”! He thereby claimed 
that, in spite of EBM’s democratic intentions, “there are still far more 
experts around than is healthy.” Ironically enough, it appears that EBM, 
which was intended to help clinicians think for themselves, had been 
appropriated by the very expert community that it was designed to chal-
lenge. Describing his experiences of being considered an expert, Sackett 
wrote: 
Whether at a meeting or in print, I was always given the last word on the matter. It 
then dawned on me that experts like me commit two sins that retard the advance of 
science and harm the young. Firstly, adding our prestige to our opinions gives the 
latter far greater persuasive power than they deserve on scientific grounds alone. 
Whether through deference, fear, or respect, others tend not to challenge them, and 
progress towards the truth is impaired in the presence of an expert. The second sin 
of expertness is committed on grant applications and manuscripts that challenge 
the current expert consensus. Reviewers face the unavoidable temptation to accept 
or reject new evidence and ideas, not on the basis of their scientific merit, but on the 
extent to which they agree or disagree with the public positions taken by experts 
on these matters. (...) new ideas and new investigators are thwarted by experts, and 
progress toward the truth is slowed. (...) Two clinical signs confirmed that I was 
once again an expert. The first was the reception of an honorary degree and the 
second bears my name: “Sackettisation,” defined as “the artificial linkage of a pub-
lication to the evidence- based medicine movement in order to improve sales”.”
All the papers in this thesis confirm that even at the height of the EBM 
era (where we currently may find ourselves), Sackett still has a point. 
Authoritative expert opinion is currently issued, but now in the name of 
EBM. The 2003 European guidelines on cardiovascular disease preven-
tion in clinical practice may be seen as an illustrative example, as dis-
cussed in papers IV and V. I have previously written that in relation to 
prenatal screening and diagnosis, practicing clinicians are wise to remain 
reflective instead of adhering uncritically to recommendations from the 
authoritative expert community (Getz 2001 ii). After having prepared 
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papers IV and V in this thesis, I have come to believe that similar scepti-
cism is also warranted in relation to the claims of CVD experts. 
Since it was launched, the concept of EBM has been widely appraised, 
debated and criticised, in both the medical and the philosophical litera-
ture. In his book Ethics and evidence-based medicine. Fallibility and 
responsibility in clinical science (2003), Kenneth W. Goodman notes 
that EBM has:
…reshaped medicine and other health professions, even as they have been sub-
jected to vigorous and vehement criticism. The growth of evidence-based medicine 
has occurred against a backdrop of health care reform (…) cost containment and 
quality improvement, and clinicians have been urged to adopt the rigours of sci-
ence whilst remaining true to their “clinical judgement”. This tension – between 
efforts to make medical practice more scientific and the suspicions of many clini-
cians – has caused one of the greatest practical and ethical challenges in the history 
of the health professions.
According to my knowledge of the literature, the original group of EBM 
proponents has, from the beginning, emphasised the limitations of us-
ing evidence alone (as contained within the paradigm of EBM) to make 
treatment decisions. This group acknowledges that values and prefer-
ence judgements are implicit and important in every clinical manage-
ment decision. Thus, they have defined clinical expertise as (Guyatt et 
al. 2004):
the ability to integrate research evidence and patients’ circumstances and prefer-
ences to help patients arrive at optimal decisions. 
EBM proponents do not, however, seem to problematise the theoretical 
foundations of EBM as such; they perceive that the main challenge of 
the future is to get EBM out to all its potential users:
EBM’s biggest future challenge is one of knowledge translation, ensuring that cli-
nicians base their day to day decision making on the right principles and on current 
best evidence. All too often clinicians are unaware of the available evidence or fail 
to apply it.
From an epistemological point of view, there may however be other 
and more fundamental challenges facing EBM (Ashcroft 2004). These 
challenges relate to the limitations of the scientific paradigm of EBM. A 
heated debate on the strengths and limitations of EBM has taken place 
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in the scientific literature ever since the concept was launched.45 On one 
side, there are scholars believing that the epistemological flaws of EBM 
are so severe as to be regarded as fatal for the paradigm (see Cohen 
2004). On the other are scholars believing that EBM has limitations that 
can and should be resolved through methodological refinement. The po-
larity of this debate is reflected in a paper by Greenhalgh who asks: 
“Evidence based medicine – objective science or intellectual imperial-
ism?” (Greenhalgh 2002). The epistemological limitations of EBM are 
a central theme in all the papers in this thesis. 
What seems to be common among ‘evidence-based’ approaches to deci-
sion making is not only the adherence to epidemiological methods but 
a tendency to emphasise, and even exaggerate, the division between the 
empirical world of ‘facts’ and the social world of meaning and values. 
The wish to separate medical facts from human values, however, does 
not capture the complex relationship between empirical analysis, mor-
al discourse, and truth/reality or right action. There is obviously much 
more to ‘scientific’ decision-making than using the results of epidemio-
logical surveys and randomised trials (Petros 2003).
The ethical debate surrounding EBM can be confusing at times. This is 
partly because arguments belonging to different levels and domains of 
the subject tend to be mixed (Gerber and Lauterbach 2005). To take one 
example, opponents of EBM claim that “EBM endangers therapeutic 
freedom”. At the same time, proponents of EBM claim that the “doctor’s 
autonomy is greatly reinforced by EBM”. Both arguments can in fact 
be seen as important and defendable, depending on the context.46 In this 
thesis, however, I put more emphasis on the epistemological weaknesses 
of the EBM paradigm than on its obvious strengths. 
45 Since 1997 The Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice has featured a yearly theme issue on “the 
evidence-based healthcare debate,” by the journal’s editor-in-chief, Professor of Public Health Sciences 
A. Miles and co-workers. These issues give an overview of the evolution of the EBM critique. The journal 
expressed strong criticism of the EBM nomenclature in 1997-1998, commenting on its “rhetorical world-
play”, “unscientific and antiscientific nature” and “pseudo-authoritative presentation”. Later, as EBM has 
been “put into ‘its place’ as a technique of significant but limited utility within modern medicine” (as the 
authors worded it in 1999), there has been emphasis on further developing the underlying philosophy of 
evidence-based health care and scrutinising various scientific, clinical and ethical challenges that are raised 
by the paradigm of EBM.
46 The same apparent “liberating-confining paradox” has been described in relation to medical technology in 
general. In his paper The paradox of health care (2001), Bjørn Hofmann notes that “Although health care 
technology might be conceived to increase the possibilities of the professionals, it appears to make them a 
slave of their tool. Where it should increase [the health care worker’s] autonomy, it appears to restrict (his) 
action. New advanced technology enforces [health care workers] to act according to its application proce-
dures. Instead of being liberating and facilitating, (…) technology appears to be confining.”
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In 2004, a categorisation of common critical arguments in relation to 
EBM was presented by Aaron M. Cohen and co-workers at the Depart-
ment of Medical Informatics and Clinical Epidemiology in Oregon 
(2004). Their overview will be briefly outlined below. I have added 
some typical quotations and arguments from other publications to illus-
trate each of Cohen’s five themes.
1. Too much emphasis on empirism. Example: “Medical doctors 
claim that their discipline is founded on scientific knowledge. Yet, al-
though the ideas of evidence based medicine are widely accepted, clini-
cal decisions and methods of patient care are based on much more than 
just results of controlled experiments” (Malterud  2001). 
2.  Too narrow a definition of evidence. Example: In 2002, Trisha 
Greenhalgh noted that EBM favours evidence that is gathered through 
randomised controlled trials and epidemiological studies on the course 
of disease, at the cost of other relevant evidence, such as philosophical 
and ethical, physiological, economical, contextual, psychological and 
organisational evidence. 
3. EBM lacks evidence of efficacy, meaning that the assumptions 
of EBM are not in themselves evidence based. Examples: “Strangely, 
the evidence of the central claim, that EBM will improve patient care, 
is conspicuously absent” (Norman 1999). “Its [EBM’s] most basic as-
sumptions are unproved, indeed largely untested. (…) Good science is 
not the sole determinant of the right things to do. (…) Many of us teach 
EBM (integrating best evidence with clinical expertise and patient val-
ues), knowing that it is nearly impossible to practice in everyday clinical 
care” (Reilly 2004). “EBM and the broader forms of evidence-based 
decision-making it has occasioned raise provocative questions about the 
relation of scientific knowledge to social action across a variety of do-
mains. Social science inquiry about EBM has not yet reached the scale 
one might expect, given the breadth and significance of the phenom-
enon” (Mykhalovskiy and Weir 2004). 
4. EBM has limited value and relevance in relation to individual 
patients, as it relies entirely on statistical means that are derived from 
groups. This can be illustrated by a recent qualitative study showing 
that health professionals in British general practice report perceiving 
that EBM has a tendency to create “a myth of certainty around what is 
inherently uncertain” for the individual (Griffiths et al. 2005). A reflec-
tion upon this dilemma can also be found in Bjørn Hofmann’s paper The 
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paradox of health care (2001). Hofmann writes: “The methods of mod-
ern health care are based on abstracting general knowledge from spe-
cific cases and applying this knowledge for particular patients. On the 
one hand, the individual patient only has a statistical significance; on the 
other hand, he means everything. In generating health care knowledge, 
he is only a number, in the application of knowledge, however, he is the 
application’s aim and its legitimacy. A precondition for statistical health 
is to ignore the individual.47 Through such generalisations, health care 
became science, by seeing the general in the particular, it was able to es-
tablish reproducible results” (Hofmann 2001:377). The dilemmas linked 
to application of data representing a mathemathical representation of a 
non-existent ‘average’ human being (epidemiological data) to a particu-
lar and unique human being have also been highlighted by Kirkengen 
(2005) and Hetlevik (2005). 
5. EBM represents a threat to the autonomy of the doctor and/or 
a threat to the doctor-patient relationship: “As medicine is essentially 
‘work in progress’, how do we foster a healthy tension between doctors’ 
autonomy and ‘standard of care’ (…) The art of medicine is slowly erod-
ed by treatment protocols” (Genuis and Genuis 2004). Along with other 
scholars (such as May et al. 2006), I believe there is a strong ideological 
tension between EBM and the narrative-based approach. A qualitative 
study from British general practice sheds light on this matter. It is one 
of several studies that have investigated why general practitioners (GPs) 
show limited adherence to preventive medical guidelines, even in rela-
tion to individuals who can be considered as at high risk for primary or 
secondary disease events (this general phenomenon is addressed in Pa-
pers II-V in this thesis). Its title introduces the project’s main conclusion 
in a thought-provoking manner: ‘I saw the panic rise in her eyes, and 
evidence-based medicine went out of the door. An exploratory qualita-
tive study of the barriers to secondary prevention in the management 
of coronary heart disease’ (Summerskill and Pope 2002). The inves-
tigators sum up the study as follows: “The doctor-patient relationship 
may act as a barrier to the delivery of secondary prevention in primary 
care.” They appear to respect this finding and immediately suggest that 
evidence should perhaps rather be implemented by healthcare workers 
other than the GPs. They suggest delegating the task of “opportunistic 
and GP-led secondary prevention to nurse-led protocol-driven clinics,” 
47 Comment by LG: At this point, it may be relevant to point out that one of the four categories of previously 
mentioned Jonathan Mann’s classifications of human dignity violations involves that of being seen as a 
member of a group only (Mann 1998; elaborated in Horton 2004).
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as “this strategy would avoid forcing GPs to choose between ‘evidence’ 
and what they see as important and valid aspects of patient care, such as 
responding to patient anxiety, or nurturing long-term professional rela-
tionships with their patients.” Personally, I think that when evidence that 
is thought to represent “the best of medical science” is relatively often 
perceived as incompatible with maintaining the doctor-patient relation-
ship in everyday practice, it is also important to scrutinize the ‘ethos’ of 
this evidence.
All papers in this thesis investigate the above-mentioned problematic 
areas of the EBM approach, with reference to everyday clinical practice 
reality.
2.3	Conceptualising	medical	ethics
Medicine is a professional moral enterprise with the ultimate aim of 
helping people. Many elements of our medical, professional, ethical 
code go back to the times of Hippocrates (400 B.C). The strong and 
circumscribed discipline called bioethics48 is, however, a very recent 
phenomenon which has emerged during the last three decades. Quite 
unfortunately, this discipline has however become a separate academic 
field, dominated by scholars with limited or no clinical experience. It 
has thereby come to live a life of its own, as a “whole industry of experts 
on good and evil” in the words of Edvin Schei.49 It tends to favour eye-
catching dilemmas that are usually quite far from the everyday problems 
which practicing clinicians face in areas such as primary health care. 
Nancy Scheper-Hughes, US professor of anthropology, WHO advisor 
and director of Organs Watch, therefore speaks of “armchair bioethicists 
[who] can ignore the real world and its messy social, economic, cultural 
and psychological realities. They only need to conjure up a hypothetical 
world…”. 50 It may also be a concern that within the relatively separate 
academic field of bioethics, narrow subspecialties are currently emerg-
ing. As stated by researcher Stephan L. Chorover at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, ethical subspecialisation is emerging as an un-
48 Merriam-Webster’s dictionary: Ethic: from Latin ethice, from Greek EthikE, from Ethikos 1: the discipline 
dealing with what is good and bad and with moral duty and obligation. 2 a: a set of moral principles or val-
ues b: a theory or system of moral values <the present-day materialistic ethic> c: the principles of conduct 
governing an individual or a group <professional ethics> d: a guiding philosophy.
49 Schei E. Goodness – what is it in medicine. Lecture at Rosendal seminar 2005.
50 Scheper-Hughes N. The ultimate commodity. Lancet 2005;366:1349-50.
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acknowledged ethical dilemma in relation to cutting-edge, hi-tech bio-
medical research, such as neuro-imaging (Chorover 2005).51
The societal environment in which medicine is being practiced is current-
ly undergoing rapid and dramatic changes, in terms of ideology, organisa-
tion and financing (Potter and McKinlay 2005). These changing premises 
for the delivery of care form the point of departure for the 5th edition of 
the Ethics Manual that was recently issued by the American College of 
Physicians (Snyder et al. 2005). One of the explicit aims of the manual 
is to “shed light on how existing [ethical] principles extend to emerging 
concerns.” The Ethics Manual opens with the following statement: 
Medicine, law and social values are not static. Reexamining the tenets of medical 
practice and their application in new circumstances is a necessary exercise. 
Papers I-V in this thesis deal with ethical issues that arise in – or relate 
directly to – primary health care, under the influence of increasing scien-
tific reductionism and implementation of new medical technologies.
2.3.1 Principlistic American bioethics and its shortcomings
Contemporary clinical-medical ethics is heavily influenced by the four 
so-called “Anglo-American principles” that were developed in the USA 
in the 1970s. It is important to realise that this approach emerged in a 
very particular cultural context (Tauber 2001). It should also be seen in 
light of unethical experiments on American human ‘guinea-pigs’, con-
ducted in the 1950s and 60s,52 experiments that were even sponsored by 
official medical bodies (Skrabanek 1990).
The four principles of the US ethical paradigm are: respect for patient 
autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice (Beachamp and 
Childress 1979). The “principlistic approach” is not grounded in any 
51 Neuro-ethics is related to studies of how our mental and behavioural manifestations (i.e., our thoughts, 
feelings and actions) depend on neural conditions, i.e., brain physiology and biochemistry. Chorover writes: 
“To make neuroethics a new speciality with its own cadre of ostensible experts is to narrow the discussion of 
ethical issues and to make the whole subject of social responsibilities of physicians, scientists, and engineers 
less accessible to the public.” In the introduction to her Norwegian book [How abused children become 
unhealthy adults] (2005), Anna Luise Kirkengen also addresses the issue of neuroethics, in a dialogue with 
Norwegian Professor of philosophy Arne Johan Vetlesen.
52 Despite the Nuremberg Code (1948) and the Declaration of Helsinki (1964), there were several scandals 
in the US in the 1950s and 60s, such as the Tuskegee experiment on the natural course of untreated syphilis. 
Another experiment involved the injection of live cancer cells into the blood stream of mentally disabled 
persons, etc. The policy of informed consent was enforced in the US Belmont Report in 1978. Source: Mann 
J et al. (eds.). Health and Human rights. NY: Routledge, 1999 (p. 363).
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comprehensive theory of ethics, but its roots are clearly to be found in 
the complex moral philosophy of the Western world, with its emphasis 
on rationality, independence, objectivity and equality. In daily life, this 
principlistic approach represents a practical, methodological guide to 
ethical discussion and decision-making. Using the four principles and 
weighing them against each other, clinicians (sometimes with, most of-
ten without, explicit guidance from consulting bioethicists) are encour-
aged to find solutions to the ethical dilemmas they face. Recent experi-
ence shows that when principles compete, autonomy comes to rank as 
the super-principle (as will be outlined later in this chapter). 
During the last decade, many scholars have expressed concern over the 
limitations of “the four principles approach”. In particular, a lot has been 
written about the limitations of the principle of autonomy, understood as 
“an individual’s freedom to make his/her personal diagnostic and thera-
peutic choices” (see, for instance, Donchin 2001; Tauber 2001 and 2003; 
Callahan 2003; Frank 2004). Critics, such as the so-called communitar-
ian thinkers53, underline that no human being should be regarded as a 
self-sufficient, independent atom in the world. People always depend on 
each other and on the society they live in. It appears to be quite common 
for doctors to perceive that offering a medical test is something that auto-
matically enhances human autonomy. For instance, this view appears 
to underlie, undebated as such, the foundation of screening programs 
for fetal anomalies (Parens and Asch et al. 2000). This can be illustrat-
ed by a letter by prenatal medicine world authority Kypros Nicolaides, 
titled Having the test gives parents options (1998). The discourse on 
patient autonomy may however come to divert our attention from the 
need to scrutinise the tacit systems of values into which individual “auto-
nomous” choices are embedded. (Marteau and Drake 1995; Press and 
Browner 1995; Dunne and Warren 1998). Many researchers have shown 
how societal and cultural power issues frame and restrict people’s pri-
vate choices (see for instance Donchin 2001; Palmblad 2003, and sev-
eral philosophical essays in the book Meaning and medicine, edited by 
Lindeman Nelson and Lindeman Nelson in 1999). Prenatal diagnosis is 
a prime example of a clinical activity which is heavily, and reciprocally, 
influenced by cultural factors. The obvious limitations of the concept of 
autonomy in such a context are highlighted in Paper I. I have previously 
53 Examples of philosophers that can be described as communitarian are Daniel Callahan and Charles Taylor 
(both mentioned in this thesis).
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mentioned the emergence of evidence-based medicine as a framework 
which has come to define what is to be considered important and cor-
rect in clinical practice. It thereby circumscribes the field within which 
autonomous medical decisions can be made, and in my opinion, this can 
be regarded as a violation of autonomy. This phenomenon has particu-
larly been documented in the area of prenatal testing (Press 2000). The 
tension between a person’s right to be treated as a unique individual and 
the paradigm of EBM, which mainly offers evaluations based on group-
based knowledge, is an explicit topic of papers II and III.
Other scholars have pointed out that references to ‘patient autonomy’, 
‘patient empowerment’ and ‘patient control’ may instrumentally serve to 
avoid confronting one’s own professional responsibility in situations that 
are problematic for medicine (Salmon and Hall 2003). It has also been 
shown that referral to patients’ freedom to choose for themselves and to 
patient demands may be a rhetorical tool to advance narrow professional 
or commercial interests (Harrington 2002). Norwegian scholars Kristin 
Bakke and Bjørn Hofmann (2005) have come to the conclusion that 
such mechanisms are likely to explain some of the increasing use – and 
overuse – of radiological examinations in contemporary medicine. 
Eric Cassell believes that the US principlistic approach has contributed 
to a gradual shift in the nature of the relationship between patient and 
doctor. This development, as he sees it, has been towards a combina-
tion of patient-centeredness and consumerism. Or, as Cassell sums it up 
(Cassell 2000): 
…from treating patients to making treatment decisions. 
Cassell also believes that the principlistic approach has implicitly and 
gradually contributed to conveying a general message that it is not the 
doctor but science and technology, as such, that diagnose, treat and cure 
disease (Cassell 2000). 
To sum up, the critique of the case-oriented US principlistic ethical ap-
proach may represent a call for another guiding moral framework of a 
“higher order” than the four “middle-level” US principles. What seems 
to be needed is an ethical framework inviting more penetrating questions 
than the four US principles have traditionally asked, and also taking the 
issues of human vulnerability and interdependency into account. 
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2.3.2 Current trends in European bioethics
In contrast to the traditional US paradigm of ethics, interest is currently 
increasing in what may be called relational ethics. Relational ethics ac-
knowledge human situatedness and interrelatedness (Häyry 2003; Häyry 
2005; Frank 2004). One proponent of the communitarian tradition is US 
philosopher David Callahan, who – drawing upon models from ecology 
– argues that the first questions asked about any ethical problem should 
focus on its social meaning, implications and context, even in situa-
tions where the problem appears to affect one individual only (Callahan 
2003). 
In the European bioethics and law environment, a new ethical frame-
work is currently under development. Throughout the 1990s, a system-
atic process of philosophical investigation has taken place (Häyry 2003), 
and the result is a suggested set of European ethical principles: patient 
autonomy, dignity, integrity and vulnerability (Rendtorff 2002). In addi-
tion, it is explicitly stated that these principles are to be promoted within 
a framework emphasising solidarity, justice and human responsibility. 
Furthermore, it is also emphasised that the European principles represent 
a deliberate change from “a contractual rights” claim to a “protective 
rights” claim (Rendtorff 2002). As yet, I am not aware that the European 
ethical analytical framework has had much influence on bedside ethi-
cal deliberations in Europe. In fact, I had not really taken notice of the 
on-going search for European ethical principles when I wrote the first 
papers in this thesis. The overall conclusions I draw from the present 
study are, however, quite coherent with what I perceive to be the current 
trends in European bioethics. 
2.3.3 ‘True’ knowledge and social awareness as crucial dimensions of 
medical ethics
Norwegian physician and professor of medical ethics Reidun Førde has 
presented an original and radical view of the nature of medical ethics 
which is thought-provoking and highly relevant to this thesis (Førde 
2003). According to Førde, clinical-medical ethics, which is what most 
of us think of as ‘medical ethics’ in daily life (outlined here above), 
should be considered only as one of three dimensions of medical ethical 
reflection. 
Førde believes that a primary premise for ethically justifiable medical 
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practice is that this practice builds on knowledge that is scientifically 
‘true’. This means that our professional willingness and ability to criti-
cally scrutinise the medical knowledge base on which our actions are 
based is fundamental. All five sub-studies in this thesis address medical-
ethical dilemmas belonging to this sphere. As I interpret Førde, we, as 
professionals, must be ready to acknowledge our fundamental respon-
sibilities to society as ‘producers’ and implementers of medical knowl-
edge. We must also accept that ‘scientific evidence’ is always derived 
from hypotheses that are conceived within an ideology – that is, a set of 
assumptions about the real world, established by previous evidence, by 
faith, or by both (Hart 2005).
Secondly, Førde sees the ability to ask critical questions concerning the 
role of medicine in society as important. She exemplifies this perspec-
tive with the following questions (English translation by LG):
Is it possible that the healthcare system contributes to the creation of more illness 
in society? Do our activities – the preventive as well as the curative, our diagnostic 
methods, as well as our treatments – affect the population’s experience of disease 
and health and ability to cope with diseases and ailments? Medicine’s place in 
society and the ethical implications following from medical choices also become 
clearly evident when discussing how to prioritise limited resources. What criteria 
should underlie the decision that people have a right to certain treatments, and why 
should other areas of activity receive fewer resources? Can medical activity con-
tribute to the maintenance of socio-economical inequalities? 
This approach has much in common with what has been called commu-
nitarian ethics and social ethics. Communitarian ethics focuses on what 
one may call “the common good” and envisage a society where people 
are joined in shared pursuit of values and goals, as opposed to ethics 
focused solely on the individual. David Callahan believes that “serious 
ethical analysis must take the social implications [of individually based 
choices and actions] seriously” (Callahan 2003). Social ethics can in 
short be defined as “a reflection of the goodness or badness of social in-
stitutions created by men.” It “includes reflections of collective values, 
prevailing views of men and society (…) and consequences for groups 
of citizens. (…) Social ethics starts from the presumption that our social 
institutions and the way they are functioning are ultimately submitted to 
human responsibility” (Pijnenburg 2002:247). It can be argued that the 
communitarian approach is particularly relevant to a social-ethical ap-
proach to health care, because it introduces attention to the overall goals 
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and uses of medicine and the humaneness or inhumaneness of its social 
and cultural conditions (Pijnenburg 2002, Callahan 2003). I will revert 
to this topic in the discussion part of this thesis.
The ethical dilemmas addressed in the five papers of this thesis can defi-
nitely be regarded from such a communitarian perspective, consider-
ing medicine’s responsibilities as a social institution (Pijnenburg and 
Gordijn 2005). 
On her third and final level of ethical reasoning, Førde arrives at the 
more familiar discourse on clinical-medical ethics, with its focus on the 
interaction between the individual doctor and patient. Papers I, II and 
III of this thesis touch directly upon clinical interactions. Papers IV and 
V address this matter indirectly, as they discuss how clinical guidelines 
and authoritative clinical recommendations affect the structural premis-
es for clinical interaction. The collection of papers in this thesis thereby 
illustrates that ethical dimensions of Førde’s model are in fact closely 
interconnected: an individual choice cannot be regarded as autonomous 
unless it is informed by true and comprehensive scientific knowledge 
(Papers I, II and III). And implementation of new medical knowledge is 
not ethically defensible unless societal implications of this knowledge 
have been carefully considered (Papers IV and V).
2.3.4 “Primum non nocere” and “think harm always”
Since the times of Hippocrates, the medical duty of not inflicting harm 
on patients has been emphasised. We are all familiar with the dictum Pri-
mum non nocere (above all, do no harm). The origin of this Latin phrase 
is not quite clear, but a recent medical paper attributes it to the teachings 
of English physician Thomas Sydenham (1624-1689),54 (Smith 2005). 
The Austrian-born polymath, historian, theologian and anti-institutional 
writer Ivan Illich55 (1926-2002) is probably the scholar who has drawn most 
54 Primum non nocere – sometimes recorded as primum nil nocere: It was long regarded to stem from Ga-
len’s paraphrasing of a Hippocratic aphorism. Hippocrates taught (in Greek; Epidemics, Bk. I, Sect. XI) “to 
help, or at least to do no harm.” One historian believes that use of the phrase in modern times can be traced 
to Paris hospital medicine (i.e., the cradle of “evidence-based medicine”) in the mid-1800s. A recent paper 
(Smith 2005), however, claims that the axiom first appeared in English, coupled with Latin, around 1860, 
and attributes it to the teachings of Sydenham (1624-1689). (Source: www.wikipedia.org).
55Illich’s intellectual activities in the 1970s and 1980s focused on major institutions of the industrialised 
world. In seven concise, non-academic books he addressed education, technological development, energy, 
transport and economic development, medicine and work (Source: Ivan Illich. Obituary, the Guardian Dec 
9, 2002).
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attention to the phenomenon of medical harm in recent times. He used the 
term iatrogenesis (originating from physicians) to designate harm induced 
by medical activity. The first sentence in Illich’s seminal book Limits to 
medicine. Medical Nemesis. The expropriation of health (1976) reads: 
The medical establishment has become a major threat to health. 
Health, argues Illich, is the capacity to cope with the human reality of 
death, pain, and sickness. Technology can help, but modern medicine 
has gone too far, launching into a Godlike battle to eradicate death, pain, 
and sickness. In doing so, it turns people into consumers or objects, 
destroying their capacity for health. Illich’s key message has several 
similarities to the teachings of Petr Skrabanek, who said: “Medicine is 
not about conquering disease and death, but about the alleviation of suf-
fering, minimising harm, smoothing the painful journey of man to the 
grave. Medicine has no mandate to be meddlesome in the lives of those 
who do not need it” (Skrabanek 1994:22). The ideas of Illich and Skra-
banek have some features in common with the teachings of Foucault and 
Laing (see chapter 2.2.6) (Nye 2003). And after Illich and Skrabanek, 
many other writers have addressed similar topics. The critique is of-
ten linked to the term medicalisation (US language: medicalization).56 
There is quite an extensive literature on this topic, which I will not go 
into here.57 The essence of medicalisation has been outlined in the fol-
lowing way: medical models come to influence standards of pathology 
and norm, therapeutic philosophies and techniques, strategies for so-
cial intervention, and theories of deviance and punishment (Nye 2003). 
An example of a working definition, which I believe captures the most 
common understanding of medicalisation among medical practitioners 
today, resulted from a seminar held by the Danish Medical Associa-
tion in 199758 (translation by LG): “By medicalization is meant that an 
56 As far as I know, the term medicalisation was coined by medical sociologist IK Zola in 1975. 
57 On April 13th 2002, the British Medical Journal published a theme issue titled Too much medicine? which 
focused on various aspects of medicalisation and also the concept ‘disease-mongering’; i.e., attempts by 
the pharmaceutical industry, aided by medical opinion-leaders, to define human problems as diseases for 
which there are medical solutions (drugs). In addition, the following two papers may exemplify discussions 
of medicalisation in concrete clinical contexts: Barker KK. A ship upon a stormy sea: the medicalization of 
pregnancy. Soc Sci Med 1998;47:1067-76. Thomas-MacLean R, Stoppard JM. Physicians’ constructions of 
depression: inside/outside the boundaries of medicalization. Health (London) 2004;8:275-93.
58 See Hvas AC. Sygeliggjøring og medikalisering. Forsøg på begrepsafklaring på baggrund af en litteratur-
studie. Ugeskr Laeger 1999;161:5783-5: “Ved medikalisering forstås, at større og større dele av menneske-
livets reaktioner og livsfaser defineres ud fra en medicinsk forståelsesramme og derved fører til et an-
liggende for sundhedsvesenet.”
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ever-increasing part of human reactions and life phases become defined 
according to a medical frame of understanding, thereby becoming mat-
ters to be dealt with by the healthcare system.” However, various uses 
and interpretations of the term medicalisation exist, and it is not auto-
matically a given that medicalisation is a negative thing. It is therefore 
important to clarify how the concept is to be understood in any given 
context or debate. 
In Limits to medicine, Illich described three ‘levels’ of medically in-
duced harm, which he at the time called iatrogenesis (Illich also adopted 
the term medicalization to cover some of these phenomena, but that was 
later):59 
• Clinical iatrogenesis is the injury done to patients by ineffective, 
toxic, and unsafe treatments. Illich believed that 7% of patients 
suffer injuries while hospitalised. Yet only in the past few years 
and in a few countries have doctors begun to take patient safety 
seriously.60 
• Social iatrogenesis results from the medicalisation of life. More 
and more problems are seen as amenable to medical intervention. 
Pharmaceutical companies develop expensive treatments for non-
diseases. Health care consumes an ever-growing proportion of the 
budget. 
• Worse than all of this for Illich is cultural iatrogenesis, the de-
struction of traditional ways of dealing with and making sense of 
death, pain, and sickness. “A society’s image of death,” argues 
Illich, “reveals the level of independence of its people, their per-
sonal relatedness, self reliance, and aliveness”. Dying has become 
the ultimate form of consumer  resistance. 
On July 3rd 2004, the British Medical Journal published a theme is-
sue dedicated to the challenging task of balancing benefits and harm in 
health care, and to exploring “some of the many ways health care might 
result in harm”. In the introduction to that issue, Richard Smith advises 
medical doctors to consider the potential for inflicting harm in relation 
59 This summary is a quote from a review of Medical Nemesis, which Richard Smith (editor of the BMJ and 
an admirer of Illich’s writings) wrote (Smith 2002). 
60 Illich’s critique of clinical iatrogenesis may have appeared harsh and radical to many healthcare workers 
when it first appeared, but some of his thoughts have become mainstream now. At a leadership seminar at 
the Landspitali University Hospital where I work, I was recently presented with US data indicating that 
around 10% of hospitalised patients are likely to experience some kind of detrimental event, caused by 
medical activity. 
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to every single intervention, “even a throwaway comment or a test ‘just 
to be sure’.” He concludes (Smith 2004):
Hard and uncomfortable as it may be, we need to think about harm all the time. 
Human experience may serve as a point of departure for discussing vari-
ous aspects of medically induced harm. And in this context, the human 
experience of being labelled as at-risk for future disease is central. All 
papers in this thesis deal with this topic, approached from various angles. 
Paper II contains an analysis of a situation where a doctor suspects that s/
he might have inflicted unintentional existential harm by the benevolent 
and plain act of implementing medical evidence in relation to an elderly 
gentleman who came to get a medical certificate for the renewal of his 
driver’s license. Papers IV and V discuss the consequences of labelling 
a large majority of the Norwegian population as having an unfavourable 
biological health profile, or as being at high risk for cardiovascular dis-
ease. I will not go deeply into the issue of the human experience of being 
at-risk, or the psychological costs of screening programmes (along the 
lines of Stewart-Brown and Farmer 2005), but it is important to recog-
nise that a body of literature addresses this subject from various general 
perspectives (see, for instance, Ogden 1995; Kenen 1996; Lupton 1999; 
Reventlow et al. 2001). Some researchers have also addressed this topic 
in concrete clinical contexts, such as cardiovascular disease (Haynes et 
al. 1978; Irvine and Logan 1994; Andersen 1998, see ref. 32 in paper II) 
and evaluations of bone mineral density/osteoporosis among currently 
healthy women (Hvas et al. 2005). A new Danish qualitative study on 
women’s experience of being labelled as having increased risk for os-
teoporosis found that technological information about the inner status 
of the body, until then unacknowledged by the women themselves, left 
most of them more uncertain and their lives more restricted than before, 
as opposed to feeling more in control and ‘empowered’ in face of the 
future. Along with what has been found in many other studies on health 
examinations, the women in this study, however, expressed satisfaction 
with the opportunity to have the bone scan. The authors conclude that 
it is important to consider the ethics of the use of medical technology 
to detect asymptomatic risk conditions, as it can induce a new sense of 
illness (Reventlow et al. 2006).
Paper I in this thesis penetrates the particular topic of pregnant women’s 
experience of carrying a fetus categorised as at increased risk for anom-
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aly or disability. It also highlights the possibility that maternal existen-
tial experience may come to affect fetal development, according to the 
‘fetal programming hypothesis’ which states that fetal environment and 
maternal experience influences the ‘design’ of the future individual61 
(Bateson 2001; O’Connor et al. 2005; Van den Bergh et al. 2005). 
There are also several other angles from which to consider the issue of 
medical harm. A recent analysis suggests that there are likely to be twice 
as many deaths from adverse drug reactions as there are from car ac-
cidents in the UK and the US (Pirmohamed et al. 2004). This estimate, 
along with recent tragedies, such as the detrimental effects of prescrib-
ing certain kinds of antiarrythmica (previously outlined in a footnote 
in chapter 2.2.7 about EBM), uncritical recommendation of hormonal 
replacement therapy (HRT) among postmenopausal women (a penetra-
tive analysis of the history of HRT is presented by Krieger et al. 2005),62 
and too aggressive marketing of so-called Cox-2 inhibitors, which led to 
numerous coronary deaths, reminds us that a precautionary principle in 
relation to medical interventions is as important as ever. One lesson to 
be learned from these events is that, whenever possible, medical inter-
vention trials should be designed to enable assessment of the risks and 
benefits of interventions with equal scientific rigor (Psaty et al. 2005). 
There is increasing concern among radiologists related to the steadily 
increasing number of procedures involving a high load of radiation, 
such as computed tomography and invasive radiological interventions. 
Italian researcher Eugenio Picano points out that the medical sources of 
radiation in industrialised countries are now exceeding the levels of ra-
diation from natural sources (Picano 2004). He calls for a debate on the 
sustainability of the current practice in this field. He quotes Illich, who 
wrote in 1976, at the beginning of “the imaging era”: 
61 This theory originates from the Forsdahl-Barker hypothesis, mentioned in Appendix 4 of this thesis (in the 
context of cardiovascular disease).
62 Routine acceptance of the use of hormone replacement therapy (HRT) was shattered in 2002 when results 
of the largest HRT randomised clinical trial, the women’s health initiative, indicated that long-term use of 
oestrogen plus progestin HRT not only was associated with increased risk of cancer but, contrary to expecta-
tions, did not decrease, and may have increased, the risk of cardiovascular disease. In June 2004 a group of 
historians, epidemiologists, biologists, clinicians, and women’s health advocates met to discuss why, and 
how, for four decades, millions of women were prescribed powerful pharmacological agents already demon-
strated to be carcinogenic? Krieger and co-workers conclude that in order to answer this question, one must 
engage core issues of accountability, complexity, fear of mortality, and the conduct of socially responsible 
science (Krieger et al. 2005).
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Act so that the effect of your action is compatible with the permanence of genuine 
human life. Very concretely applied this could mean: Do not raise radiation levels 
unless you know that this action will not be visited upon your grandchild. 
In the context of medical imaging, however, harm is not only a vague 
possibility that can affect future generations. It can also affect present 
users. Several researchers have warned that extensive use of CT scan-
ning as part of aggressively marketed, preventive medical programmes,63 
can – by itself – cause a significant increase in the incidence of cancer. 
A single full body CT of a 45-year-old adult would – referring to the 
technology in question in 2004 – result in a life-time attributable cancer 
mortality risk of 0,08%. If this same individual is persuaded to undergo 
a yearly CT scan for the next 30 years, his or her accrued life-time at-
tributable cancer risk would be 1,9% (Brenner and Elliston 2004). Risk 
estimates of this kind are needed to assess the utility of medical screen-
ing by radiological imaging, both from an individual and public health 
point of view (Lee et al. 2004; Brenner and Elliston 2004). 
The final perspective in my considerations of iatrogenic harm has been 
brought forward by Ian McWhinney in his textbook (1989), which 
includes a particular section on harm in relation to preventive medi-
cal programmes. Among the potential harms of preventive medicine, 
McWhinney reflects upon the meaning of the term normal. He writes 
(1989:165): 
In the history of medicine, few errors have led to so much harm as the failure to be 
precise about the meaning of the term normal. (…) The history of medicine is full 
of examples of unnecessary suffering imposed on patients because they have been 
erroneously classified as abnormal.
As examples, McWhinney mentions elaborate bed rest regimens that 
were wrongfully assigned to young people who had sinus arrhythmia, 
‘wholesale’ removal of large tonsils, and misclassification of mitral 
valve prolapse as a life-threatening condition. McWhinney also quotes 
63 Particularly in the US, many radiological examinations are currently performed as a result of direct-to-
consumer advertising. CT technology is currently advocated to detect atherosclerotic heart disease (EBCT), 
lung cancer (CT), colon cancer (CTC), as well as for “general screening” (total-body CT). See Ashar BH 
et al. Current evidence for the use of emerging radiologic technologies for disease screening. Am J Manag 
Care 2005;11:385-92. The paper states that population screening by CT is not as yet supported by evidence, 
whilst it carries a potential for harm that has yet to be explored in full, involving false positive findings, 
harmful effects of unnecessary, invasive testing, infliction of worry and concern, false negative findings and 
radiation doses.
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(1989:166) a distinguished doctor named John Ryle who, already in 
1946, observed that failure to study the limits of variability has implied 
that:
Each new instrument has left a trail of faulty diagnoses in its wake.64 
Despite technology getting ever more advanced, the problems with de-
fining normality do not seem to have diminished with time. In 1993, 
Black and Welch wrote a seminal paper about the problem of disease 
overestimation by use of new diagnostic imaging techniques (1993). 
Paper I in this thesis documents that life-threatening ethical dilemmas 
arose in the 1990s as a result of technically induced uncertainties related 
to the definition of normality. 
How can we conceptualise the causes of iatrogenic harm induced by a 
“lack of careful considerations related to the application of the term ab-
normal?” McWhinney suggests the following categories: 
1. The distinction between normality and abnormality is regarded as an 
either/or question. The use of arbitrarily chosen cut-off points in rela-
tion to phenomena which we know are continuously distributed is obvi-
ously a problem. Thereby one person with essentially the same blood 
sugar as another person (just at the other side of an arbitrarily chosen 
cut-off point) may end up as “having diabetes”, whilst the other is clas-
sified as “normal”. A recent editorial in the New England Journal of 
Medicine highlights the problems of responding to patients’ concerns 
about this issue (Arky 2005). Papers IV and V in this thesis also address 
this topic. 
2. “The normal is confused with the average”. McWhinney refers to 
the practice of considering test results that lie outside two standard de-
viations from the mean as abnormal. This is the kind of fallacy that led 
Edmund Murphy, professor of medicine at Johns Hopkins University, to 
define – quite ironically – a normal person as “one who has been insuf-
ficiently investigated”.65
3. Criteria of abnormality for a new test may have been arrived at by 
testing an unrepresentative sample of the population, such as people 
admitted to hospital or a particular clinic. Paper I in this thesis illustrates 
dilemmas related to the application of data from high-risk populations 
64 Ryle refers to the stethoscope, the sphygmomanometer, the gastroscope and various laboratory methods.
65 Murphy EA. The logic of medicine. 1st ed. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. 
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of pregnant women in low-risk settings. Paper V discusses a similar 
phenomenon, i.e., the problem of risk overestimation due to ‘retrospec-
tive risk bias’.
4. Physicians reflect cultural norms of their own society and social class 
and may therefore classify as abnormal or unhealthy human behaviour 
that should rather  be classified as unfashionable or unpopular. Norwe-
gian general practitioner and researcher Janecke Thesen has recently 
conceptualised, in a more general fashion, how medical doctors can 
come to show oppressive attitudes in the clinical encounter (Thesen 
2004 and 2005). 
2.3.5 “Corruptio optimi pessima” and the power(s) of goodness66
This chapter’s final entry on medical ethics focuses on the issue of con-
cealed power. Ivan Illich frequently cited the Latin maxim corruptio op-
timi pessima; the corruption of the best is the worst. He was concerned 
about what he perceived to be corruption of public institutions which, 
in his opinion, ended up by performing the opposite of their original 
purpose. He believed that the roots of this process lie in the institution-
alisation of charity in the 13th-century church. Along the same lines as 
Illich, Skrabanek criticised the WHO’s definition of health for repre-
senting a “medicalisation of man’s search for Utopia”, which gives the 
medical establishment a carte blanche to intervene in the private and 
social spheres of people’s lives. This leads into what Skrabanek calls 
‘coercive altruism’, meaning that it becomes possible to expropriate hu-
man health in the name of goodness: promoting people’s health can only 
be good, therefore one can use all means possible (see also Hofmann’s 
recount of these thoughts in Grimen and Elvbakken (eds.) 2003). Even 
David Sackett has pointed out that the presumed goodness of such proj-
ects makes it very hard to challenge and criticise preventive medical 
programmes (Sackett 2002). 
As previously mentioned, social historian Michel Foucault focused on 
the constellation of “power/knowledge” and maintained that power/
knowledge apparatuses reach “right down into the depths of society”, 
such as medical institutions (Foucault quoted in Milchman and Rosen-
berg 2003:61). Among Foucault’s key messages is that one may be able 
to identify considerable power hidden within scientific discourses that 
are regarded as neutral and ‘true’. As previously mentioned, he saw 
66 This refers to the 2005 Rosendal seminar The power of goodness (see methods chapter).
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modern science as difficult to separate from disciplinating technologies 
and, in this context, introduced the notion of biopower (this is outlined 
in Reventlow et al. 2006). Foucault was particularly observant of what 
he perceived to be overlooked consequences of individual or collective 
practices and programmes. He found that power/knowledge complexes 
tend to be of a diffuse, deep and often hidden character and was particu-
larly concerned with the oppressive effects of practices that are gener-
ally regarded as beneficial or benign (Milchman and Rosenberg 2003, 
Nye 2003). Foucault noted that “power is tolerable only on condition 
that it masks a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its 
ability to hide its own mechanisms” (Foucault 1987:86). 
It is possible to argue that the constellation of societal mandate and aspi-
ration to scientific truthfulness in the domain of medicine can open the 
way for direct coercion and exploitation of human beings. Daniel Calla-
han (2003) believes there is a definite potential for coercion by means of 
medical technology, without our really recognising what is happening. 
He writes that “the power of technology and the profit to be made from 
it, can control and manipulate us even more effectively than authoritari-
anism. Moral dictators can be seen and overthrown, but technological 
repression steals up on us, visible but with an innocent countenance.” 
He then explains how he believes that modernity’s focus on individu-
alism and autonomy can effectively fuel coercive processes: “Liberal 
individualism makes this scenario more easily possible, and is why it 
is not a tolerable guide to the sensible use of medical knowledge and 
technology” (Callahan 2003:506). Callahan’s concerns related to medi-
cal coercion by use of medical technology in relation to autonomous 
subjects, brings to mind a concept that has been outlined by English 
sociologist David Riches; tactical pre-emption. Riches pointed out that 
the most efficient way of dominating and exploiting people is to make 
them believe that what is happening is for their own good (Riches 1986, 
Ehrenreich and English 1979). 
At the 2005 Rosendal seminar,67 Anna Luise Kirkengen reflected upon 
the “power of goodness”. She will have the final word on the ambiguous 
topic of the power of goodness in medicine:
Medical goodness, as a construct, in the wrong hands and guided by wrong knowl-
edge or wrong intention, is the most powerful tool for modern colonisation. (…) 
67 Kirkengen AL. Goodness, risk and responsibility. Lecture at the Rosendal seminar, 2005.
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Scientifically grounded techno-biomedicine may, in the name of goodness, prog-
ress and help, become the worst imperialist ever. Defined as matter and manipu-
lated for the betterment of their owners, so to speak, both human minds and hu-
man bodies are about to become unlimitedly exploitable. In the perspectives of the 
global market, the human body and mind are the new third world. And, remarkably 
enough, this third world of bodies is to be found in the affluent parts of the old first 
and second world, Western countries.
To illustrate the relevance of this concern, I would like to mention that 
the newly established and ambitious open access web journal Public 
Library of Science (PLoS, see www.plos.org) aims to counteract an ever 
more widespread phenomenon which has been designated disease mon-
gering. Disease mongering can be seen as a particular kind of medi-
calisation (Moynihan and Heath 2002). PLoS is co-organiser of the first 
conference on disease mongering to be arranged in the world (in April 
2006, see www.plos.org/disease-mongering), and the organisers write in 
the announcement: 
The pharmaceutical industry’s drive for innovation, essential for sustaining profit-
ability, has extended beyond the invention of novel drugs to sponsoring the cre-
ation of new diseases, disorders and dysfunctions, and the expansion of old ones. 
Using informal alliances with physician and patient groups, and with help from 
public relations experts, drug companies now ‘brand’ conditions, just as they brand 
medicines. 
Whether one believes that medicalisation of human lives is currently be-
ginning to involve elements of exploitation and coercion or not, it is im-
portant to realise that modern techno-bio-medicine does indeed involve 
strong legitimating forces that might function as concealers of hidden 
power, by way of assuming a kind of a ‘cognitive authority’ in a Fou-
cauldian sense (Pippin 1999). On the one hand, medicine has a societal 
mandate – extended to a monopoly, and, on the other, it refers to a sci-
entific framework, which – as Foucault pointed out – aspires to represent 
the truth. Another theoretical concept coming to mind here is symbolic 
capital, as formulated by French professor of sociology Pierre Bourdieu 
(1930-2002). Symbolic capital includes such resources as prestige and 
authority, and – importantly – the legitimate ability to define situations 
(see Dixon-Wood 2006). Correspondingly, Bourdieu speaks of symbolic 
power. This is “the power to impose the legitimate vision of the social 
world and its divisions” (see Dixon-Woods 2006), or – in Bourdieu’s 
own words – “that invisible power which can be exercised only with the 
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complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it 
or even that they themselves exercise it” (Bourdieu 1991:164). Analyses 
of symbolic capital and power in medicine play a central role in what has 
been termed “the sociology of bio-ethics” (Dixon-Woods 2006). Here, 
the links between power and ethical deliberations are being analysed, 
and close attention is being paid to power relations in ordinary, everyday 
practice where mind-boggling ethical dilemmas are not evident. 
I believe that the issues of symbolic and hidden power have a certain 
relevance to all papers in this thesis. 
2.4	The	nature	of	medical	technology
Medical technology is a core concept in this thesis, so it needs to be 
defined and outlined.68 This presentation of medical technology and 
its value-ladenness is strongly influenced by the works of Norwegian 
scholar Bjørn Hofmann, who has written extensively on medical tech-
nology and ethics. 
2.4.1 Conceptualising medical technology
Technology can be defined in various ways. Encyclopædia Britannica 
defines it as “the application of scientific knowledge to the practical 
aims of human life or, as it is sometimes phrased, to the change and 
manipulation of the human environment.” It can also be described as the 
development and application of tools, machines, materials and process-
es that help to solve human problems. As a human activity, technology 
can be seen as predating both science and engineering. It embodies the 
human knowledge of solving challenges in the design of standard tools, 
machines, materials and processes. Thus, standardisation of design is an 
essential feature of technology. In daily life, the term technology typi-
cally characterises inventions and gadgets using recently-discovered 
scientific principles and processes. However, it can be argued that even 
very old inventions, such as the wheel, are examples of technology. 
In its original Greek form, the word technE covered the activities and 
skills of a craftsman, and also the arts of the mind and the fine arts. In 
this context, technology was seen as a way of bringing forth, of reveal-
68 The word technology originally stems from the Greek technologia, meaning systematic treatment of an 
art, from technE art, skill + -o- + -logia –logy: a manner of accomplishing a task, especially using technical 
processes, methods, or knowledge.
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ing, the truth. This could be done by manufacturing and manipulating 
some object by use of instrumental means. But it could also imply the 
artist’s act of bringing forth “the true in the beautiful” by a particular 
blend of technical skills and mindful contemplation. Bjørn Hofmann has 
argued that in relation to medicine, the term techne actually integrates 
the scientific and technical as well as the normative aspects of the activ-
ity (Hofmann 2001 iii). In his famous 1953 essay The question concern-
ing technology, Martin Heidegger departs from this ancient Greek way 
of conceptualising technE as a form of poiesis (bringing forth) (Hei-
degger 1977). 
In his thesis The technological invention of disease – On disease, tech-
nology and values (Hofmann 2002:11), Hofmann defines contemporary 
technology in general, and relates it to medicine in particular, in the fol-
lowing way: 
By technology I understand the complex of devices, methods and organisations 
applied in human purposive activity. Both in terms of devices, methods and organi-
sation, technology today is integrated in modern medicine. A defibrillator (heart 
starter) is not just a box with wires, electrodes and electronic components (device). 
It is a defibrillator on behalf of the methods of medical resuscitation applied in the 
organisation of health care. 
When talking about medical technology, it is not unusual to encompass 
such dissimilar ‘things’ as drugs, surgical procedures, imaging devices, 
screening and diagnostic tests, electronic gadgets, lifestyle change pro-
tocols and clinical guidelines under the term “medical device”. In addi-
tion to these instrumental devices come, as Hofmann describes, organ-
isational structures, strategies and other approaches that are designed 
to achieve defined purposes (Mechanic 2002, Deyo and Patrick 2005). 
According to US sociologist David Mechanic, the recent transforma-
tion of American medicine has resulted as much from changes in what 
he designates as social and organisational technologies, as they have 
resulted from the use of conventional medical technologies in the form 
of diagnostic and treatment tools (Mechanic 2002).
In the following chapter, I will outline the clinical contexts that are being 
addressed in Papers I-V. They are antenatal screening for fetal anomaly, 
cardiovascular disease (CVD) prevention, and the consultation between 
doctor and patient in primary health care. In each of these contexts, one 
particular type of technology is being addressed: ultrasound imaging, a 
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CVD risk assessment tool with accompanying guidelines, and a particu-
lar body of evidence-based medicine. In chapters 3.1-3.3, these tech-
nologies will be defined according to the terms outlined by Hofmann: 
device, method and organisation. 
2.4.2 Heidegger on technology: Questioning builds a way
The relation between human beings and technology is a vast and compli-
cated philosophical topic. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine 
the literature dealing with “the philosophy of technology.” Among the 
prominent philosophers who have contemplated this topic are the pre-
viously mentioned philosophers Martin Heidegger (1889-1976)69 and 
his students Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) and Hans Jonas (1903-
1993). Heidegger is generally considered one of the most influential70 
and controversial European philosophers of the 21st century. In his es-
say The Question Concerning Technology Heidegger stated that: 
The essence of technology is by no means anything technological. 
What he meant is that the essence of technology is existential, that is, 
how human beings, in their social practices, are primarily oriented in the 
world as knowing subjects (Milchman and Rosenberg 2003). He thereby 
warned against an ‘instrumental’ understanding of technology as simply 
a set of tools “to get things done”. According to Heidegger, such an ‘an-
thropological’ conception prevents us from appraising the true nature 
of our relationship with modern technology. It also leads us to think 
– wrongfully – that by simply improving and extending our technologi-
cal tools, thereby enhancing our capability to “get things done”, we will 
master technology itself and solve any problems that technology, as a 
system, may engender. 
Papers I and V in this thesis illustrate that systematic attempts to refine 
technological devices and methods of application, such as better visu-
alisation of the fetus or development of a more valid cardiovascular 
disease risk scoring system, do not necessarily eliminate the existence 
69 Reading Heidegger presents a major challenge, even to philosophers. I am not a philosopher, and this short 
passage is my first attempt to approach his teachings.
70 Heidegger’s thinking has contributed to such diverse fields as phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty), exis-
tentialism (e.g., Sartre), hermeneutics (Gadamer, Ricoeur), political theory (Arendt, Marcuse), psychology 
(Boss, Binswanger, Rolo May), theology (Bultmann, Rahner, Tillich), and postmodernism (Derrida). See 
The Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. (www.iep.utm.edu/h/heidegge.htm).
82
of technology-related dilemmas. However, such refinements are likely 
to change the nature of the dilemmas.71 
Heidegger attempted to capture the essence of technology with referral 
to the German word Gestell (English “enframing”). When technology 
is allowed to enframe our human drive for precise and scientific knowl-
edge of the world, it also frames the nature of knowledge as such; i.e., 
how things can be known, and what there is reason to know. Thereby, 
everything considered real in the world becomes “material” which can 
be submitted to technological investigation and manipulation. From this 
perspective, the world is seen as Bestand, “a standing-reserve”. Hei-
degger wrote – in his particular language style: “Modern science’s way 
of representing pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of 
forces.” Man thereby ‘summons’ nature to fit into his plans. His view is 
that “technological enframing of the earth” is what constitutes the es-
sence of modern technology.72 In Heidegger’s words: “The essence of 
modern technology starts man upon the way of that revealing through 
which the real everywhere, more or less distinctly, becomes standing-
reserve.” This involves “the destining into objectifying representation.” 
Modernity is characterised by a relentless quest for certainty and for 
mastery, dating back to the days of the scientific revolution and Des-
cartes (See Appendix 2). In such a framework, nothing is “good” in and 
of itself; it is good only if it is “good for” something. This moves us in 
the direction of a nihilism where all our options become increasingly 
technological and our values instrumental. And to a certain extent, Hei-
degger argued, modern technology is about to transform humanity itself 
into a standing-reserve.73
Heidegger did not focus on the question of whether technology is good 
71 To give an example of what this means, a British research team recently concluded that pregnant women 
in the UK have a history of being, and can still be, considered as “moral pioneers” in the face of steadily 
advancing prenatal screening technologies (Williams et al. 2005)
72 Heidegger thereby sees reductionistic scientific theory as an aggressive, manipulative, and productive 
practice of control. Thus, he collapses the distinction between theory and practice (Milchman and Rosen-
berg 2003). Heidegger describes modern physics, a discipline originating in the 17th century, as the herald 
(messenger) of modern technological enframing. He, however, emphasises that the human tendency for 
rational ordering and controlling of reality, so strongly dominating the modern age, predated the develop-
ment of the physical sciences. Physics should be regarded as a tool of technological control, not as the origin 
of modern technology as such. In other words, Heidegger believed that man’s tendency for technological 
enframing of the world is part of our existential nature, present “prior” to modern physics. 
73 I suspect that Heidegger might have advised us to re-consider the use of the term “human resources” in 
relation to the staff in organisations, such as the hospital where I currently work.
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or bad as such. And he was apparently not so much concerned with the 
world which technology may reveal as he was with the world it may 
erase. If technology’s enframing of nature is unrestrictedly extended 
to humanity, we will suffer an existential “hollowing out,” and that is a 
self-destructive course. Heidegger, however, saw both dangers and op-
portunities in relation to modern technology. “The essence of technol-
ogy, as a destining of revealing, is the danger (...) But where danger is, 
grows the saving power also.” It was Heidegger’s advice that we accept 
the intellectual “gift of distress” (Deluca 2005) and reflect continuously 
and critically upon enframing as the essence of technology. If we do 
this, we are likely to acknowledge our responsibility towards humanity 
and the world we live in. Gracefully, he stated that 
For the saving power lets man see and enter into the highest dignity of his essence. 
This dignity lies in keeping watch over the unconcealment (...) of all coming to 
presence on this earth.
What people speak of as the ‘problem’ of technology therefore does not 
call for our abandoning it. According to Heidegger, the solution lies in 
constant and critical scrutiny of technology. 
Everything then depends on this; that we ponder this arising [of the saving power] 
and that, recollecting, we watch over it. How can this happen? Above all through 
our catching sight of what comes to presence in technology, instead of merely star-
ing at the technological.
In Heidegger’s own words, “Questioning builds a way.” 
2.4.3 Technology and values
The concept “value” is closely linked to technology. According to Mer-
riam-Webster’s dictionary (accessed 2005), value refers to “something 
(as a principle or quality) intrinsically valuable or desirable.” The con-
cept is difficult to define beyond that; it appears to have a variety of con-
notations, even within the field of ethics (Hofmann’s thesis 2002:11). In 
this work, I will lean toward the definition Hofmann uses in his thesis, 
where he states: (2002:11) “Value refers to issues of the good life”. 
In the context of medicine, it can be argued that technology has be-
come “the measure of all things” (Hofmann 2001:339), i.e., what is to 
be treated (or not) and how, and hence what is diseased and what is not. 
According to Hofmann, technology is essential to our understanding of 
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crucial challenges and dilemmas facing modern medicine, such as the 
discourses on medicalisation, somatisation, paternalism and autonomy. 
It is thereby reasonable to say that whilst technology contributes to mak-
ing medicine a scientific discipline, it also emphasises its moral nature. 
US Professor of Philosophy H. Tristam Engelhardt Jr. describes mod-
ern medicine as “the most revolutionary of human technologies. (...) it 
restructures man and man’s life. Medicine is not merely a science, not 
merely a technology, but it is the art of remaking man, not in the image 
of nature, but in his own image; medicine operates with an implicit idea 
of what man should be” (Engelhardt quoted in Zaner 2003:162). Medi-
cine is thereby not merely science in practice, as most medical doctors 
may be used to thinking of it. Referring to the previous discourse on 
concealed powers, medicine can, from a certain angle, also be regarded 
as normativity practiced in the name of value-neutral science (this is a 
key element in Foucault’s teachings; see also Canguilhem 1966; Jonas 
1985).
2.4.4 Ways in which technology is value-laden
Heidegger warned against regarding technology as value-neutral. “We 
are delivered over to it [technology] in the worst possible way when we 
regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today 
we particularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essences 
of technology” (Heidegger 1977). Along the same lines, Bjørn Hofmann 
believes that technology should be seen as both posing and promoting 
issues of value. Two current medical topics may illustrate this double 
impact: 
Technology promotes values. Technology is often purposefully de-
veloped on the basis of its desirable function. For instance, research-
ers have been trying to develop a device allowing insulin to be inhaled 
rather than injected.74 This is motivated by the wish to make life more 
comfortable for people with diabetes mellitus.
Technology poses issues of value. Through a particular “action poten-
tial” of a general technology, it can come to pose new and particular 
value issues. One example is fetal sex selection. In the context of West-
ern medicine, ultrasound technology has been developed for the purpose 
74 Rosenstock J et al. Inhaled insulin improves glycemic control when substituted for or added to oral com-
bination therapy in type 2 diabetes. Ann Intern Med 2005;143:549-58.
85
of detecting structural fetal anomalies early in pregnancy. But once this 
has become possible, determination of the fetus’s sex has also become 
possible. A new question of value thereby arises: “Is it morally defend-
able to use diagnostic ultrasound for the single purpose of identifying 
fetal sex?” (Jha et al. 2006).75
Technology is also value-laden in other respects. It strongly influences 
the content and formation of medical knowledge. What is seen as rel-
evant and true in medicine is largely constituted by technology. Tech-
nology provides the basic entities and events that are applied in defin-
ing diseases, both in diagnostics and treatment, in clinical practice and 
research. It strongly influences the explanatory models of disease and 
medical taxonomy (diagnostic classification systems). The practical ca-
pability of technology may increase the sensitivity and lower the treat-
ment threshold, resulting in increased occurrence of disease. Technology 
constitutes the signs, markers and end-points to be studied and manipu-
lated (such as blood pressure, bone density, cerebral blood perfusion 
or clinical depression scales) in medical research. Technology thereby 
comes to direct how we as helpers act towards disease, and what we see 
as relevant therapeutical options. 
Technology aims to eliminate the singularity of the patient and the sub-
jectivity of the physician. It abstracts any given problem from the in-
dividual person in question (McWhinney 1989). Through technology, 
individual illness is translated into presumably objective data. This gen-
eralising attribute, which Hofmann refers to as “an evaluative ignorance 
of the individual in technological medicine” (Hofmann 2001:342), is 
however something which emphasises the value-ladenness of medical 
technology. This stands in contrast to the common claim that evaluating 
an individual by means of generalisations and abstractions is a value-
neutral act. 
75 India’s girl to boy ratio (aged 0-6 years) has declined from 945 to 1000 in 1991, to 927 to 1000 in 2001. 
In the most extreme geographical region, the reported ratio is 754 girls to 1000 boys. Explanations for 
these numbers include the traditional Indian penchant for a male son. The director of a leading non-gov-
ernmental health organisation explains that pursuit of this culturally based value is made possible through 
the widespread availability and affordability of ultrasound machines. Despite legislation, sex determination 
tests have spread rapidly, even to remote areas. BMJ 2003;327:1007, doi:10.1136/bmj.327.7422.1007. A 
Lancet paper from 2006 addresses this issue in an empirical manner. It concludes that based on conservative 
assumptions, 10 million female fetuses are likely to have been selectively killed in India during the last 2 
decades (Jha et al. 2006).
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2.4.5 Who is in control – the doctor or the tool?
In his paper Is there a technological imperative in health care?, Hof-
mann investigates the argument that “technology has grown from being 
a tool to becoming a companion, and in some cases, the master of physi-
cians” (Hofmann 2002:675). The relation between technology, on the 
one hand, and professional responsibility, on the other, thereby becomes 
a crucial issue to consider. Hofmann has investigated this question in a 
paper titled Technological medicine and the autonomy of man (2002), 
where he investigates to what extent a technological imperative in health 
care exists that can be seen as reducing our professional responsibility 
towards technology.
In the philosophical literature, one may find several different positions, 
referring to the way scholars perceive technology’s value-ladenness and 
the degree to which we, as humans, can be regarded as in control of 
technology. The most clearly defined positions are:
i. Technology is value-laden – but we control it, by taking moral respon-
sibility for the technology that we design, construct, produce, commer-
cialize, promote, implement and use. Hofmann holds this position, and 
his paper on technology and autonomy of man ends with the statement 
(Hofmann 2001:166): 
Hence, technology is value-laden, but it is not imperative, and does not reduce our 
autonomy. This is particularly prominent in medicine, where issues of value are 
conspicuous.
In Hofmann’s view, technology may however – for a wide range of 
reasons – appear on the surface to have an imperative character. He 
however argues that these apparent technological imperatives do in fact 
emphasise and increase our responsibility in relation to its powerful po-
tentials. The conclusion of Is there a technological imperative in health 
care? (Hofmann 2002:687) is:
It can be argued that there is no technological imperative in the sense that it re-
duces man’s responsibility with regard to technology in health care. Human be-
ings invent, construct, produce, commercialize, implement and apply technology, 
and as such are responsible for all these aspects of technology. (…) However, the 
individual healthcare professional and a specific healthcare institution can experi-
ence an imperative toward applying technology. Although such situations appear to 
reduce their responsibility, the responsibility is shifted, not diminished. 
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Many thinkers have however – in the spirit of Michel Foucault – empha-
sised that to the extent that humans control technology, the power to do 
so is not democratically distributed. It tends to be located with interest 
groups controlling both the general production of medical knowledge and 
the application of technology in the clinical setting. A key to understand-
ing the development and spread of medical technology therefore lies in 
the study of societal power issues (see, for instance, Gillett 2004). 
ii. Technology controls us (technological determinism). Many scholars 
have written about a “technological imperative” and demonstrated how 
technological values external to human values tend to enforce our ac-
tions in clinical practice (See, for instance, Tymstra 1989). Hofmann is 
concerned that referral to the imperative character of technology can 
be used as an excuse to disclaim responsibility. He refers to common 
phrases, such as “Progress can’t be stopped,” or “We have to use this 
opportunity, – or else someone else will.”
In 1993, Eric J. Cassell published a seminal paper on the issue of tech-
nology and human control. It is titled The sorcerer’s broom. Medicine’s 
rampant technology (1993). Here, Cassell describes medical technology 
as having certain general self-perpetuating traits: 
– Technologies originally come into being to serve the purposes of 
their users (i.e., medical goals direct technology), but ultimately 
their users redefine their own goals in terms of technology. There-
by, technological values come to foster medical values, which are 
values “intolerant of ambiguity”. The human “quest for certain-
ty”76 drives the user to try to improve his or her technology. Tech-
nology thereby gradually comes to redirect the fundamental goals 
of health care. In short, we gradually adapt medicine’s goals to fit 
with technology’s means.
– Technologies are reductive and oversimplifying. Cassell sees 
technology’s hold on medicine as the result of two prior reductive 
steps in the history of medicine: The first such step involved the 
reduction of the problem of human illness, with all its intricate 
physical, social, emotional and cultural aspects, to the biological 
problem of disease. The thus emerging precise definitions of dis-
76 Note by LG: Physician Grant Gillett has also described this phenomenon, in a paper called Clinical medi-
cine and the quest for certainty (2004).
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ease, in terms of anatomical, biochemical or otherwise measurable 
characteristics, are prerequisites for application of the scientific 
method of the natural sciences in medicine. The second reductive 
step follows from the scientific investigation of disease by use of 
technological investigation. Here, the findings from science come 
to represent the accepted picture of the disease. This closes the 
circle: scientific knowledge that was gained by technology further 
promotes the application of technology. 
Cassell explains the rampant nature of medical technology with refer-
ence to human nature. “Technology is not the problem: it is the relation-
ship to it of those who employ it that is problematic” (1993:32). This is 
captured by the metaphor The Sorcerers broom where the broom comes 
to live a life of its own in the hands of an apprentice who has not yet 
learned to master it.77 Cassell perceives that what appears to us like a 
technological imperative is a result of human deficiencies: We have a 
tendency to wonderment, an attraction for the immediate and unambig-
uous, a tendency to avoid uncertainty, and an inherent desire for power. 
Cassell suggests that the solution to the problem of self-perpetuating 
technology is that we must learn to control ourselves, which means to 
learn to “tolerate uncertainty, accept ambiguity, deal with the complex, 
and turn away from mere wonder.” In this way, Cassell strives to com-
bine the notion of a technological imperative with the recognition that as 
humans, we are still responsible for how we use technology.
In 1999, James le Fanu stated that “the general, and probably correct, 
perception of medical technology is that it is out of control” (le Fanu 
1999:252). In accordance with Cassell, he argues: “The culprit is not 
technology itself, but the intellectual and emotional immaturity of the 
medical profession which seemed unable to exert the necessary self-
control over its new-found powers” (1999:261). A recent paper on the 
use of new medical technology in the USA illustrates that modern hi-
tech medicine has indeed come to represent a profound, professional, 
everyday challenge to doctors, – here exemplified by the particular field 
of radiology: 
77 The Sorcerer’s Apprentice is a poem by Goethe from 1779. In the sorcerer’s absence the apprentice takes 
the sorcerer’s magical broom, believing that he is in control of the device: “By my wishes now I’ve bound 
you.” But then he realises that the spirits he has conjured come to live their own life, and they ignore him. 
The entire house is about to go under – and the apprentice has forgotten the word with which the master turns 
off the broom’s magical powers.
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The cutting-edge technology of modern radiological imaging may capture the at-
tention of patient and physicians alike, but it is incumbent on the physician to see 
beyond the enthusiasm and perform a rational analysis of the screening test in 
context. The Charter on Medical Professionalism espouses the view that physicians 
have a duty to ‘create new knowledge and ensure its appropriate use’ (Ashar et al. 
2005).
2.4.6 Introduction of new medical technology – a history lesson by Ann 
Oakley
After studying the development and implementation of ultrasound in 
obstetrical care, UK professor of sociology Ann Oakley reflected upon 
lessons to be learned, to help us predict how things are likely to develop 
in other and future medical settings (Oakley 1986). Initially, she notes 
that “commercial interests are essential to consider when trying to un-
derstand the spread of a new technique, although it is extremely difficult 
to acquire reliable information on these interests” (Oakley 1986:6). She 
subsequently proceeds to outline what we can learn from the history of 
obstetric ultrasound: 
1. Technical innovation in medicine is usually a serendipitous rather 
than a rational process. Thus, for example, the obstetric application 
of ultrasound developed somewhat incidentally (it began in Glasgow 
where ultrasound was much in use in the heavy steel industry).
2. Scientific evaluation of a new technique is not a necessary precon-
dition for the introduction of that technique into routine practice. 
Ultrasound entered routine use in clinical practice before its effec-
tiveness and possible hazards had been scientifically evaluated.
3. The time between experimental use of a new technique and its 
introduction into routine practice may be very short.
4. Because techniques like ultrasound form part of clinicians’ profes-
sional resources, the experiences, opinions, and consent of preg-
nant women are rarely considered either necessary or valid in de-
ciding on whom the technology should be used, or for what kind 
of indication.
5. As a final point, Oakley notes: “Advocates of a new technique are 
liable to suffer from a strange condition called certainty.”
Paper I in this thesis outlines the development of fetal screening technol-
ogy by way of ultrasound after 1986. It highlights that several of Ann 
Oakley’s observations appear to have remained valid beyond the time 
period she herself investigated (Gabbay and Walley 2006).
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3. THREE CLINICAL ARENAS STUDIED IN 
THIS THESIS
Three well-defined clinical arenas or ‘scenarios’ are analysed in Papers 
I-V in this thesis. These are: 
1. antenatal screening and diagnosis by ultrasound, with emphasis 
on screening for chromosomal aberrations in the fetus,
2. the prevention of cardiovascular disease in clinical practice, and 
3. the medical consultation in primary health care.
3.1	Antenatal	screening	and	diagnosis	by	ultrasound
The setting for Paper I of this thesis, screening for fetal anomalies, is 
perhaps the area in mainstream medicine where medical technology, 
social values and culturally determined meaning are most closely in-
tertwined. The moral value-ladenness of antenatal preventive/predictive 
medical technology (Solberg 2003) and the potential for unprecedented 
ethical dilemmas to arise as technology develops are, in my opinion, 
indisputable. On the 27th of October 2005, I received an e-mail from 
an experienced Norwegian general practitioner illustrating this. The GP 
knew that I had written about prenatal diagnosis and ethics and asked 
if I could send her my papers. Here is a quote from her letter (my own 
translation): 
Some years ago, there was considerable debate about prenatal diagnosis and ethical 
guidelines for its use here in Norway. To me, it looks as though this debate has dis-
appeared; at least, I no longer know how the Norwegian healthcare system wants 
this problem / health service (?) to be handled. (...) As a GP, I am familiar with the 
criteria for referral to prenatal diagnosis. But then it is up to the hospital to decide 
on further procedures. (...) My concerns in relation to this matter increased this fall 
as a result of something I read in a newspaper: In a twin pregnancy, one fetus was 
diagnosed with Down’s syndrome. It was aborted by injection of kalium into the 
fetus’ heart so that it died.78 It was somehow presumed that the other twin would be 
born quite prematurely, with the risks associated with that. Today, I read in another 
newspaper that a Danish doctor is facing a lawsuit because s/he had not discovered 
a fetus with Down’s syndrome during screening. (...) Do you have a better over-
view of the development in this field than I do?
78 This is called selective fetocide, a procedure used to kill one fetus selectively, see: Rustico MA et al. Man-
aging twins discordant for fetal anomaly. Prenat Diagn 2005;25:766-71.
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A brief account of the historical development as well as the current state 
of ultrasound screening for fetal anomalies (including referral to the 
above-mentioned lawsuit) can be found in Appendix 3. 
Referring to Hofmann’s conceptualisation of medical technology as the 
complex of device, method and organisation (Hofmann’s thesis 2002:11), 
the technology analysed in Paper I can be described as follows: 
device = ultrasound machine, 
method = screening for fetal anatomy by ultrasound imaging, 
organisation = antenatal care system.
In 2005, a UK research team addressed the relation between technol-
ogy development and ethical dilemmas in a research paper titled Women 
as moral pioneers? Experiences of first trimester antenatal screening 
(Williams et al. 2005). The paper presents a qualitative study of the 
experiences of pregnant women undergoing first trimester ultrasound 
screening (synonyms: early ultrasound screening, nuchal translucency 
screening) in one of the most technologically innovative centres for an-
tenatal care in the UK. 
The study can be regarded as an empirical follow-up of the theoretical 
analysis contained within Paper I in this thesis.79 The UK study opens 
with the words: 
The implementation of innovative medical technologies can raise unprecedented 
ethical, legal and social dilemmas,
and the conclusion is:
…whatever other implications they may have, first trimester screening technolo-
gies continue the tradition of pregnant women acting as ‘moral pioneers’ in increas-
ingly complex settings.
3.2	Prevention	of	cardiovascular	disease
The clinical topic in Papers II, IV and V in this thesis is prevention of 
cardiovascular disease (CVD) in clinical practice. This is an interesting 
and important issue for at least two reasons. Firstly, CVD has been the 
major cause of death and disability in the Western world for several 
decades, due to what has been called “a modern epidemic of heart dis-
79 The paper by Williams et al. (2005), opens and closes with reference to Getz and Kirkengen, 2003 (Paper I).
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ease”. This epidemic is said to have started in the 1930s, and reached its 
peak in the 1950s and 60s. Mortality from CVD has thereafter declined 
steadily (see figures 3.2.1. and 3.2.2). Secondly, the tradition for indi-
vidually oriented risk evaluation and modification among asymptomatic 
individuals was first established in the field of CVD. 
Appendix 4 contains a time-line of important and/or interesting (in the 
context of this thesis) events with relation to cardiovascular disease risk 
assessment and intervention. To mention a few items, the list begins 
with the invention of the sphygmomanometer and continues with the 
early, small-scale pioneering studies on hypertension control. Thereaf-
ter, the list highlights the huge and controversial studies on the relation 
between life style and heart disease in the 1970s and continues with the 
large-scale preventive drug intervention studies bearing catchy names, 
such as STOP, HOT, 4S, LIFE, PROSPER, etc. The time-line also high-
lights milestones in the development of medicine’s theoretical under-
standing of the determinants and prevention of cardiovascular disease. 
The steadily decreasing cut-off points for definition of increased risk 
due to elevated blood pressure and cholesterol levels are noted, as are 
the correspondingly increasing sizes of the study population needed to 
ensure that the intervention studies have statistical power. 
Paper II examines the particular task of implementing ‘evidence-based 
medial knowledge’ relating to one particular individual encountered in 
clinical practice. Referring to Hofmann’s definition, the technology be-
ing investigated can be conceptualised as follows: 
device (or tool) = the narrowly circumscribed body of biomedical 
knowledge pertaining to this individual’s situation, as defined by 
EBM, 
method = implementation of EBM in clinical practice, and 
organisation = primary healthcare system. 
Papers IV and V deal with practical and ethical dilemmas related to 
implementation of the most recent (2003) European guidelines on CVD 
prevention in clinical practice (for further description, see the methods 
section). The technology being investigated is
device (or tool) = 2003 European guidelines on CVD prevention in 
clinical practice including the SCORE chart, 
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method = CVD risk assessment and intervention in routine clinical 
practice, and 
organisation = primary healthcare system.
The following list gives a very brief outline of the work involved in 
cardiovascular disease risk assessment, intervention and monitoring of 
individuals persons/patients in primary health care:  
– Determine the level of conventional CVD risk factors. Repeat ini-
tial measurements to avoid assigning the person to an incorrect 
risk group (misclassification). 
– Estimate total risk for CVD. This involves combining convention-
al CVD risk factors (by use of the SCORE system). 
– Intervene with the aim of reducing risk: offer life style advice and 
drug intervention, when appropriate.
– Control: monitor effects and reconsider therapeutic interventions, 
if necessary. 
– Monitor potential side effects of therapy. 
– Keep on inspiring the patient to make or maintain favourable 
changes, whilst keeping disease-related worries to a minimum. 
Figure	3.2.1 Secular trends in age-standardised mortality per 100 000 
population for coronary heart disease for men and women 1921-98, 
England and Wales. Source: Lawlor DA et al. BMJ 2001;323:541-5.
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Figure	3.2.2	WHO statistics on mortality from ischemic heart disease 
in selected European countries 1970-2003. Source: the WHO’s Euro-
pean Health for All database at www.hfadb.who.dk, accessed in Febru-
ary 2005.
3.3	The	medical	consultation	in	primary	care
The consultation can be regarded as the heart of medicine. As I see it, it is 
the clinical encounter which has legitimised the medical enterprise and 
given medicine its mandate from society from the times of Hippocrates. 
In 1949, the English paediatrician Sir James Spence delivered a famous 
statement regarding this topic:80
The real work of a doctor is not an affair of health centres, or public clinics, or 
operating theatres, or laboratories, or hospital beds. These techniques have their 
place in medicine. The essential unit of medical practice is the occasion when, in 
the intimacy of the consulting room or sick room, a person who is ill, or believes 
himself to be ill, seeks the advice of a doctor whom he trusts. This is the consulta-
tion, and all else in the practice of medicine derives from it.
80 Spence, James: The need for understanding the individual as a part of the training and functions of doc-
tors and nurses. [Speech delivered at a conference on mental health, held in March 1949]. In: The purpose 
and practice of medicine: selections from the writings of Sir James Spence. London: Oxford University 
Press; 1960, p 273-4.
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Previously in this theoretical introduction, I have outlined how the 
medical ‘preconception kit’ (see chapter 2.2.4), which most practicing 
clinicians share, lays out the basic premises for what happens between 
doctor and patient in the consultation. Some of the historical premises 
for the biomedical approach to disease and suffering are outlined in Ap-
pendix 2. Sir James Spence wrote his speech, based on his experience as 
a practitioner of the full-blown, reductionist, medical paradigm (refer-
ring to the previously mentioned analysis by scholars, such as McWhin-
ney, Leder and Cassell). Spence, however, practiced as a physician long 
before anyone had said that ‘opportunistic health promotion’ should be 
considered a self-evident part of the good consultation (the main topic 
of Paper III), very long before the times of ‘evidence-based medicine’ 
(a core topic of Papers II-V in this thesis) and, thereby, also long before 
authoritative clinical guidelines and clinical recommendations were de-
veloped in the preventive sphere (the topic of Papers II, IV and IV). 
As mentioned in the previous section, the first milestone along the road 
towards the ‘new’ preventive paradigm was passed in relation to medical 
control of hypertension among asymptomatic subjects. James le Fanu 
(1999) has listed “the prevention of strokes by control of hypertension” 
(referring to a paper in The Lancet in 1964, see Appendix 4) as one of 
the 12 most important moments of ‘the therapeutic medical revolution’, 
which began around 1940: 
In the past people visited their doctors because they were ill or had some distress-
ing symptoms about which they were concerned. Hypertension changed all of this 
(…) it expands the scope and influence of medicine enormously.
The clinical task of incorporating preventive medical activities into ev-
eryday clinical practice, whenever an opportunity to do so arose, gradu-
ally developed in the wake of this breakthrough. Such incorporation be-
came formally acknowledged as a cornerstone of good practice in primary 
health care in general when Stott and Davis published their seminal 1979 
paper The exceptional potential in each primary care consultation, where 
the concept ‘opportunistic health promotion’ was pinpointed. This paper 
represents the point of departure for the discussion in Paper III, which 
outlines the development since 1979 and examines to what extent Stott 
and Davis’ consultation model fits with contemporary expectations and 
imperatives in the field of preventive medicine. The technology being in-
vestigated in this paper can thereby be described in terms of:
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device (or tool) = preventive guidelines and recommendations, 
method = opportunistic disease prevention, taking place in the con-
text of routine consultations, and 
organisation = primary healthcare system.
The technology being investigated in Paper II, which deals with the par-
ticular topic of the consultation in addition to the topic of cardiovascular 
disease, was outlined in chapter 3.2.
In this thesis, the doctor-patient relationship is addressed from the par-
ticular angle of opportunistic preventive medicine. This discussion may 
nevertheless be seen in light of more general developments apparently 
taking place in the doctor-patient relationship, if regarded from a gen-
eral and more global perspective (See, for instance, a paper by Potter 
and McKinlay titled From relationship to encounter: an examination of 
longitudinal and lateral dimensions in the doctor-patient relationship, 
2005). 
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4. AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK TO GUIDE 
FURTHER DISCUSSION
“The first decision to make when developing a public-health strategy 
must be to decide the philosophical basis on which it is to stand”. This 
statement appeared in a Lancet commentary (McKee and Raine 2005) to 
the UK Department of Health’s White paper Choosing health: making 
healthy choices easier (2004). Along the same lines, other public health 
researchers state that knowledge of philosophical theory is about to be-
come equally relevant to the field of public health as knowledge about 
epidemiological methods (Roberts and Reich 2002). Personally, I am 
convinced that philosophical analysis is also relevant to the planning of 
individually targeted preventive medical programmes. One of the aims 
of this thesis is to present “sustainable and responsible development” 
as a conceptual framework for discussing the strategic and ethical chal-
lenges which are highlighted in the five sub-studies of this thesis (Getz 
et al. 2005). 
As I see it, the idea of sustainable and responsible development in pre-
ventive medicine would have implications for 
– medical theory building and development,
– medical research activities,
– medical practice organisation, integration and remote planning, 
and
– the individual clinical encounter.
In the following, I will briefly introduce the concepts professional moral 
responsibility and sustainable development. The introduction of respon-
sibility will depart from the notion of medical professionalism.
4.1	On	the	moral	responsibility	of	medical	professionals	
4.1.1 What does it mean to be a professional?
The first and paramount topic discussed in the 5th edition of the previ-
ously mentioned American College of Physicians’ Ethics manual (see 
Snyder et al. 2005) is the notion of professionalism. 
8
Medicine is “a profession to be entered,” not only a trade to be learned. 
It involves “membership in a self-correcting moral community” (Snyder 
et al. 2005:576). “Being a professional is an ethical matter, entailing de-
votion to a way of life, in the service of others and of some higher good” 
(Kass 1983). UK Sociologist David Armstrong crystallises81 the essence 
of a profession as a combination of: 
– a service ideal, and
– an esoteric knowledge base. 
The roots of medical professionalism date back to the teachings of Hip-
pocrates (See Appendix 2). The word profession stems from the Latin 
professio, which means “public declaration.” This indicates that pro-
fessionals are expected to be explicit and clear about their moral val-
ues (Wynia et al. 1999). A professional person not only has particular 
knowledge and skills, acquired through regulated training and refined 
by experience but also conforms to certain standards of personal be-
haviour marked by honesty, ethical integrity, humility, compassion and 
empathy. 
Quite a lot has been published in the medical literature on the topic of 
medical professionalism in recent years. In these texts, there appears to 
be consensus that the medical profession has a responsibility to protect 
not only vulnerable persons but also vulnerable social values (Wynia et 
al 1999, Rothman 2000). 
Somewhat more specifically, a profession is characterised by (Snyder et 
al. 2005):
i. A specialised body of knowledge that its members must teach and 
expand. It is important to acknowledge that non-professionals cannot 
easily evaluate or regulate this body of knowledge (Irivine 1997). 
ii. A code of ethics and a duty of service putting patient care above self-
interest. By definition, a professional claims to be responsible – which 
means that s/he can be trusted to work conscientiously without supervi-
sion.
iii. A privilege of self-regulation granted by society. Competent self-reg-
ulation is a pre-requisite for professional independence (Irivine 1997). 
81 Lecture posted on the homepage of the Royal College of Physicians, see www.rcplondon.ac.uk. Accessed 
2 Dec, 2005.
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The literature indicates that self-regulation is not only a matter of keep-
ing a watchful eye on the competence and abilities of individual practi-
tioners of the profession. Essential features of professional self-regula-
tion also appear to include (Irivine 1997 and 1999): 
– ensuring that medical activity has well-defined purposes, values, 
and strategic direction that is compatible with public expecta-
tions. 
– ensuring good and consistent performance, the use of set stan-
dards and quality-assurance. 
– well-defined and well understood responsibilities and lines of ac-
countability. Whenever possible, the process of regulation should 
be made visible and public. 
In 2002, the US-European Medical professionalism project resulted in 
the publication of a Physician Charter on medical professionalism.82 This 
charter lists a set of responsibilities pertaining to the medical profession. 
Among these responsibilities is a commitment to scientific knowledge. 
This commitment is further specified in the following way: 
Much of medicine’s contract with society is based on the integrity and appropriate 
use of scientific knowledge and technology. Physicians have a duty to uphold sci-
entific standards, to promote research, and to create new knowledge and ensure its 
appropriate use. The profession is responsible for the integrity of this knowledge, 
which is based on scientific evidence and physicians’ experience.
I regard all five papers in this thesis as dealing with the challenge of 
maintaining the integrity and clinical relevance of the medical knowl-
edge base in an era characterised by increasing biological reductionism, 
combined with ever stronger commercial influences (see, for instance, 
Moynihan et al. 2002; Lian 2003; Abramson 2004; Angell 2004; Nelkin 
and Andrews 1998).
For a long time, professionalism has been considered as a given in medi-
cine, but with changes in the doctor-patient relationship and, more glob-
ally, in the way medical care is being delivered, the nature and role of 
medical professionals has come to be ever more often questioned and 
debated (Pereira Gray 2002). The contemporary analyses and critiques 
of medical professionalism can be exemplified by papers such as The 
end of the golden age of doctoring (McKinley and Marceau 2002). The 
82 Medical professionalism in the new millennium: a physicians’ charter. Lancet 2002; 259:520-522 (The 
charter was also published in 29 other national and international medical journals).
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debate is not new, however; the sociology literature has discussed and 
criticised the concept of professionalism since the 1970s. 
It is difficult to arrive at a shared understanding of what ethically re-
sponsible, professional behaviour actually is, as long as the moral basis 
for our actions, i.e., the values on basis of which decisions are taken 
– is not reasonably clear and accepted by society as a whole. Until now 
many have considered the basis for responsible action in medicine to be 
connected with the Hippocratic Oath, but this code does not have any 
clear philosophical basis, other than that it was recognized by the inner 
circle of physicians. Modern dilemmas like the role of technology, pub-
lic costs, the definition of life, genetic engineering and assisted suicide 
currently challenge the notion of moral integrity and responsibility in 
professionals in an unprecedented manner. 
Some of the controversy regarding medical professionalism can be seen 
as stemming from different perspectives on what medicine is all about. 
Two quite polarised views of the nature of medicine and its goals can be 
said to exist, at least in the US context (Callahan 1996). One view dis-
cerns inherent goals in medicine, the other external, socially constructed 
goals. The ‘inherentist’ position has the doctor-patient relationship at its 
core and defines medicine’s goals as healing, helping, caring and curing. 
The ‘social construction position’, in contrast, presumes that it is quite 
difficult to define a meaningful set of inherent values, and that medicine 
is best thought of as an evolving fund of knowledge and a changing 
range of clinical practices with no fixed essence – ready to respond to 
evolving societal expectations and demands. 
In December 2005, an authoritative report on the topic of medical pro-
fessionalism, authored by The Lancet’s editor-in-chief Richard Horton, 
was released from a working group on behalf of the UK Royal College 
of Physicians (see Horton 2005).  The report states that medical profes-
sionalism lies at the heart of being a good doctor, but that today’s health-
care environment, which focuses on setting targets and regulation, puts 
this at risk. It states that “professionals and professional organisations 
are increasingly mistrusted.” Richard Horton’s conclusion, as he sums 
up the report in The Lancet, is: “Medical professionalism needs to be 
put back onto the political map of health” (Horton 2005).83 The working 
83 The full report is accessible through www.rcplondon.ac.uk/pubs/books/docinsoc.
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group proposes a new definition of professionalism, which the mem-
bers believe to be more valid for our time: “a set of values, behaviours 
and relationships that underpins the trust the public has in doctors.”84 
In other words, this definition focuses on partnership with patients and 
with other disciplines and disregards the classical focus on professional-
clinical autonomy, privilege and self-regulation. The report also says 
that serious failures in leadership mean that the medical profession is 
currently underselling itself, due to a lack of a clear vision and coordina-
tion of activities: “While there are many leaders in medicine as a whole, 
there is little leadership in medicine as a whole. As a result doctors are 
too often seen as “negative, defensive and self-serving.” It is also noted 
that “no single institution across medicine presently exists to define an 
overall vision for health from the profession. (…) We believe there is 
a case (…) to debate, explore, think about, study, and develop policies 
across the many different institutions of medicine.” Finally, the working 
group perceives that “the regulatory pendulum” has swung too far in the 
direction of “rigorously enforced dutiful conduct [of doctors].” It be-
lieves that the pendulum “needs to be brought back to a more balanced 
position where there is an understanding that an environment which en-
courages a doctor’s ‘goodness’ is one that will promote positive patient 
outcomes. This ‘goodness’ is what we mean by professionalism.” 
4.1.2 The reflective practitioner
In 1994-1996, I was member of a committee in The Norwegian Medical 
Association which planned continuous medical development in the field 
of general practice. In that setting, I was introduced to the works of pro-
fessor of planning and education Donald A. Schön85 (Schön 1983, 1987 
and 1988). Schön’s thoughts are in many ways relevant to this thesis. 
Based on research on the working lives and learning styles of profes-
sionals, he came to regard a general ability to critically analyse and 
evaluate one’s own experience and develop one’s practice as a result as 
a key characteristic (Schmidt 2000; MacLeod 2001). Thus, systematic 
engagement in reflective processes of ‘design’, i.e., processes of learn-
ing and inquiry, which aim to change an existing situation into a pre-
84 It is specifically stated that in their day-to-day practice, doctors are committed to the following values, 
which form the basis for a moral contract between the medical profession and society: integrity, compas-
sion, altruism, continuous improvement, excellence, and working in partnership with members of the wider 
healthcare system.
85 Donald A. Schön (1930-1997) is regarded as one of the most influential thinkers in the theory of education 
and professional development in the 20th century.
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ferred one, distinguishes professional practitioners. Organizations and 
individuals should be flexible and aim to incorporate lessons learned 
throughout their life, Schön called this ‘organizational learning’. Schön 
argued that professional inquiry of this kind can be as rigorous as con-
ventional research. In the methods section of this thesis (see chapter 
7.1.3), I describe how clinical ‘conversations with the situation’ – a 
phrase borrowed from Schön – have been part of my reflective process 
as an academic. 
4.1.3 “Once the rockets are up – who cares where they come down”:86 
on the moral responsibility of scientists
As previously mentioned, Francis Bacon believed that knowledge con-
tains the power to conquer what he perceived to be man’s vulnerable and 
helpless natural condition. Since the times of the Scientific Revolution, 
the validity as well as the ethical implications of this statement have 
become increasingly clear. The ethical implications of man’s search for 
knowledge relate both to what researchers do and do not invest them-
selves in. Related to researchers’ negligence of important scientific top-
ics, I would like to mention Yehuda Elkana (b. 1934), who is a scholar 
of the history, theory and politics of the sciences and Dean of the Central 
European University of Budapest.87 Elkana believes that the majority of 
the contemporary academic world is currently very far from addressing 
the most central questions burdening humankind. Above all of these are 
poverty, mass-diseases like AIDS, ecological threats, and the future of 
democracy and human rights in the emerging global political systems.
If considering moral responsibilities related to what scientist do invest 
their resources in, it appears reasonable to reflect on the development 
in the field of nuclear physics. Until the Second World War, there was 
86 “Once the rockets are up, who cares where they come down? / That’s not my department, says Wernher von 
Braun.” This line comes from a Tom Lehrer song (1965) about the German scientist who led Nazi Germa-
ny’s rocket programme before and during the Second World War, and who entered the United States at the 
end of the war through the then-secret Operation Paperclip. Von Braun became a naturalized US citizen, later 
joined NASA, and is regarded as a founding father of the United States space program. As Lehrer indicates, 
Von Braun has been characterised as the kind of researcher who is willing to serve any aims, provided the 
research is commissioned and funded.
87 CEU is a US-style graduate university with a focus on the social sciences and the humanities. Elkana sees 
it as a major challenge to establish a global niche for creating new knowledge in areas where rethinking is 
necessary, and where rethinking is a question of intellectual risk-taking. Elkana claims that our traditional 
way of thinking in objectivities has to give way to thinking in complexities, since there is no single, valid 
method for understanding the human condition. See the university’s homepage on  www.ceu.hu/welcome.
html.
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a reigning conviction that by applying scientific methodology which 
secured the gathering of pure, objective and value-neutral knowledge, 
researchers did not bear any responsibility for the potential impact of 
knowledge application. This notion, however, started to change after the 
Second World War, both in the German88 and the Allied setting. Some 
of the researchers contributing to the Manhattan project came to experi-
ence that their scientific contribution turned into a personal moral bur-
den. An example of this was Albert Einstein, who in 1939 sent a letter 
to warn President Franklin D. Roosevelt that energy released in nuclear 
fission might be used in bombs by the Germans. After the bombing of 
Hiroshima, Einstein is said to have claimed: “I could burn my fingers 
that wrote that first letter to Roosevelt.” Physicists had lost their scien-
tific innocence, so to speak, and acknowledged that no clear demarca-
tion line existed between research, on the one hand, and application of 
the research, on the other (Kirkengen: Rosendal lecture, 2005).
4.1.4. Heidegger on causality and responsibility
We are now in the post-war era where Martin Heidegger, in 1953, wrote 
The Question Concerning Technology (see 2.4.2). Contemplating the 
inherent dangers he saw in the way modern technology ‘enframes’ the 
world, Heidegger, in his poetical way, wrote: 
We look into the danger and see the growth of the saving power. 
He continued by emphasising that the essence of this saving power lies 
in continuous and painstaking, critical reflection: 
Through this we are not yet saved. But we are thereupon summoned to hope in the 
growing light of the saving power. How can this happen? Here and now in little 
things, that we may foster the saving power in its increase. This includes holding 
always before our eyes the extreme danger.
As I see it, Heidegger is here calling forth the moral responsibility in 
every scientist and every professional, in our everyday work, for every 
project we engage in, world-wide. The word responsibility is derived 
from ‘response’ (in Latin, responsum means reply) and suggests that a 
88 A recent book demolishing the notion of scientific value-neutrality on the basis of the history of The Third 
Reich, is Hitler’s scientists by John Cornwell at the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at 
Cambridge University (2003). Cornwell explores the general relationship between science and society and 
claims that it is naive to assume that in a democracy, this relationship may automatically be characterised 
as morally sound.
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person who has responsibility must be prepared to respond to questions. 
The potential question awaiting a response may however be posed some 
time in the near or distant future. And the future will also reveal the pos-
sible questioner. It could, for instance, be a patient, a relative, society or 
a public body. It could also be yourself.89 The question might apply to 
your personal decisions and actions, but it might also address actions in 
which you took part as member of a scientific group or a healthcare in-
stitution. In recognition of the latter, Dutch ethicist Martien Pijnenburg 
recently made a systematic attempt to outline how moral responsibility 
can be conceptualised as pertaining to healthcare organizations (Pijnen-
burg and Gordijn 2005). Pijnenberg’s arguments build upon the theo-
ries of Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, who was again inspired by 
Martin Heidegger.
Something particularly interesting in Heidegger’s thoughts concerning 
technology, is how he connects two important – but, in our contempo-
rary minds, quite separated – concepts; namely causality and responsi-
bility. In Heidegger’s view, the instrumental way of thinking which has 
become so prevalent in Western societies can best be captured by inves-
tigating our assumptions about causality. If we were able to understand 
modes of causality in the same way as the ancient Greeks did, we would 
come to consider causality in a broader sense than we do today, in terms 
of ways of being responsible for things coming into existence. We would 
see that our basic orientation towards the coming-into-existence, or the 
‘revealing’ of the world, is linked to the outcome, and thereby has to do 
with responsibility. 
Prior to the Roman introduction of the term causa, the Greek thought 
about causality in terms of aition. Aition meant “that to which something 
else is indebted.” To encompass the meaning of aition, Heidegger used the 
German phrase: “das, was ein anderes verschuldet.” The word verschul-
det implies the same as aition; i.e., to be indebted, to owe, to be guilty, to 
be responsible for, and also to cause. According to the ancient Greek way 
of thinking about causality, causing something meant “starting something 
on its way to arrival.” This means that causality, moral responsibility and 
instrumentality cannot be seen in isolation. Thereby, the one giving some-
thing a start, meaning one who “brings something into being”, is respon-
89 I came across this plain, but attractive, outline of what the notion of responsibility might mean to us as 
individual professionals in a paper called Ethics in pharmacy: a new definition of responsibility (Dessing RP, 
Flameling J. Pharmacy World and Science 2003;25:3-10).
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sible for the bringing forth (Heidegger uses the term Hervorbringen), both 
in the sense of “that” and “how”. This again means that technology (= 
how) is no neutral means to an end (= that). Technology is value-laden, 
it represents a particular way of revealing that which has been concealed. 
And the realm of revealing is the realm of truth. 
4.1.5 Einstein: a man of conscience
In the post-war era, in parallel with Martin Heidegger, Albert Einstein 
came to focus ever more strongly on the fundamental moral challenges 
which modern science and technology are facing. This gradually led to 
the Russell-Einstein Manifesto in 1955 and establishment of the Pug-
wash Movement in 1957.90 In 2005, an editorial in Scientific American 
was devoted to Einstein’s sense of social responsibility as a researcher. 
In memory of the formula E = m∙c2, it was titled: Einstein = Man of 
Conscience2 and ended with the words:91 
Today, when prominent researchers comment on environmental politics, missile 
defence, health care priorities and similar matters, critics sometimes suggest that 
science and politics should not mix. But Einstein knew that scientists have a moral 
responsibility to explain their work, including its political implications. To argue 
otherwise is to say that science does not matter.
Interest in discussing scientific responsibility currently appears to be 
on the rise, even in peaceful democratic countries. In Berlin in 2005, a 
conference called Einstein weiterdenken (Thinking with Einstein, www.
einstein-weiterdenken.de) was held, as “an invitation to re-examine the 
ethical and political responsibility of science in a globalised world.” In 
Norway, a recent issue of the journal Forskningsetikk (Research ethics, 
the newsletter of the national research ethics committees in Norway)92 
was dedicated to the topic of scientific responsibility. To illustrate how 
discussions about the moral responsibility of medical researchers may 
look in our contemporary hi-tech research environment, we may look 
once again to the previously mentioned field of neuroscience. In a 2004 
90 In 1995, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded in two equal parts, to Joseph Rotblat and the Pugwash Con-
ferences in Science and World Affairs. The Pugwash Conferences were based on nuclear scientists’ recogni-
tion of their responsibility for their inventions. Pugwash was the name of the location of the first meeting 
(Pugwash, Nova Scotia, 1957). The stimulus for that gathering was the manifesto issued in 1955 by Bertrand 
Russell and Albert Einstein, accompanied by other renowned scientists of the time. The manifesto called 
upon scientists to assemble to discuss the threat posed by the advent of thermonuclear weapons. The closing 
paragraph contains the sentence “Remember your humanity, and forget the rest” (See www.pugwash.org).
91 Editors. Einstein = Man of Conscience2,  September issue 2004. See www.sciam.com, (accessed Sept 16, 
2005).
92 Forskningsetikk No 2, 2005.
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lecture93 at the US Society for Neuroscience, Researcher Stephan L. 
Chorover at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology claimed that the 
most important ethical questions in contemporary neuroscience are not 
the narrow questions which are currently posed by neuroethicists, which 
address the technical details of exactly how to perform research which 
involves brain surveillance and manipulation of the human brain in an 
ethically correct manner. Chorover perceives that the most essential 
questions to be asked in relation to this field are far more fundamental; 
they relate to whether the research should be done at all: 
Is applied neuroscience helping to enhance the quality of human life? Is it promot-
ing sociotechnical dehumanization? What might be done to give neuroscience and 
neuroscientists a better chance of contributing responsibly to the emergence of a 
more just, participatory, and sustainable society?
4.1.6 Hans Jonas on medicine, technology and responsibility
The Western philosopher best-known for reflection on medicine, tech-
nology and moral responsibility is German-English-American philoso-
pher Hans Jonas (1903-1993).94 As previously said, Jonas was a student 
of Heidegger. He believed that taking moral responsibility is an essential 
part of being human, something “instituted by nature” (Bernstein 1995). 
In 1979, he formulated this as “the principle of responsibility” in a book 
titled Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technolo-
gische Zivilisation (English translation 1984, see reference list). Jonas 
believed that knowledge ‘production’ in general, and knowledge pro-
duction related to human life and the human body in particular, imply a 
major moral challenge. 
With time, Jonas became ever more interested in the relationship be-
tween technology and medicine. Scientists and clinicians, thought Jo-
nas, must take great care to preserve the wholeness and integrity of life 
as they work to develop and implement new medical technologies. The 
following passage from his 1985 book Technik, Medizin und Ethik,95 
encapsulates Jonas’ thoughts: 
93 Chorover SL. Whither neuroethics? A developmental perspective. Lecture given in the Society for Neuro-
science, San Diego, Oct. 25th 2004.
94 For more about Jonas, see for instance Hans Jonas-Zentrum Berlin at www.hans-jonas-zentrum.de. A fine 
book about Hans Jonas in Norwegian is: Fidjestöl A. Hans Jonas. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2004. 
95 This book – as far as I know – has not been translated to English. Translation from German by Anna Luise 
Kirkengen.
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It is argued that natural scientists are not responsible for what others do with the 
results of their research. If research were just contemplation, pure thought so to 
speak, this position, though still problematic, could eventually be defended. How-
ever, basic research is already to a considerable degree in itself also an action. This 
is expressed in the technology implied and the prior societal investment into the 
construction of these technical devices. Action is always already part of modern 
research. It is no longer like how Aristotle perceived nature, or how Copernicus and 
Keppler observed the universe and the stars without being able to interfere. Nowa-
days, every act of acknowledging and penetrating the secrets of nature already rep-
resents a manipulation of nature. We are aware that knowledge results in capability; 
capability leads to acting, and this acting turns into imperative action, that we must 
do what we can do. In case we can foresee that certain consequences of this chain 
of cause and effect may lead to a disaster, the question arises where to interrupt the 
process – or whether one should do so already at the source of knowledge, on the 
level of basic research. The latter would provoke most opposition (1985:304).
I will close this chapter on professional responsibility in medicine with 
a final quote from Hans Jonas (1984). It relates to his “imperative of 
responsibility,” and builds a bridge to the next, and final, theoretical 
concept I will introduce, which is that of ‘sustainable development’:
In your present choice, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of 
your will.96
4.2	The	concept	of	sustainable	development
4.2.1 Historical background and definition 
The word ‘sustainable’ comes from Latin sustere, which means to up-
hold. The use of the word has developed over time. It originally referred 
to harvesting of single resources; subsequently it was used in relation to 
more complex ecosystems, and more recently it has come to encompass 
the integrated social-physical-economical welfare of communities (Laf-
ferty and Langhelle 1999). The concept ‘sustainable development’ first 
appeared around 1980.97 As mentioned in the opening of the thesis, it 
was brought to world-wide attention in 1987 in the report Our Common 
Future (1987). Our common future gave the concept of sustainable de-
velopment unprecedented political authority as a theoretical framework 
for discussing issues related to growth and development. 
96 “Handle so, daß die Wirkungen deiner Handlungen verträglich sind mit der Permanenz echten menschli-
chen Lebens auf Erden.”
97 The 1972 book The limits to growth, published by the interdisciplinary group “Club of Rome” (Meadows 
D. et al.) is considered among the important works preceding the discourse of sustainable development. 
108
Sustainable development is a complex and contested concept (Jacobs 
1999). However, there is agreement that it embraces the notions of 
‘needs’ and ‘limits’ and describes a process of transformation where 
resource use, investment, technologies, institutions and consumption 
patterns do not occur at the expense of environmental degradation. Sus-
tainable development can be regarded both from a local and a global 
perspective. Various formal definitions of the concept have been pro-
posed, but the best-known is still ‘the Brundtland definition’:
Sustainable development is meeting the needs of the present generation without 
compromising the ability for future generations to meet their needs. 
The Brundtland Report addressed environmental and socio-economic 
sustainability from a relatively pragmatic viewpoint. It regarded eco-
nomic growth as something basically ‘good’ and encouraged develop-
ment of currently impoverished regions of the world whilst aiming to 
maintain a high living standard in affluent countries. The view of sus-
tainability presented in the report has thereby been widely criticised as 
too “weak.” It has also been accused of being too “fluid,” because Our 
common future does not go very far in making the vision “technically 
operationalisable.” Many scholars however believe that the universal 
appeal and political potentials of the concept ‘sustainable development’ 
are dependent on the fact that the concept appears relatively neutral and 
flexible (Jacobs 1999). Their argument is that although the Brundtland 
Report is not very radical as such, the discourse on sustainable develop-
ment can open new windows of opportunities where it becomes possible 
to pose critical questions and draw attention to previously unacknowl-
edged, down-prioritised and sensitive issues on the political or societal 
agenda.
It must be noted that sustainability – defined as the quantitative capacity 
to uphold some phenomenon or activity – contains no statement about 
the moral value of the activity as such. The discourse on sustainable 
development thereby presupposes a wider ethical framework defining 
certain values that are linked to human and societal well-being and pros-
perity (Dower 1997).98 As Canadian philosopher Ingrid Leman Stefa-
novic has pointed out, “in this technological age, sustainability clearly 
98 An anthology reflecting the Norwegian discourse on sustainable development has been written by Lafferty 
and Langhelle (1999).
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becomes more than a technical issue. It is also, in fact, a philosophical 
matter” (Stefanovic 2000). And this is where the moral notion of re-
sponsibility comes in.
As previously mentioned, the medical community has so far contributed 
very little to the debate on sustainable development. Daniel Callahan 
is in fact the only writer I have come across who has systematically 
attempted to investigate what sustainability might mean in a medical 
context. (See the report from The Goals of Medicine Project edited by 
Callahan in 1996 and Callahan’s book False hopes from 1999.) Cal-
lahan is a communitarian thinker focusing on what one may call social 
ethics, “the common good” and public interest, as opposed to an ethics 
focusing on the individual. Callahan believes that ethical analysis must 
take the social implications of medical activity seriously and not sim-
ply assume that medicine can be directed by autonomous choices made 
by isolated individuals. Relations between a public healthcare system, 
technological advancements and the health problems of individuals are 
very complex. Every professional proposal, decision or intervention has 
private as well as public aspects (Callahan 2003). As he addresses the 
topic of sustainability, however, Callahan examines medicine in general, 
as it is currently evolving in the USA, where the world’s highest eco-
nomic expenditure on health exists together with dramatic inequalities 
in access to services. It is important to note that the present thesis relates 
to preventive medicine in the context of the far more egalitarian Nor-
dic welfare systems where healthcare has been regarded as part of the 
primary benefits of society, along with rights to education and political 
rights. Despite these contextual differences, it nevertheless appears rel-
evant to sum up what Callahan believes to be the essence of sustainable 
medicine (Callahan 1999 and 2000): 
• First: from an economic perspective, no society can any longer 
afford to maintain unlimited progress as its ideal.
• Second: there are better ways to promote health than surrendering 
to a strong dependency on technological medicine. 
• Third: all of us will do better in terms of health, provided we con-
ceptualize it within categories of the common well-being of whole 
populations instead of only chasing individual benefit/advantage.
4.2.2 General prerequisites for sustainable development
The prerequisites for sustainable development have been examined 
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from a variety of angles in recent years. Several scholars appear to agree 
that it is possible to outline a set of ‘intermediary principles’, something 
between abstract ideals and technically operationisable reality (Lafferty 
and Langhelle 1999). As such, these principles are comparable to the 
previously discussed principles in medical ethics. The following list 
contains the principles I have most frequently come across in texts on 
sustainable development. My main reference in this field is a paper writ-
ten by Michael Jacobs, titled Sustainable development as a contested 
concept (Jacobs 1999).
1. Policy integration. This implies ensuring that economic develop-
ment and environmental protection are integrated in planning and 
implementation. Fragmentation of responsibility can generally be 
seen as a major obstacle to sustainable development. It is impor-
tant to challenge compartmentalised groups of decision-makers, 
for example, medical expert communities, to broaden their hori-
zons. This may call for creation of new administrative structures, 
reform of existing institutions, and transformation of established 
policy-making processes. 
2. Participation and democracy. This involves recognising that sus-
tainable development requires the political involvement of all 
stakeholder groups in society. 
3. Equity. This emphasises a commitment to meeting at least the ba-
sic needs of those having the greatest need, depending on the con-
text (global/national/local perspective). One is also called upon to 
consider equity from the perspective of future generations’ needs. 
4. The precautionary principle related to environmental protection. 
This implies a systematic commitment to anticipating and reduc-
ing the risk of detrimental effects (such as pollution) and envi-
ronmental degradation as a result of current activities. The sus-
tainable development paradigm emphasises that complexity and 
uncertainty surrounds decision-making, particularly in situations 
where complex technical and scientific issues are involved. This 
highlights the relevance of what has been designated “the precau-
tionary principle.” This principle states that lack of scientific cer-
tainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to 
foresee and prevent potential detrimental side-effects of current or 
planned activities. 
5. Planning for the future. Sustainable development is something 
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that must be carefully planned. There are too many complex in-
terdependencies between political, social and economic factors to 
leave development to chance.
6. One final element appears on Michael Jacobs list which is not 
found in all overviews of sustainable development. This is the no-
tion quality of life.99 As I understand Jacobs, this concept aims 
to highlight that growth (which can potentially be sustained in a 
technical sense), is not necessarily equivalent to valuable devel-
opment100 that is good for human beings or the earth in the long 
run.101  
In the discussion chapter, I will depart from the notion of ‘sustainable 
and responsible development’ and examine what this might imply in the 
context of preventive medicine.
4.3	Man	as	‘standing-reserve’?
I will close this theoretical introductory part with some personal reflec-
tions and questions anchored in Heidegger’s and Foucault’s writings on 
technology. As previously outlined, these philosophers were very in-
fluential. My acquaintance, however, with Heidegger and also partially 
with Foucault took place when I wrote the final papers in this thesis. 
Nevertheless, once I entered their thought universes, I realised that all 
the papers can be seen as representing examples of the kind of tech-
nological questioning and critique which these two thinkers called for. 
The conceptual frameworks presented by Heidegger and Foucault have 
facilitated my attempts to understand more deeply why and how imple-
mentation of new scientific knowledge in everyday practice can lead to 
the emergence of new and unacknowledged ethical dilemmas. 
At first glance, the writings of Heidegger and Foucault appear very dif-
ferent.  However, as others have documented (see Milkman and Rosen-
berg 2003), their teachings can be seen as closely connected. Heidegger 
probably did not know Foucault, but Foucault read Heidegger’s works. 
99 This should not be confused with the phrase ‘quality of life’ as it is frequently used in the context of medi-
cal research. 
100 In the introduction to this thesis, I presented the JAMA paper by Fisher and Welch (1999), which ad-
dresses the difference between growth and development in the medical context. 
101 In a general discussion of sustainable development, this perspective may be extended from the human 
society to life on earth in general, but in the context of this thesis, I will stay within the realm of human 
medicine.
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In fact, Foucault maintained that his entire philosophical development 
was determined by Heidegger, although he very rarely quoted him di-
rectly (Milchman and Rosenberg 2003). The two philosophers worked 
very differently and addressed technology from very different perspec-
tives. Heidegger’s thinking can be characterised as meditative, and he 
focused on the domination of nature by the natural sciences in a rather 
abstract manner. The documents he investigated were classical texts 
in the history of Western metaphysics, with an emphasis on ancient 
Greek thought prior to ‘technologization’ as we know it today. In con-
trast, Foucault wrote in a rebellious manner about the recent history of 
human sciences and the institutions in which they are embedded. His 
research builds on the practical documents of everyday human life, such 
as administrative treatises, architectural plans, case studies and hospi-
tal records. But if we look beyond these fundamental differences, both 
Heidegger and Foucault critically scrutinised the same topic; i.e., how a 
reductionist, Cartesian world-view102 has come to dominate human sci-
ences and institutional practices. Both thinkers can be envisioned as en-
gaged in freeing the concepts of scientific ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ from 
what they perceive to be repressive epistemological constraints. They 
warned against what Heidegger called “forgottenness of being” (Seins-
vergessenheit).
Both Heidegger and Foucault have been accused of technological nihil-
ism. These charges can however be refuted. Although they were both 
occupied with the destructive potential of technologies, none of them 
should be classified as technological determinists or as opposed to tech-
nology in general (see Sawicki’s essay in Milchman and Rosenberg 
2003). 
I will now formulate three questions related to the way medical technol-
ogy can be seen as conceptualising man, from the point of view of man 
as a standing-reserve: 
First, Heidegger reminds us that technically correct facts may be far 
from what the old Greeks would have called the truth. He says: 
In a similar way the unconcealment in accordance with which nature presents itself 
as a calculable complex of the effects of forces can indeed permit correct determi-
102 A brief account of the Scientific Revolution and René Descartes’ thoughts can be found in Appendix 2 
of this thesis.
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nations; but precisely through these successes the danger can remain that in the 
midst of all that is correct the true will withdraw (Heidegger 1977:26-7, italics by 
LG).
Correspondingly, and in relation to the particular context of medicine, 
Foucault observed how what he called disciplinary technologies of pow-
er/knowledge are far from neutral. They systematically “push” medical 
inquiry in the direction of isolating abnormalities requiring even further 
inquiry. He speaks of “laboratories of power... [in which] knowledge fol-
lows the advances of power, discovering new objects of knowledge over 
all the surfaces on which power is exercised” (Milchman and Rosenberg 
2003:63). It thereby becomes quite apparent that Foucault’s technolo-
gies of power can be expected to function quite anonymously in every-
day life in much the same way as Heidegger’s account of technological 
enframing. We are typically talking about everyday technologies that 
can be seen as implemented by no one and everyone, and quite typically 
in the name of goodness and progress.
As a medical doctor with an academic interest in preventive medicine 
and associated technologies, I pose the following question to reflect Hei-
degger’s and Foucault’s concerns: 
Can	it	be	that	professionals	as	well	as	lay	people	are	currently	be-
coming	increasingly	distracted	and	desensitized,	as	a	result	of	medi-
cal	technology’s	particular	way	of	enframing	the	human	condition,	
in	such	a	way	that	we	lose	sight	of	the	essence	of	what	it	means	to	be	
human,	in	sickness	and	in	health?
More concretely, the following question appears to become increasingly 
relevant in the preventive setting: How can I, as a professional, be con-
fident that my (supposedly) systematic and technically correct measure-
ments of certain biological variables, such as cholesterol, or homocys-
teine, will result in a representation which is so true that it warrants the 
status of “that which matters the most” in relation to the health of the 
particular person in question? 
Second, Heidegger warns us that technological ‘enframing’ implies a 
danger that man becomes alienated from himself in an existential sense. 
By treating others as though their essence can be understood and calcu-
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lated according to the laws of nature (a standing-reserve), we are about 
to reduce ourselves as human beings and lose sight of who we are. Hei-
degger says (1977:27-8): 
As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object but does 
so, rather, exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness 
is nothing but the orderer of the standing reserve, then he comes to the very brink 
of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be 
taken as a standing-reserve. (...) Enframing endangers man in his relationship to 
himself and to everything that is (...) it drives out every other possibility of reveal-
ing (...) The rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be 
denied to him to enter into more original revealing and hence to experience the call 
of a more primal truth. 
As a medical doctor currently working as the staff physician of a 
busy university hospital with a ‘culture’ that moves steadily towards 
the crossroads where “biologism” meets “economism”103 (key-words: 
subspecialisation, financing by diagnosis-related-groups, a vocabulary 
related to production and customers, and leadership strategies derived 
from “human resources management” theories), I allow myself to pose 
a question which can be found between the lines of all the papers of 
this thesis, and which will be briefly addressed in the discussion of this 
thesis:
Could	it	be	that	the	increasing	international	focus	on	dissatisfaction	
and	‘burn-out’	among	healthcare	personnel	in	general	and	doctors	
in	particular104	is	related	to	and	may	even	represent	an	early	warn-
ing	sign	that	the	combination	of	modern	medical	and	management 
technologies	implies	an	unprecedented	potential	to	alienate	the	pro-
fessional	 helper	 from	a	 genuine	 experience	 and	understanding	 of	
what	it	means	to	be	a	human	being	who	cares	for	other	human	be-
ings?	
Third and finally, let us revert to the ancient Greek way of “knowing 
how to bring forth” (reveal), also called technE. TechnE involved an 
103 I owe the phrase “biologism meets economism” to previous CEO of the Karolinska Hospital in Stock-
holm May-Len Sundin, who is concerned about these matters and has shared her thoughts with me on 
several occasions.
104 See, for instance, the theme issue of British Medical Journal on April 6th 2002, titled Unhappy doctors 
and the paper Why are doctors so unhappy? by Richard Smith (BMJ 2001; 322: 1073-4) along with the 
electronic responses which followed on bmj.com. I will not go further here into the literature on doctors’ 
health and well-being in this thesis.
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act of creation, of poiesis. Modern technology, too, is in a sense reveal-
ing. However, according to Heidegger, revealing by modern technology 
does not unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of poiesis, but rather in 
a challenging (Herausfordern) manner. The German term Herausfordern 
has particular connotations relevant to an understanding of the differ-
ence. “Zu fordern” means “to demand, to summon, to crave.” Here is 
the source for the difference of impact modern technology takes on what 
it reveals: it exercises a new form of revealing that is not ‘poetic’, it is 
challenging and ordering in an almost aggressive sense. It objectifies 
and subordinates that which it reveals. And that which is objectified is 
simultaneously subjected to be “Bestand”, a standing-reserve, some-
thing “on call for use.” 
Introduced into the realm of medicine, the Heideggerian way of inter-
preting technology raises fundamental questions related to the human 
body as a potential resource to be manipulated commercially for scien-
tific and therapeutic purposes, as well as for the purpose of profit (Nel-
kin and Andrews 1998):
In	a	context	where	human	beings	are	‘known’	to	medicine	by	tech-
nological	measures	only,	we	accept	 that	man	 is	being	 included	 in	
Heidegger’s	standing-reserve.	But,	if	everything	is	to	be	known	as	
objectified only, where do we draw the limits for manipulation? 
How	can	we	then	protect	ourselves	and	our	patients	from	medico-
technological	exploitation	and	colonisation	of	all	aspects	of	our	be-
ing	human?	If	man	becomes	a	standing-reserve,	what	happens	 to	
human	dignity	in	the	medical	context?
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6. AIMS OF THE STUDY
The paramount objective of this project is to contribute to critical reflec-
tion and theory development in medicine by performing a systematic 
documentation, analysis and conceptualisation of possible, unacknowl-
edged ethical dilemmas arising from clinical implementation of advanc-
ing, preventive, individually targeted medical technology.
Five different papers have been written to address this problem from 
different clinical angles, with the aims to:
117
1. Document and analyse the relation between advancing ultrasound 
imaging technology, the identification of soft markers for fetal chromo-
somal aberrations (most often Down syndrome) in the unborn child, and 
the rise of novel ethical dilemmas, with reference to the period 1980-
2000. 
2. Document and explore inherent difficulties and dilemmas related to 
implementation of so-called evidence-based medicine (EBM) in relation 
to individual persons/patients. 
3. Conceptualise and discuss the aggregated implications of advancing 
preventive technology in the form of authoritative clinical guidelines 
and checklists in the context of everyday clinical practice in primary 
health care. 
4. Model and reflect upon the consequences of implementing the 2003 
European guidelines on cardiovascular disease prevention in clinical 
practice in an unselected Norwegian population; 
i. In a study including an empirical analysis and subsequent discussion 
of the proportion of individuals who exhibit unfavourable levels of the 
single cardiovascular disease risk factor of blood pressure and/or cho-
lesterol, as defined by the guidelines cut-off points. 
ii. In another modelling study discussing the prevalence of individuals 
becoming classified as ‘at high combined risk’ for CVD and in need of 
maximal clinical attention, as defined by the guidelines’ SCORE sys-
tem. 
Finally, it is an aim of this thesis to present the idea of “sustainable 
and responsible development” as a conceptual framework for address-
ing the ethical and practical challenges that are highlighted by the five 
sub-studies of this thesis. This will be attempted in the discussion part 
of this thesis. 
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7. MATERIAL AND METHODS
The question being asked determines the appropriate research architecture, strat-
egy, and tactics to be used – not tradition, authority, experts, paradigms, or schools 
of thought.            – Sackett & Wennberg 1997
The present work builds on two distinctly different scientific approaches: 
1. Conventional empirical analysis of population data. Papers IV and V 
build upon empirical analyses of selected cardiovascular disease risk 
factors throughout a well-defined Norwegian population. These analy-
ses were undertaken in the wake of a pilot study (see chapter 7.2.4), 
which indicated that our concerns were justified, to demonstrate the ex-
istence of unacknowledged ethical dilemmas in relation to preventive 
medicine. The epidemiological analyses indicate the need for systematic 
and critical reflection upon the theoretical foundations for, and philo-
sophical aims of, individually targeted initiatives in clinical practice. 
2. Systematic, critical appraisal of existing medical evidence and clinical 
recommendations with regard to inconsistencies implicit in their frame 
of references. In papers I, II and III, the data material submitted to fur-
ther analysis consists of previously published scientific medical knowl-
edge and clinical recommendations. In other words, it is the theoretical 
foundation for recommended medical practice that is being investigated. 
Such a critical appraisal of valid knowledge on the level of epistemol-
ogy is commonplace and considered appropriate in many academic dis-
ciplines, such as in the theory and history of science and in the political 
and social sciences. It is, however, not common in medicine to conduct 
studies to address, identify and evaluate the theoretical sources of prob-
lematic aspects of medical knowledge or practice. Consequently, such 
an approach is neither well established nor standardized in the context 
of traditional medical knowledge production. Both research approaches, 
however, must be considered equally necessary and appropriate to as-
sure both theoretical consistency and methodological adequacy with re-
gard to the conduct of research. Also, both approaches are equally and 
explicitly in accordance with Encyclopaedia Britannica’s definition105 of 
research, which is 
105 Encyclopaedia Britannica’s on-line dictionary (Merriam-Webster), accessed Sept 7, 2005.
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studious inquiry or examination; especially: Investigation or experimentation 
aimed at the discovery and interpretation of facts, revision of accepted theories 
or laws in the light of new facts, or practical application of such new or revised 
theories or laws.
Later in this chapter, particular methodological issues pertaining to the 
different papers will be presented. I will however begin by outlining 
what I regard as fundamental premises for the reflective process leading 
up to this thesis.
7.1	Outline	of	the	premises	of	my	research	process
7.1.1 Exploration of the scientific literature 
From the mid 1990s, I have been exploring peer-reviewed medical lit-
erature, selected papers from other academic disciplines, as well as text-
books in the fields of philosophy, ethics, medical history, anthropology 
and sociology. Since I started this process, it has become increasingly 
easy to access full-text articles directly via the Internet. Not having to 
formally prioritise, finance, order and wait for papers has made roaming 
around in academic cyberspace ever more rewarding. 
My search for literature has been driven by a combination of ‘systematic 
rationality’, where I have searched for documentation related to rela-
tively sharply defined questions, and ‘intuition,’106 where I have pursued 
information or ideas that have attracted my interest, although the im-
plicit relevance of this material did not always become explicitly clear 
to me until later. In the process of writing up this thesis, however, I have 
found that most of my topics of interests have come to fit together in a 
coherent fashion. They now constitute the foundation of the introduc-
tory theory chapter and the discussion of this thesis, and they can all be 
linked to the notion of ‘sustainable and responsible medicine’. 
The references constituting the empirical and theoretical basis and the 
discussion of this thesis cover a wide spectrum. Besides various psy-
chological, sociological, philosophical, anthropological and historical 
papers and books, this spectrum encompasses 
106 Trisha Greenhalgh, professor of general practice with much experience in the fields of both evidence-
based medicine and narrative-based medicine, defines professional intuition as “a decision-making method 
that is used unconsciously by experienced practitioners but is inaccessible to the novice. It is rapid, subtle, 
contextual, and does not follow simple, cause-and-effect logic. (…) Intuition is not unscientific. It is a highly 
creative process, fundamental to hypothesis generation in science” (Greenhalgh 2002).
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• traditional epidemiological and clinical research, 
• studies on the benefits and harmful effects of screening pro-
grammes, 
• studies on risk assessment and communication, 
• discussions of the development and implementation of clinical 
guidelines, 
• discussions on medicalisation,
• basic research within the fields of psycho-neuro-immunology and 
fetal development, 
• studies on the relation between social inequality and health, 
• studies of the doctor-patient relationship and medical profession-
alism, 
• critical analyses of contemporary biomedical and bioethical rea-
soning, and 
• studies on the health and well-being of healthcare professionals. 
7.1.2 Arenas for critical reflection and ‘respectful dialogue’
In 2000, I found a paper in The Lancet which fascinated and stimulated 
me. Its title was The idea is more important than the experiment, au-
thored by UK professor of cardiology John Martin. There, Martin pres-
ents an outline of academic processes that he thinks are likely to foster 
development and innovation in medicine (Martin 2000). He emphasises 
three things, which I have, through my own experience, come to under-
stand and appreciate more and more:
Scientific concepts are put together often most fruitfully in a non-linear fantasy, 
which is both spontaneous and intuitive. 
A multidisciplinary team is more likely to give rise to non-linear fantasy than a 
monovalent team. 
Perhaps the great problem of the next 100 years (...) will be to understand what 
makes a human being a human being. (...) The solution to the problem of “what is a 
human being” can only come from an interaction between science, philosophy and 
sociology. Surely we need to understand what is the nature of man, before we can 
plan his appropriate society. 
The intuitive and non-linear elements of my search for medical literature 
have already been described. Furthermore, I have come to realise that 
the complex topic of the prevention of disease cannot be a project for 
medicine alone. It certainly presupposes input from multidisciplinary 
teams. Therefore, I have made systematic attempts to integrate perspec-
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tives and research methods from the humanities in this thesis. Also, si-
multaneously with my efforts to get acquainted with basic humanistic 
perspectives on ‘the human condition’ and health care, a series of aca-
demic gatherings involving both medical and non-medical scholars have 
had a strong impact on my learning, questioning and understanding. In 
particular, I want to mention the following academic events, which have 
come to represent milestones in the continuous reflective process that 
has resulted in this thesis. 
In 2000, I attended the 2nd World Congress of Philosophy of Medicine 
in Krakow. This experience was a professional eye-opener. At the con-
gress, I presented a lecture, based on a preliminary version of Paper 
I. Inspired by fruitful dialogues with medical colleagues and scholars 
from other disciplines, I returned to Iceland where I planned a Nordic 
workshop, titled Human dignity in a medical context. This workshop 
took place at Skálholt, Iceland, in the spring of 2001. It was attended 
by a multidisciplinary group of about 25 specially invited participants. 
Among them were members of Filosofisk poliklinikk (“Philosophical 
Polyclinic,” founded in 1998, see www.uib.no/isf/filpol/) at the Faculty 
of Medicine, University of Bergen. Filosofisk poliklinikk has subse-
quently arranged four four-day multidisciplinary seminars at the Barony 
in Rosendal, Norway. I have had the opportunity to attend them all: 
2002: Dignity and Dialogue: Exploring Medicine’s Relational Foundations. The 
case history upon which Paper II is based was explored in-depth in a workshop at 
this seminar (see below). 
2003: Health, Culture and Self. Exploring Modernity’s Challenges to Medicine. 
2004: The Meaning of Risk. Exploring the Foundations of Medical Evidence. 
2005: The Power of Goodness. Exploring Help and Helplessness in a Medicalised 
Society. This seminar took place at the point where I was beginning to structure the 
discussion part of this thesis.
The Rosendal seminars have all been openly advertised and acknowl-
edged by the Norwegian Medical Association as regular, continuous 
medical education courses. Each seminar has been attended by 25-30 
people. Filosofisk poliklinikk has always paid minute attention to detail 
when the programme has been designed. This has resulted in learning 
processes which many experienced academics, in particular medical 
122
doctors, have characterised as a unique professional experience. The 
academic content has been challenging, thought-provoking and contro-
versial; opinions have been diverse, yet the atmosphere has always been 
utterly respectful.107 
The seminars have – seen in retrospect – revolved around questions 
of moral responsibility in medicine. In order to make the implications 
of the concept of responsibility clear, one aim has been to develop the 
participants’ understanding of the humanistic foundations of medicine. 
Icelandic professor of philosophy Vilhjálmur Arnason, twice a Rosendal 
participant, links this to what he calls a relational responsibility in medi-
cine.108 Another aim has been to stimulate reflection on the nature of the 
biomedical paradigm as we know it today. In particular, implications of 
the discourse on ‘risk’ and implementation of so-called ‘evidence-based 
medicine’ have been investigated. Arnason links this to the notion of 
structural responsibility in medicine. 
The Rosendal participants have included medical doctors – many of 
them experienced general practitioners with research experience, phi-
losophers, and academics from various non-medical disciplines. Among 
the specially invited external participant-lecturers at the Rosendal sym-
posia have been Alfred Tauber, professor of medicine and philosophy in 
Boston; Arne-Johan Vetlesen, professor of philosophy at the University 
of Oslo; Kenneth W. Goodman, founder and director of the University of 
Miami’s Bioethics Program; Iona Heath, general practitioner and chair 
of the BMJ ethical committee; Eric Cassell, US physician-writer and 
clinical professor emeritus of public health; Vilhjálmur Arnason, profes-
sor of philosophy at the University of Iceland; and Tor-Johan Ekeland, 
professor of psychology at the University of Bergen. 
7.1.3 “Conversations with the situation”
The reflective process underlying this work should not be regarded in 
isolation from what I have experienced and learnt as an intern, during 
107 Readers familiar with medical culture are likely to know that new ideas are not necessarily treated with 
respect in the medical community. The history of Robin Warren and Barry Marshall, who were awarded the 
2005 Nobel Prize for their discovery of the bacterium Helicobacter pylori and its role in gastritis and peptic 
ulcer disease, is a reminder of this (see chapter 2.2.2). Eivind Meland, one of the co-founders of Filoso-
fisk poliklinikk, has proposed the concept ‘respectful dialogue’ to describe an academic atmosphere where 
vulnerable and controversial arguments and ideas can be presented in the absence of arrogant or malicious 
critique.
108 Arnason V. Are we responsible for each other? Lecture at the Rosendal seminar, 2005.
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four years as a general practitioner in Norway, a short, but memorable, 
period as a resident at an oncology department, three years at the De-
partment of Psychiatry at Landspitali University Hospital in Iceland, 
and five years as a staff physician in the same hospital, serving 4500 
employees. My academic and clinical interests have ever more often 
come to interact and reinforce each other. For instance, my consulta-
tion office at Landspitali is sometimes the arena for what professor of 
education and development Donald A. Schön might have described as 
“conversations with the situation” (Schmidt 2000; Malterud 2001). That 
is to say, some of my patients at the hospital have taught me, as a profes-
sional, to see health and disease from a new perspective. These dialogue 
partners have often been experienced, devoted and previously healthy 
healthcare workers who have at some point encountered severe or re-
current health problems that have not found successful resolutions in 
the conventional, curative system of care. In these instances I have de-
liberately taken on a professional role distinctly different from that of a 
treating physician, co-reflecting with the person upon her biography and 
current life situation. I have realised that it can be quite unscientific, and 
thereby unethical, to address human disease and suffering only from the 
narrow perspective of conventional biomedicine. To put it another way, 
resistant suffering has become meaningful, and treatable, when the sick 
person’s narrative and experience has come into focus. At this level, an 
‘existential logic’ has become apparent (Kirkengen 2001 and 2005). For 
instance, I have seen how remarkably destructive the subjective experi-
ence of humiliation and unfair treatment can be to health.109 What I have 
been able to contribute as a professional in these situations has first of all 
been an empathic recognition of the person’s sense of violated dignity. 
I have subsequently made use of my growing understanding of ‘doctor-
ing-as-leadership’ (Schei 2006). Thus, I have guided the person to focus 
on the resources and possibilities of the situation. I have written more 
about my experiences in this field in an essay called Om mentorskap og 
medisin (On mentorship and medicine, Getz 2003). In her thesis The 
skapende mellomrommet i møtet mellom pasient og lege (“The creative 
in-between in the clinical encounter”), Norwegian general practitioner 
109 This observation validates the theory put forward by previously mentioned Harvard researcher Jonathan 
Mann (1998). These individual stories are also congruent with the increasing number of studies which have 
(during the last 6-8 years) addressed the relation between Organizational fairness (or justice) and health, 
see Medline. Even when operationalised quantitatively, ‘fairness’ emerges as an independent determinant 
of employees’ health and well-being. The most recent finding of the Whitehall study is that “justice at work 
may have benefits for heart health” (Kivimäki et al. Arch Int Med 2005; 165:2245-51). Other results from 
the Whitehall II study are listed in Appendix 4.
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and researcher Eli Berg has explored successful cases of doctor-patient 
co-reflection along similar lines (Berg 2005). To sum up, my experience 
has taught me that the scientific base of the medical paradigm is simply 
not comprehensive enough for doctors to do a good job, and I see it as 
my professional responsibility to speak out about this. 
7.2	Methodological	information	pertaining	to	the	individual	studies,	
not	outlined	in	the	published	papers
7.2.1 Paper I 
Exploration of the topic of anatomical soft markers for fetal chromo-
somal aberrations 
Paper I contains an exploration of the development of the knowledge 
base related to anatomical soft markers for chromosomal aberrations in 
the fetus (see Paper I for definitions and explanations). The paper inte-
grates numerical and hermeneutical approaches, as it aims to document 
and describe one particular chapter in the recent history of medical tech-
nology development. The paper can be regarded as both an analysis of 
very recent medical history and a contribution to the building of medi-
cal theory. As previously said, there is a very limited tradition within 
medicine for regarding the medical knowledge base as such as ‘material’ 
worthy of academic investigation. However, as I set out to describe the 
methodological approach that was used in Paper I, I found a publica-
tion by Trisha Greenhalgh and co-workers who describe a new scien-
tific method, the meta-narrative review (Greenhalgh et al. 2005). This 
method refers to philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) theory 
of scientific paradigms and was developed to address the diffusion of 
academic innovation throughout various medical and non-medical dis-
ciplines. I realised that the methodological approach in Paper I has many 
similarities to a meta-narrative review. The analytical process leading up 
to Paper I will therefore be presented with reference to the elements of 
the meta-narrative review, as outlined by Greenhalgh et al.
i. “Territorial mapping” and “planning” phases (conducted in 1998-1999)
• This was a period of informal dialogues about the potential aca-
demic relevance of investigating the topic of soft markers. These 
dialogues came to involve several trusted academic colleagues in 
various fields and resulted in a broad and open-ended outline of 
the research questions.
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• During this period, general, broad and non-exhaustive search-
es related to the topic of prenatal diagnosis were conducted in 
PubMed®, the search engine of the National Library of Medicine. 
I applied various combinations of search terms including: screen-
ing, ultrasound, fetal/foetal, pregnancy, trimester, soft marker, 
Down’s/Down syndrome, trisomy, anomaly, ethics.
• An initial exploration was made of the particular issue of soft 
markers, by “browsing” the internet and performing preliminary 
targeted searches in PubMed. 
• Contact was established with fetal medicine experts in order to 
gain access to information and interpretations that could not be 
retrieved from the published peer-reviewed literature. A further 
description of this collaboration appears below (marked with *). 
• I was allowed to spend three working days at the National Centre 
for Fetal Medicine in Norway (1999). The visit involved observa-
tions of clinical practice and collegial discussions related to this.110 
At this centre, clinical dilemmas related to fetal soft markers in the 
second trimester of pregnancy were encountered on a daily basis 
at the time. 
ii. “Search” phase (mainly conducted in 1998-1999) 
• This phase involved comprehensive, targeted searches using the 
specific terms related to anatomical soft markers in PubMed (see 
further comments below, marked with**).
• Subsequent searches were made for additional empirical papers by 
way of manually searching selected journals and ‘snow-balling’, 
i.e., searching references for references, and pursuing the publica-
tion list of key researchers and clinicians. 
• A continuous e-mail dialogue was maintained with my main fetal 
medicine expert informant, to ensure that no important publica-
tions were missed.
 
iii. “Mapping” phase (mainly conducted 1998-2000)
• This phase involved identification of conceptual, theoretical and 
methodological key phenomena of the research area in question. 
• Identification of key actors and events in the unfolding of the re-
110 I had been granted the necessary permissions to enter the National Centre for Fetal Medicine as a re-
searcher, as it was part of my original research protocol to observe clinical encounters and interview expect-
ant mothers as well as their clinicians in this setting.
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search tradition was a key issue, including scientific milestones 
and seminal papers related to the anatomical soft markers.
• Attention was paid to the prevailing language and reasoning used 
by scientists to ‘tell the story’ of their scientific work and/or clini-
cal practice.
• The above-mentioned e-mail dialogue was maintained to ensure 
that my interpretation of technical details remained valid.
iv. “Appraisal” and “synthesis” phases (1999-2000)
• Each primary paper/study retrieved by searching the literature was 
examined with respect to its validity and relevance to the study in 
question. 
• Key results of relevant publications were extracted, and comparable 
studies were viewed together. The chronology of the development 
of the research field related to soft markers was gradually outlined. 
• The numbers of original publications related to each of five se-
lected soft markers were counted as a function of time. This made 
it possible to illustrate visually how the research field surrounding 
the anatomical soft markers developed. This way of describing the 
development within a research field appears to be a core element 
of the meta-narrative review process.
• Through reflection and dialogue with my co-author, a preliminary 
synthesis of the emerging findings and their implications was now 
prepared. Further literature searches were driven by this reflec-
tive process. They came to involve a wide range of topics, such 
as maternal-fetal bonding, fetal development, the vulnerable child 
syndrome, shortcomings of the principlistic bioethical paradigm, 
feministic theory, papers on the value-ladenness of medical tech-
nology, etc. 
• Through continued reflection and correspondence with selected 
scholars regarding particular aspects of the paper, a final synthesis 
of the findings was formulated.
v. “Recommendation” phase (2000- 2001)
• The overall messages from the meta-narrative review were formu-
lated. Implications for practice, policy and further research were 
outlined. The paper was subsequently submitted to Social Science 
& Medicine, where it was subjected to review by three experts in 
the field of prenatal diagnosis. 
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* Contact with external experts: In order to ensure overview of and 
valid interpretation in fetal medicine, Kjell Å. Salvesen, MD, PhD at 
Nasjonalt senter for fostermedisin (the National Centre for Fetal Medi-
cine) in Trondheim, Norway, made himself available for consultation 
by e-mail throughout the whole study period. This contact was essential 
since very limited published information could be obtained on the issue 
of how soft markers were handled in daily clinical practice throughout 
the Western world. Salvesen described the clinical “golden standard” at 
‘his’ competence centre but also had insight into how the topic was han-
dled internationally, based on unpublished information and dialogues 
with clinicians and scientists in the small and well-defined international 
fetal medicine expert community. In addition to Salvesen, Prof. Martin 
Whittle of the UK, who expressed concern in relation to what he saw 
as soft marker dilemmas in 1997 (see reference list in Paper I), was 
contacted. This resulted in several acquaintances, most importantly with 
UK psychologist Catherine Baillie. She had recently completed original 
research (then still unpublished) on parental experience in relation to the 
soft marker dilemmas. Baillie’s work (see Paper I) became an empirical 
cornerstone for the analysis in paper I. 
** Formal literature search on the topic of soft markers: As part of 
the review of the relevant literature, a formal, computerised search re-
lated to the five most researched soft markers was conducted through 
PubMed®, the National Library of Medicine’s (NLM™) journal litera-
ture search system. This was done to illustrate that Paper I is about the 
rise and development of a distinctly new body of medical knowledge: 
figure I in Paper I depicts the number of published original papers about 
the five most commonly discussed soft markers graphically as a func-
tion of time, from the time the topic first appeared in the biomedical 
literature shortly after 1980 until 1999, the year preceding the year when 
the systematic literature searches were conducted. Several search terms 
for each of the relevant soft markers were applied, as the terminology 
tended to change over time. An example: The soft marker, currently 
termed “nuchal translucency” (referring to the first trimester of preg-
nancy), was originally described in the second trimester of pregnancy 
where it was termed “nuchal oedema”, “nuchal thickening” or “nuchal 
fold”. In addition to the specific search for each individual soft marker, 
more informal methods were used. As the fetal medicine expert com-
munity appeared to be small, the names of the 10-15 most active authors 
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were systematically used to cross-check for additional relevant papers. 
In addition to the search in PubMed, reference lists of all key references 
and seminal papers were checked to identify papers that might have 
been missed by the computerised search. Very few (in the range of 5-10 
in total) additional papers were identified in this way. The number of 
retrieved original articles for each marker per year was always within 
such limits that it was possible to keep a list of them and check that each 
of them was relevant. Thereby, it was assured that no publication was 
counted more than once. 
7.2.2 Paper II
Development of a case history to be submitted to critical analysis
Paper II is an analysis of a case history which can be found in the intro-
duction to the paper itself. The case can be traced back to an authentic 
consultation in the office of an experienced general practitioner (GP) in 
Trondheim in 2001. It was a clinical encounter which evoked profes-
sional uneasiness in the GP, despite his knowing that he had handled 
the case ‘correctly’, according to the golden standard of evidence-based 
medicine (EBM). The GP recounted the essence of the case – as he saw 
it – to two academic colleagues at the Department of Public Health and 
General Practice at the Norwegian University of Science and Technol-
ogy (NTNU). The department was responsible for the planning of the 
12th Nordic Congress for General Practitioners, and I was subsequently 
invited to contribute to a plenary lecture which was to address the di-
lemma recounted by the GP. My task was to provide ‘contra EBM’ ar-
guments, as opposed to the ‘pro EBM’ speaker who would present the 
‘evidence-based’ and thereby presumably the correct way to handle the 
situation. I thereby had to search for theoretical arguments and scientific 
data to support the GP’s reported perception that the consultation had 
in a sense been burdened by, rather than supported and facilitated by, 
biomedical ‘evidence’. 
A discussion of the use of an anonymised case history as ‘material’ for 
critical reflection and theory development is warranted. This is not a 
common approach in medical science. As medical doctors we are fa-
miliar with cases that present new disease entities or syndromes, unex-
pected therapeutical side effects and other complications, etc. In these 
contexts, case studies are typically considered as contributing most to 
science when little is known about a phenomenon. Case studies are typi-
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cally regarded as a first step in the development of medical knowledge, 
and decreasingly useful as more knowledge accumulates (Anderson et 
al. 2005). It has however been demonstrated in other contexts, that case 
studies can be appropriate for exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory 
purposes at any level of knowledge (Anderson et al. 2005). The rel-
evance of appreciating evidence that emerges in the context of a par-
ticular clinical encounter has also been highlighted by Kirsti Malterud, 
who stated (2002): 
Regarding the clinical encounter as constitutive of medicine, the specific knowl-
edge generated in this encounter deserves status as evidence. So far, such issues 
are nearly invisible on the conventional maps of EBM. (…) If medicine insistently 
discards clinical knowledge from the realm of valid evidence, clinical practice will 
be isolated from scientific knowledge and medicine will lose its credibility as a 
scientifically based professional activity.
The use of casuistries, fictional and factual narratives or stories has long 
since been acknowledged as important to understanding and theory de-
velopment in medical ethics (Jones 1999). Reflections on case histories 
also hold a central place in Donald A. Schön’s investigations of how 
professional practitioners, such as medical doctors, learn and develop 
their skills. Influenced by existential philosophy, Schön affirms “the 
here-and-now as the test, the source, the limits of knowledge”. Theory 
building must grow out of the concrete things happening here and now, 
be tested against it, and then tested against the next situation, which may 
turn out to be different. Schön points out how stories can play a useful 
role in many kinds of academic research (Schmidt 2000).
In a recent editorial, Greenhalgh (2005) reflects upon the use of ‘anec-
dotes’ as a basis for medical research. She states that narratives suitable 
for research purposes tend to have three defining features: 
1.  an account of the unfolding events over time, 
2.  ‘emplotment’, i.e., the rhetorical juxtaposition of events to convey 
meaning, motive and causality, and
3.  ‘trouble’, i.e., a breach from something that was expected.
Trouble, Greenhalgh says, “is the raw material from which plot is wo-
ven”, i.e., the point of departure for further investigation. The case in 
Paper II satisfies Greenhalgh’s trouble criterion: the clinician feels that 
he may have done something wrong in relation to the patient, despite 
having done everything right in terms of evidence-based medicine.
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Case histories represent flexible frameworks for discussion and provide 
a tool for studying what Anderson et al. (2005) call integrated systems: 
every case story contains a human story as well as a medical story, 
which together can highlight various aspects of “person management, 
case management, health system management, and self-management” 
(Cox 2001). The presentation of any particular case, however, is never 
‘objective’ or ‘true’; every case history reflects the basic assumptions, 
values and intentions of its author(s). Like any other set of narrative 
or numerical material, it imposes a context upon the reader (Carson 
2005). According to Greenhalgh, the validity of any given case should 
be judged by narrative criteria; the crucial question is whether the story 
rings true and appears authentic and credible to the reader/listener. 
Case stories have previously proven to be useful tools for highlight-
ing the particular distinction between evidence-based medicine, where 
data are derived from population studies so as to feature the character-
istics of a theoretical and non-existent ‘mean’ individual, and narrative-
based medicine which focuses on one particular individual’s experience 
(Bleakley 2005). It is generally presumed that good doctors knowing 
‘the art of medicine’ are able to integrate both perspectives in any given 
clinical encounter. The case in Paper II was purposefully constructed111 
(or “packed”, in the terms of Carson) to stimulate further reflection on 
the task of integrating EBM and humanistic perspectives in the clinical 
setting. The case can be seen as extreme in the sense that the ‘scien-
tific’ (EBM) approach and the narrative-based approach turned out to 
represent two kinds of ‘knowing’ about the patient that were mutually 
exclusive. But in this respect, the case is authentic. The fact that “the sci-
ence” and “the art” of medicine no longer went hand in hand but pulled 
the clinician’s mind in opposite directions was the very reason why the 
experienced GP brought this particular case to the academy. In a sense, 
the case can be regarded as an anomaly112 in Thomas Kuhn’s terminol-
ogy (1962). 
At the 2002 Rosendal seminar, two months prior to the scheduled ple-
nary session at the Nordic congress for general practitioners, the case 
history in Paper II was discussed in a multidisciplinary group. Interest-
111 A different secondary version of the same primary case was developed by Irene Hetlevik for use in 
the Norwegian textbook of general practice. See Hunskaar S (red). Allmennmedisin. Oslo: Gyldendal aka-
demisk. 2003, p. 780.
112 An anomaly is an irregularity that is difficult to explain using existing rules or theory. See Appendix 2.
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ingly enough, Trisha Greenhalgh encouraged critical reflection upon the 
task of implementing EBM in clinical practice in this same year (2002) 
when she stated that: 
The enduring tradition of ‘Balint groups’113 indicates that storytelling and reflective 
discussion in groups is a time-honoured method for professional development. (...) 
The evidence-based Balint group is surely the epistemological marriage we have 
been waiting for. 
The case evoked intense debate at the Rosendal seminar. The discussion 
even came to involve an accompanying person (a renowned historian) 
who was not present at the workshop itself (see Table III in Paper II). 
Some of the participating doctors initially responded to the case history 
with clear frustration; they did not see that the case presented a dilemma 
worth discussing at all. Other participants responded with silence. But as 
time went by, the atmosphere changed. The turning point came when a 
professor of philosophy who had listened to the debate in silence, stated 
that he saw a clear ethical dilemma related to EBM as the only defend-
able approach to the man who was described in the case. But the best 
argument he could find to support his view was not part of his academic 
knowledge, he said. It came from his personal experience in relation to 
his own mother, witnessing her as she aged.114 It thereby appeared that 
the case history could serve as a catalyst for radical and non-linear re-
flection upon the challenge of practicing “narrative-based medicine in 
an evidence-based world” (Greenhalgh 1999).
Agreeing upon a working definition of EBM for the ‘pro et contra’ analysis
Part of the material that was subjected to critical analysis in Paper II was 
“the body of authoritative biomedical knowledge fulfilling the criteria 
as being ‘Evidence-based medicine’, i.e., the golden standard for good 
clinical practice. As outlined in the introduction, the working group 
behind the EBM-movement maintained that the concept of evidence 
should be understood in a broad sense: “EBM is the conscientious, ex-
plicit and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions 
about the individual patient” (Sackett et al. 1997). As explored in the 
previous theoretical section, however, the mainstream interpretation of 
EBM has become a far more narrow and authoritative one (Hetlevik 
2004). EBM does not involve evidence related to interpretation of the 
113 The works of psychoanalyst Michael Balint (1896-1970) are mentioned in the theoretical introduction to 
this thesis. Reflective “Balint groups” and societies are still active internationally.
114 Recounted with permission.
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particular patient’s situation, only evidence that pertains to choosing op-
timal interventions, as documented by  
1) randomized, controlled trials and meta-analyses for assessing the 
efficacy of interventions, and 
2) epidemiological studies of the specific disease condition in ques-
tion for predicting the course of illness, and, on a meta-perspec-
tive: 
3) clinical guidelines provided by expert committees that have com-
piled and evaluated evidence in categories 1 and 2. 
This narrow interpretation of EBM was submitted to critical analysis in 
Paper II. In relation to preparation of the manuscripts, it was evident that 
the pro-EBM author (PN), the contra-EBM author (LG) and the orga-
nising and facilitating academic-clinician (IH) interpreted the notion of 
EBM in the same way. 
7.2.3 Paper III 
This paper is a focused, critical appraisal of the well-established tra-
dition for doctor-initiated, individually oriented preventive measures 
in the context of the clinical consultation (Stott and Davis’ model, see 
reference list in paper III). The paper scrutinises an original problem, 
i.e., to what extent the honoured argument for opportunistic preventive 
initiatives remains valid, as we start aggregating – in the clinical en-
counter – a series of recommendations that have been derived in differ-
ent research contexts. From a methodological point of view, the paper 
resembles analytic research papers in the area of medical ethics and phi-
losophy. The aim of the paper is however not to provide an exhaus-
tive overview of relevant theory and research related to opportunistic 
preventive interventions, but to highlight a distinct set of practical and 
ethical dilemmas which are bound to arise in primary healthcare set-
tings where all clinical recommendations will ultimately converge. The 
discussion of this thesis will demonstrate that Paper III holds a logical 
and necessary position among the five sub-studies. It highlights one of 
the suggested core elements of a sustainable and responsible preventive 
medicine, namely the notion of equity (see chapter 9.5). 
7.2.4 Papers IV and V 
Pilot study to strengthen our motivation to conduct the studies
The main reason why we wanted to perform the studies that resulted in 
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Papers IV and V of this thesis was that, based on former studies (Hetlevik 
1999), we had good reason to believe that implementation of the 2003 
European guidelines on cardiovascular disease prevention in clinical 
practice would result in a very large proportion of the population being 
labelled as having an unfavourably high blood pressure, cholesterol, or 
combined disease risk level. Whilst preparing our formal investigation 
of the HUNT 2 data, we were allowed by Professor Emeritus of Gen-
eral Practice Calle Bengtsson to perform some preliminary calculations 
on data from the Population study of women in Gothenburg, Sweden 
(Bengtsson et al. 1997). The results indicated that our concerns were 
warranted. So our research group went on to formally analyse the data 
from the HUNT 2 study. 
The Nord-Trøndelag Health Study (HUNT) 
This study so far consists of the two cross-sectional sub-studies HUNT 
1 (1984-6) and HUNT 2 (1995-7). HUNT 3 will start in 2006. HUNT is 
one of the largest health studies ever performed. It contains a database 
of personal and family medical histories, collected in two consecutive 
cross-sectional studies. It also contains a bio-bank. The main objectives 
have been related both to epidemiological and clinical research. The 
HUNT 1 and 2 studies have been approved by the Data Inspectorate of 
Norway and by the Regional Committee for Medical Research Ethics, 
and all information from HUNT is treated according to the guidelines 
of the Data Inspectorate. The participation has been based on informed 
consent. The design and questionnaires applied in the HUNT study is 
further presented on the study’s website: http://www.hunt.ntnu.no. Hol-
men and co-workers have also published a comprehensive overview 
paper describing the HUNT study (in English) in the journal Norsk Epi-
demiologi (2003).
The population in Nord-Trøndelag County is stable and well defined. 
The geographical, demographical, and occupational structure and pat-
terns of morbidity and mortality are considered fairly representative of 
Norway as a whole. The county, however, lacks a large city, and the 
average level of education is somewhat lower than the national average, 
as is the average income. 
Some particular issues relating to The Nord-Trøndelag Health Study 
1995-1997 (HUNT 2) should be mentioned: All residents of Nord-Trøn-
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delag County, aged 20 (reaching their 20th birthday during the year of 
screening in their municipality) and older were invited to the health sur-
vey between August 1995 and June 1997. The invitation letter was sent 
by mail attached to a three-page questionnaire (Questionnaire 1, see the 
HUNT website and Appendix in this thesis) and an information folder. 
The questionnaire was to be completed and returned at the screening 
site. A second questionnaire (Questionnaire 2, see the HUNT website 
and Appendix) was handed out at the screening site to be completed 
and returned by mail. In total, the HUNT 2 (1995-1997) study recruited 
30 860 men (67% of those invited) and 35 280 women (76% of those 
invited), aged 20 and older. 
The 2003 European guidelines on cardiovascular disease prevention in 
clinical practice 
All the necessary information regarding the guidelines (De Backer et al. 
2003) is presented in Papers IV and V. However, it might be of interest 
to see how the guidelines are presented on the homepage of the Euro-
pean Society of Cardiology.
Figure	7.2.4	The front page of the 2003 European Guidelines on the Eu-
ropean Society of Cardiology (ESC) website (www.escardio.org). Note 
that pocket and PC versions for personal use can be ordered. Accessed 
April 19th 2005.
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European Guidelines on Cardiovascular 
Disease Prevention in Clinical Practice
Document	 type: Guidelines & Scientific 
Statements 
Publication: New European Journal of 
Cardiovascular Prevention and Rehabilita-
tion 10 (Suppl 1): S1-S78 : 2003  
Authoring	 body: Third Joint Task Force 
of the European and other Societies (con-
stituted by representatives of eight societ-
ies and by invited experts) 
Authors: Guy De Backer, Chairperson, 
(ESC); Ettore Ambrosioni, (ESC); Knut 
Borch-Johnsen, (EASD, IDFE); Carlos 
Brotons, (ESGP/FM); Renata Cifkova, (ESC); Jean Dallongeville, 
(ESC); Shah Ebrahim, (ESC); Ole Faergeman, (EAS); Ian Graham, 
(ESC); Giuseppe Mancia, (ESC); Volkert Manger Cats, (EHN); Kris-
tina Orth-Gomér, (ISBM); Joep Perk, (ESC); Kalevi Pyörälä, (ESC); 
José L. Rodicio, (ESH); Susana Sans, (ESC); Vedat Sansoy, (ESC); Udo 
Sechtem, (ESC); Sigmund Silber, (ESC); Troels Thomsen, (ESC); Da-
vid Wood, (ESC)Other experts who contributed to parts of the guide-
lines: Christian Albus, Nuri Bages, Gunilla Burell, Ronan Conroy, Hans 
Christian Deter, Christoph Hermann-Lingen, Steven Humphries, An-
thony Fitzgerald, Brian Oldenburg, Neil Schneiderman, Antti Uutela, 
Redford Williams, John Yarnell    
Endorsed	by: Albanian Society of Cardiology / Armenian Society of 
Cardiology / Association of Cardiologists of Bosnia & Herzegovina / 
Austrian Cardiologists Association / Belgian Society of Cardiology / 
Croatian Cardiac Society / Cyprus Society of Cardiology / Czech So-
ciety of Cardiology / Estonian Society of Cardiology / Finnish Cardiac 
Society / French Society of Cardiology / German Society of Cardiology 
/ Hellenic Cardiological Society / Hungarian Society of Cardiology / 
Latvian Society of Cardiology / Lithuanian Society of Cardiology / Pol-
ish Cardiac Society / Portuguese Society of Cardiology / Romanian So-
ciety of Cardiology / San Marino Society of Cardiology / Slovak Soci-
ety of Cardiology / Cardiology Society of Serbia & Montenegro / Swiss 
Society of Cardiology / Netherlands Society of Cardiology / Tunisian 
Society of Cardiology / Ukrainian Society of Cardiology
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8. RESULTS
8.1 Synopsis of Papers I-IV
Paper	I	
Ultrasound	 screening	 of	 pregnancy:	 Advancing	 technology,	 soft	
markers	of	fetal	anomaly	and	unacknowledged	ethical	dilemmas.	
Getz L, Kirkengen AL. Social Science & Medicine 2003; 56:2045-57
The paramount objective of the project, of which the present investiga-
tion constitutes the first part, is to contribute to critical reflection and 
theory development in medicine by systematic documentation, analy-
sis and conceptualisation of unacknowledged ethical dilemmas arising 
from clinical implementation of advancing, preventive, individually 
targeted medical technology. This paper addresses the topic by explor-
ing the relation between advancing ultrasound imaging technology, the 
identification of soft markers for fetal chromosomal aberrations in the 
unborn child (in particular trisomy 21 or Down syndrome), and the rise 
of novel ethical dilemmas, with reference to the period 1980-2000. 
Material and methods 
The material analysised was the evolving biomedical knowledge base 
and clinical practice related to anatomical soft markers for fetal chromo-
somal aberrations. More specifically
1. a comprehensive literature review was performed by a combina-
tion of formal and informal searching methods. This review cov-
ered the relevant biomedical literature but also extended into the 
social sciences. 
2. information which was inaccessible by other routes was obtained 
by consultations with national and international experts who con-
tributed unpublished interpretations and knowledge pertaining to 
the issue of soft markers. 
Results and implications 
The principal result of the study was formal documentation of the fact 
that the practice of routine fetal screening by obstetrical ultrasound, ap-
plying the latest in diagnostic equipment, appears to have caused harm 
to an unknown number of expectant parents and unborn children dur-
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ing the period covered by the study. This harm involved loss of an un-
known number of healthy fetal lives as well as significant distress in an 
unknown number of expectant parents. This resulted from the fact that 
many ultrasound examiners had to counsel pregnant women about an 
increased risk for fetal chromosomal aberrations on the basis of subtle 
findings in the ultrasonographic image, interpretations that proved to be 
misleading as solid scientific evidence on the significance of the find-
ings accumulated at a later date. Profound and private moral dilemmas 
thereby emerged as a direct consequence of application of an advancing 
medical technology in a routine clinical setting. The study thereby chal-
lenges the bio-medical tradition for considering scientific knowledge 
production as a value-neutral act per se. It also provides strong argu-
ments for scrutinising the interface between prenatal testing and human 
experience, and the relevance of applying scientific methods and ethical 
approaches extending beyond traditional biomedicine and bioethics. 
Paper	II	
A	matter	of	heart.	The	GP	consultation	in	an	evidence-based	world. 
Getz L, Nilsson P, Hetlevik I. Scandinavian Journal of Primary Health 
Care 2003; 21:3-9. 
This second paper addresses unacknowledged ethical dilemmas arising 
from clinical implementation of evidence based medicine (EBM) in the 
individual consultation. It explores the inherent tension that may arise 
between EBM and a so-called humanistic approach. 
Material and methods
The material which was subjected to scientific analysis consisted of 
1) an authentic case description brought to the academy by an expe-
rienced general practitioner. The clinician reported professional 
uneasiness in relation to the consultation, despite having treated 
the patient ‘correctly’ according to the standards of evidence based 
medicine. 
2) the body of evidence based medical (EBM) knowledge pertaining 
to the above-mentioned case at the time of the study (2002). 
3) relevant theories and scientific knowledge beyond conventional 
EBM that could support the GP’s sense of professional uneasiness 
in relation to the case.
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Results 
The study documented that the clinician could find substantial theoreti-
cal support for professional uneasiness related to the implementation of 
EBM in the particular consultation in question. 
The conventional EBM literature indicated that persons with a previ-
ously unrecognised myocardial infarction (MI) ought to be treated like 
patients with a history of a symptomatic MI. The incidental finding in 
the ECG should thereby be communicated to the person, accompanied 
by an offer of further diagnostic testing, risk evaluation, and follow-up 
with life-style interventions and up to four different medications. Fur-
ther critical evaluation of the EBM literature, however, revealed that the 
quantity and quality of evidence concerning the natural prognosis and 
potential intervention benefits for an ‘average’ 70-year-old man with 
a previously unrecognised MI was far more limited than could be ex-
pected from the term “evidence-based medicine”. 
Beyond conventional EBM, substantial scientific evidence could be 
found on the relation between experience of meaning and physiologi-
cal processes in the body. For instance, there appears to be a clinically 
significant relation between self-perceived health and survival. There is 
also considerable evidence of a direct link between negative emotions 
and cardiovascular disease progression. Scientific knowledge about how 
people/patients perceive being labelled as “at risk” for future disease 
events was almost non-existent in 2002. 
Implications of the findings
A truly evidence-based approach to the person in the case would en-
compass theories and knowledge that extend beyond the paradigm of 
conventional EBM. The analysis also indicated that the bioethical prin-
ciple respect for patient autonomy can have fundamental limitations in 
relation to the paradigm of EBM. It also appeared that in this particular 
case, application of conventional EBM (which would be in favour of 
intervention) and other kinds of relevant medical evidence (that could 
be used as arguments to refrain from intervention) turned out to be mu-
tually exclusive kinds of scientific knowledge. In total, there were so 
many scientific uncertainties relating to this particular individual that 
they might represent an argument for following the ethical principle 
do no harm and not interfering with the patient’s life and self-image. 
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In total, the study challenges the bio-medical tradition for considering 
implementation of medical evidence and communication about risk as 
value-neutral acts per se. 
Paper	III	
Is	opportunistic	disease	prevention	in	the	consultation	ethically	jus-
tifiable? 
Getz L, Sigurdsson JA, Hetlevik I. British Medical Journal 2003;327:498-
500.
This third paper addresses the topic of unacknowledged ethical dilem-
mas arising from clinical implementation of advancing medical technol-
ogy by exploring the aggregated impact of advancing preventive tech-
nology in the form of authoritative clinical guidelines and checklists on 
everyday clinical practice in primary health care. Paper III can be seen 
as a general elaboration of some particular topics that were raised in 
paper II. 
Material and methods 
The setting analysed is the consultation in general practice (primary 
health care, family medicine). The material analysed consisted of 
1) A widely recognised consultation model by Stott and Davis (1979), 
particularly emphasising the clinical task of “opportunistic health 
promotion.”
2) The aggregated body of EBM-based clinical checklists and guide-
lines which primary healthcare clinicians are implicitly expected, 
or explicitly advised, to implement in their daily practice, in ac-
cordance with the above-mentioned consultation model. 
3) Theories and scientific knowledge extending beyond the para-
digm of conventional EBM indicating a need to reconsider the 
moral foundation for opportunistic implementation of preventive 
guidelines in routine clinical practice.  
Results and implications
The paper highlights that the number and complexity of potential pre-
ventive interventions that can be considered relevant, opportunistic ini-
tiatives have increased dramatically during the last decade. Risk com-
munication and decision-making in relation to preventive interventions 
have become a correspondingly demanding task. 
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The rapid increase in doctor-initiated, opportunistic preventive actions 
and check-list driven medicine may gradually come to repress or divert 
an open dialogue between patients and doctors. This general develop-
ment should be considered in light of the principle of respect for patient 
autonomy. The scientific ‘truth’ in relation to human health reaches far 
beyond the scope of evidence-based medicine. It can be argued that it 
is ethically questionable to impose evidence based preventive interven-
tions on patients who do not express explicit interest in undergoing this 
particular kind of medical evaluation. 
The paper sheds new light on medical doctors’ limited adherence to 
clinical guidelines in the preventive sphere. This phenomenon, which 
has been called clinical inertia, may perhaps reflect unacknowledged 
ethical dilemmas arising from the doctor’s steadily expanding preven-
tive medical agenda.
Paper	IV
Ethical	 dilemmas	 arising	 from	 implementation	 of	 the	 European	
guidelines	on	cardiovascular	disease	prevention	in	clinical	practice:	
descriptive	epidemiological	study.	
Getz L, Kirkengen AL, Hetlevik I, Romundstad S, Sigurdsson JA. 
Scandinavian Journal of Primary Health Care 2004;22:202-8.
This is the first of two papers addressing the topic of unacknowledged 
ethical dilemmas arising from clinical implementation of advancing 
medical technology by modelling the practical impact of implementa-
tion of the 2003 European guidelines on cardiovascular disease preven-
tion in clinical practice in an unselected population. In this paper, there 
is a focus on the single risk factors serum cholesterol and blood pressure 
(BP). 
Material and methods 
The 2003 European guidelines were applied to a cross-sectional pop-
ulation study comprising 62.104 adult Norwegians, aged 20-79, who 
participated in The Nord-Trøndelag Health Study 1995-97 (HUNT-2). 
Total, age- and gender-specific point prevalences of individuals with to-
tal cholesterol ≥ 5 and/or systolic blood pressure ≥ 140 mmHg and/or 
diastolic blood pressure ≥ 90 mmHg, or taking antihypertensive medica-
tion was calculated and the results critically reflected upon. 
141
Results and implications
In total, 76% of individuals, aged 20-79, appeared to have an ‘unfavour-
able’ cardiovascular disease risk profile, according to guideline defini-
tions of optimal blood pressure and serum cholesterol. The point preva-
lence of individuals with cholesterol and/or blood pressure above the 
recommended cut-off-points increases with age. By age 24, the preva-
lence reaches 50%. By age 49, it reaches 90%. It has thereby been docu-
mented that implementation of the 2003 European guidelines on CVD 
prevention in clinical practice would label a large majority of Norwegian 
adults as having an unfavourable cardiovascular disease risk profile. Im-
portant ethical dilemmas arise at the point of guideline implementation, 
relating to risk labelling and medicalisation, as well as resource alloca-
tion and sustainability within the healthcare system. 
Paper	V
Estimating	 the	 high	 risk	 group	 for	 cardiovascular	 disease	 in	 the	
Norwegian	HUNT	 2	 population	 according	 to	 the	 2003	 European	
guidelines:	modelling	study.	
Getz L, Sigurdsson JA, Hetlevik I, Kirkengen AL, Romundstad S, Hol-
men J. British Medical Journal 2005;331:551-4. 
Note: this paper exists in a short version (published in the paper journal) as well as a 
full text version (accessible from the bmj website). The full text version is enclosed 
with this thesis: doi:10.1136/bmj.38555.648623.8F (published 15 August 2005). 
In this second modelling paper, the size of the “high risk” group, as 
defined by a combined risk estimate, is calculated and discussed. This 
is the group which should receive “maximal clinical attention”, accord-
ing to the 2003 European guidelines on cardiovascular disease (CVD) 
prevention in clinical practice. 
Material and methods 
The 2003 European guidelines were applied to a total of 5.548 partici-
pants, aged 40, 50, 55, 60 and 65, who participated in The Nord-Trøn-
delag Health Study 1995-1997 (HUNT-2), Norway. These are the same 
age groups that are depicted in the SCORE risk chart that is part of the 
guidelines. The distribution of risk categories for CVD was calculated, 
with emphasis on the “high risk” group; i.e., ≥5% probability for a fatal 
CVD event within 10 years. 
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Results and implications 
Application of the 2003 European guidelines on CVD prevention in a 
well-defined Norwegian population would label four out of ten women 
and nine out of ten men, aged 50, as “at high risk for fatal cardiovascular 
disease”. No men, aged 40 or older, would be classified as “at low risk 
for fatal CVD”. Already by age 40, 23% (95% confidence interval 19-26) 
of women and 86% (83 to 89) of men are at “high risk”, according to the 
guidelines. At age 50, the “high risk” category includes 40% (36 to 43) 
of women and 89% (87 to 93) of men. At age 65, the numbers are 84% 
for women (81 to 87) and 92% (89 to 94) for men. Implementation of 
the guidelines would thereby classify the majority of adult Norwegians 
as “at high risk for fatal CVD” and, thus, eligible for “maximal clinical 
attention”. This finding raises important scientific questions related to 
the evidence base of the guidelines, as well as questions related to the 
professional process leading up to the publication of these authoritative 
guidelines. It also predicts major ethical dilemmas related to resource 
allocation, workload and medicalisation. A discussion about the funda-
mental values, strategies, and sustainability of preventive medicine ap-
pears to be warranted.
8.2	Overview	of	results	and	emerging	topics
In the following table, an attempt has been made to give an overview of 
the topics that are dealt with in the five papers of this thesis. 
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TOPICS PAPER NUMBER
I II III IV V
Issues related to the theoretical foundation 
of contemporary, individually based, preven-
tive medicine
The value-ladenness of biomedical science 
and practice
√ √ √ √ √
The limitations of the theoretical foundation 
underlying contemporary Western biomedical 
research and practice
√ √ √ √ √
The potential for unintended or unrecognised 
harm related to the implementation of new, 
preventive medical technology in routine 
clinical practice
√ √ √ √ √
The problems and dilemmas related to identify-
ing risk for future disease or disability, given a 
physiological link between human experience 
of meaning and physiological state (extended 
to the maternal-fetal unity in Paper I)
√ √ √ √ √
The need to reconsider and revise the theoreti-
cal foundation underlying preventive medical 
activities directed towards individual persons/
patients
√ √ √ √ √
The strengths and limitations of the meth-
odological approach leading up to ‘evidence 
based medicine’ 
√ √ √ √ √
The emergence of EBM as a contemporary 
and indisputable authoritative value in medi-
cine
√ √ √ √ √
Blurring of borders between ‘population 
health care’ initiatives and personal health 
care in the consultation
√ √ √ √ √
Topics inherent to the particular paradigm 
of EBM
Dilemmas related to risk communication and 
risk-related decision-making
√ √ √ √ √
To be continued on the next page...
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I II III IV V
The dilemma of implementing evidence de-
rived from groups on the level of the individ-
ual
√ √ √ √ √
Dilemmas related to application of the prin-
ciple of patient autonomy in relation to the 
paradigm of EBM
√ √ √ √ √
The application of biomedical evidence in in-
appropriate clinical settings; i.e., transposing 
experimental data emerging from high risk 
populations in other clinical settings
√ √
The problems related to cut-off points for es-
timating and categorising risk 
– applying single risk factors √ √
– applying combined risk estimates √ √
Dilemmas related to medicalisation of popu-
lations
√ √ √ √
Issues related to practical sustainability and 
carrying capacity of the healthcare system
The practical processes and procedures re-
lated to development and implementation of 
clinical guidelines and recommendations 
√ √ √ √
The practical feasibility of preventive inter-
ventions in terms of workload and resource 
allocation 
√ √ √
The need to regard national/local preventive 
medical activities from a global perspective
(√) (√) √ √
Meta-perspectives
The danger of alienation of patients and 
healthcare professionals from the basic prem-
ises of human existence by technological ‘en-
framing’
√ √ √ √ √
Doctors’ limited adherence to clinical guide-
lines in the preventive sphere
√ √ √ √
The recognition of professional responsibility 
in relation to both scientific bringing forth and 
practice of medical knowledge
√ √ √ √ √
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9. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This thesis started with the definitions and goals of medicine and con-
tains an exploration of three concrete clinical arenas with reference to six 
theoretical knowledge fields. All five papers highlight that implementa-
tion of new, preventive medical technology at the interface between in-
dividually and population-oriented care can lead to the emergence of 
important and complex ethical as well as practical dilemmas and even 
have harmful consequences. This implies that technological innovations 
in preventive medicine should be more systematically and comprehen-
sively analysised than they recently have been. However, evaluating 
each particular new technology is not enough. At the same time, the 
overall goals, means and priorities of preventive medicine should be 
made clear, explicit and accessible to scrutiny and debate (McKee and 
Raine 2005; Roberts and Reich 2002).  
All five papers in this thesis clearly show that preventive medical re-
search and practice must be regarded as value-laden activities. And it 
has, during the process of writing, become increasingly clear to me that 
the theoretical foundation  presently underpinning these activities does 
not encompass the human condition in a scientifically comprehensive 
manner, and this shortfall renders the foundation ethically untenable. As 
I approach the completion of this thesis, I realise that my main concerns, 
and the main topic of this thesis, can be seen as representing a contem-
porary affirmation of Martin Heidegger’s and Hans Jonas’ conceptuali-
sations of the dangers related to technological enframing of the human 
condition (see chapters 2.4.2, 4.1.4 and 4.1.6). And once this is said, it 
follows as a logical consequence that all the papers in this thesis point to 
the relation between the development and implementation of new tech-
nology, on one side, and moral responsibility of medical researchers, 
administrators and clinicians, on the other. 
9.1	Medical	responsibility	-	promoting	just	and	fair	health	care
Canadian professor of sociology Arthur Frank has recently remarked 
how the noun form of “medical ethics” appears to suggest something 
substantive, embedded in a body of principles designed to help solve 
recognizable problems in clinical practice, and located in the offices of 
institutionalized experts called “ethicists” (Frank 2004). As an exten-
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sion of this way of conceptualising ethics, Frank suggests that we start 
to think about ethics in terms of a process of lives and decisions affect-
ing each other over time. He believes that most clinical dilemmas arise 
as a consequence of prior actions and decisions made by ourselves or 
others – i.e., any decision now is part of a process that began then. An 
important potential of ethics in medicine is found outside the domain of 
institutional ethics as a prescribed procedural activity; it lies in our ‘be-
ing ethical’ in everyday thought and practice. In Frank’s opinion, being 
ethical has less to do with making single decisions than with initiating 
and maintaining a process of constructive events (Frank 2004). I agree. 
As a community of medical researchers, administrators, opinion lead-
ers and practitioners, we need to conceptualise and develop a distinct 
awareness of how we all contribute, day by day and step by step, to “the 
arrival of things into existence”; i.e., to the making of medical reality. 
As Heidegger and Jonas taught (see chapter 4.4.4), we need to redis-
cover the link between causality and moral responsibility. This link was 
obvious to the ancient Greek scholars but has since become obscured in 
a society which has learned to regard the creation of new knowledge and 
technology as a value-neutral activity that can and should be pursued for 
its own sake. 
In the concluding chapter to the previously mentioned Goals of medi-
cine project, titled Looking forward (Callahan 1996), the writing group 
formulated a series of recommendations. The chapter opens by acknowl-
edging that “the traditional, powerful and attractive strong premises” un-
derlying modern medicine have been a source of great advances. Now, 
however, it seems to be time to re-examine these premises as they imply 
an increasingly naive and resource-consuming faith that medicine will 
ultimately win the war against its two main enemies – disease and death. 
The Goals of Medicine project group’s advice is that the medical com-
munity should learn to think more along the lines of ecology. This would 
imply becoming more temperate, prudent, economically sustainable, 
just and equitable, socially sensitive, and respectful of genuine human 
choice and dignity (Callahan 1996). In many respects, these key recom-
mendations are congruent with the central conclusions of Papers I–V 
in this thesis. In total, preventive medical research and practice should 
become somewhat more directed towards those conditions of human life 
that are health preserving and enhancing and a bit less preoccupied with 
fighting disease and death. 
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As medical doctors, we have been proud of our professional rights 
and duties to serve as “a self-directive, moral community” (see chap-
ter 4.1.1). In this context, our right to define and direct production and 
implementation of new medical knowledge has been regarded as a self-
evident part of our professional autonomy. However, as outlined by oth-
ers (see chapter 4.1.1), the professions are, in general, (May 2001) and 
the medical profession, in particular (Horton 2005), under siege, and it 
seems quite probable to me that the credibility, influence and autono-
my of the medical profession will continue to decline if people do not 
acknowledge that our priorities and activities are just and fair.116 For 
instance, I believe that the approach to disease prevention and health 
promotion which is embedded in the 2003 European guidelines on CVD 
(the topic of Papers IV and V) ought to be evaluated from this view-
point. The underlying idea, to prevent as much disease as possible in a 
given population, appears rational in its own right. But within a system 
with limited resources, which will always be our clinical reality, it does 
not seem reasonable and fair to embark on such an out-reaching proj-
ect without even considering beforehand how the healthcare system is 
going to accommodate the guidelines, and how their implementation 
might come to affect services for people who are already asking for our 
help, or who might benefit from other preventive services. At this point, 
it may be relevant to evoke the teachings of Harvard philosopher John 
Rawls (1921-2002), one of the most influential political philosophers of 
the 20th century. After authoring the seminal book A theory of Justice in 
1971, Rawls continued outlining the essence of his key concept called 
“justice as fairness.” His final theory appeared as Justice as fairness: 
a restatement in 2001. It outlines a theory of justice based on the idea 
of a social contract, as a fair system of cooperation, based on reciproc-
ity and mutuality and the notion of what is good for each participant. 
Rawls emphasised the importance of maintaining the social bases of 
self-respect and self-confidence among people in general and scrutiny 
of how political decisions would affect the least advantaged in society 
in these important areas. Rawls’ theory was not primarily designed to 
address issues of health care, but it has been applied by other thinkers as 
a guide to analysing the organisation of health care, both nationally and 
116 Just: from Latin justus, from jus right, law; akin to Sanskrit yos welfare. It implies having a basis in or 
conforming to fact or reason, being faithful to an original, acting or being in conformity with what is morally 
upright or good (Merriam-Webster 2005). Fair: from Old English fæger; akin to Old High German fagar 
beautiful: marked by impartiality and honesty, free from self-interest, prejudice, or favouritism. Conforming 
to the established rules. Consonant with merit or importance. Open to legitimate pursuit, attack, or ridicule 
(Merriam-Webster 2005).
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globally (Horton 2003, Ruger 2004 i and ii). Furthermore, continuing 
from Rawls’ argument, one might also address the medical knowledge 
paradigm from the perspective of “justice as fairness”: one of the major 
challenges facing modern medicine today is to conceptualise, develop 
and implement knowledge about the causal pathways through which so-
cioeconomic and other inequalities work to produce gradients in health 
outcomes, whether regarded on a local, national or global level (see 
chapter 2.1.4). This is also the claim of a group of US scholars that sees 
Rawls’ theory as a compelling tool to help re-direct academic and clini-
cal attention (Daniels et al. 2000). They state: 
With some significant exceptions neither academic nor popular discussion has 
looked “upstream” (...) to the social arrangements that determine the health achieve-
ments of societies. 
The remaining part of this discussion will be organised according to 
the previously presented criteria for sustainable development. To be-
gin with, I will outline a preliminary list of criteria for sustainable and 
responsible, individually targeted preventive medicine. As previously 
mentioned, the list is inspired by the criteria made by economist Michael 
Jacobs, presented in chapter 4.2.2. Subsequently, each criterion will be 
outlined and its relation to the five papers of this thesis emphasised.
9.2	Criteria	for	sustainable	and	responsible	preventive	medicine	
Compared with Jacobs’ version, my list of criteria entails some changes, 
made to accommodate the particular topic of individually based preven-
tive medical activities as practiced in Western countries. Primarily, I 
have moved Jacob’s final concept – which he termed Quality of life – to 
the top of the list and renamed it. The concept thereby becomes the most 
fundamental criterion, and I call it A balanced theoretical approach to 
preventive medicine. Secondly, I emphasise that Jacob’s principle of 
environmental precaution is applied in a broad sense. I thereby draw 
attention to our existential, social and cultural environment in addition 
to focusing on preserving and protecting the natural (physical) environ-
ment. Such a broad interpretation has also been used by other recent 
thinkers on the topic of sustainable development (Stefanovic 2000). The 
final point regarding the adaptations is that, for this particular purpose, I 
found it possible to combine two of Jacob’s criteria. Policy integration 
and Participation and Democracy have therefore been combined into 
a single criterion which has been designated Democratic goal-setting, 
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participation and policy integration. I want to emphasise that the list 
itself, as well as its specifications, should be considered as a work-in-
progress.117
These are the criteria I suggest for sustainable, responsible preventive 
medicine: 
• A balanced theoretical approach to medical practice implies that 
knowledge about the human condition must build upon both the natural 
and the humanistic sciences. 
• Environmental precaution, in the context of medicine, can be 
taken to mean that potential detrimental side-effects of medical activi-
ties must be systematically anticipated, supervised and minimised. 
• Equity in medicine is a comprehensive issue, with major politi-
cal implications. Here, I will only address the importance of keeping a 
sound balance between doctor-initiated, technological preventive activi-
ties, aiming at what may be called ‘population care’, and medical activi-
ties that are directed by the expressed problems, concerns or wishes of 
people seeking care or advice. 
• Democratic goal-setting, participation and policy integration 
means that all relevant stakeholders should be involved in defining, co-
ordinating and evaluating the overall vision, philosophy and strategies 
of preventive medicine. Preventive recommendations in particular areas 
need to be harmonised and prioritised in accordance with the overall 
vision, and the expected impact of new recommendations on clinical 
practice should be an integrated part of guideline development.
• Planning for the future is a topic that can be addressed from 
various angles, depending on context. Here, I take it to represent two 
issues which I see as important for the long-term planning of sustain-
able and responsible preventive medicine: first, we should remember 
that our priorities and actions ought to appear justifiable and reasonable, 
not only from the point of view of evidence-based medicine as it appears 
here and now but also from a more distant or even global perspective, 
or as regarded by the generations following us who are making medical 
reality today. In addition, I believe we should continuously consider to 
what extent the research questions we ask and the decisions we make as 
117 An earlier and less developed version of this list was published in the Scandinavian Journal of Primary 
Health Care in 2005 (Getz et al. 2005).
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professionals are concordant with what rings true and is important to us 
as fellow human beings. 
9.3	Balanced	theoretical	approach	
A balanced theoretical approach to medical practice implies that knowl-
edge about the human condition must be sought from both the natural 
sciences and the humanities. Biomedical measures are only part of what 
is relevant with regard to human health and disease. Responsible medi-
cal care must recognise, and should also make systematic aims to further 
conceptualise, the strong impact of social conditions and interpersonal 
relationships on health, on both the individual and the group level. 
In the Nordic countries, the healthcare system can be conceptualised as 
a societal institution, mandated to help sick people and prevent human 
suffering. Implicit in this mandate is the power to exercise actions based 
on knowledge. As Reidun Førde has emphasised (see chapter 2.3.3), sci-
entific medical knowledge informing medical practice must be ‘true’ in 
order to be ethically justifiable. By true, she – as I interpret her –  means 
correct, valid, and also adequate. Although it can prove sufficient in 
many practical instances, medical knowledge derived from the pre-
sumption that a human being can be regarded as a biological clockwork 
(see Appendix 2) is not true enough, in this comprehensive sense. As 
Eric Cassell, Drew Leder, Ian McWhinney, George Engel, Anna Lu-
ise Kirkengen and many other thinkers and researchers have pointed 
out (see the theoretical introduction), the Cartesian rational model of 
the body-as-nature is not humane. Austrian philosopher Herbert Pi-
etschmann formulates this in his essay Merits and limits of applying the 
scientific method to human society (Pietschmann 2001): 
Any health system has to take into account the great achievements of scientific 
rationality, otherwise it violates the right of human society for the best possible 
treatment of illnesses. On the other hand, if this health system restricts itself to the 
frame of scientific thinking (in other words to scientific rationality), it violates hu-
man dignity. Therefore we reach the conclusion, that a health system, which sets 
out to be of benefit for human beings in their totality has to find a synthesis (or at 
least a balance) of these seemingly contradictory poles. 
The challenge of striking a balance between the ‘rational and scientific’ 
versus the ‘hermeneutical and humanistic’ approach, is a central topic of 
all five papers in this thesis and the core topic of Papers II and III. 
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9.3.1. The characteristics of humane medicine 
Humane118 refers to “what is fitting for a human being”, or to “what is 
rightly to be expected of mankind at its best in the treatment of sentient 
beings; a humane enterprise or endeavour is one that is intended to pre-
vent or relieve suffering” (Pijnenburg 2002). What does this mean in 
a medical context? On the one hand, humane medicine respects every 
patient as an autonomous and self-determining person. On the other, 
and at the same time, it respects man’s fundamental dependency and 
contingency (Pijnenburg 2002). There may be few fixed universal crite-
ria for what fits a human being; much depends on cultural perceptions 
of the good life and the good which human beings are striving for. But 
since medicine involves the science and art of helping people, one could 
expect that medical professionals would show considerable interest in 
finding out what is generally considered good for and by people, at least 
in the cultural context where they practice. Canadian professor of phi-
losophy Charles Taylor (b. 1931), who is among the foremost thinkers 
on modernity (Taylor 1989 and 1991), has however observed that in the 
modern Western world, people very seldom reflect upon the question 
of what it means to be a human being. In a way this fundamental ques-
tion is removed from the agenda of modernity.119 Taylor observes that in 
the wake of the naturalistic philosophers, beginning with the Scientific 
Revolution, Descartes and the Enlightenment researchers (see Appendix 
2), there appears to be a silence – Taylor calls it inarticulation – about 
our deepest moral and spiritual intuitions. In Taylor’s mind, this inar-
ticulation has come to threaten the achievements of modernity (Taylor 
1989). In his work The ethics of authenticity (1991), he explicitly de-
scribes how inarticulation poses a particular great challenge to health 
care. Along similar lines as Heidegger and Jonas, Taylor believes that 
we stand before some fundamental choices in relation to how we will 
utilise technology. Will we adhere to Cartesian technological enfram-
ing aiming at control over nature, or will we aim for authenticity? Tay-
lor speaks of “runaway extensions of technological reason” in modern 
health care and suggests (Taylor 1991:106): 
118 According to Merriam-Webster’s dictionary (2005), the word humane means: marked by compassion, 
sympathy, or consideration for humans or animals. 
119 In The Norwegian context, I see professor of philosophy Arne-Johan Vetlesen as an eminent excep-
tion to this rule. I still remember the impact he made on the group at the 2002 Rosendal seminar when he 
listed what he saw as the basic premises of human life. He discerns mortality, vulnerability, dependency, 
existential loneliness, and the precariousness of human relations, as later presented in the book Smerte 
[Pain] (Vetlesen 2004). Vetlesen has also reflected on some implications of these premises for the medical 
encounter (Vetlesen 2001). 
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Instead of seeing it [technology] purely in the context of an enterprise of ever-in-
creasing control, of an ever-receding frontier of resistant nature, perhaps animated 
by a sense of power and freedom, we have to come to understand it as well in a 
moral frame of the ethic of practical benevolence. (...) But we have to place this 
benevolence in turn in the framework of a proper understanding of the human 
agency, not in relation to the disembodied ghost of disengaged reason, inhabiting 
an objectified machine. (...) Technology in the service of an ethic of benevolence 
towards real flesh and blood people. 
At the 35th meeting of the Society for Neuroscience in Washington in 
November 2005, the Dalai Lama, renowned for his enthusiastic inter-
est in science through 20 years of contact with prominent researchers 
around the world, addressed almost 14.000 participants in a keynote lec-
ture.120 His message was thought-provoking and obviously controversial 
to biomedical scientists: 
It is all too evident that our moral thinking simply has not been able to keep pace 
with such rapid progress in our acquisition of knowledge and power. 
It is no longer adequate to adopt the view that our responsibilities as a society is to 
simply further scientific knowledge and enhance technological power and that the 
choice of what to do with this knowledge and power should be left in the hands of 
the individuals. 
How might it be possible for us, as a scientific community, to create 
a penetrating and engaging debate about what impact we will ‘allow’ 
technology to have on us – as individuals, as a profession, as a society? 
The freedom of basic research is one of the pillars of academic life and 
scientific endeavour (Jonas 1985: 90-108). Thus, the challenging clus-
ter of knowledge, power and responsibility cannot be addressed from 
the question: should political or societal control secure the “right” type 
of knowledge production? And certainly, when applied to medicine, no 
ideology or government should direct medical research. So much should 
have been learned from the lessons of Auschwitz.121 But if we, from 
where we stand today, follow in Taylor’s footsteps, inspired by Arthur 
Frank’s idea of ethics as a continuous and conscious way of being, one 
could begin, for instance, by examining the role of medical ethics, ethi-
cists and ethical review boards and committees in modern health care. 
120 Marc Kaufman: Dalai Lama Gives Talk on Science. Monk’s D.C. Lecture Links Mind, Matter. The Wash-
ington post, Nov 13th 2005.
121 Lifton R.J. The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychiatry of Genocide. New York: Basic books, 
1986.
153
Personally, I could imagine ethical committees reminding and challeng-
ing medical researchers and practitioners to reflect more deeply on the 
true nature of human beings. What happens in today’s reality is, howev-
er, that medical ethics is most often applied in a – paradoxically enough 
– technological and instrumental manner: much of its mandate appears 
to be limited to protocol-driven, superficial questions, such as how given 
information or consent letters should be written. I agree with research-
ers like Chorover (see chapter 4.1.5), who propose ‘institutionalising’ 
a more challenging ethical debate about what type of medical research 
is needed. And whether research activities currently exist that, despite 
permissions granted by ethical review boards, can be seen as threatening 
to dehumanise us. It would also be interesting to address more system-
atically how the medical research agenda interacts with society-at-large, 
both in an ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ manner.122 
9.3.2 From ‘evidence-based’ to ‘adequate’ recommendations?
All papers in this thesis, and in particular Paper II, illustrate how the 
concept of evidence, as defined in the particular and demarcated context 
of evidence-based medicine (EBM) has become an indisputable ‘good’ 
in contemporary medicine; how it has attained the status of being almost 
synonymous with scientific truth concerning health and disease, and 
how it thereby renders other ways of ‘knowing’ less relevant and valid 
(see chapter 2.2.7). As previously outlined, EBM is notably silent on the 
values and judgments going into empirical analysis and research, from 
designing the study to interpreting the data and applying it to patient 
care. The term evidence suggests that something has evinced, come into 
being, ‘come forth’ by itself. The term conceals the fact that the knowl-
edge termed evident is the result of scientific construction and, as such, 
a forth-bringing of a particular kind of knowledge about something. The 
term evidence-based suggests that the evidence, as such, speaks, guides, 
and decides what is best (Goldenberg 2005, Raine et al. 2005).123 The 
existence of ‘evidence’ thereby appears to carry with it an imperative to 
intervene to change reality. As mentioned, philosopher Charles Taylor 
has for two decades puzzled over this enduring dominance – in language, 
122 By upstream, I mean the discourses informing the making of medical research projects. By downstream, I 
mean the way the medical research agenda comes to affect individuals, society and the healthcare system. At 
the 2004 Rosendal conference, one session was devoted to this kind of ethical analysis (conducted by Roger 
Strand and Yngvild Hannestad, researchers at the University of Bergen).
123 Kernick (2005) notes how dichotomizing results of trials according to whether they are statistically sig-
nificant or not can apparently be seen as producing yes-no responses to decision makers.
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practices and institutions – of what he calls “naturalism”, the view that 
humans are not only part of nature but should be understood according 
to the canons of the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, which 
ultimately aim for control over nature (see Appendix 2). In an attempt to 
explain why this is so, Taylor observes that all human communities are 
defined, guided and structured by what he calls hyper-goods (or hyper-
values). This also appears to be true in the realm of the human sciences. 
Taylor defines hyper-goods as “goods which not only are incomparably 
more important than others but provide the standpoint from which these 
must be weighed, judged, decided about” (Taylor 1989:63). He further-
more believes that the force of the natural science paradigm derives 
“from the underlying image of the self ... and the images of freedom, 
dignity and power which attach to it” (Taylor 1985, quoted in Gordon 
1988). There therefore appears to exist a mutual reinforcement between 
the naturalistic biomedical paradigm and the Western ideals of indi-
vidualism and autonomy (see also Gordon 1988).124
In a medicine aspiring to be sustainable and responsible, the epistemo-
logical limits of contemporary evidence based approaches, and ques-
tions of what kinds of evidence should inform current medical research 
and practice, should receive more attention than is currently the case 
(Malterud 2002; Goldenberg 2005). The reason is that even when medi-
cal evidence is technically correct and just, which may, in fact, not al-
ways be the case (as demonstrated in Papers I and V), one should still 
remain free to question whether it appears adequate to act upon the evi-
dence. Evidence can in no way be regarded as ‘given;’ it must undergo 
the social processes of production, interpretation, evaluation, and ap-
plication before it can be the foundation of any decision. To paraphrase 
the philosopher David Hume’s teachings in A treatise of human nature: 
normative “ought” statements like guidelines cannot be derived from 
descriptive “is” statements like research evidence (Raine 2005).
124 We thereby keep applying the same epistemology and methodology to the exploration of human beings, 
human health, and more recently, human experiences of meaning and value as we do to the exploration of 
nature. Take as an example the increasing interest for what is called ‘evidence-based bioethics’ (see Halpern 
SD. Towards evidence based bioethics. BMJ 2005;331:901-3). This trend has been analysed by US phi-
losopher Maya Goldenberg (Goldenberg 2005). The impact of this categorical mistake, as the Norwegian 
philosopher Hans Skjervheim has termed it (Skjervheim 2002), under the influence of the latest hyper-value 
in medicine, which appears to be evidence, has been elicited by contemporary Norwegian psychologist Tor-
Johan Ekeland in his critique entitled Evidensbasert behandling: kvalitetssikring eller instrumentalistisk 
mistak [Evidence-based treatment: quality assurance or instrumental mistake?] in 1999.
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Instead of relying almost solely on the hyper-values of objectivity and 
evidence in the context of biomedical research, one could continue in 
the footsteps of Charles Taylor and consider whether medicine needs an-
other hyper-value besides evidence, namely that of adequacy.125 If med-
ical research were, above all, judged by its level of adequacy, it would 
be validated differently from what it is now. The validating question 
underlying EBM of “is this a correct finding in human bodies?” would 
then be followed by other crucial questions: “Does this approach do 
justice to the nature of human beings?” Or: “Does this method account 
for the actual social context?” And: “Does this interpretation account 
for all relevant dimensions of meaning?” The best account principle 
is, according to Charles Taylor who elaborated the term, what should 
guide our description of reality and our ethical considerations. At this 
level, one may approach questions, such as whether it represents reason-
able and adequate medical action to personally communicate existing 
evidence to a large majority of the individuals in one of the world’s 
longest-living and healthiest-living populations that they are at high risk 
of ultimately dying from cardiovascular disease (Papers IV and V). In 
the context of adequacy-based medicine, it might also become easier to 
discuss whether it is good medicine to impose ‘evidence of bad health’ 
upon an elderly gentleman who feels he is in a state of good health and 
seeks out his doctor only because he needs a medical certificate to get 
his driver’s licence renewed (Paper II).
9.3.3 From Cartesian dualism to the Lived body
It is no easy matter to challenge “the Cartesian position” in medicine. It 
is so firmly entrenched in our culture that it is difficult both for medical 
professionals and lay people to think beyond its horizon (see chapter 
2.2.6 and Appendix 2). One may begin by considering terminology, the 
words directing our thoughts and our way of questioning human health 
and disease. As Heidegger and other thinkers have shown, in the ancient 
Greek world there was no dichotomy between the body and its inten-
tions. Also, several thinkers believe that what we must do is re-invent a 
conceptual framework transcending ‘the mind-body split’ (Bracken and 
Thomas 2002). Among these scholars is medical doctor and philosopher 
Drew Leder who has worked with the phenomenological notion of the 
125 I am indebted to Anna Luise Kirkengen, who, on the basis of Charles Taylor’s teachings, introduced the 
concepts Adequacy and Best account principle as potential tools for medicine at the 2005 Rosendal seminar. 
According to Merriam-Webster dictionary, adequate means “sufficient for a specific requirement; or law-
fully and reasonably sufficient.”
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Lived body, as opposed to the Cartesian material corpse.126 The concept 
of the Lived body implies that the body of a living being has an essen-
tial structure of its own which cannot be captured by the language and 
concepts we use to describe and explain inanimate nature. The Lived 
body is a perceiving, experiencing and ‘intending’ entity – bound up 
with and directed toward, an experienced world. It is a being in relation-
ship to that which is other: other people, other things, an environment. 
Furthermore, the Lived body is our gateway to experiencing the world. 
Through our senses, our motility, and our desires, the world ‘comes to 
be’ by way of our bodies. As Leder (1998:124) formulates it: “To be hu-
man is to be the site of an intentionality which is materially determined 
and enacted.” 
Papers IV and V of this thesis, as well as Appendix 4, illustrate how 
current clinical guidelines build upon evidence about that human condi-
tion that is highly selective, with a strong bias towards decontextualised, 
biomedical measures. Even this demarcated approach is characterised 
by many simplifications. As a professional community, we have to start 
envisioning medicine – and a healthcare system – where biological and 
existential approaches are somehow interwoven in more complex pat-
terns (Wade and Halligan 2004). Leder speaks of “mutually implicatory 
and involved in intricate ‘logics’ of exchange” (1998:125). To take an 
example: at the epistemological ‘chiasma’ where meaning meets matter, 
a clinical phenomenon, such as hypertension, cannot be addressed only 
as a question of circulatory dynamics. In parallel, it would always be 
addressed as a potential reflection of the person’s social and existential 
situatedness and style of being-in-the world (see 2.1.4). The existential 
account should obviously not replace the biological account, but place it 
in a wider perspective. As Leder says: “To attend to the lived body is not 
to forsake the tools and learning that Cartesian medicine has provided. It 
is merely to refuse to grant this mechanical wisdom the status of ruling 
paradigm” (1998:127).
Once it is understood that disease has existential dimensions no less im-
portant than its physiology, or, formulated more decisively, that physi-
ology is enacted by experiential phenomena, new methods of clinical 
evaluation and intervention become available to the clinician. The pa-
126 In the German language, there is in fact one word to designate the living body, – Leib; and another word 
for the dead body, Körper.
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tient’s story would not only be interesting for its own sake, or as part 
of the process of creating trust and eliciting the patient’s concerns and 
expectations to reach a common understanding of the biomedical condi-
tion and enhance the patient’s concordance with the doctor’s suggested 
treatment. The patient’s narrative would provide genuine understand-
ing of the social and existential preconditions of health and disease 
in this particular person (see chapter 2.1.4: Situatedness, embodiment 
and health and chapter 2.1.5: The health benefits of a narrative). Cor-
respondingly, medical interventions would not be “bounded by the flesh 
only,” meaning addressing human biology by technological approaches 
involving drugs and schematic lifestyle advice. Scientifically founded 
medical intervention might aim to alter the individual “body-world rela-
tion” and strive to reduce existential dis-ease. 
As said above, a comprehensive approach departing from the notion of 
the Lived Body, appears to require development of a fundamentally new 
theory and terminology. Important innovation is already taking place in 
this field; this can be exemplified by the emerging concepts allostasis 
and syndemiology (see chapter 2.1.4). Acknowledgement of complexity 
as opposed to linear causality (see chapter 2.2.5) also appears promising 
as it allows anticipation that in clinical practice, small initial changes 
can have important end results that could hardly be accounted for by 
conventional, linear cause-and-effect models. If medical professionals 
began to emphasise the notions of Lived body, complexity and adequa-
cy, exploration of an individual’s health resources would also appear 
more essential than it does today (Malterud and Hollnagel 1998; Hol-
lnagel and Malterud 2000; Malterud and Hollnagel 2004).
9.4	Environmental	precaution:	minimising	adverse	effects	of	medi-
cal	activity
This component of sustainable development means that we have a re-
sponsibility to pay systematic attention to conceptualising, predicting 
and preventing adverse side effects, harm and undue medicalisation 
that can result from medical activity, on the level of individuals, the 
healthcare system, our physical environment and society-at-large. In the 
general theory of sustainable development, the precautionary principle 
states that lack of scientific proof of detrimental effects of current activi-
ties is no argument for postponing measures to discover, conceptualise 
and prevent them.
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This approach has much in common with, and is indeed inspired by, the 
way Ivan Illich conceptualised ‘iatrogenesis’ in the 1970s (see chapter 
2.3.4). All five papers in this thesis outline potential harm related to 
preventive medical activity, and together they cover a wide spectrum 
of effects. In the theoretical introductory part, I have mentioned some 
other concrete examples of harm that has resulted, or can be anticipated 
from, preventive medical activity. The types of harm can be classified 
as follows: 
Concrete risks to the physical health and well-being of individuals. This 
may result from clinical uncertainty engendered by ambiguous or false 
positive test results in screening/prevention (systematic or opportunis-
tic) activities in clinical practice. An option of further investigations 
and/or treatment interventions typically follows in the wake of such re-
sults, and these interventions may entail a potential for physical harm 
(Ewart 2000, Welch 2004). Documentation of this kind of harm, follow-
ing in the wake of ambiguous findings by ultrasound screening, is the 
main topic of Paper I in this thesis, which demonstrates loss of wanted 
pregnancies caused by attempts to resolve technologically induced un-
certainty.127 Side effects of this kind have been known for many years, 
as has been highlighted in seminal papers by Black and Welch (1993) 
and Fisher and Welch (1999). Detrimental effects of cancer screening 
programmes are the focus of a new book written by Gilbert Welch, who 
is a US physician and professor in the field of community and family 
medicine (Welch 2004). He believes it is important to inform healthcare 
professionals and the general public about the ‘downsides’ of medical 
screening programmes. His aim is to educate people to enable them to 
protect their vulnerability in a healthcare system that is characterised by 
a strong bias towards action. The reason is that, in relation to medical 
127 The concerns expressed in Paper I have been validated in various ways after its publication. The fun-
damental – and thereby predictable - link between technological advancement and moral dilemmas in the 
context of prenatal medicine was recently confirmed by the previously mentioned study by Williams et al. 
(2005). The particular relation between the experience of false positive test results and profoundly distress-
ing emotional experience among pregnant women has also been confirmed in a Swedish study on women’s 
experiences of first trimester ultrasound screening (Georgsson Öhman et al., in press). In this study, 24 
women who had received information about an increased risk for chromosomal deviations according to 
nuchal translucency screening, were interviewed during pregnancy and after birth. Twenty of these women 
had false positive tests, and for 16 the risk was higher than expected, considering their age. These women 
expressed major worry, and many said they chose to reject their pregnancy, to take “time out”, while waiting 
for the results of fetal karyotyping. Two months after the birth, most of these women, however, seemed to 
have overcome the stress. Some of the women nevertheless expressed serious concerns in the interview as to 
whether it was ethically justifiable to offer a medical test like this on a routine basis.
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screening and diagnostic testing, more is not necessarily better (Fisher 
and Welch 1999; Del Mar and Glasziou 2003). 
Ecological and biological hazards. This, for instance, can be radiation 
exposure affecting investigated individuals directly as well as the popu-
lation in general, due to increased background radiation resulting from 
medical activity (see chapter 2.3.4 with references). This particular topic 
is not a main focus of this thesis, but it belongs to a general discussion 
of sustainable, preventive medicine. In addition, the use of ultrasound 
in pregnancy can serve as a good example of activity in need of close 
surveillance due to a theoretical risk of biological hazard (Westin and 
Bakketeig 2003). Several authoritative bodies in the USA have recently 
called for responsible use of ultrasound during pregnancy, where it has 
been increasingly promoted as ‘boutique fetal imaging’ (Chervenak and 
McCulloch 2005). 
Negative social and cultural impact of medicalisation of human life. This 
refers to the potential for negative and disempowering effects of medi-
cally related programmes and initiatives aiming at enhancing people’s 
health and coping with life. The potential for unfavourable medicalisation 
of a given (in this case a statistically healthy and long-living) population 
is a core topic of Papers IV and V in this thesis. And it is not only disease 
prevention programmes that should be watched critically. New Zealand 
researchers Buetow and Docherty (2005) also warn that in relation to gen-
eral health promotion activities, “there is an unmet need for evidence not 
only of effectiveness but also of the physical and cultural safety.”
The previously outlined repressive and coercive forces in medicine 
which have been conceptualised and described by several scholars in 
terms of medicalisation, medical policing and disease mongering (see 
chapter 2.3.5) should be acknowledged at this point. These forces may 
come to the surface as incidental and unintended violations of individual 
patients’ autonomy and integrity (as described in Paper II), but may also 
take the form of systematic projects designed by ‘the medical-industrial 
complex’, aiming to expand the number of consumers asking for, and 
patients perceived to be in need of, medical care ‘for their own good.’ 
The importance of reflecting upon the coercive potentials of preventive 
medicine was explicitly mentioned in the proceedings of the Goals of 
medicine project (Callahan 1996:16): 
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The temptation to use medical knowledge and skills to manipulate or coerce whole 
classes of people or whole societies in the name of improved health, social well-
being, or cost-control is likely to become increasingly potent, and enormously se-
ductive, in the years ahead. (...) It is a development to be carefully watched and 
generally resisted. 
I agree with Callahan and co-workers who see this as “a threat to the 
institution of medicine and to human liberty and dignity.” 
A negative psychological and existential impact of risk labelling on the 
level of the individual is a well-known concern in relation to preventive 
medicine and screening programmes, as exemplified by the writings of 
Illich, Skrabanek, Stewart-Brown and Farmer (1997), and many others. 
The importance of paying attention to the potential for inflicting psy-
chological or existential harm as a result of implementing new, preven-
tive technology in clinical practice is a topic of all papers in this thesis, 
and particularly Paper I. Previous findings of how false positive results 
from ultrasound screening in mid-pregnancy may have a dramatic emo-
tional impact on the pregnant woman have recently been confirmed in a 
Swedish study on early ultrasound screening (Georgsson Öhman et al., 
in press). As previously outlined, Paper I contains an argument which 
extends even to the psycho-physiological interface between the expect-
ant mother and the child-to-be. The hypothesis that medically induced 
distress might cause subtle harm to the unborn child appears even more 
plausible today than when Paper I was first submitted in 2001 (see chap-
ter 2.3.4 with references). 
Another type of harm that may accompany preventive medical activ-
ity is the focus of Paper III. This is the possibility that technologically 
oriented preventive medicine will distract the dialogue between patient 
and doctor from other issues that are important to the patient’s health. As 
Welch puts it (2005:662): 
...this downside of screening is not frequently discussed, and the evidence that it 
exists is anecdotal. But I believe it’s real. The more time we spend prescribing, or-
dering, communicating results, and following-up abnormal findings, the less time 
there is to spend with the patient’s concerns. 
I will let this last quote serve as a bridge to the next topic, which is equity. 
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9.5	Equity:	balancing	the	doctor’s	and	the	patient’s	agenda
I will focus only on one element of equity in this discussion, and that 
is the need to find a sound balance between the ‘doctor’s agenda’ of 
clinical recommendations, based on EBM as we know it today, and the 
agenda which the individual patient brings to the clinical encounter in 
primary health care.128 
The pressure from health policy initiatives on general practitioners to 
share responsibilities for what can be called population approaches to 
health care currently appears to be increasing, in not only the Nordic 
countries but also the UK, Australia, New Zealand and other areas where 
family medicine has a strong position (Buetow and Docherty 2005). 
With this responsibility follows increased emphasis on the implementa-
tion of EBM and preventive medical guidelines in the clinical encoun-
ter. The traditional lines between public health (the act of improving a 
population’s health through collective action), population health care 
(preventive activities recommended by a third party for implementa-
tion in primary health care), and traditional primary health care (typi-
cally initiated by the patient coming to the doctor with an expressed 
concern or wish) are thereby becoming obscure. This can be seen as a 
central topic of all papers in this thesis. Evidently, general practitioners 
in other parts of the world appear to be pondering the same questions. 
For instance, from the perspective of general practice in New Zealand, 
Buetow and Docherty write (2005:397):
...reasoned debate on the policy of introducing preventative care and health promo-
tion initiatives in clinical practice is overdue, not least in New Zealand, where cli-
nicians within general practice appear to have been seduced by the lack of clarity in 
health policy into accepting this policy without question. They appear to disregard 
implications of the policy for redefining the nature and scope of their discipline 
(and of public health), including their own role as providers of personal care. 
I personally believe that in order to preserve the dignity of our patients, 
the quality of medical care, and - as a logical consequence – people’s 
trust in the medical profession, primary healthcare physicians should 
remain committed first to responding adequately to patients’ expressions 
of experienced problems or wishes in terms of medical assistance. Only 
128 In the theoretical introduction to this thesis, I outlined the concept of patient-centred medicine (see chap-
ter 2.2.6), which is based on the notion of ‘agendas’ and defines a patient’s agenda in addition to (or rather 
in parallel with) the doctor’s agenda. The theory of patient-centred medicine was developed before the 
introduction of EBM, and it did not specifically address the issue of evidence-based clinical recommenda-
tions in the way I do here.
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thereafter does it appear reasonable to prioritise well-documented, cost-
effective and safe preventive activities within the limits of available re-
sources. It is fundamentally important to protect the clinical encounter 
from becoming instrumental to an extensive “checklist agenda” that is 
mainly defined and monitored129 by a third party, and thereby becomes 
alienated from its main purpose and dehumanised in its nature. If this 
were to happen, patients would be alienated from their lives, bodies and 
needs. The same might also gradually happen to the doctors who exer-
cise an alienating medical practice.
9.5.1 The ‘carrying capacity’ of the consultation
One approach to the discussion of a balance between agendas is consid-
ering what we might call “the carrying capacity”130 of the consultation 
and the primary healthcare system. Such an analysis could begin with 
simple considerations of the time available for preventive interventions 
versus ‘other’ purposes in the consultation. This has already been out-
lined in Paper III. As presented there, a recent study (Yarnall et al. 2003) 
showed that in the US context, 7.4 hours of the working day of an av-
erage primary care physician would be needed to provide all services 
recommended by the US Preventive Services Task Force. The same re-
search group subsequently calculated the time needed to provide rec-
ommended care to patients with chronic diseases (Östbye et al. 2005). 
It appeared that if guideline recommendations for 10 common chronic 
diseases were applied to a panel of 2500 primary care patients with an 
age-sex distribution and chronic disease prevalences similar to those of 
the general US population, the minimum physician time required to de-
liver high-quality care would exceed the total time currently available 
for patient care. These modelling studies are not directly transferable to 
the Nordic setting, but they indicate that dictums of authoritative guide-
lines can be grossly incompatible with clinical reality. Once this is docu-
mented, new light is shed on the important and well-documented fact 
that general practitioners show limited adherence to clinical guidelines. 
This phenomenon has been highlighted in Papers II-V and will also be 
touched upon in the next chapters. 
129 There may also be economic incentives connected to this monitoring, as will be outlined below.
130 The notion of carrying capacity is well known from discussions related to economic growth and exploi-
tation of natural resources. See, for instance, the seminal book by Meadows D et al. The Limits to growth 
(1972), which presents the works of the so-called Club of Rome, involving a group of MIT scientists who 
developed scenarios for the future. Limits to growth was among the works leading up to the interest for 
sustainable development and the Brundtland Report in 1987.
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Research into communication in primary health care usually focuses on 
what takes place and more rarely investigates the aspects of clinical 
communications left unspoken. Preliminary research made by the Cana-
dian research group conceptualising patient-centred medicine (Leven-
stein et al. 1986; McWhinney 1989) documented that doctors often fail 
to elicit the patient’s actual reasons for consulting, or other worries that 
bother them. Time restraints may evidently contribute to this. Recent 
research has shown that emotional and social issues are the topics most 
likely to be underrepresented in the consultation. In a recent qualita-
tive study involving 35 patients consulting 20 GPs, a UK research team 
systematically investigated issues that were important to the patient, but 
not elicited in the consultation. The findings indicated that, compared 
to the research interviews conducted after the consultation (Barry et al. 
2000): 
in consultations patients seem only partially present, with only limited autonomy 
– that is to make requests but not suggest solutions. Outside consultations patients 
are more fully present: as socially and contextually situated, thinking, feeling peo-
ple, with their own ideas on their medical condition (...) This suggests that in the 
consultation, the patient is most commonly construed as a purely “biomedical” 
entity.
The authors conclude that what they call “partial voicing” and facilita-
tion of certain agendas at the expense of others may produce less effec-
tive consultations. The fact that unvoiced topics can have detrimental 
effects on the clinical outcome, either by way of negatively influencing 
adherence to prescribed treatments, or because they pave the way for 
misunderstandings, has also been documented in other settings (see ref-
erences in Barry et al. 2000). 
9.5.2 Patients and doctors as moral strangers?
In a paper titled The doctor, his patient, and the computerized evidence-
based guideline, a British general practitioner reflected upon empirical 
studies which have showed that computerised guidelines for treatment 
of asthma and angina131 are often ignored in clinical practice (Lipman 
2004). It appeared that the GPs thought that the guidelines imposed an 
external, largely biomedical, agenda that tended to supersede the pa-
131 These studies were 1) Eccles M et al. Effect of computerised evidence based guidelines on management of 
asthma and angina in adults in primary care: cluster randomised controlled trial. BMJ 2002;305, 941–944. 
2) Rousseau N et al. Practice based, longitudinal, qualitative interview study of computerised evidence 
based guidelines in primary care. BMJ 2003; 326, 314–318.
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tient’s. The technical nature of the guidelines somehow disrupted the 
normal pattern and power balance in the GP consultations (see also the 
discussion of EBM in chapter 2.2.7). It can be seen as rather thought-
provoking that even in relation to people having the diseases for which 
the guidelines have been developed, EBM may conflict with patients’ 
needs and wishes. Lipman explains this in terms of a fundamental con-
flict between care and the values underlying medical science. With ref-
erence to the motto of the Royal College of General Practitioners, Cum 
Scientia Caritas, he writes (Lipman 2004:173):
The implementation of a research agenda promoted by guideline committees and 
their assorted apparatus of quality frameworks, guidelines and computerized flow 
charts elevates Scientia into the prime purpose of clinical practice while removing 
control of it from clinicians. In such circumstances, Caritas is relegated to second 
place and may be seen as conflicting with Scientia. This is not only uncomfortable 
but positively harmful. It undermines GPs’ professional status and their confidence 
in making their own judgements, and subverts their well-evolved culture of holistic 
practice focused on individuals and their families. 
From a corresponding perspective, New Zealand general practice re-
searcher Stephen Buetow also addresses the term care (Buetow 2005). 
He emphasises that, by definition, to care for someone is to engage in 
“a reciprocal relationship and intersubjective experience that the patient 
or clinician cannot define alone. Clinicians care with, rather than for, 
patients, and both benefit from care as a process and outcome.” The 
importance of a reciprocal conceptualisation of care in contemporary 
medical reality is also reflected in a paper by two British general practi-
tioners focusing particularly on the large group of patients with multiple 
problems and diagnoses (Heath and Sweeney 2005):
As general practitioners focus increasingly on the management of people with mul-
tiple and compounding conditions, the balance of technical with compassionate 
care must be continuously negotiated so that it makes sense in the context of the 
patient’s life story and acknowledges the full diversity of their health and social 
problems. In such a situation, the values and priorities of the individual patient 
must always be allowed to trump the dictates of medical science and evidence 
based guidelines. The ever present, malevolent potential of illness to destroy an 
individual’s personhood can never be forgotten. Although biomedical interventions 
may become more sophisticated, and service delivery more slick, the responsibility 
of the general practitioner to acknowledge and, where possible, relieve suffering 
endures and can never be abrogated.
To sum up, it can be noted that the moral basis of what can be called a 
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utilitarian approach (implying that what is ethical, is what is believed 
to increase overall health or well-being in a group or society, something 
I see as congruent with the EBM approach), is, however, qualitatively 
different from ethics of care, implying that what is ethical is to respond 
to the needs of the unique individual. Both approaches are indispens-
able in the healthcare system. However, as discussed in the previous 
section, it is not self-evident that they fit equally well with the ethos of 
the consultation in primary health care (Summerskill and Pope 2002; 
Heath 2004). All papers in this thesis, and in particular Papers II and III, 
conceptualise how implementation of EBM may impose an alien moral 
framework in the clinical encounter. Buetow and Docherty (2005) are, 
as a consequence of this, concerned about what they call a “weakening 
of personal care in response to depersonalized population health agen-
das” and warn that patients and doctors may become ‘moral strangers.’ 
This could reduce patients’ ability to access care that they can trust to 
be the best care for them in their situation. The same authors conclude 
(2005:402):
We acknowledge a need for collaboration and coordination between general prac-
tice and public health. (...) However, population health care in general practice is 
appropriate only when this care is known to be safe and effective, and does not 
compromise personal care.
It should be noted that several of the arguments for providing time, space 
and status to mutuality and genuine dialogue in the clinical encounter132 
have been formulated in relation to implementation of clinical guide-
lines for secondary prevention and control of symptomatic disease. To 
what extent all these arguments are valid for primary preventive guide-
lines is open to debate. The relevance of finding this out, however, is 
great, as economic incentives are  increasingly being used to direct clini-
cians’ attention and actions towards monitoring and documenting their 
patients’ biomedical health status on a regular basis (Boyd et al. 2005). 
Such an incentive system was, for instance, introduced in British gener-
al practice in 2004 (Roland 2004). When this idea was launched, it was 
described as “an initiative to improve the quality of primary care that is 
132 I would like to direct Norwegian readers to an interesting paper that addresses this topic from a broad per-
spective: Dialogene som forvitrer. Et kritisk blikk på klinikkens utvikling, by Ole Berg and Charlotte Haug 
(1997). Quote (translation by LG): “Medicine is becoming increasingly specialised and depersonalised. It 
would represent an irony of fate if medicine itself should contribute to processes that create the very prob-
lems it is supposed to reduce. Medicine should rather be characterised by a calling to strengthen the person-
alising processes – the genuine dialogues. (...) Industrialisation of medicine does not only come from outside 
(...) it also comes from inside: medicine shows tendencies to alienate itself and its representatives…”
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the boldest such proposal attempted anywhere in the world” (Shekelle 
2003). Opinions were, and still are, divided as to whether the overall 
quality of British primary health care will improve, and to what extent 
clinical practice will be informed by evidence, as opposed to becoming 
frustrated or coerced by it. Most observers, including those in favour of 
the system as such, appear to share the view that primary care is now 
likely to become more biomedically oriented, less holistic, and perhaps 
also more elitist – in the sense that patients who do not fit with the tar-
gets defined by the computerised monitoring system might feel less wel-
come in the doctor’s office (Shekelle 2003, Roland 2004). The intensity 
of the reactions to this possibility, however, varies, as can be seen from 
the following two quotes: 
Will patients no longer be persons to the general practitioner but rather a series of 
performance targets to be met? This is a very real possibility, but I do not buy into 
the argument that improvement in one area of care must come at the expense of 
another (Shekelle 2003).
They [doctors] will cease to be personal doctors and become instead disease man-
agers. This is the ultimate expression of Ivan Illich’s (1976) nightmare scenario. 
The management of health is becoming an industry in which individuals are seen 
only as members of groups with defined diseases. They will receive standardized 
interventions ‘for their own good’, and dissent will be seen as a threat to the doc-
tor’s earning and the Government’s statistics, rather as a basic human right (Lip-
man 2004). 
One final remark may be relevant here, as it links the notion of equity to 
the next element of sustainability, which is democratic goal-setting and 
policy integration. David Callahan and co-workers believe (1996;16):
A medicine that knows no boundaries, that lacks its own compass, that is supine 
before the market, that forgets human finitude, cannot be an equitable medicine. It 
will follow money and power.
Thereby, one prerequisite for equitable medicine is that we make clear 
– to ourselves and to society – the overall vision, mission, values and 
strategies of individually targeted preventive medicine. 
9.6	Democratic	goal-setting,	participation	and	policy	integration
Democratic goal-setting and participation means that all relevant stake-
holders – medical generalists, specialists, researchers and thinkers in 
other academic fields, health administrators, and also lay people – should 
be involved in defining, coordinating and evaluating the overall vision, 
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philosophy and strategies of preventive medicine. Policy integration 
implies that preventive recommendations in different areas need to be 
harmonised and prioritised in accordance with the overall vision. The 
expected overall impact of new recommendations on clinical practice 
should be estimated before guidelines are issued. In addition, assess-
ment of the professional integrity of guideline authors is crucial. 
9.6.1 Before choosing health, choose your philosophy
In a recent debate paper in The Lancet, titled Choosing health? First 
choose your philosophy, public health experts McKee and Raine (2004) 
called for an explicit and coherent philosophical foundation for the plan-
ning of programmes aiming to enhance the overall health of a popula-
tion. They say: 
The first decision to make when developing a public-health strategy must be to 
decide the philosophical basis on which it is to stand. 
I believe this was a timely and important reminder. Public health133 ini-
tiatives often entail ethical challenges and dilemmas, such as how to pri-
oritise scarce resources, and to what extent one has a right to approach 
individuals with a message that they should change the way they live 
their lives. It is quite evident that moral questions in these domains ex-
tend beyond traditional bioethics and require their own form of ethical 
analysis (Callahan and Jennings 2002, Beaglehole et al. 2004).134 Health 
promotion and disease prevention programmes are clearly value-laden 
activities, and it is important to reflect upon the nature of the moral 
framework(s) underpinning medical activity of this kind. As mentioned 
in the opening part of this thesis, it can therefore be argued that poli-
cy makers planning public health and population care activities need 
knowledge of philosophical theory, just as they must be familiar with 
epidemiological methods (Roberts and Reich 2002). 
133 The definition of public health has changed as the field has evolved. I will not discuss this here. I will 
however refer a recent definition suggested by Beaglehole et al. (2005): “Collective action for sustained 
population-wide health improvement.” The disciplinary basis of public health can be narrow – mainly the 
medical sciences -- or broad and inclusive, bringing together a wide range of disciplines, including the 
political and social sciences.
134 We have argued elsewhere (Getz et al. SJPHC 2005) that the four classical ethical principles can in fact 
be seen as challenged by the nature of the preventive medical paradigm: Preventive medicine approaches 
people who do not feel diseased and are not necessarily asking for help; the basis for autonomy may thereby 
be challenged. Furthermore, it applies measures that are derived from group-based knowledge and may have 
limited validity for the particular individual. This obscures the issues of benefit and harm. Finally, it focuses 
on highly selected biological variables that are often mediators rather than the true causes of ill health and 
health inequalities. This may challenge the principle of justice (interpreted in terms of justice-as-fairness).
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9.6.2 Defining visions, goals and means for preventive initiatives
Prevention of CVD in the population-at-large is an activity that should 
have clearly defined goals and strategies. In practice, however, these are 
hotly debated topics; general practitioners, cardiologists, epidemiolo-
gists, pharmaceutical companies and other stakeholders present diverse 
and partly conflicting views of what should be considered a rational and 
reasonable approach (for various arguments, see Meland, Ellekjær et al. 
2000; Law et al. 2004; Makover and Ebrahim 2005; or Jackson et al. 
2005). In fact, if considering the matter from a philosophical viewpoint, 
it turns out that more than one strategy can be ethically defendable (Rob-
erts and Reich 2002). To illustrate this, I will present somewhat simpli-
fied versions of two different approaches to CVD prevention in clinical 
practice.135 
Approach 1: To reduce the total burden of CVD events in the population. 
The aim here is to produce “the most gain for society,” as measured, for 
instance, in disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) or quality-adjusted 
life-years (QALYs). This can be seen as a utilitarian approach. In prac-
tise, it implies reducing the risk level widely throughout the population, 
since most disease events will happen among people with a relatively 
unremarkable risk profile (because this group is so big). To reach such a 
target, it appears rational at first glance to systematically implement dis-
ease-preventive guidelines with a low threshold for intervention, such 
as the 2003 European Guidelines on CVD Prevention (given that imple-
mentation of these guidelines is effective in non-selected populations, 
which is not yet proven). Individual evaluation, counselling and moni-
toring according to such guidelines are, however, resource-consuming 
activities. Realising this, authoritative researchers have suggested that 
everyone aged 55 or older should take one ‘Polypill’ a day (outlined 
in Appendix 4, year 2003 on the timeline). This idea means to formu-
late a ‘magic bullet’ balancing anticipated136 therapeutic effects against 
predictable adverse events, in a fashion calculated to keep the need for 
personal medical surveillance to a minimum. In relation to the use of 
lipid-lowering medication, this has been called a “fire and forget” ap-
proach (see Appendix 4). One might consider this to be some kind of a 
135 I do not consider public health mass strategies here, such as easy access to healthy food and a physical 
environment facilitating out-door activities.
136  It has – on the basis of purely theoretical calculations – been anticipated that the Polypill could reduce the 
number of CVD events by 70-80%. Its effectiveness, however, has not yet been tested in clinical trials.
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mass strategy, but implemented on the level of the individual. In a utili-
tarian framework such as this, it is not an ethical imperative to pay more 
attention to individuals at higher risk than the average or to young indi-
viduals. This is because the number of disease events that would occur, 
and might in part be prevented, among these groups would contribute 
relatively little to the total disease burden. 
Approach 2: To try to avert premature death and disability among indi-
viduals going to the doctor and turning out to be at high risk for CVD.137 
These are first and foremost people who have already suffered a disease 
event or people seeking medical counselling due to CVD in their fam-
ily or because of other concerns. Here, the motive is to help individuals 
asking for help to increase their chance of implementing what Rawls 
might have called their life plans (Roberts and Reich 2002). In this mor-
al framework, one would not be concerned much about cardiovascular 
deaths occurring at a relatively ripe age (one might even argue that death 
from CVD might be preferable to death from a competing cause). On 
a macro level, the ‘life plan approach’ might not reduce the numerical 
burden of CVD deaths very much. This strategy might nevertheless be 
considered justifiable and coherent with Rawls’ idea of “justice as fair-
ness” (Roberts and Reich 2002). 
In clinical reality, the line between the two approaches could hardly be 
very clear. It should also not be necessary to make a definite choice 
between these two alternatives. But for a discussion of preventive medi-
cine to be creative and respectful, participants need to know that plan-
ning of preventive medicine does in fact involve philosophical delibera-
tions and choices (McKee and Raine 2004). 
Before closing this section on the importance of defining the moral foun-
dations, goals and means of preventive medicine, I will highlight one 
final dimension of the debate about preventive medicine and population 
health initiatives: the question of who is responsible for people’s health. 
What efforts are to be reasonably expected from society and what from 
the individual (McKee and Raine 2004)? I will not go far into this de-
bated topic, but it is relevant to note that a recent Norwegian study of 
137 This argument presupposes that the screening tool (e.g. a CVD risk calculator) classifies a “reasonable” 
proportion of the population as at high risk, as opposed to the current version of the SCORE system (as 
discussed in Papers IV and V).
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historical trends in political steering documents found an increasing em-
phasis on the individual’s personal responsibility for making healthy life 
choices (Stenvoll et al. 2005). 
Reflected against the background of the history of science, the increasing 
emphasis on the individual’s personal responsibility for making healthy 
life choices can be interpreted as representing a scientific reinstitution 
of the concept of sin – no longer in the domain of the church, but in the 
medical context. As Deborah Gordon (1988:40) has noted, “Biomedi-
cine has both created and stepped in to fill the apparent moral vacuum, 
replacing moral idioms with medical ones.” Interestingly enough, the 
“breaking away of disease from the metaphysics of evil to which it had 
been related for centuries” (Foucault 1975; 198) was a core idea behind 
the progress that “the Enlightenment thinkers aimed at when devoting 
themselves to disengaging nature from its previous metaphysical and 
spiritual connections” (Gordon 1988; 24, see also Appendix 2 in this 
thesis). By defining the body as the domain of science and the soul as 
the domain of religion, disease was in the period of Enlightenment re-
defined to become a natural mechanism, and no longer a divine punish-
ment for committed sins. Current implementation of scientific evidence, 
although presented to the public as free from morality and grounded 
in pure rationality and objectivity, is accompanied by a definite appeal 
to change personal “misbehaviour” in the sense of non-healthy living. 
In preventive medicine, one does not speak about the “sinful” person; 
the individual is encouraged to manage the “risky” self (Ogden 1995). 
In modernity’s context of naturalism and individualism, we should ac-
knowledge that preventive medicine can thereby come to assume the 
character of “normativity in scientific disguise” (see chapter 2.3.5).
Medical ethicist Richard Zaner (2003) has noted: “Medicine is one of 
the major remaining sources of taken-for-granted social authority in our 
times.” Norwegian professor of social medicine Per Fugelli has, along 
with other previously mentioned scholars, expressed concerns that med-
icine is developing into social authority which promotes moral blaming 
and coercion of people in the name of goodness and individual freedom 
(Fugelli 2003 and 2006). 
In his most recent works, Fugelli warns against medical equivalents to 
the “Zero Vision.” In an attempt to counteract abuse of medical power, 
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he recently formulated a ‘wish list’ regarding values and strategies that 
he would like to see informing preventive medicine in the future (Fugel-
li 2003 and 2006). Fugelli wants to remould “the mind-shaping narrative 
power of public health education”, and he proposes that the professional 
emphasis in preventive medicine should move: 
• from omnipotence to moderation,
• from a focus on life style to a focus on living conditions,
• from risk to the bright sides of life (from pathogenesis to saluto-
genesis),
• from a statistical clone to a holy individual,138 and finally
• the public health messenger’s style of communication should 
change from what Fugelli sees as ‘authoritarian truth mongering’ 
to transparency, respectfulness, and acknowledgement of doubt in 
the face of uncertainty.139
9.6.3 Evidence-based guidelines versus reality-based ‘mindlines’
In recent years, there has been considerable health service research on 
why medical evidence is not being more easily accommodated into 
practice, and how the perceived “barriers to implementation” can be 
reduced (see, for instance, Grol and Grimshaw 2003). As previously 
mentioned in this thesis and Papers II-V, the reasons for poor compli-
ance with guidelines in clinical practice appear multifaceted and com-
plex when contemplating the details (see, for instance, refs. 37-40 in 
Paper IV). From a meta-perspective, however, UK general practitioner 
David Kernick (2005) believes that these phenomena can be summed 
up in “the fact that the evidence-based product may not be relevant to 
those at whom it is directed.” To explain what he means, Kernick de-
scribes an ever more solid consolidation of “two cultures”140 in the con-
temporary British health service: the academic/researcher culture, on 
138 Here, Fugelli does not speak about individual responsibility for health, but about paying attention to each 
person’s individuality and social situatedness, as opposed to treating him or her exclusively as a representa-
tive of a group on the basis of EBM.
139 When choosing these provocative words, Fugelli is in good accordance with the founding father of EBM 
David Sackett who recently described the ethos of preventive medicine as arrogant; meaning aggressively 
assertive, presumptuous and overbearing (Sackett 2002). 
140 In a famous 1959 lecture in Cambridge and a subsequent book, physicist and writer Charles Percy Snow 
(1905-80) conceptualised a tension between the two cultures of the sciences and the humanities. Magne 
Nylenna has presented this topic to Norwegian readers (2000). According to Kernick, Snow saw a struggle 
of modernity that we can find 50 years later in health care as two groups struggling to “redefine the modern”; 
the health service academic/researcher and the clinician/practitioner (Kernick 2005).
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one side, and the clinician/practitioner culture, on the other.141 Kernick 
proposes that emphasis should shift from “bridging the gap” and “man-
aging the interface” (which involves increased efforts to find ways to 
implement existing evidence in practice organizations) to undertaking 
a fundamental reappraisal of the nature of the knowledge that is being 
produced by the healthservice academic community. Kernick wants aca-
demic knowledge to become more coherent with “the realities of health 
services delivery.”
In contrast to the way he describes the ‘academic/researcher community’ 
(see quote in chapter 2.2.2), Kernick conceptualises the ‘clinician/prac-
titioner community’ in terms of an eco-system of co-evolving elements 
where one might regard “people coming together to make sense of their 
world within a framework that is largely socially constructed.” Decision 
making in such healthcare communities is characterised by multiple goals 
and ambiguous and competing objectives, as well as uncertain relation-
ships between cause and effect (see the section on complexity theory in 
chapter 2.2.5 in this thesis). Kernick states that “the bulk of our [GPs’] 
activity is to establish and modify relationships rather than seeking an 
endless series of goals.” This description evokes sociologist Martin Lip-
sky’s renowned theory of Street level bureaucrats (1980). There, Lipsky 
describes how practitioners in the front line of public service constantly 
strive to modify their roles and organizational expectations to reduce the 
gap between available possibilities and system objectives. With reference 
to Lipsky’s theory, Kernick maintains that such strategies, which involve 
a continuous negotiation between expectations and reality, are absolutely 
essential to the long-time survival of the healthcare system. In order to 
fulfil professional expectations, the practicing clinician should thereby be 
encouraged to develop not only an evidence-based but also an intuitive 
grasp of reality. This grasp should be based on a deep understanding of 
the tasks at hand and ability to take in complex situations and produce a 
vision of what is realistic to achieve (Greenhalgh 2002; Kernick 2005). 
This understanding will be based upon experience with similar cases, un-
derpinned by professional reflection in action (Schön 1983; Schön 1987; 
see chapters 4.1.2 and 7.1.3 in this thesis). In practice, such understanding 
is often developed in the presence of a collegial tutor or supervisor, i.e., 
within a master-apprentice relationship. 
141 Kernick’s view that current biomedical research on medical interventions operates “on the flat of the ex-
ponential curve” and thereby yields marginal returns in terms of improved healthcare delivery, despite huge 
investments, was outlined in Chapter 2.2.2.
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An in-depth ethnographic study from 2004 highlights how experienced 
clinicians in two highly regarded English general practices derive their 
individual and collective healthcare decisions (Gabbay and LeMay 
2004). The researchers reported that “the individual practitioners did not 
go through the steps that are traditionally associated with the linear-ra-
tional model of evidence based health care – not once in the whole time 
we were observing them.” Instead, the GPs relied on what the investiga-
tors termed “mindlines”, which the researchers defined as collectively 
reinforced, internalised, tacit guidelines. The mindlines were partly in-
formed by a brief reading of original research and guidelines outside 
practice hours, but mainly by the doctors’ own experience and that of 
their colleagues, their interactions with each other and with opinion 
leaders, patients, and pharmaceutical representatives, and other sources 
of largely tacit knowledge. Mediated by organisational demands and 
constraints, mindlines were interactively negotiated with a variety of 
key actors, often through a range of informal interactions in fluid “com-
munities of practice,” resulting in socially constructed “knowledge in 
practice” (Gabbay and leMay 2004).
These findings have fundamental relevance to the planning of knowledge 
implementation and quality development in primary health care. Instead 
of defining the challenge as a problem of “poor concordance” and “clini-
cal inertia” among clinicians, which are highly normative characteris-
tics, it would be wise to acknowledge and respect the intricate processes 
of collective “sense making” by which knowledge, both explicit and 
tacit, is negotiated, constructed, and internalised in everyday clinical re-
ality (Greenhalgh and Hurwitz 1998; Kernick 2005; Greenhalgh 2002). 
In 1998, UK general practice researchers Greenhalgh and Hurwitz de-
fined three aspects of what Kernick (2005) has termed “interface zones 
between evidence-based health care and the real world” which they be-
lieve need further scrutiny. I will highlight these areas, as they fit very 
well with the research and reflections I have presented in this thesis: 
–  Research trials are planned, funded, undertaken and disseminated 
within a historical, political, economical and cultural context.142 
–  The current tendency to overlook the difference between efficacy 
142 Comment by LG: Solid documentation of this can be found in the previously mentioned multi-disciplin-
ary research paper (Krieger et al. 2005), which analyses the development of research, promotion and prac-
tice in relation to hormone replacement therapy.
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and effectiveness143 ignores the socio-cultural aspects of profession-
al behaviour, organizational change and intervention delivery.
–  The clinical encounter is an interpretative and creative act going 
beyond objective, scientific enquiry and must be separately stud-
ied by appropriate techniques.
It is obviously a challenge to change health service research traditions. 
But in recent years, there has in fact been an increasing emphasis on 
collaboration between researchers and the users of research results, as 
well as on involving patients at all levels of healthcare decision mak-
ing. Against this background, programmes, such as ‘action research’ and 
‘knowledge utilization’, have been launched. An overarching frame-
work for involvement of relevant stakeholders in the development of 
new knowledge, termed dialogical research, has also been suggested 
(Schrijvers 1991).144 According to Kernick (2005), this model portrays 
research as a dialogue rather than an expert activity and implies that all 
parties should be invited to contribute ideas and concepts to the research 
process in a respectful atmosphere. 
9.6.4 Some notes on the process of guideline development
Despite wide recognition of the need for methodological rigour in the 
development of clinical guidelines, there is ample evidence that current 
approaches often lack sufficient quality and transparency (Shekelle et 
al. 1999; Hasenfeld and Shekelle 2003; Raine et al. 2005). As outlined 
in Papers IV and V, the 2003 European Guidelines on CVD Prevention 
in clinical practice evoke fundamental scientific and ethical questions, 
regarding both the quality of the biomedical evidence on which the risk 
scoring system is based, and the process of guideline development. The 
question of how to make clinical guidelines is, as such, not a central 
topic of this thesis. I will nevertheless sum up some points I have come 
to see as particularly relevant in the context of sustainable and respon-
sible preventive medicine: 
143 Comment by LG: British pioneer clinical epidemiologist Archie Cochrane defined the concepts of ef-
ficacy and effectiveness. Efficacy is the extent to which an intervention does more good than harm under 
ideal circumstances: “Can it work?”, usually referring to the context of clinical trials. Effectiveness assesses 
the extent to which the intervention does more good than harm when provided under usual circumstances: 
“Does it work in practice?”, usually referring to unselected populations (Haynes 1999).
144 Kernick’s paper (2005) contains relevant references to action research and knowledge utilisation in clini-
cal practice. The original reference by Schrijvers (which I have not read) is: Schrijvers J. Dialectics of 
dialogical ideal age: studying down, studying sideways and studying up. In L. Rencel & P. Pells (eds.) 
Constructing Knowledge. London: Sage, 1991.
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– The fundamental aims and philosophical approach(es) to the medical 
problem(s) in question should be stated as explicitly as possible in the 
guidelines (as outlined in chapter 9.6.1). It should, for instance, be clear 
to what extent the recommendations aim for clinical effectiveness, cost 
effectiveness and equity. 
– The scientific knowledge and evidence, on which the guidelines are 
built, should be comprehensive. As previously outlined (see chapter 
9.3.2), it is neither rational nor reasonable to base clinical guidelines 
only on medical evidence, as currently defined by EBM (see also Hol-
men, Hetlevik et al. 1999; Raine et al. 2004). 
– The role of value judgements and group consensus should be out-
lined in the guidelines. Specific methods have been developed for trans-
parently incorporating group judgements in the preparation of clinical 
guidelines (Raine et al. 2005).
– Participants in guideline development should be multidisciplinary. It 
has been shown that when presented with the same evidence, a single 
speciality group is likely to reach different conclusions than a multi-
disciplinary group; the speciality group tends to be biased in favour of 
performing procedures in which it has vested interests (Shekelle 1999; 
Raine 2005; Krieger et al. 2005). All stakeholders whose activities or 
interests will be directly affected by the recommendations should there-
fore be involved from the beginning in the preparation of guidelines. 
– The question of efficacy versus effectiveness must be carefully consid-
ered, (the terms are defined in footnote 143). Almost all clinical trials 
have until now assessed efficacy in the context of randomised clinical 
trials. Such trials have typically recruited patients who are carefully se-
lected and diagnosed, lack other serious illnesses, are likely to follow 
and respond to the treatments of interest, and will be monitored with 
special interest and attention by the staff in accordance with a well-de-
fined protocol (Haynes 1999). 
A wealth of evidence from randomised controlled trials suggests that in-
tensive management of hypertension, diabetes, dyslipidemias and other 
chronic conditions is, on average, beneficial to broad groups of patients 
in terms of disease outcomes (many of these trials are listed in Appendix 
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4). Until quite recently, most of the data have, however, been gathered in 
studies limited to single, clinical interventions (O’Connor 2005). The ef-
fectiveness of such interventions in non-selected populations in the com-
munity obviously depends on efficacy. Nevertheless, there is a whole 
range of additional factors influencing effectiveness, such as selection 
of patients, diagnostic accuracy, provider concordance, patient adher-
ence, and locally available resources (Swensen 2000). With reference 
to the previously mentioned precautionary principle, it is important to 
acknowledge that potential harm is related to the implementation of effi-
cacy-based guidelines in unselected populations. This will be illustrated 
with an example in the following paragraph about modelling studies.
‘Implementation modelling studies’ of guidelines should be mandatory 
before clinical guidelines are issued. Once an authoritative guideline is 
disseminated, it sets the standard for accepted health policy in its area. 
Adherence to guidelines is often used as a quality indicator and may 
even be linked to incentive payments (Boyd et al. 2005). Guidelines 
have important resource and equity implications; they stipulate what 
health resources should be allocated to which patients. They also have 
important implications for the distribution of health service resources 
among different specialities. Papers IV and V highlight the relevance of 
performing estimates of the implications of implementing guidelines, 
in terms of both the size of the target population and the accompany-
ing workload. British GP and health economist Tom Marshall, who has 
conducted mathematical modelling studies of guidelines (e.g., Marshall 
and Rouse 2002), recently wrote (Marshall 2005): 
If guidelines are not to become simply marketing tools by which specialists try to 
increase the slice of health service resources allocated to their particular speciality, 
they must justify the resource implications in relation to the benefits they gener-
ate.
Marshall (2005) emphasises that analyses of anticipated effectiveness 
and workload implications are neither complex nor expensive to do. 
Still, to date, very few guideline committees have undertaken such anal-
yses before issuing their recommendations. The 2003 European guide-
lines that are the focus of Papers IV and V are just one example of this. 
After the publication of Papers IV and V, another Norwegian study mod-
elled the potential consequences of implementing the SCORE guide-
lines, based on data from the Tromsø population study. It documents that 
177
implementation of the 2003 guidelines might lead to a doubling of the 
number of patients on cardiovascular medication for primary preven-
tion, compared with the current status (Hartz et al. 2005). 
Another type of modelling study that should be undertaken addresses 
the aggregated effect of applying different clinical guidelines to patients 
with multiple medical problems (Wright et al. 2003). An example of such 
a study was recently published in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association. It addressed the applicability of clinical practice guidelines 
in the care of a hypothetical older woman with several chronic diseas-
es.145  It turned out that most of the guidelines applying to her conditions 
did not modify or discuss the relevance of their recommendations for 
older patients with multiple co-morbidities. Most guidelines also did not 
comment on short- and long-term goals and the quality of the underlying 
scientific evidence or provide guidance for incorporating patient prefer-
ences into the treatment plans. If the relevant guidelines were followed, 
the hypothetical patient would be prescribed 12 medications, dosed three 
to five times a day and, in addition, a complicated non-pharmacological 
regimen. It was apparent to the investigators that medical errors, as well 
as adverse interactions between drugs and diseases, could easily hap-
pen. The resulting complex treatment regimen was also deemed likely to 
disrupt daily routines, impair social activities, and invite non-adherence. 
The authors’ conclusion was that concordance with current guidelines in 
caring for an older person with several co-morbidities may have unde-
sirable effects (see also Hetlevik 2005). 
As noted in Paper V, the US Framingham study tended to overestimate 
risk in the European context, and this was one of the motivating factors 
behind the SCORE project. Now it turns out that the SCORE chart for 
high risk regions (including Norway) also overestimates risk. As out-
lined in Paper V, the SCORE-high chart appears to overestimate risk in 
the Norwegian population to a considerable extent. An even more recent 
study indicates that the same holds in Germany, and that the SCORE 
system overestimates risk to an even higher degree than the Framingham 
risk equation does (Neuhauser et al. 2005). Consequently, before issuing 
authoritative guidelines, cardiovascular risk scoring systems should be 
145 The patient had chronic obstructive lung disease, type 2 diabetes, osteoporosis and osteoarthritis; this 
combination of diseases is well imaginable in a women of her age. In the USA, it is estimated that half of the 
population aged 65 years or older has three or more chronic diseases (Boyd et al. 2005).
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tested against epidemiological data gathered in the population where 
they are intended for use (Reynolds et al 2004, see ref. 13 in Paper V). 
The final point I want to make regarding the development of clinical 
guidelines is that there should also be transparency regarding compet-
ing interests among guideline authors/committees. It is a well-estab-
lished fact that the pharmaceutical industry’s influence on medical prac-
tice has widely become too pervasive (see, for instance, Smith 2005 
as well as several references in Appendix 4). Competing interests have 
been shown to introduce significant risk of bias in medical publishing. 
This made most leading medical journals introduce a competing interest 
statement for authors in the 1990s. In 2002, US internist Bob Goodman, 
who is the founder of a campaign for independent prescribing called 
No Free Lunch (www.nofreelunch.org), explained why it is particularly 
important that clinical practice guidelines are written by independent 
authors: 
Any influence of a drug company on an individual author [of a clinical guideline] is 
multiplied thousands of times. Worse, there’s a subjective element to the recommen-
dations in clinical guidelines that makes them particularly vulnerable to bias.146
In relation to compilation of clinical guidelines, the tradition of disclos-
ing competing interests still appears to be very young (Papanikolaou et 
al. 2001, Choudhry et al. 2002, Smith 2005). For example, I found no 
statement about authors’ and contributing experts’ competing interests 
in the 2003 European Guidelines for CVD Prevention in Clinical Prac-
tice.147 A study recently published in Nature (Taylor and Giles 2005) 
showed that about a third of authors who had recently written practice 
guidelines concerning drug use in the USA had ties to the pharmaceuti-
cal industry. It also showed that about 70% of guideline writing panels 
were affected. Furthermore, it also appeared that doctors quite often did 
not disclose drug industry connections, even when the guideline com-
mitment or a scientific journal required it. I believe that a formal routine 
should be built into the process of guideline development compelling 
authors to declare, qualitatively as well as quantitatively (Smith 2005), 
any competing interests. A declaration of the contributors’ competing 
interests should also be included in the written product. 
146 This quote is taken from the News section of the BMJ: Tonks A. Authors of guidelines have strong links 
with the drugs industry. BMJ 2002;324:383 is accessible at www.bmj.com.
147 I refer to the complete version of the guidelines: DeBacker G et al. Eur J Cardiovasc Prev Rehabil. 2003 
Aug;10(4):S1-S78.
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9.7	Planning	for	the	future:	closing	remarks	
According to my list, planning for the future is the final prerequisite for 
sustainable and responsible preventive medicine. The topic of futurity 
can obviously be defined very broadly. This entire thesis may, in fact, be 
regarded as an entry in the debate on medicine’s future. It therefore feels 
appropriate to conclude the arguments I have already started, rather than 
introduce new and different perspectives that could also fit under this 
heading. 
At the heart of medicine, in general, and primary health care, in particu-
lar, rests “the central, enduring responsibility of doctors in any society 
– the recognition and relief of suffering” (Heath and Sweeney 2005). 
In the hope of continuing to be satisfied and proud of my work as a 
medical doctor in the future, I have felt compelled to make this person-
al contribution to keeping medicine ‘on the right track’, with the hope 
that medical activity, in general, and preventive medicine, in particular, 
will be regarded as reasonable and justifiable, not only from the narrow 
perspective of evidence-based medicine here-and-now but also from a 
viewpoint of geography (“think globally, act locally”) or chronology 
(how will my grandchildren describe the medical generation I belong 
to?). I therefore think we as medical doctors should strive to develop 
what has been called our human moral imagination (Benatar 2005 ii). 
This involves more human introspection and, at the same time, a more 
global orientation (Heath 2005). 
Let us begin with the introspective part, as I believe it leads us to the 
global part. In the chapter Man as standing- reserve? which ended the 
theoretical introduction (Chapter 4.3), I asked whether the increasing 
international focus on dissatisfaction and so-called ‘burn-out’ among 
medical doctors148 could be interpreted as a warning sign that the con-
vergence of medical technologies and new management technologies is 
currently creating an unprecedented technological enframing of the hu-
man condition within the healthcare system. Fortunately (not for medi-
cine, but for my argument), there are other medical thinkers than I who 
see a problem and, thereby, a great professional challenge, in this area: 
148 The suicide rate among male hospital physicians in Denmark is reportedly three times higher than the 
average suicide rate among working males in the country. A commenting psychiatrist has explained this by a 
combination of demanding tasks/decisions and stress, or – alternatively - as due to easy access to knowledge 
about self-poisoning and drugs among doctors. I leave it open to debate whether existential alienation could 
play a role in these statistics. Bech M. Læger har rekord i selvmord.  Politiken 5. jan 2006 (http://politiken.
dk/VisArtikel.sasp?PageID=428349).
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When medical doctor and Harvard-affiliated quality improvement ‘guru’ 
Donald M. Berwick was preparing to go to hospital to have his right 
knee joint replaced due to arthrosis in 2003, he formulated a short wish 
list of his personal requirements. This author probably knows better than 
anyone else in the USA that times have recently been good for quality 
improvement in health care, particularly in the renowned institutions 
he can choose to access. Nevertheless, he was deeply concerned about 
what might now happen to him as a patient. His wish list was as follows 
(Berwick 2004): 
Don’t kill me (no needless deaths). Do help me, and don’t hurt me (no needless 
pain). Don’t make me feel helpless. Don’t keep me waiting. And don’t waste re-
sources, mine or anyone else’s.
These requirements seem absolutely just and reasonable, don’t they? 
The problem is that as Berwick wrote this list, he feared:
Given my requirements, it is not clear that any healthcare institution in the United 
States will want to take me on as a patient.
How can this be? Berwick explains what he means, asks what can be 
done, – and also provides an answer, to which I wish to draw attention: 
Despite the good news, [quality] improvement is still happening in pieces. It must 
take some different level of energy, insight and courage than we have mustered 
so far to get total quality of care. Where will we find the courage we are going to 
need? 
I propose this: If we are going to care enough to provide really different care, top to 
bottom, we are going to have to begin seeing patients and their lives not ‘out there’, 
but as mirrors of our own lives, ‘in here’.
What Berwick is asking for, can perhaps best be ‘captured’ by place-
less and timeless human values, such as compassion, tolerance, a sense 
of caring, consideration of others, and the responsible use of medical 
knowledge and power.149 Berwick does not have Heidegger, Jonas, 
Taylor or Frank on his reference list, but I believe these thinkers could 
provide a meaningful philosophical framework for Berwick’s worries. 
What I believe he is observing, although not saying so explicitly, is that 
the rationally and technologically oriented ‘hypervalues’ of modernity 
149 Incidentally, the speach made by the Dalai Lama at the previously mentioned conference of The Society 
for Neuroscience in 2005 (see chapter 9.3.1 for the reference) contains the following passage: “By invok-
ing fundamental ethical principles, I am not advocating a fusion of religious ethics and scientific inquiry. 
I am speaking of what I call ‘secular ethics’ that embrace the key ethical principles, such as compassion, 
tolerance, a sense of caring, consideration of others, and the responsible use of knowledge and power – prin-
ciples that transcend barriers between believers and non-believers, and followers of this religion and that 
religion.”
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(see chapter 9.3.2) that have for decades dominated biomedical research 
(see chapter 2.2) are currently beginning to overtake the ethos of medi-
cal care in general. Berwick’s potential caregivers are thereby – in daily 
life on the clinical wards – becoming increasingly alienated from the 
basic truths of what it means to be a human being (Vetlesen 2004) and to 
care for other human beings (Jones 2002). Thus, these professionals are 
being drawn away from values that have since Hippocrates constituted 
the basis of professional ethics for medical doctors (see chapter 4.1.1 on 
professionalism and Appendix 2 regarding Hippocrates). 
The capacity for moral imagination has – until now – been central to 
medical professionalism. And once moral imagination is in place, I be-
lieve it automatically opens a global perspective on things (Benatar 2005 
ii). Berwick also points this out, whilst contemplating his knee: 
For me it is only a knee. Thank God. It could have been my heart. It could be cancer 
(…) or a disabling psychosis. (…) I could be not just an American with a bad knee 
but a Thai with dengue or an African with AIDS. 
Therein lies the challenge [for us as doctors]: finding the courage to see myself 
in others. What if everyone I want to help is just like me, in disguise? (…) I am 
coming to believe that we cannot relieve the distress of others until we get better at 
sensing our own, and what we need to relieve it. That may be the only sustainable 
source of sufficient will for change. 
This thesis focuses on preventive medicine as it is currently promoted 
and practiced in affluent industrialised countries. I however believe, like 
Berwick, that we will do a more truthful and responsible job locally if 
we concurrently think globally and consider our professional actions and 
duties from a wider perspective. Although the 20th century saw a major 
expansion of the world’s economy and spectacular progress in science 
and technology, the sad reality of the first decade of the new millennium 
is that human life, well-being and security remain under severe threat – a 
threat that can be related to a large extent to adverse effects of increasing 
disparities in wealth, health and knowledge within and between nations 
(Benatar 2005 i and ii; Benatar et al. 2005). There is, as yet, no explicit 
and coherent political, social or ethical framework to help nations, in 
general (Horton 2003), or physicians, in particular (Benatar 2005 i), to 
cooperate in addressing this challenge. I personally see this as the most 
obvious and legitimate arena where the medical profession could – and 
ought to – make deliberate use of the fact that we are still one of the ma-
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jor remaining sources of taken-for-granted social authority in our times, 
as described by medical ethicist Richard Zaner (2003). Rather than los-
ing our collective trustworthiness by chasing blood pressure measures, 
cholesterol levels and other risk factors indefinitely in order to control 
and “treat” them with drugs, driven by the vanity of Vision Zero, I think 
we should invest a few more resources in the creation of a shared global 
understanding of how it might be possible to secure the health of hu-
mankind throughout the world (Benatar 2005 i). 
To improve human health in a world-wide perspective, there is, however 
– as I have previously outlined in this thesis – a need for a wider hori-
zon in medical research and an urge to appraise human beings for what 
they are: persons capable of constructing and maintaining meaning in 
interaction with others. Nobody is a meaningless body with a mind lo-
cated somewhere else. Medical research ignoring this perspective is nei-
ther up to the challenges it faces nor ethically justifiable. Realising this, 
medicine should join forces with other academic disciplines; philosophy 
and ethics, ecology, political science, economics and social geography, 
to mention just a few (Horton 2003; Ruger 2004 i and ii; Kirkengen: 
lecture at Rosendal seminar, 2005). 
Before the Dalai Lama took the podium at the 2005 conference of The 
Society for Neuroscience in Washington,150 about 800 people had signed 
an online petition demanding that his invitation be withdrawn. Outside 
the conference hall itself, a young neuroscientist held a poster with the 
words 
“DALAI LAMA NOT QUALIFIED TO SPEAK HERE.” 
In an interview with the press, this scientist maintained that: 
This is supposed to be a scientific talk. If he is not presenting data, he should not 
speak. 
I truly disagree with this scientist. My reasons are in this thesis. It is my 
hope that the arguments and reflections presented here can – in an aca-
demically justifiable manner – be of help to colleagues and others who, 
for explicit or, perhaps, mostly intuitive reasons, ‘know’ that medical 
150 This speech was introduced in chapter 9.3.1 and was also mentioned in the previous footnote.
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science needs to encompass much more than the collection of original, 
empirical data. In order to promote sustainable and responsible medical 
research and practice, I believe we are obliged to regard medical activity 
from a distance. Not only should medical professionals be called upon 
to explain their own work (as outlined in chapter 4.1.5), but medical 
activity should also be examined and challenged from other intellectual 
viewpoints. Closing the discussion of this thesis, I think the most im-
portant thing I have learnt is to appreciate what Hans Jonas, profoundly 
aware of the potential of ever more sophisticated medical technology 
and the ever increasing status derived from it, meant when he formu-
lated the core of his concern as follows (Jonas 1974, as quoted in Zaner 
2003): 
We need wisdom most when we believe in it least.
END
184
EPILOGUE
On existential ground
I believe there is no such thing as objectivity and value-neutrality in 
human life. Whilst working on this thesis, I have come to realise how 
my own background and closest family have influenced the way I relate 
to modern medicine with its strengths, limitations and fascinating para-
doxes. I want to express my gratitude:
To	my	father	Jan	R.	Getz	(1921-1997)	
Even after you became an internationally renowned researcher in the 
field of shipbuilding and marine construction (and were awarded the 
Royal Norwegian Order of St. Olav), you always kept a pencil and a 
folded sheet of paper in the back pocket of the saggy pants you loved to 
wear when out-of-office. 
It was the 27th of March 1980, and I was 17 years old. On that stormy 
day, the oil platform Alexander L. Kielland broke and turned over. 123 
people died; 89 survived. You were in no way professionally responsible 
for what happened, but I shall never forget the look on your face in the 
days following the catastrophe. There was the disbelief and emptiness 
which we all felt. But there was more, something unfamiliar. Today, I 
think it was the look of remorse, as if you felt responsible for not having 
acted upon a gut feeling that something was wrong. Gradually, I realised 
that you had been concerned about the lack of safety in the North Sea 
long before the disaster struck. This hypothesis was strengthened in the 
spring of 2005, 25 years later, when historian Helge Ryggvik described 
the Kielland event in terms of “An announced disaster” (En varslet 
storulykke, see Petromagasinet 1/2005 or Dagbladet 15. mars 2005.) 
Observing you in the days after the event taught me, I think, that if some-
thing feels wrong in your professional environment, one has to speak out. 
Internal professional critique is not necessarily welcome, however. You 
knew, or at least you would sometimes say: “You are right; you ought to 
be hanged,” when someone said something unpleasant, but relevant.
The Alexander L. Kielland saga also taught me the virtue of sound scep-
ticism in the presence of expert authority. When the Norwegian Par-
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liament finally succeeded in convincing the government to take “full 
responsibility” and request the Kielland platform to be reversed from its 
overturned position at sea, your back-pocket pencil immediately came 
out. After making a quick sketch and contemplating the engineering task 
at hand, you concluded: “It cannot work.” I remember my bewilderment 
as I said “But Dad, the plan is designed by experts!” “I am afraid,” you 
said, “that it still won’t work.” And it turned out that you were right.
Your final year was dramatic from a medical point of view. Well into 
retirement, you still fixed everything around the house yourself. Then, in 
the summer of 1996, you fell from the roof. The head injury was almost 
fatal. But you survived, with severe brain damage. One year later, you 
walked the streets of Trondheim, on your way to an old friend’s funeral. 
You were dressed in a ragged outfit you had been wearing when painting 
the house some years earlier. Objectively speaking, you should not have 
been on you own, or dressed the way you were. But nobody (not my 
mother, whom you had always loved sincerely, nor any health institution 
- it had certainly been attempted) could stop you from doing what was 
important to you. Then you stumbled and fell, and acquired a fracture of 
the neck (dens axis), which paralysed your body from the neck down.
You managed to hang onto life until I arrived from Iceland. I was eight 
months pregnant, expecting my first child. At the Intensive Care Unit, 
they had started to give you nutrition i.v. when I arrived. I immediately 
asked to see the anaesthesiologist on duty and protested angrily to this 
absurd treatment. The doctor replied quite calmly: “Don’t worry. There 
is much more between heaven and earth than we know. In this situation, 
I don’t think the nutrition will interfere with those things.” 
That was a wise reply. It encouraged me to concentrate on the important 
things. So I went back to your bed, sat down and stroked your chin, – the 
only part of your body with sensibility still intact. You were intubated 
and could not speak, but your bewildered eyes brought forward a very 
clear question, which I was able to answer honestly: “Yes, Dad. I am 
happy with my life in Iceland. It is not easy, but it will be OK. When 
I was a little girl, I thought I would never be able to live without you. 
But… now I know I will manage quite well. 
So Dad…. you are free to let go, if that is what is best for you.” 
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Early the next morning, Stefi, your wife, sat beside your bed for a couple 
of hours. Then she felt that you needed to rest. Soon after she left the 
hospital, your heart quietly stopped beating. 
To my mother Stefi Getz, nee Okkenhaug (1923 - Dec 25th	2004)
Looking back to my childhood, I had the best mother of all. You were so 
attentive, so intuitive, so generous – and so elegant. Despite being older 
than the mothers of my peers, you were the one who opened the house 
to the kids of the block. You saw people. My friends from school and 
university would drop in to see you, even the week before you died! I 
also remember the pride I felt upon seeing you accompany Jan to gala 
dinners arranged by the shipping industry. It was not until I became an 
adult that I started to reflect upon the more subtle sides of my child-
hood: Why did I always get so angry and care so little for you during the 
few days you ever spent in bed, sick with something like flu? And why 
would I never sit in your lap? 
Today I realise that the answers to these minor, but significant, ques-
tions are embedded among three letters: Tbc. During the war, you were 
involved in the resistance movement in Trondheim. This brought you to 
prison. Your cell mate was severely ill and coughing. You helped her as 
best you could. When I was born two decades later, you had survived 
two bouts of life-threatening tuberculosis. As a person who had experi-
enced, and embodied, the true meaning of medical stigma, you did not 
encourage children to come close. And surely, it makes sense that you 
could not handle trivial illness lightly. Thus, simple flu could fill your 
bedroom with darkness and surrender, totally out of proportion to the 
situation. No wonder I stayed out. 
I owe my life to medical advance. You said that you took the decision to 
have a second child at a mature age only because your physician prom-
ised that Tbc could now be cured with drug therapy, should it recur. You 
would never have to experience again what happened six weeks after the 
birth of your first child, my sister Ingri.
I never had the courage to listen deeply to that story. You were first ad-
mitted to a sanatorium filled with people in the final stages of Tbc. What 
was it really like? The doctors refused to let you see your newborn child 
for months and months. In response to your trembling question, the 
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young doctor bluntly said: “If your baby has been infected, let us hope 
she will die quickly, because it [Tbc] has a tendency to go to the head 
of those little ones [referring to meningitis]”. How was it to undergo 
thoracoplasty in those days? And how did it feel to be discharged, filled 
with hope – only to be readmitted again a few years later, with almost 
all hope of survival gone. I never invited you to share the pain, and you 
were wise enough never to push it. 
You died peacefully in the silence of Christmas night in 2004. The night 
warden at the old people’s home reported that you had been a little rest-
less around 3:30 a.m. For no obvious reason, you asked her just to “be 
there.” And then you died. The staff was struck by a blend of surprise 
and awe. 
Together with my family, I had come over from Iceland to visit you 
only one week before you died. There were no objective medical signs 
of imminent death at that time. But when we said goodbye, you looked 
me briefly in the eyes in a way that was new to me. And during the next 
days, it sunk in. I knew. Your life was about to come to an end. 
I have never been much for listening to sermons, but I felt a strong 
urge to listen to the midnight mass on Icelandic television on Christmas 
night, four days after returning from Norway. The Bishop of Iceland has 
a remarkably determined and gentle voice. I remember quite distinctly 
that he said: 
“Nú er heilög jólanótt, þegar himinninn snertir jörðina á sérstakan 
hátt.”151
I also remember the silence that followed, and the way I shivered. 
 
151 Icelandic: “This is the Holy Night, when Heaven touches the Earth in a particular way.”
188
10. LITERATURE
Abramson J. Overdo$ed America. The broken promise of American medicine. New 
York: Harper Collins, 2004.
Adelsvärd V, Sachs L. The meaning of 6.8: Numeracy and normality in health informa-
tion talks. Soc Sci Med 1996;43:1179-87.
Anderson RA, Crabtree BF, Steele DJ, McDaniel RR Jr. Case study research: the view 
from complexity science. Qual Health Res 2005;15:669-85.
Angell M. The truth about the drug companies. How they deceive us and what to do 
about it. New York, NY: Random House, 2004.
Antonovsky A. Unravelling the mystery of health. How people manage stress and stay 
well. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1987.
Antonovsky A. The structure and properties of the sense of coherence scale. Soc Sci 
Med 1993;36:725-33.
Arky RA. Doctor, is my sugar normal? N Engl J Med 2005; 353:1511-3.
Armstrong D. The rise of surveillance medicine. Sociology of Health & Illness 
1995;17:393-404.
Arnetz BB. Causes of change in the health of populations: a biopsychosocial view-
point. Soc Sci Med 1996;43:605-8.
Ashar BH, Hughes MT, Marinopoulos SS, Prokopowicz GP, Berkenblit GV, Sisson 
SD, Simonson LA, Miller RG. Current evidence for the use of emerging radiologic 
technologies for disease screening. Am J Manag Care 2005;11:385-92.
Ashcroft R. Current epistemological problems in evidence based medicine. J Med Eth-
ics 2004;30:131-5.
Bakke K, Hofmann B. Patient autonomy and professional pride in the face of chal-
lenges with extended use of radiological services. Paper presented at the XIX Euro-
pean conference on philosophy of medicine and health care: Ethics and philosophy of 
emerging medical technologies. Barcelona, Aug 24-27, 2005. Abstract book p. 8.
Balint M. The doctor, the patient and the Illness. London: Pitman Medical Publishing 
1964.
Bardage C, Isacson D, Pedersen NL. Self-rated health as a predictor of mortality among 
persons with cardiovascular disease in Sweden. Scand J Public Health 2001;29:13-
22.
18
Barker DJ. The fetal origins of adult disease. Proc R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 1995;262:37-43.
Barry CA, Bradley CP, Britten N, Stevenson FA, Barber N. Patients’ unvoiced agendas 
in general practice consultations: qualitative study. BMJ 2000;320:1246-50. 
Bateson G. Steps to an ecology of mind. Chicago: University of Chicago press, 2000. 
Originally published in 1972.
Bateson G, Bateson MC. Angels fear. Towards an epistemology of the sacred. NY: 
Bantam books, 1987. 
Bateson P. Fetal experience and good adult design. Int J Epidemiol 2001;30:928-34.
Beaglehole R, Bonita R, Horton R, Adams O, McKee M. Public health in the new era: 
improving health through collective action. Lancet 2004;363:2084-6.
Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of biomedical ethics (5th ed). Oxford/NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Beck U. Risk society. Towards a new modernity. London: Sage, 1992. 
Benatar SR (i). Achieving gold standards in ethics and human rights in medical prac-
tice. PLoS Med 2005;2:e260. Epub 2005 Jul 19, access through www.plos.org.
Benatar SR (ii). Moral imagination: the missing component in global health. PLoS 
Med 2005;2:e400. Epub 2005 Dec 27, access through www.plos.org.
Benatar SR, Daar AS, Singer PA. Global health challenges: the need for an expanded 
discourse on bioethics. PLoS Med 2005;2:e143. Epub 2005 Jul 26, access through 
www.plos.org.
Bengel J, Strittmatter R, Willmann H. What keeps people healthy? Expert report com-
missioned by the Federal Centre for Health Education. The current state of discussion 
and the relevance of Antonovsky´s salutogenetic model of health. Cologne: Federal 
Centre for Health Education, 1999.
Bengtsson C, Ahlqwist M, Andersson K, Björkelund C, Lissner L, Söderstrom M. The 
Prospective Population Study of Women in Gothenburg, Sweden, 1968-69 to 1992-93. 
A 24-year follow-up study with special reference to participation, representativeness, 
and mortality. Scand J Prim Health Care 1997;15:214-9.
Benjamins MR, Hummer RA, Eberstein IW, Nam CB. Self-reported health and adult 
mortality risk: an analysis of cause-specific mortality. Soc Sci Med 2004;59:1297-306.
Berg O. Haug C. Dialogene som forvitrer? Et kritisk blikk på klinikkens utvikling. 
[Confusion dialogues. A critical look at the clinical development] Tidsskr Nor Laege-
foren 1997;117:1163-8. 
10
Berg E. The skapende mellomrommet – i mötet mellom pasient og lege. Oslo: Gylden-
dal Akademisk, 2005.
Bernstein RJ. Rethinking responsibility. Hastings Cent Rep 1995;25:13-20.
Berwick DM. Improving patient care. My right knee. Ann Int Med 2005;142:121-5.
Black WC, Welch HG. Advances in diagnostic imaging and overestimations of disease 
prevalence and the benefits of therapy. N Engl J Med 1993;328:1237-42.
Blaxter M. Health. Cambridge: Polity press, 2004.
Bleakley A. Stories as data, data as stories: making sense of narrative inquiry in clini-
cal education. Med Educ 2005;39:534-40.
Bourdieu P. Language and symbolic power. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1991.
Boyd CM, Darer J, Boult C, Fried LP, Boult L, Wu AW. Clinical practice guidelines 
and quality of care for older patients with multiple comorbid diseases: implications for 
pay for performance. JAMA 2005;294:716-24. 
Bracken P, Thomas P. Time to move beyond the mind-body split. BMJ 2002;325:1433-
4.
Brenner DJ. Elliston CD. Estimated radiation risks potentially associated with full-
body CT screening. Radiology 2004;232:735-8.
Brundtland GH (chairman). The World commission on environment and development. 
Our common future. Oxford: Oxford university press, 1987.
Buetow S, Docherty B. The seduction of general practice and illegitimate birth of an 
expanded role in population health care. J Eval Clin Pract 2005;11:397-404.
Buetow SA. To care is to coprovide. Ann Fam Med 2005;3:553-5.
Callahan D (project director, no authors listed). The goals of medicine project. Setting 
new priorities. Hastings Cent Rep 1996 Nov-Dec;26: special supplement S1-27. 
Callahan D. False Hopes: Overcoming the Obstacles to a Sustainable, Affordable 
Medicine. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1999.
Callahan D. Falsche Hoffnungen. In: Ethik in der Medizin. Ein Reader. Stuttgart: Rec-
lam, 2000 (p 260-2).
Callahan D, Jennings B. Ethics and public health: forging a strong relationship. Am J 
Public Health 2002;92:169-76.
11
Callahan D. Individual good and common good: a communitarian approach to bioeth-
ics. Perspect Biol Med 2003;46:496-507.
Canguilhem G. Le normal et le pathologique. Paris: Presses Universtitaires de France, 
1966. 
Carson AM. That´s another story: narrative methods and ethical practice. J Med Ethics 
2001;27:198-202.
Cassell EJ. The sorcerer’s broom. Medicine’s rampant technology. Hastings Cent Rep 
1993;23:32-9.
Cassell EJ. Doctoring: The nature of primary care medicine. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press/ Milbank Memorial Fund, 1997.
Cassell EJ. The principles of the Belmont report revisited. How have respect for per-
sons, beneficence and justice been applied to clinical medicine? Hastings Cent Rep 
2000; 39 (no 4):12-21.
Chandola T, Brunner E, Marmot M. Chronic stress at work and the metabolic syn-
drome: prospective study. BMJ 2006; (published 20 January Online first, see www.
bmj.com).
Charlton BG, Andras P. Medical research funding may have over-expanded and be due 
for collapse. QJM 2005;98:53-5.
Charon R. Narrative and medicine. N Engl J Med 2004;350:862-4.
Chervenak FA, McCullough LB. An ethical critique of boutique fetal imaging: a case 
for the medicalization of fetal imaging. Am J Obstet Gynecol 2005 Jan;192:31-3.
Chorover S. Who needs neuroethics? Lancet 2005;365:2081-2.
Choudhry NK, Stelfox HT, Detsky AS. Relationships between authors of clinical prac-
tice guidelines and the pharmaceutical industry. JAMA 2002;287:612-7.
Cicero S, Bindra R, Rembouskos G, Spencer K, Nicolaides KH. Integrated ultrasound 
and biochemical screening for trisomy 21 using fetal nuchal translucency, absent fetal 
nasal bone, free beta-hCG and PAPP-A at 11 to 14 weeks. Prenat Diagn 2003 23:306-
10.
Cohen AM, Stavri PZ, Hersh WR.A categorization and analysis of the criticisms of 
Evidence-Based Medicine. Int J Med Inform 2004;73:35-43.
Cox K. Stories as case knowledge: case knowledge as stories. Med Educ 2001;35:862-
6.
12
Daniels N, Kennedy B, Kawachi I. Justice is good for your health. Boston review 
2000, Feb-March. See www.bostonreview.net/BR25.1/daniels.html. Accessed Dec 
21st 2005.
De Backer G, Ambrosioni E, Borch-Johnsen K, Brotons C, Cifkova R, Dallongeville 
J, et al. Third Joint Task Force of European and Other Societies on Cardiovascular 
Disease Prevention in Clinical Practice. European guidelines on cardiovascular dis-
ease prevention in clinical practice. Third Joint Task Force of European and Other 
Societies on Cardiovascular Disease Prevention in Clinical Practice (constituted by 
representatives of eight societies and by invited experts). Eur J Cardiovasc Prev Re-
habil 2003;10 (Suppl 1):S1-S78. The executive summary also appears in Eur Heart J 
2003;24:1601-10. 
Dean K. The role of methods in maintaining orthodox beliefs in health research. Soc 
Sci Med 2004;58:675-85.
Del Mar C, Glasziou P. How many conditions can a GP screen for? BMJ 
2003;327:1117.
Deluca KM. Thinking with Heidegger. Rethinking environmental theory and practice. 
Ethics and the Environment 2005;10:67-87.
Deyo RA, Patrick DL. Hope or hype: The obsession with medical advances and the 
high cost of false promises. New York: American Management Association, 2005.
Dixon-Woods M, Williams SJ, Jackson CJ, Akkad A, Kenyon S, Habiba M. Why 
do women consent to surgery, even when they do not want to? An interactionist and 
Bourdieusian analysis. Social Science & Medicine 2006 (accessed under “in press”on 
the SSM homepage Dec 19th 2005).
Donchin A. Understanding autonomy relationally: toward a reconfiguration of bioethi-
cal principles. J Med Philos 2001;26:365-86.
Dong M, Giles WH, Felitti VJ, Dube SR, Williams JE, Chapman DP, Anda RF. In-
sights into causal pathways for ischemic heart disease. Adverse childhood experience 
study. Circulation 2004;110:1761-6.
Dower N. Sustainable development: Some ethical issues. Journal of Contemporary 
Health 1997, Issue 6 (autumn):57-60.
Dunne C, Warren C. Lethal autonomy: The malfunction of the informed consent mech-
anism within the context of prenatal diagnosis of genetic variants. Issues in Law & 
Medicine 1998;14:165-202.
Ehrenreich B, English D. For Her Own Good: 150 Years of Expert´s Advice to Wom-
en. NY: Doubleday, 1979.
13
Eik-Nes SH, Salvesen KA, Okland O, Vatten LJ. Routine ultrasound fetal examination 
in pregnancy: the ‘Alesund’ randomized controlled trial. Ultrasound Obstet Gynecol 
2000;15:473-8.
Ekeland TJ. Evidensbasert behandling: kvalitetssikring eller instrumentalistisk mis-
tak? [Evidence based treatment: Quality assurance or instrumetal mistake?] Tidsskrift 
for Norsk Psykologforening 1999;36:1036-47.
Ekeland TJ. The healing context and efficacy in psychotherapy: psychotherapy and the 
placebo phenomenon. Int J Psychother 1997;2:77-87.
Ekeland TJ. Meining som medisin: ein analyse av placebofenomenet og implikasjonar 
for terapi og terapeutiske teoriar [Meaning as medicine. An analysis of the placebo 
phenomenon and implications for therapy and therapeutical theories]. Thesis. Bergen: 
Universitetet i Bergen, Institutt for samfunnspsykologi, 1999.
Ekeli BV. Med kunnskapsbasert fysioterapi baklengs inn i fremtiden? [With evi-
dence based physiotherapy backwards into the future?] Fysioterapeuten 2000;No 10 
(Sept):21-6.
Engel GL. The need for a new medical model: a challenge for biomedicine. Science. 
1977;196:129-36. 
Engel GL. The clinical application of the biopsychosocial model. Am J Psychiatry 
1980;137:535-44.
Engel GL. How much longer must medicine’s science be bound by a seventeenth cen-
tury world view? Psychother Psychosom 1992;57:3-16.
Engel GL From biomedical to biopsychosocial. Being scientific in the human domain. 
Psychosomatics 1997;38:521-28.
Ewart RM. Primum non nocere and the quality of evidence: rethinking the ethics of 
screening. J Am Board Fam Pract 2000;13:188-96.
Farmer P. Pathologies of power. Health, human rights, and the new war on the poor. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.
Felitti VJ, Anda RF, Nordenberg D, Williamson DF, Spitz AM, Edvards V, Koss MP, 
Marks JS. Relationship of childhood abuse and household dysfunction to many of the 
leading causes of death in adults. Am J Prev Med 1998;14:245-58.
Felitti VJ. The relation between adverse childhood experiences and adult health: Turn-
ing gold into lead. The Permanente Journal 2002;6(1). Access at 
http://xnet.kp.org/permanentejournal/winter02/goldtolead.html.
Fidjestöl A. Hans Jonas. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2004.
14
Fisher ES, Welch HG. Avoiding the unintended consequences of growth in medical 
care: how might more be worse? JAMA 1999;281:446-53. 
Flensborg-Madsen T, Ventegodt S, Merrick J (i). Sense of coherence and physical 
health. A review of previous findings The Scientific World Journal 2005;5:665-73.
Flensborg-Madsen T, Ventegodt S, Merrick J (ii). Why is Antonovsky´s sense of co-
herence not correlated to physical health? Analysing Antonovsky´s 29-item Sense of 
Coherence Scale. The Scientific World Journal 2005;5:757-76.
Fleshner M, Laudenslager ML. Psychoneuroimmunology: then and now. Behav Cogn 
Neurosci Rev 2004;3:114-30.
Foucault M. The birth of the clinic: An archeology of medical perception. New York: 
vintage books 1975. 
Foucault M. The history of sexuality: an introduction. New York: Pantheon, 1987.
Fox RC. Cultural competence and the culture of medicine. N Engl J Med 2005;353:1316-
9.
Frank AW. Just listening: Narrative and deep illness. Families, Systems & Health 
1998;16:197-212.
Frank AW. Ethics as process and practice. Intern Med J 2004;34:355-7.
Fraser SW, Greenhalgh T. Complexity science. Coping with complexity: educating for 
capability. BMJ 2001;323:799-803. 
Fugelli P. 0-visjonen. Essays om helse og frihet [Vision zero. Essays on health and 
freedom]. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2003.
Fugelli P. The Zero-vision: potential side effects of communicating health perfection 
and zero risk. Patient Education and Counseling 2006; 60: 267-71.
Førde R. Etiske overveininger i allmennpraksis. I: Hunskår S. Allmennmedisin. Oslo: 
Gyldendal Akademisk, 2003 (pg. 797-800).
Gabbay J, le May A. Evidence based guidelines or collectively constructed “mindlines?” 
Ethnographic study of knowledge management in primary care. BMJ 2004;329:1013-
5.
Gabbay J. Walley T. Introducing new health interventions. BMJ 2006;332:64-5.
 
Gannik DE. Sosial sykdomsteori – et situationelt perspektiv. Fredriksberg C: Sam-
fundslitteratur, 2005.
15
Gatrell AC. Complexity theory and geographies of health: a critical assessment. Soc 
Sci Med 2005;60:2661-71.
Genuis SJ, Genuis SK. Resisting cookbook medicine. BMJ 2004;329:179.
Georgsson Öhman S, Saltvedt S, Waldenstrom U, Grunewald C, Olin-Lauritzen S. 
Pregnant women’s responses to information about an increased risk of carrying a baby 
with Down syndrome. Birth 2006 (in press).
Gerber A, Lauterbach KW. Evidence-based medicine: why do opponents and propo-
nents use the same arguments? Health Care Anal 2005;13:59-71.
Gerberding JL. Protecting health – the new research imperative. JAMA 2005;294:1403-
6.
Getz L (i). Fragmentenes forvaltere [The collector of fragments]. Editorial. Tidsskrift 
Nor Lægeforen 2001;121:1562. 
Getz L (ii). General practitioners and prenatal testing – follow the authorities or scruti-
nise the issue? Editorial. Scand J Prim Health Care 2001;19:145-7. 
Getz L (iii). Prenatal diagnostikk- et minefelt med etiske snubletråder. I: Almind G, 
Hjortdahl P (red.) Medicinsk Årbog 2002. Köbenhavn: Munksgaard forlag, 2001:49-
59.
Getz L. Om mentorskap og medisin [On mentorship and medicine]. I: Nylenna M Ja-
cobsen G (red): Legerollens mange muligheter. Oslo: Gyldendal akademisk, 2003:157-
173.
Getz L. Kirkengen AK, Hetlevik I, Sigurdsson JA. Individually based preventive med-
ical recommendations – are they sustainable and responsible? A call for ethical reflec-
tion. Editorial. Scand J Prim Health Care 2005;23:65-7.
Gillett G. Clinical medicine and the quest for certainty. Soc Sci Med 2004;58:727-38.
Glaser R. Stress-associated immune dysregulation and its importance for human health: 
a personal history of psychoneuroimmunology. Brain Behav Immun 2005;19:3-11.
Goldenberg MJ. Evidence-based ethics? On evidence-based practice and the ‘empiri-
cal turn’ from normative bioethics. BMC Med Ethics 2005;6:11.
Goodman K. Ethics and evidence-based medicine. Fallibility and responsibility in 
clinical science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Goodwin RD, Stein MB. Association between childhood trauma and physical disor-
ders among adults in the United States. Psychol Med 2004;34:509-20.
16
Gordon DR. Tenacious assumptions in Western medicine. In: Gordon DR, Lock M. 
Biomedicine examined. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988.
Greenhalgh T, Hurwitz B (eds.). Narrative based medicine. Dialogue and discourse in 
clinical practice. London: BMJ books, 1998.
Greenhalgh T, Hurwitz B. Narrative based medicine: why study narrative? BMJ 1999; 
318:48-50.
Greenhalgh T. Narrative based medicine in an evidence based world. BMJ 1999;318: 
323-5.
Greenhalgh T. Intuition and evidence--uneasy bedfellows? Br J Gen Pract 2002;52:395-
400.
Greenhalgh T, Robert G, Macfarlane F, Bate P, Kyriakidou O, Peacock R. Storylines 
of research in diffusion of innovation: a meta-narrative approach to systematic review. 
Soc Sci Med 2005;61:417-30.
Greenhalgh T. Can ‘anecdote’ ever be research? Fam Pract 2005;22:1.
Griffiths F, Green E, Tsouroufli M. The nature of medical evidence and its inherent 
uncertainty for the clinical consultation: qualitative study. BMJ 2005;330:511-5.
Grilli R, Magrini N, Penna A, Mura G, Liberati A. Practice guidelines developed by 
specialty societies: the need for a critical appraisal. Lancet 2000;355:103-6.
Grimen H, Elvbakken KT (eds.) Cultural perspectives on risk, preventive medicine 
and health promotion. Report 15/2003. Bergen: Rokkansenteret/Norges forskningsråd, 
2003.
Grol R, Grimshaw J. From best evidence to best practice: effective implementation of 
change in patients’ care. Lancet 2003;362:1225-30.
Guyatt G, Cook D, Hayes B. Evidence based medicine has come a long way. BMJ 
2004;329:990-1.
Hampton T. Markers in prenatal ultrasound debated. JAMA 2004;291:170-1.
Harrington JA. The instrumental uses of autonomy: a review of AIDS law and policy 
in Europe. Soc Sci Med 2002;55:1425-34.
Hart JT. No evidence is without ideology. BMJ 2005;331:964.
Hartz I, Njolstad I, Eggen AE. Does implementation of the European guidelines based 
on the SCORE model double the number of Norwegian adults who need cardiovascular 
drugs for primary prevention? The Tromso study 2001. Eur Heart J 2005;26:2673-80. 
17
Hasenfeld R, Shekelle PG. Is the methodological quality of guidelines declining in the US? 
Comparison of the quality of US Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) 
guidelines with those published subsequently. Qual Saf Health Care 2003;12:428-34.
Haynes RB, Sackett DL, Taylor DW, Gibson ES, Johnson AL. Increased absentee-
ism from work after detection and labeling of hypertensive patients. N Engl J Med 
1978;299:741-4.
Haynes B. Can it work? Does it work? Is it worth it? The testing of healthcare interven-
tions is evolving. BMJ 1999;319:652-3.
Hayry M. European values in bioethics: why, what, and how to be used? Theor Med 
Bioeth 2003;24:199-214.
Hayry M. Precaution and solidarity. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2005; 
14:199-206.
Heath I. View of health technology assessment from the swampy lowlands of general 
practice. Int J Technol Assess Health Care 2004;20:81-6.
Heath I. Who needs health care – the well or the sick? BMJ 2005;330:954-6.
Heath I, Sweeney K. Medical generalists: connecting the map and the territory. BMJ 
2005;331:1462-4.
Heidegger M, The Question Concerning Technology. In: The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays. New York: Harper & Row, 1977 (pgs. 3-36). (This es-
say was originally presented as a lecture in 1953, titled Die Frage nach der Technik.)
Heidrich J, Liese AD, Lowel H, Keil U. Self-rated health and its relation to all-cause 
and cardiovascular mortality in southern Germany. Results from the MONICA Augs-
burg cohort study 1984-1995. Ann Epidemiol 2002;12:338-45.
Herxheimer A. Communicating with patients about harms and risks. PLoS Med 
2005;2(2):e42, accessed through www.plos.org.
Hetlevik I. The role of clinical guidelines in cardiovascular risk intervention in general 
practice. Thesis. Trondheim: Bjaerum, 1999.
Hetlevik I. Evidence-based medicine in general practice: a hindrance to optimal medi-
cal care? Scand J Prim Health Care 2004;22:136-40.
Hetlevik I. Signe Skred – prioritert opp eller ned? [Signe Skred – prioritised up or 
down?] Utposten 2005; 34 (No 7): 15-23. 
Hofmann B. Normalitet og patologi [The normal and the pathological]. Tidsskr Nor 
Lægeforen 1995;115:3800-2.
18
Hofmann B (i). On the value-ladenness of technology in medicine. Med Health Care 
Philos 2001;4:335-46.
Hofmann B (ii). The paradox of health care. Health Care Anal 2001;9:369-86.
Hofmann B (iii). Legen som kroppstekniker [The doctor as a body technician]. Tidsskr 
Nor Lægeforen 2001;121:1266-9. 
Hofmann B. Is there a technological imperative in health care? Int J Technol Assess 
Health Care 2002;18:675-89.
Hofmann B. The technological invention of disease – on disease, technology and val-
ues. Thesis. Oslo: University of Oslo, Faculty of Medicine, 2002.
Hofmann B. Technological medicine and the autonomy of man. Med Health Care Phi-
los 2002;5:157-67.
Hofmann B. Health promotion – conceptual risk behaviour. In: Grimen H, Elvbakken 
KT (eds.). Cultural perspectives on risk, preventive medicine and health promotion. 
Report 15/2003. Bergen: Rokkansenteret/Norges forskningsråd, 2003:49-58.
Hollnagel H, Malterud K. From risk factors to health resources in medical practice. 
Med Health Care Philos 2000;3:257-64.
Holmen J. Medikamentell risikointervensjon – en omsorgsteknologi i krise? [Drug risk 
intervention--a care technology in crisis?] Tidsskr Nor Laegeforen 1994;114:465-9.
Holmen J, Hetlevik I, Ellekjaer H, Gjelsvik B, Kimsas A, Meland E. Kliniske retning-
slinjer for primærhelsetjenesten [Clinical guidelines for primary health care]. Tidsskr 
Nor Laegeforen 1999;119:1794-7.
Holmen J, Midthjell K, Krüger Ö, Langhammer A, Holmen TL, Bratberg GH, et al. 
The Nord-Tröndelag Health Study 1995-7 (HUNT-2): Objectives, contents, methods 
and participation. Norsk Epidemiologi 2003;13:19-32. 
Horton R. Georges Canguilhem: philosopher of disease. J R Soc Med 1995;88:316-9.
Horton R. The health of peoples: predicaments facing a reasoned utopia. Int J Health 
Serv 2003;33:543-68.
Horton R. Rediscovering human dignity. Lancet 2004;364:1081-5.
Horton R. Medicine: the prosperity of virtue. Lancet 2005;366:1985-7.
Hvas L, Reventlow S, Jensen HL, Malterud K. Awareness of risk of osteoporo-
sis may cause uncertainty and worry in menopausal women. Scand J Public Health 
2005;33:203-7.
1
Idler EL, Benyamini Y. Self-rated health and mortality: a review of twenty-seven com-
munity studies. J Health Soc Behav 1997;38:21-37.
Illich I. Limits to medicine. Medical Nemesis. The expropriation of health. NY: Ran-
dom House, 1976.
Irvine MJ, Logan AG. Is knowing your cholesterol number harmful? J Clin Epidemiol 
1994;47:131-45.
Irvine D. The performance of doctors. I: Professionalism and self regulation in a chang-
ing world. BMJ 1997;314:1540-2.
Irvine D. The performance of doctors: the new professionalism. Lancet 1999;353:1174-7.
Jackson R, Lawes CM, Bennett DA, Milne RJ, Rodgers A. Treatment with drugs to 
lower blood pressure and blood cholesterol based on an individual’s absolute cardio-
vascular risk. Lancet 2005;365:434-41.
Jacobs M. Sustainable development as a contested concept. In: Dobson A (ed.). Fair-
ness and futurity. Essays on Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice. Oxford/
New York: Oxford University Press, 1999 (pgs. 21-45).
Jha P, Kumar R, Vasa P, Dhingra N, Thiruchelvam D, Moineddin R. Low male-to-fe-
male ratio of children born in India: national survey of 1,1 million households. Lancet 
2006;367:211-8.
Jonas H. Philosophical essays: From ancient creed to technological man. Englewood-
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974. 
Jonas H. The imperative of responsibility: In Search for an Ethics for the Technologi-
cal age. Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1984. 
Jonas H. Technik, Medizin und Ethik. Zur Praxis des Prinzips Verantwortung. Frank-
furt/Main: Insel Verlag, 1985.
Jones AH. Narrative based medicine: narrative in medical ethics. BMJ 1999;318:253-6.
Jones R. Declining altruism in medicine. Understanding medical altruism is important 
in workforce planning. BMJ 2002;324:624-5. 
Kass LR. Professing ethically. On the place of ethics in defining medicine. JAMA 
1983;249:1305-10.
Kavanagh AM, Broom DH. Embodied risk: My body, myself? Soc Sci Med 
1998;46:437-44.
200
Kenen RH. The at-risk health status and technology: A diagnostic invitation and the 
“gift” of knowing. Soc Sci Med 1996;42:1545-53. 
Kernick D. Life on the exponential curve--time to rattle the academic cage? A view 
from the street. J Eval Clin Pract 2005;11:1-6.
Kirkengen AL. Inscribed bodies: Health Impact of Childhood Sexual Abuse. Dordre-
cht: Kluwer Academic Press, 2001. 
Kirkengen AL. The encounter with particulars. A time-space requiring privilege of 
unfolding and understanding. Eur J Gen Pract 2002;8:183-4.
Kirkengen AL. Hvordan krenkede barn blir syke voksne. [How abused children be-
come sick adults]. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2005.
Klein G. Varför tigar läkarna i human-genetiska frågor? Nordisk Medicin 1998; 
113:170.
Kleinman A. The illness narratives: suffering, healing, and the human condition. New 
York: Basic Books, 1988. 
Krieger N, Lowy I, Aronowitz R, Bigby J, Dickersin K, Garner E, Gaudilliere JP, Hin-
estrosa C, Hubbard R, Johnson PA, Missmer SA, Norsigian J, Pearson C, Rosenberg 
CE, Rosenberg L, Rosenkrantz BG, Seaman B, Sonnenschein C, Soto AM, Thornton 
J, Weisz G. Hormone replacement therapy, cancer, controversies, and women’s health: 
historical, epidemiological, biological, clinical, and advocacy perspectives. J Epide-
miol Community Health 2005;59:740-8.
Krieger N. Embodiment: a conceptual glossary for epidemiology. Epidemiol Com-
munity Health 2005;459:350-5.
Kuhn T. The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.) Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1970. (This work was originally published in 1962.)
Lafferty WM. Langhelle O. Towards sustainable development. On the goals of devel-
opment and the conditions of sustainability. London: Maximillian press Ltd., 1999.
Law MR, Wald NJ, Morris JK. The performance of blood pressure and other cardio-
vascular risk factors as screening tests for ischaemic heart disease and stroke. J Med 
Screen 2004;11:3-7.
Le Fanu J. The rise and fall of modern medicine. London: Little, Brown and Company, 
1999. 
LeBaron S. Can the future of medicine be saved from the success of science? Acad 
Med 2004;79:661-5.
201
Leder D. A tale of two bodies: The Cartesian corpse and the lived body. Reprinted 
in: Welton D. Body and Flesh. A philosophical reader. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1998:117-29. (This text originally appeared in Leder D (ed.): The body in medical 
thought and practice. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992:17-35). 
Leder D. Clinical interpretation: The hermeneutics of medicine. Theor Med 1990;11:9-
24.
Lee CI, Haims AH, Monico EP, Brink JA, Forman HP. Diagnostic CT scans: assess-
ment of patient, physician, and radiologist awareness of radiation dose and possible 
risks. Radiology 2004;231:393-8.
Levenstein JH, McCracken EC, McWhinney IR, Stewart MA, Brown JB. The patient-
centred clinical method. 1. A model for the doctor-patient interaction in family medi-
cine Fam Pract 1986;3:24-30.
Lewis DK, Robinson J, Wilkinson E. Factors involved in deciding to start preventive treat-
ment: qualitative study of clinicians’ and lay people’s attitudes. BMJ 2003;327:841-7.
Li J, Precht DH, Mortensen PB, Olsen J. Mortality in parents after death of a child in 
Denmark: a nation-wide follow-up study. Lancet 2003;361:363-7. 
Lian OS. Når helse blir en vare [When health becomes a commodity]. Kristiansand S: 
Høyskoleforlaget, 2003.
Lindeberg S. Who wants to be normal? Editorial. Eur Heart J. 2005;26:2605-6. 
Lipman T. The doctor, his patient, and the computerized evidence-based guideline. J 
Eval Clin Pract 2004;10:163-76.
Lipsky M. Street Level Bureaucracy. Dilemmas of the individual in public services. 
NY: Russell Sage, 1980.
Lupton D. Risk and Otherness. In: Lupton D. Risk. London: Routledge 1999 (pgs. 
123-47).
MacMahon S, Neal B, Rodgers A. Hypertension – time to move on. Lancet 
2005;365:1108-9.
Makover ME, Ebrahim S. What is the best strategy for reducing deaths from heart 
disease? PLoS Med 2005;2:e98. Access through www.plos.org.
Mallia P, ten Have H. Can the four principles help in genetic screening decision-mak-
ing? Health Care Anal 2003;11:131-40.
Malterud K, Hollnagel H. Talking with women about personal health resources in general 
practice. Key questions about salutogenesis. Scand J Prim Health Care 1998;16:66-71.
202
Malterud K. The art and science of clinical knowledge: evidence beyond measures and 
numbers. Lancet 2001;358:397-400.
Malterud K. Reflexivity and metapositions: strategies for appraisal of clinical evi-
dence. Journal of Evaluation of Clinical Practice 2002;8:121-6. 
Malterud K, Hollnagel H. Positive self-assessed general health in patients with medi-
cal problems. A qualitative study from general practice. Scand J Prim Health Care 
2004;22:11-5.
Mann J. Dignity and Health: The UDHR’s Revolutionary First Article. Health Hum 
Rights 1998;3:30-38.
Margotta R (ed.). Medisinens historie, Oslo: Notabene forlag, 1996.
Marshall T, Rouse A. Resource implications and health benefits of primary prevention 
strategies for cardiovascular disease in people aged 30 to 74: mathematical modelling 
study BMJ 2002;325:197-9.
Marshall T. Evaluating national guidelines for prevention of cardiovascular disease in 
primary care. J Eval Clin Pract 2005;11:452-61.
Marteau TM, Drake H. Attributions for disability: the influence of genetic testing. Soc 
Sci Med 1995;40:1127-32. 
Martin J. The idea is more important then the experiment. Lancet 2000;356:934-7.
May WF. Beleaguered rulers: the public obligation of the professional. Louisville: 
Westminister John Knox Press, 2001. 
May C, Rapley T, Moreira T, Finch T, Heaven B. Technogovernance: Evidence, subjec-
tivity, and the clinical encounter in primary care medicine. Soc Sci Med 2006;62:1022-
30. 
McEwen BS, Wingfield JC. The concept of allostasis in biology and biomedicine. 
Horm Behav 2003;43:2-15.
McKee M, Raine R. Choosing health? First choose your philosophy. Lancet 
2005;365:369-71.
McKenzie K. Racism and health. BMJ 2003;326;65-6. 
McKinlay JB, Marceau LD. The end of the golden age of doctoring. Int J Health Serv 
2002;32:379-416.
McLeod RD. On reflection: doctors learning to care for people who are dying. Soc Sci 
Med 2001;52:1719-27.
203
McWhinney. IR. A textbook of family medicine. NY: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Mead N, Bower P. Patient-centredness: a conceptual framework and review of the 
empirical literature. Soc Sci Med 2000;51:1087-110.
Mechanic D. Emerging trends in the application of the social sciences to health and 
medicine. Soc Sci Med 1995;40:1491-6.
Mechanic D. Socio-cultural implications of changing organizational technologies in 
the provision of care. Soc Sci Med 2002;54:459-67.
Meland E, Ellekjaer H, Gjelsvik B, Kimsas A, Holmen J, Hetlevik I. Medikamentell 
forebygging av hjerte- og karsykdommer i primærhelsetjenesten [Pharmacological 
prevention of cardiovascular diseases in general practice]. Tidsskr Nor Laegeforen 
2000;120:2643-7.
Meland E, Schei E, Baerheim A. Pasient-sentrert medisin – en oversikt med vekt på 
bakgrunn og dokumentasjon [Patient centred medicine--a review with emphasis on 
background and documentation]. Tidsskr Nor Laegeforen 2000;120:2253-6. 
Michie S, Lester K, Pinto J, Marteau TM. Communicating risk information in genetic 
counseling: an observational study. Health Educ Behav 2005;32:589-98.
Mikulecky DC. The emergence of complexity: science coming of age or science grow-
ing old? Comput Chem 2001;25:341-8.
Milchmann A, Rosenberg A (eds). Foucault and Heidegger. Critical encounters. Min-
neapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 2003. 
Moerman D, Jonas WB. Deconstructing the placebo effect and finding the meaning 
response. Ann Intern Med 2002;136:471-6.
Moerman DE, Jonas WB. Toward a research agenda on placebo. Adv Mind Body Med 
2000;16:33-46. 
Moser M. Evolution of the treatment of hypertension from the 1940s to JNC V. Am J 
Hypertension 1997;10:2S-8S.
Moynihan R, Heath I, Henry D. Selling sickness: the pharmaceutical industry and 
disease mongering. BMJ 2002;324:886-891.
Moynihan R, Smith R. Too much medicine? Almost certainly. Editorial. BMJ 2002; 
324:859-60.  
Murphy EA. The Logic of Medicine. 2nd ed. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 1997. 
204
Mustillo S, Krieger N, Gunderson EP, Sidney S, McCreath H, Kiefe CI. Self-reported 
experiences of racial discrimination and Black-White differences in preterm and low-
birthweight deliveries: the CARDIA Study. Am J Public Health 2004;94:2125-31.
Mykhalovskiy E, Weir L. The problem of evidence-based medicine: directions for so-
cial science. Soc Sci Med 2004;59:1059-69.
Møller L, Kristensen TS, Hollnagel H. Self rated health as a predictor of coronary heart 
disease in Copenhagen, Denmark. J Epidemiol Community Health 1996;50:423-8.
National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE). Antenatal care. Routine care for the 
pregnant woman. Clinical guideline 6. October 2003. (See www.nice.org.uk.)
Nelkin D, Andrews L. Homo economicus. Commercialisation of body tissue in the age 
of biotechnology. Hastings Center Rep 1998;28(5):30-9.
Neuhauser HK, Ellert U, Kurth BM. A comparison of Framingham and SCORE-based 
cardiovascular risk estimates in participants of the German National Health Interview 
and Examination Survey 1998. Eur J Cardiovasc Prev Rehabil 2005;12:442-50.
Nicolaides K. Letter to the Editor. Having the test gives parents options. BMJ 
1998;317:749.
Nicolaides KH, Spencer K, Avgidou K, Faiola S, Falcon O. Multicenter study of first-
trimester screening for trisomy 21 in 75 821 pregnancies: results and estimation of 
the potential impact of individual risk-orientated two-stage first-trimester screening. 
Ultrasound Obstet Gynecol 2005;25:221-6.
Norman GR. Examining the assumptions of evidence-based medicine. J Eval Clin 
Pract 1999;5:139-47.
Nye RA. The evolution of the concept of medicalization in the late twentieth century. 
J Hist Behav Sci 2003;39:115-29.
Oakley A. The history of ultrasonongraphy in obstetrics. Birth 1986;13 (Suppl):5-10.
Oakley A. Essays on women, medicine and health. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1993.
O’Connor PJ. Adding value to evidence-based clinical guidelines. JAMA 2005;294:741-3.
O’Connor TG, Ben-Shlomo Y, Heron J, Golding J, Adams D, Glover V. Prenatal anxi-
ety predicts individual differences in cortisol in pre-adolescent children. Biol Psychia-
try 2005;58:211-7.
Ogden J. Psychosocial theory and the creation of the risky self. Soc Sci Med 
1995;40:409-15. 
205
Palmblad E. The well citizen. In: Grimen H, Elvbakken KT (ed). Cultural perspectives 
on risk, preventive medicine and health promotion. Report 15/2003. Bergen: Rokkan-
senteret/Norges forskningsråd, 2003:13-21.
Papanikolaou GN, Baltogianni MS, Contopoulos-Ioannidis DG, Haidich AB, Gianna-
kakis IA, Ioannidis JP. Reporting of conflicts of interest in guidelines of preventive and 
therapeutic interventions. BMC Med Res Methodol 2001;1:3. Epub 2001 Jun 4.
Parens E, Asch A. Prenatal testing and disability rights. Hastings Center studies in eth-
ics. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press: 2000.
Pennebaker JW. Telling stories: The health benefit of a narrative. Literature and Medi-
cine 2000;19:3-18.
Pereira Gray D. Deprofessionalising doctors? The independence of the British medical 
profession is under unprecedented attack. BMJ 2002;324:627-8. 
Petros P. Non-linearity in clinical practice. J Eval Clin Pract 2003;9:171-8.
Picano E. Sustainability of medical imaging. BMJ 2004;328:578-80.
Pietschmann H. Merits and limits of applying the scientific method to human society. 
2001. http://www.pantaneto.co.uk/issue2/pietschmann.htm.
Pijnenburg M. Humane healthcare as a theme for social ethics. Med Health Care Philos 
2002;5:245-52.
Pijnenburg MA, Gordijn B. Identity and moral responsibility of healthcare organiza-
tions. Theor Med Bioeth 2005;26:141-60.
Pippin RB. Medical practice and social authority. In: Nelson JL and Nelson HL (eds.) 
Meaning and medicine: A reader in the philosophy of health care. NY: Routledge, 
1999. 
Pirmohamed M, James S, Meakin S, Green C, Scott AK, Walley TJ, Farrar K, Park 
BK, Breckenridge AM. Adverse drug reactions as cause of admission to hospital: pro-
spective analysis of 18 820 patients. BMJ 2004;329:15-9.
Plsek PE, Greenhalgh T. Complexity science: The challenge of complexity in health 
care. BMJ 2001;323:625-8.
Poortinga W. Social capital: An individual or collective resource of health? Soc Sci 
Med 2006;62:692-302.
Porter R. The Greatest Benefit to Mankind. A medical history of humanity. NY: Norton 
& Company, 1997.
206
Potter SJ, McKinlay JB. From a relationship to encounter: an examination of lon-
gitudinal and lateral dimensions in the doctor-patient relationship. Soc Sci Med 
2005;61:465-79.
Press N, Browner CH. Risk, autonomy and responsibility. Informed consent for prena-
tal testing. Hastings Center Rep 1995;25 (no 3): S9-12.
Press N. Assessing the expressive character of prenatal testing: The choices made and 
the choices made available. In Parens E, Asch A (eds.): Prenatal testing and disability 
rights. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000.
Psaty BM, Furberg CD. Cox-2 inhibitors – Lessons in drug satefy. N Engl J Med 
2005;352:1133-5.
Raeburn S. Evidence based screening for Down syndrome. We should be prepared to 
re-examine entrenched practices. BMJ 2000;320:592-3.
Raine R, Sanderson C, Hutchings A, Carter S, Larkin K, Black N. An experimental 
study of determinants of group judgments in clinical guideline development. Lancet 
2004;364:429-37.
Raine R, Sanderson C, Black N. Developing clinical guidelines: a challenge to current 
methods. BMJ 2005;331:631-3.
Rawls J. A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971. (A 
revised version was published by Harvard University Press in 1999.)
Rawls J. Justice as fairness. A restatement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2001.
Reilly BM. The essence of EBM. BMJ 2004;329:991-2.
Rendtorff JD. Basic ethical principles in European bioethics and biolaw: autonomy, 
dignity, integrity and vulnerability--towards a foundation of bioethics and biolaw. Med 
Health Care Philos 2002;5:235-44.
Reventlow S. Hvas AC, Tulinius C. “In really great danger…” The concept of risk in 
general practice. Scand J Prim Health Care 2001;19:71-5. 
Reventlow S. Hvas L. Malterud K. Making the invisible body visible. Bone scans, 
osteoporosis and women’s bodily experiences. Social Science and Medicine 2005;Dec 
12 [Epub ahead of print].
Riches D. The phenomenon of violence. I: Riches D (ed.). The anthropology of vio-
lence. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
Roberts MJ, Reich MR. Ethical analysis in public health. Lancet 2002;359:1055-9.
207
Roland M. Linking physicians’ pay to the quality of care--a major experiment in the 
United kingdom. N Engl J Med 2004;351:1448-54.
Rose G. The strategy of preventive medicine. Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1992.
Rose G. Sick individuals and sick populations. Int J Epidemiol 1985;14:32-8. (a revis-
ited version of this classic paper was published in Int J Epidemiol 2001;30:427-32 with 
an accompanying commentary on pages 433-4.)
Rothman DJ. Medical Professionalism -- Focusing on the Real Issues. N Engl J Med 
2000;342:1283-6.
Rudebeck CE. The doctor, the patient and the body. Scand J Prim Health Care 
2000;18:4-8.
Ruger JP (i). Health and social justice. Lancet 2004;364:1075-80.
Ruger JP (ii). Ethics of the social determinants of health. Lancet 2004;364:1092-7.
Sackett DL, Rosenberg WM, Gray JA, Haynes RB, Richardson WS. Evidence based 
medicine: what it is and what it isn’t. BMJ 1996;312:71-2.
Sackett DL, Richardson WS, Rosenberg W, Haynes RB. Evidence-based medicine: 
How to practice and teach EBM. NY: Churchill Livingstone, 1997.
Sackett DL, Wennberg JE. Choosing the best research design for each question. Edito-
rial. BMJ 1997;315:1636.
Sackett DL. The sins of expertness and a proposal for redemption. BMJ 2000;320: 1283.
Sackett DL. The arrogance of preventive medicine. CMAJ 2002;167:363-4.
Salmon P, Hall GM. Patient empowerment and control: a psychological discourse in 
the service of medicine. Soc Sci Med 2003;57:1969-80.
Sawicki J: Heidegger and Foucault: Escaping technological nihilism. In: Milchman 
and Rosenberg (eds.) Foucault and Heidegger. Critical encounters. Minneapolis: Uni-
versity of Minneapolis Press, 2003:55-73. 
Schei E. Doctoring as leadership: the power to heal. Persp Biol Med 2006 (in press).
Schmidt MR. You know more then you can say: In memory of Donald A. Schön (1930-
1997). Public Administration Review 2000;60(3):266-74.
Schön DA. The Reflective Practitioner: How professionals think in action. London: 
Temple Smith, 1983. 
Schön DA. Educating the Reflective Practitioner. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1987.
208
Schön DA. From technical rationality to reflection-in-action. In: Dowie J, Elstein A 
(eds.) Professional Judgement: A Reader in Clinical Decision Making. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988:60-77.
Shekelle PG, Woolf SH, Eccles M, Grimshaw J. Clinical guidelines: developing guide-
lines. BMJ 1999;318:593-6. 
Shekelle P. New contract for general practitioners. BMJ 2003;326:457-8.
Singer M, Clair S. Syndemics and public health: reconceptualising disease in a bio-
social context. Medical Anthropology Q 2003;17:423-41.
Skjervheim H. Mennesket. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2002. 
Skolbekken JA. The risk epidemic in medical journals. Soc Sci Med 1995;40:291-
305.
Skrabanek 1990. Why is preventive medicine exempted from ethical constraints? J 
Med Ethics 1990;16:187-90. 
Skrabanek P. The death of humane medicine and the rise of coercive healthism. Lon-
don: Social Affairs Unit, 1994.
Smith CM. Origin and uses of primum non nocere – above all, do no harm! J Clin 
Pharmacol 2005;45:371-7.
Smith R. Medical Nemesis. BMJ 2002;324:923.
Smith R. Editor’s choice. Think harm always. BMJ 2004;329 (3 July). No page num-
ber. (Accessible through www.bmj.com).
Smith R. Curbing the influence of the drug industry: a British view. PLoS Med 2005;2:
e241, access through www.plos.org.
Snyder L, Leffler C; Ethics and Human Rights Committee, American College of Phy-
sicians. Ethics manual: fifth edition. Ann Intern Med 2005;142:560-82.
Solberg B. Sortering av liv? Etiske hensyn ved å lage barn med og uten genetisk 
risikoinformasjon [Sorting of lives? Ethical aspects of creating children with and with-
out genetic risk information]. Dissertation. Trondheim: Norwegian University of Sci-
ence and Technology, 2003. 
Spence D. Risk-the game of life. BMJ 2005;330:607.
Stefanovic I. Safeguarding our common future. Rethinking sustainable development. 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000.
20
Stenvoll D, Elvbakken KT, Malterud K. Blir norsk forebyggingspolitikk mer indivi-
dorientert? [Is Norwegian public health policy going to be more individual-oriented?]. 
Tidsskr Nor Laegeforen 2005;125:603-5.
Stewart-Brown S, Farmer A. Screening could seriously damage your health. Decisions 
to screen must take account of the social and psychological costs. BMJ 1997;314:533-
4.
Stott NCH, Davis RH. The exceptional potential in each primary care consultation. J 
R Coll Gen Pract 1979;29:201-5.
Straus S. What’s the E for EBM? BMJ 2004;328:535-6.
Summerskill WS, Pope C. ‘I saw the panic rise in her eyes, and evidence-based medi-
cine went out of the door.’ An exploratory qualitative study of the barriers to secondary 
prevention in the management of coronary heart disease. Fam Pract 2002;19:605-10.
Swensen E (ed.). Diagnose: Risiko [Diagnosis: Risk]. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 
2000.  
Szawarski Z. Wisdom and the art of healing. Med Health Care Philos 2004;7:185-93.
Tallis R. Hippocratic Oaths. Medicine and its discontents. London: Atlantic books, 
2004.
Tauber A. Historical and philosophical reflections on patient autonomy. Health Care 
Anal 2001;9:299-319.
Tauber A. Sick autonomy. Persp Biol Med 2003;46:484-95.
Taubes G. Epidemiology faces its limits. Science 1995;269:164-9.
Taylor C. Sources of the self: the making of modern identity. Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1989.
Taylor C. The ethics of authenticity. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1991. 
Taylor R, Giles J. Cash interests taint drug advice. Nature 2005;437:1070-1.
Thesen J. Normalitet sett fra legekontoret [Normality seen from the doctor’s office]. 
Utposten 2004,No 5:37-40. 
Thesen J. From oppression towards empowerment in clinical practice – offering doc-
tors a model for reflection. Scand J Public Health Suppl 2005;66:47-52.
Trnka P. Subjectivity and values in medicine: the case of Canguilhem. J Med Philos 
2003;28:427-46.
210
Taylor R, Giles J. Cash interests taint drug advice. Nature 2005;437:1070-1.
Tymstra T. The imperative character of medical technology and the meaning of “antici-
pated decision regret.” Int J Technol Assess Health Care 1989;5:207-13.
Van den Bergh BR, Mulder EJ, Mennes M, Glover V. Antenatal maternal anxiety and 
stress and the neurobehavioural development of the fetus and child: links and possible 
mechanisms. A review. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2005;29:237-58.
Van Hooft S. Disease and subjectivity. In Humber JM, Almeder RF (eds.) What is dis-
ease? Biomedical Ethics Reviews. Totowa, NJ: Humana Press, 1997.
Ventura HO, Mehra MR, Messerli FH. Desperate diseases, desperate measures: tack-
ling malignant hypertension in the 1950s. Am Heart J 2001;142:197-203.
Vetlesen AJ. Profesjonell og personlig? Legerollen mellom vellykkethet og sårbarhet 
[Professional or private? Physician’s role between success and vulnerability]. Tidsskr 
Nor Laegeforen 2001;121:1118-21. 
Vetlesen AJ. Smerte [Pain]. Lysaker: Dinamo forlag, 2004. 
Wade DT, Halligan PW. Do biomedical models of illness make for good healthcare 
systems? BMJ 2004;329:1398-401.
Welsh HG. Should I be tested for cancer: maybe not and here is why. Berkeley/LA: 
University of California Press, 2004. 
Welch HG. Search and destroy--the right cancer strategy for Europeans? Eur J Cancer 
2005;41:660-3.
West Midlands Perinatal Institute (no authors listed). Soft markers. A guide for profes-
sionals. Birmingham: West Midlands Perinatal Institute, 2002. ISBN 0 9523457 4 9. 
Westin S, Bakketeig LS. Unnecessary use of ultrasound in pregnancy should be 
avoided. Probably safe, but new evidence suggests caution. Scand J Prim Health Care 
2003;21:65-7.
Westin S. Heath I. Thresholds for normal blood pressure and serum cholesterol. BMJ 
2005;330:1461-2.
Wifstad Å. Gadamers forsvar for legekunsten [Gadamer’s defence of the art of medi-
cine]. Tidsskr Nor Laegeforen 2003;123:3567-8. 
Williams C, Sandall J, Lewando-Hundt G, Heyman B, Spencer K, Grellier R. Women 
as moral pioneers? Experiences of first trimester antenatal screening. Soc Sci Med 
2005;61:1983-92.
211
Wilson T, Holt T, Greenhalgh T. Complexity science: complexity and clinical care. 
BMJ 2001;323:685-8.
Woolf SH, Johnson RE, Fryer GE Jr, Rust G, Satcher D. The health impact of resolving 
racial disparities: an analysis of US mortality data. Am J Public Health 2004;94:2078-
81.
Wright N, Smeeth L, Heath I. Moving beyond single and dual diagnosis in gener-
al practice: many patients have multiple morbidities, and their needs have to be ad-
dressed. BMJ 2003;326:512-4.
Wynia MK, Latham SR, Kao AC, Berg JW, Emanuel LL. Medical professionalism in 
society. N Engl J Med 1999;341:1612-6.
Yarnall KSH, Pollack KI, Östbye T, Krause KM, Michener JL. Primary care: is there 
enough time for prevention? Am J Pub Health 2003;93:635-41.
Zandbelt LC, Smets EM, Oort FJ, de Haes HC. Coding patient-centred behaviour in 
the medical encounter. Soc Sci Med 2005;61:661-71.
Zaner RM. Ethics and the clinical encounter. Lima, Ohio: Academic Renewal Press, 
2003. 
Östbye T, Yarnall KS, Krause KM, Pollak KI, Gradison M, Michener JL. Is there time 
for management of patients with chronic diseases in primary care? Ann Fam Med 
2005;3:209-14.
PAPER	I
PAPER	I

213
214
215
216
217
218
21
220
221
222
published biomedical literature makes evident that the
practice of routine fetal screening by obstetrical ultra-
sound applying the latest in diagnostic equipment has
caused harm to an unknown number of expectant
parents and unborn children during the last decade. This
has resulted from the fact that many ultrasound
examiners have counselled pregnant women about an
increased risk for fetal chromosomal aberrations on the
basis of subtle ﬁndings in the ultrasonographic image,
interpretations that have proved to be misleading as
solid scientiﬁc evidence on the signiﬁcance of the
ﬁndings accumulated at a later date. Profound and
private moral dilemmas arise as a direct consequence of
premature application of an advancing medical technol-
ogy in a routine clinical setting.
A second conclusion of this paper is that the
implementation of ever-advancing biotechnology has
placed clinicians in obstetrics and prenatalogy in an
arena where medicine, social values and culturally
determined meaning are closely intertwined. In that
context, expert examiners have found themselves pre-
senting unprecedented ethical dilemmas to parents-to-
be, dilemmas which involve diagnostic options that
endanger the lives of normal children-to-be.
Finally, the present analysis documents how technical
advances related to imaging technology have come to
challenge the biomedical tradition of considering scien-
tiﬁc knowledge production as a value neutral act per se.
By the same token, our concept of the fetal–maternal
relationship, which has until now been conceptualised as
either biologically or juridically determined, has also
been challenged. The recently emerging side-effects of
fetal ultrasound screening shed new light on the
maternal–fetal unity and remind us that this unity has
yet to be explored to its profound emotional and
existential depths.
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community. The general practitioner is in a unique position toScand J Prim Health Care 2003;21:3–9. ISSN 0281-3432
observe the interaction between the scientific paradigm of
biomedicine and individuals, whether suffering from ill health orThis article is based on a keynote presentation at the 12th Nordic
considering themselves healthy. It is our privilege and professionalCongress in General Practice in Trondheim, Norway in September
duty to reflect upon clinical experience and be open to critical debate.2002. The aim was to demonstrate the strengths and limitations of
evidence-based medicine (EBM) in a primary healthcare setting. The
Key words: general practice, evidence-based medicine, unrecognisedpresentation comprised two separate lectures discussing an authentic
myocardial infarction, human sciences, ethics, concept of risk, riskcase history from everyday practice that had been presented to
perception, emotional health.the authors by the congress organisers. Initially, Peter Nilsson
overviews the correct approach to the situation as described accord-
Linn Getz, Department of Human Resources Management, Landspi-ing to EBM. Subsequently, Linn Getz questions whether we can be
tali Uni�ersity Hospital, IS-101 Reykja�ik, Iceland. E-mail:sure that application of EBM is necessarily in this particular pa-
linngetz@med.istient’s best interests. The title of the presentation, ‘A matter of
Peter M. Nilsson, Department of Medicine, Uni�ersity Hospital,heart’, has a double meaning. On the one hand it indicates an update
SE-205 02 Malmo¨, Sweden. E-mail: Peter.Nilsson@on preventive cardiology, on the other it addresses the importance of
medforsk.mas.lu.seacademic courage (coeur=heart) among members of the medical
CASE HISTORY
The patient is a 70-year-old healthy male who, be-
cause of his age, needs a health certificate in order to
have his driving licence renewed. He thus comes to
see his general practitioner for the first time since he
enlisted at the practice 8 years previously. He informs
the doctor that he is healthy and emphasises the fact
that he has always been healthy. Clinical examination
reveals no sign of pathology, except for his heartbeat
appearing somewhat irregular. The doctor thus or-
ders an electrocardiogram (ECG), which shows no
pathological arrhythmia. However, there is indication
of an old coronary infarction in the ECG.
The doctor hesitates. She recognises that being ‘of
strong health’ may be important to this man’s iden-
tity. On the other hand, several scientific studies
indicate that, compared to the general population, he
is at increased risk of future coronary events. Fur-
thermore, it is a medical duty not to withhold diag-
nostic information from patients. Choosing her
words carefully, so as not to upset him, the doctor
informs the man about the finding in the ECG. She
asks him to make a new appointment so that his
condition can be evaluated further. She then com-
pletes the certificate confirming that she considers
him medically fit to drive a car and hands it over with
a smile. She tells the man not to worry about his
heart. The patient nevertheless appears hesitant and
troubled as he leaves her office.
Despite having performed her task according to
existing medical guidelines, the doctor is left with a
feeling of unease, as if she has made a mistake.
Evidence-based medicine – the narrow road
PETER M. NILSSON
Why is evidence-based medicine (EBM) a narrow
road? Even though we try to apply EBM in our daily
clinical practice, we have to admit that the findings
are generally based on randomised controlled trials
(RCTs) and mean effects on a group basis (1). Any
conclusions must therefore be translated to the indi-
vidual level relative to age, gender, ethnic back-
ground and other relevant medical problems of the
patient involved. Furthermore, EBM is often difficult
to remember in all its aspects and it changes in focus
and content. We therefore need continuous medical
education as well as technical support through reli-
able information systems, e.g. easy computer access
to MEDLINE/Pubmed and other relevant databases
in the clinical office. Even if there are many inherent
problems and shortcomings with EBM, it is a lifeboat
Scand J Prim Health Care 2003; 21
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on a stormy sea of medical problems and ignorance,
but it does not always reach harbour, for example
when the patient suffers a morbid event or dies in spite
of all good intentions and efforts.
Is a silent myocardial infarction (MI) in a 70-year-
old man something to bother about or not? According
to observational epidemiological data from the Fram-
ingham study, based on 708 MI cases among 5127
participants, more than 25% were detected by annual
ECG check-up only (2), and more than half of these
were ‘‘silent’’, especially in women and elderly men.
After a follow-up period, it was concluded that a silent
MI implied a similar risk for cardiovascular complica-
tions as a clinical MI (2). The risk associated with a
silent MI cannot therefore be ignored and should be
categorised as a triggering event for starting secondary
prevention of coronary heart disease (CHD).
Can the physician confirm a diagnosis of silent MI?
The first step would be to compare an abnormal
current ECG with previous ECGs, if possible, to prove
changes. Other technical options, not all of them
necessary or needed in every case, are the following:
a myocardial scintigram for evaluation of myocardial
damage; an echocardiography for evaluation of car-
diac failure and decreased ejection fraction; or a
bicycle ergonometry test for evaluation of coronary
ischaemia. In addition to these investigations, the full
cardiovascular risk factor profile should be evaluated,
including family history, medical history, lifestyle,
blood pressure and blood sampling (fasting lipids,
glucose). Balanced advice for an improved lifestyle
(stopping smoking, increasing physical activity, proper
diet) could be offered to all patients regardless of how
well proven the cardiac damage is or is not – this is
a message for everyone!
The five cornerstones for EBM in the secondary
prevention of CHD/MI are: (a) improved lifestyle, (b)
lipid lowering by statin use (based on the trials 4S,
HPS, CARE and LIPID) or fibrate use (VA-HIT
trial), (c) ACE inhibition (HOPE trial), (d) beta-recep-
tor blockers (several trials) and (e) low-dose aspirin
(several trials). These interventions should be dis-
cussed with the patient, not forced upon him/her, and
ranked according to cost of intervention (Table I). In
the recent Heart Protection Study, which included
19,000 high-risk individuals, the relative risk reduction
(RRR) of acute MI was 24% by added-on simvastatin
treatment compared to placebo and was not depen-
dent on baseline LDL-cholesterol level (3). If all EBM
proven therapies in secondary prevention could be
jointly and successfully applied, a much higher RRR
could be expected, as high as 80% according to some
authors (4).
What about numbers needed to treat (NNT) in
secondary prevention? This should be based on data
Table I. Evidence-based medicine (EBM) measures in sec-
ondary prevention of coronary heart disease, stratified for cost
of intervention.
Low-cost interventions
Smoking cessation
Physical training
Low-dose aspirin
Medium-cost interventions
Beta-receptor blocker therapy
ACE inhibitor (generics) therapy
Statin (generics) and fibrate therapy
High-cost interventions
ACE inhibitor (non-generic) therapy
Statin (non-generic) therapy
Revascularisation (CABG/PTCA) procedures
from trials. In the Scandinavian Simvastatin Survival
Study (4S), risk reduction during the trial was related
to the absolute risk at baseline. In the 4S, the RRRs
were 38%, 39% and 42% in patients at low, medium
and high baseline risk. The absolute risk reduction
(ARR) varied between 8% and 16% according to risk
category (5). This corresponds to NNT (1/ARR) of 6
(95% CI: 4–11) to 11 (7–25) and 13 (8–34) patients
for 6 years in order to prevent one cardiovascular
event (5).
How can the quality of secondary prevention for
CHD be improved? In Sweden, a national project for
better quality in secondary prevention has been on-go-
ing for 6 years based on a joint collaboration between
the Swedish Society for Cardiology, the Swedish Soci-
ety for General Medicine and the Swedish Federation
for Health Care Staff in Cardiology. One of the
findings, based on data from almost 30,000 patient
visits, is that gender-equal care has been established
for secondary prevention, as mirrored by similar lipid
levels and drug treatment profiles in male and female
patients after 1 year of follow-up, post-MI or follow-
ing a revascularisation procedure (6).
The well-proven facts of EBM in secondary preven-
tion should be acknowledged and not ignored, other-
wise the doctor runs the risk of working in an
unprofessional, unethical and non-legal way, at least
according to Swedish recommendations (7,8), and
most importantly the Health Care Legislation Act
from 1980. This Act states that the patient should have
the right to an informed choice whenever possible.
However, no prevention should be forced on the
patient; the crucial point is that it takes information
and mutual communication between the doctor and
the patient to make real the goal of an informed
choice. Otherwise the doctor is working in a God-like
manner, prohibiting the patient, an adult person, from
making use of the relevant medical information for a
personal choice (9). Therefore, we should all reflect
Scand J Prim Health Care 2003; 21
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Table II. Which kind of GP doctor are you? A personal test
for self-reflection.
The sphinx-like GP – knows everything, but says nothing.
The God-like GP – knows everything, but says only partly
and wants the patient to be obedient and thankful
whatever is said and done.
The charlatan GP – knows little, says anything.
The anxious GP – says little, makes a referral to hospital.
The ultra-democratic GP – knows something, asks the
patient and relatives for a joint majority decision on what
to do.
The ‘‘normal’’ GP – knows something, tries to balance
evidence-based medicine with narrative
medicine=consultation skills.
� the fact that general practitioners show limited
concordance with clinical guidelines in the field of
preventive medicine
� issues related to philosophy, theory of science and
medical ethics.
Connecting these diverse issues together in one argu-
ment is tricky. Medical reasoning, the way we have
been taught to understand the physical heart of a
patient, is detached from the human sciences that
enable us to analyse the person’s life-world. If we
intend to apply a truly scientific approach, the case
should be evaluated at the crossroads between these
approaches. Biomedicine’s inability to explain the
placebo effect, however, documents that the
paradigm cannot encompass the fundamental fact
that human experience of meaning has profound
effects on the physical body (15).
Is biomedicine in accordance with common sense?
I have presented this case history to several scholars.
It tends to evoke one of two distinct responses. To
illustrate these, I present an authentic dialogue be-
tween an American professor of medicine and his
wife, a researcher in ancient history. This short dia-
logue (Table III) highlights three key issues: firstly,
we see that from a traditional biomedical standpoint
there appears to be no doubt as to whether the
medical professional is doing good by transforming a
healthy person into a patient. Secondly, it illustrates a
statement recently put forward by David Sackett in
his paper ‘‘The arrogance of preventive medicine’’
(16). Sackett states that pre�enti�e medicine displays
all three elements of arrogance ; aggressive assertive-
ness, presumptuousness and use of forcible argu-
ments. Thirdly, I choose to believe that the opinion
of the historian-wife reflects her knowledge that in
Antiquity medicine was intertwined with philosophy,
the two disciplines together ser�ing a common aim –
the relief of human suffering.
How exact is the e�idence?
Unrecognised MIs may be present in about 3.5% of
70-year-old men in the general population (17). Stud-
ies indicate that their prognosis does not differ signifi-
cantly from that of patients with recognised
infarctions (17–19). Evidence-based calculations of
upon the kind of doctor/GP we would like to be – in
our own view and in the eyes of the patient (Table II).
In conclusion, the EBM-believing physician should
consider the absolute (total) risk of a cardiovascular
event in the next 10-year period, and base treatment
recommendations on this estimation according to
current European (10) and national recommendations.
In the case history presented here, all relevant risk
factors should be evaluated and discussed for possible
treatment. The patient should be an active partner in
this process, and relevant information should be avail-
able from the physician or from recommended litera-
ture. If the patient in the end declares that he or she
will not take medication, this is based on an informed
choice and should be respected. To put it in another
way: when mother EBM meets father narrative
medicine (11–13), the two happy parents (14) will have
a beautiful child called consultation skills. No child
can be born without the interaction of two parents –
a simple fact of life!
What kind of evidence is relevant to
clinical decision-making?
LINN GETZ
Despite convincing evidence that men who have un-
dergone a MI may benefit from secondary prevention,
I am not fully convinced that the medical encounter
described in this case was health-promoting. Consider
the outcome of the consultation: the patient appears
hesitant and troubled as he leaves the office. The
doctor is left with a feeling of unease, as if she has
made a mistake. Is something of clinical and scientific
significance going on? I see crucial questions in rela-
tion to several topics. These include:
� the validity of EBM to this particular man
� the significant correlation between emotions and
cardiovascular health
Table III. Dialogue illustrating two typical but differing views
of how to handle the case in question.
Accompanying wife/historian:
‘‘Of course it is best not to tell the patient’’
Professor of medicine:
‘‘But, darling, it is a matter of saving his life!’’
Wife:
‘‘Oh…’’
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the potential benefits of therapy for a patient like
our man come from a heterogeneous mixture of
studies, mostly related to patients with symptomatic
heart disease. There is reason to ask whether the
term ‘evidence-based’ may give the pretence of high
scientific certainty, which in fact does not apply in
this particular case. Table IV presents some ‘best
estimates’ of the prognosis (17–19) and potential
theoretical benefits of intervention (20).
Deducing from the group to the particular
Let us presume that the estimates (Table IV) are
indeed valid for a group of men like our man. We
intend to inform him about his personal risks and
the potential benefits of therapy. However, as we
counsel him on the basis of group-based data, we in
fact commit a logical error, according to scholars of
the theory of science (21,22). We choose to ignore
individual variation and diversity, crucial phenom-
ena in human biology. It should not therefore come
as a surprise when epidemiological studies confirm
that ‘‘The prediction of coronary heart disease risk
in individuals is an imprecise science’’ (23).
Dealing with the concept of risk
During recent decades, there has been a steadily
increasing focus on risk in Western societies (24–
27). Adoption of the risk concept as a basis for
preventive medicine on a large scale has taken place
without much analysis and debate (25). The goals of
medicine have expanded from the curative to the
preventive sphere, a development that carries funda-
mental philosophical and ethical implications
(25,27). The process of critical reflection in relation
to risk intervention is still in its early stages.
For once, there is a problem related to the com-
munication of risk and treatment effects (28,29). Doc-
tors and patients tend to make different therapeutic
considerations, depending on the way risk estimates
are presented, i.e. what statistical model is used
(29,30). Our man may be greatly interested in
achieving a 40% reduction in the relative risk for a
disease event during the next year, but reluctant if
told that it is 98% likely that therapy will not affect
his prognosis during the next year. The underlying
data are the same. When can we say that a person
makes an autonomous, informed choice?
Another issue yet to be explored is how people
experience the state of being ‘at-risk’ (24,25,31,32). A
philosopher reminds us how knowledge about medi-
cal risk may connect directly to the depths of our
existence; our mortality, vulnerability and depen-
dence (Arne Johan Vetlesen, pers. comm., 2002). As
professionals we need to consider how this particu-
lar man may feel about the information he receives.
Does his perception of his body change? What does
he do, or stop doing? What will he tell his wife?
What will she think if one day he looks a bit tired?
There are relatively few empirical studies on hu-
man experience of being labelled as ‘at risk’. The
results are contradictory and reveal what appear to
be several paradoxes. The professional’s preconcep-
tion is of course that information about risk will
increase people’s sense of control over their lives
and ultimately their quality of life. However, studies
indicate that knowledge about medical risk may
come to echo in people’s minds in daily life. Food
may become connected to ambivalence and guilt,
innocent bodily symptoms to anxiety. There are em-
pirical data indicating that knowledge about risk
may cast shadows of doubt and insecurity over peo-
ple’s lives. One individual who was diagnosed as ‘at
risk’ as he participated in a population study on
cardiovascular disease worded this experience: ‘‘the
fear is always there with you’’ (32). Despite the
absolute risk of disease being relatively low, people
also report that if you don’t truly believe the statis-
tics relate to you personally, there is no motivation
to comply. Consequently, prevention may become a
question of ‘‘complying or dying’’ (32). Are we set-
ting up an emotional trap? It is not easy to say;
research shows that many people express satisfaction
with screening programmes and gratitude for the
‘‘gift of knowing’’ (33).
Table IV. Some ‘‘best estimates’’ of medical risks and poten-
tial benefits of therapy for the man in the case story. Estimates
of therapeutical benefit are based on a number of intervention
studies (included 4S) indicating a potential for 30–40% relative
risk reduction for each drug prescribed for secondary preven-
tion after a myocardial infarction.
No inter�ention (natural prognosis): 96–97% of 70-year-old
men like this man are likely to survive each of the years to
come, i.e. mortality in this group is 3–4% per year or
30–40% in the next 10 years (17,18).
Inter�ention may statistically reduce the mortality in this
group somewhere between 1.5% and 2.5% per year. The
maximum estimate presumes intervention with 3 or 4 drugs
according to EBM, and furthermore presupposes that each
drug will subsequently contribute a 30–40% relative risk
reduction in relation to fatal CV events. Additive effects of
several drugs, however, have not been documented
scientifically.
Number needed to treat (NNT): If you intensively treat
40–60 patients like this man for 1 year, you might prevent
1 man from dying a cardiovascular (CV) death. After 10
years of treatment, 1 CV death may have been prevented
for every 4–6 men.
Impact of diagnosis and therapy on quality of life in a group
of patients like this:
There appears to be very little applicable evidence.
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Emotional well-being and cardio�ascular health
There is much evidence that changes in emotional life
may affect the cardiovascular disease process itself
for better or for worse (34–36). Depression may be
associated with a twofold to threefold increase of
cardiovascular mortality (36,37). A sense of hopeless-
ness, defined as feeling unable to reach one’s goals in
life, has been shown to be predictive of a threefold
increase in the incidence of hypertension in the near
future, as well as worsening of overall cardiovascular
status (38,39). We have no direct evidence that emo-
tional stress related to information about medical risk
can aggravate the disease process itself, but such a
link appears biologically plausible.
The man in our case told his doctor that he consid-
ered himself ‘‘a man of strong health’’. However,
subjective experience of this kind is not considered
worthy of inclusion in cardiovascular risk estimates.
There is much e�idence that a subjecti�e perception of
good health is a strong predictor of sur�i�al (40–42).
Our particular man may have a considerably better
prognosis than estimated by so-called EBM.
Biomedical data – the ultimate truth?
The doctor in our case hesitates for a moment before
allowing a diagnostic test result to overrule our man’s
subjective experience of being ‘‘a man of strong
health’’. Her feeling of unease reflects an ethical
dilemma necessary to discuss. The biomedical ap-
proach to the human being rests on systematic sepa-
rations between ‘normal’ and ‘deviant’ findings,
based on definitions made by the healthcare system
itself. As medical professionals, we have a moral
obligation ‘‘to tell the truth’’ to our patients. By
tradition, the results of medical diagnostic tests have
come to represent ultimate truths about the human
condition, and thus something to be communicated
irrespective of the context in which the results arise.
In his 1973 analysis of the history of medical percep-
tion, social philosopher Michel Foucault describes
the historical context in which the clinical gaze
evolved, and how this gaze came to represent ‘‘a
separating agent of truths’’ (43). As diagnostic tech-
nology becomes ever more widespread and refined,
the professional’s dilemma of having to communicate
medical ‘truths’, despite considerable scientific uncer-
tainty about their significance for the particular indi-
vidual involved, appears to arise ever more frequently
(44,45).
Limited concordance with clinical guidelines – what
lies beneath?
Several studies indicate that general practitioners
show limited adherence to clinical guidelines (46,47).
Organ experts tend to indicate that the reason may be
either ignorance or paternalism among GPs and con-
sider it a violation of patient autonomy not to offer
state-of-the-art medical intervention. In discussions
of the present case, the question of autonomy typi-
cally arises at the final stage of the consultation, to
emphasise the patient’s democratic right to consider
further diagnosis and therapy. But at that point a
violation of our patient’s autonomy has already
taken place: our man never asked for a cardiovascu-
lar risk evaluation, his interest was driving his car.
What is medical paternalism if not the use of medical
technology in a somewhat arbitrary fashion on a
healthy individual who is not asking for medical
advice? Being aware of the scientific uncertainties
outlined above we cannot know that we are not doing
more harm than good by imposing information about
risk on this particular man. Remember the prime
principle of medical ethics – primum non nocere
(first of all, do no harm) (9).
Whether analysing the case history from a biomed-
ical or a humanistic perspective, the doctor in our
case may find considerable theoretical and empirical
support for her feeling of unease. Can it thus be that
among general practitioners who show limited adher-
ence to medical guidelines in the preventive sphere,
there are doctors who actually show respect for a
‘scientific truth’ about their patient’s condition that
penetrates deeper than EBM (48)?
Humane doctoring
The medical practitioner who strives to combine
biomedical evidence derived from group data (EBM)
with a humanistic approach to the particular individ-
ual can be designated a humane doctor. Humane
doctors hesitate before applying ECG electrodes to
the chest of elderly gentlemen of very strong health.
This is due not to ignorance in relation to medical
guidelines (humane doctors do not hesitate to per-
form literature searches), but because a humane doc-
tor acknowledges that the biomedical paradigm has
fundamental shortcomings when it comes to explain-
ing human health and suffering (49). With reference
to the literature on empowerment and health, a hu-
mane doctor might deliberately choose to exclude the
measurement of body mass index (BMI) in an over-
weight patient, despite this being part of a state-of-
the-art risk evaluation. Making a point of excess
body fat may sometimes be counterproductive to the
symmetrical dialogue about health resources and fu-
ture possibilities (50) which may facilitate construc-
tive and lasting changes in a person’s life.
Being a professional is not simply a question of
commanding the various tools of medicine, such as
medical guidelines. A medical professional also ac-
knowledges that the use of reductionist medical tech-
Scand J Prim Health Care 2003; 21
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nology may carry unintended side effects (22,44,45),
and thus makes sure that its application is truly
warranted in the first place. The decision of when to
perform a diagnostic test and when to refrain from
testing has to rest on scientific considerations that
transcend the biomedical paradigm. As pointed out
by Haynes, EBM does not make clinical decisions.
People do (48).
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Objective �/ Our first objective is to describe total, age- and gender-
specific prevalences of subjects in a well-defined population for whom
medical follow-up is indicated due to unfavourably high blood pressure
and/or cholesterol levels, as defined by the 2003 European guidelines
on cardiovascular disease prevention in clinical practice. Our second
objective is to highlight scientific questions and ethical dilemmas
relating to implementation of the guidelines.
Design, setting, and participants �/ Cross-sectional population study
comprising 62 104 adult Norwegians aged 20�/79 years who partici-
pated in The Nord-Tro¨ndelag Health Study 1995�/97.
Main outcome measures �/ Total, age- and gender-specific point
prevalences of individuals with total cholesterol ]/5 mmol/l and/or
systolic blood pressure ]/140 mmHg and/or diastolic blood pressure
]/90 mmHg, or taking antihypertensive medication.
Main results �/ In total, 76% of individuals aged 20�/79 years have an
‘‘unfavourable’’ cardiovascular disease risk profile, according to
guideline definitions. The point prevalence of individuals with
cholesterol and/or blood pressure above the recommended cut-off
points increases with age. By age 24, the prevalence reaches 50%. By
age 49, it reaches 90%. Men below 50 years of age have higher
combined risk prevalence than women.
Conclusions and implications �/ Implementation of the 2003 European
guidelines on CVD prevention would label a large majority of
Norwegian adults as having unfavourably high cholesterol and/or
blood pressure levels. The current biomedical standards appear to
invalidate demographic health statistics. The theoretical basis on
which the guidelines rest should thereby be scrutinized with regard to
scientific methodology and consistency. Important ethical dilemmas
arise at the point of guideline implementation, relating to risk labelling
and medicalization, as well as resource allocation and sustainability
within the healthcare system.
Key words: cardiovascular disease, clinical guidelines, ethics, general
practice, preventive medicine, risk, sustainability.
Linn Getz, Office of Human Resources, Landspitali University
Hospital, IS-101 Reykjavik, Iceland. E-mail: linngetz@med.is
Identification of risk factors for future disease and
efforts to modify risk among currently asymptomatic
individuals have expanded rapidly over the past
decades (1,2). This is particularly true in relation to
risk factors associated with cardiovascular disease
(CVD) (2,3).
Serum cholesterol and blood pressure (BP) are
continuous variables. More or less arbitrarily chosen
cut-off points have been defined to identify individuals
with the highest disease risk (2). Since authoritative
guidelines on the management of hypertension were
issued in 1962 (4), subsequent versions of guidelines
for BP and blood lipid control have presented ever
lower cut-off points for intervention (2). Every de-
crease of level seems to have been legitimized as a
Clinicians are expected to implement clinical
guidelines such as the 2003 European guidelines
on cardiovascular disease (CVD) prevention in
their everyday practice. There has, however, been
little debate about the pragmatic and ethical
aspects of guideline implementation within the
biomedical community.
. Implementation of the 2003 European guide-
lines on CVD prevention would label 76% of
Norwegian adults 20 years and older, and
90% of individuals 50 years and older, as
having unfavourably high cholesterol and/or
blood pressure levels.
. We see important ethical dilemmas arising at
the point of guideline implementation, relat-
ing to medicalization, resource allocation,
and sustainability within the healthcare sys-
tem.
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contribution to increased safety and health in the
population. However, the rationale of applying risk
factor thresholds in clinical decision-making is cur-
rently under scrutiny (5).
The latest version of the European guidelines on
CVD prevention in clinical practice was published in
2003 (6). The authors state that the aim of presenting
guidelines is to ‘‘present all the relevant evidence’’ to
facilitate clinical decision-making. The guidelines
‘‘should be considered as the framework in which all
necessary adaptation can be made in order to reflect
different political, economic, social and medical
circumstances’’ (6).
According to the guidelines, total serum choles-
terol should be below 5 mmol/l in general, and life-
style advice and medical follow-up are recommended
for individuals with cholesterol equal to or above
this level. Likewise, the guidelines recommend coun-
selling and medical follow-up for persons with
systolic BP ]/140 mmHg, and/or diastolic BP ]/90
mmHg.
Clinical guidelines represent consensual expert re-
commendations derived from population-based data
and are meant to facilitate decision-making among
clinicians with regard to individual patients. Ample
population-based data on the distribution of CVD
risk factors across Europe are available (7). However,
surprisingly few researchers have highlighted the
theoretical, methodological, pragmatic, and ethical
aspects that are aggregated in the task of implement-
ing guideline recommendations throughout a given
population (8�/10). To our knowledge, no attempts
have been made to address these questions with regard
to the current European guidelines on CVD preven-
tion in clinical practice (6). The first objective of this
study is to describe the total, age- and gender-specific
prevalences of subjects in a well-defined population
for whom medical follow-up is indicated due to
unfavourably high BP and/or cholesterol levels, as
defined by the guidelines. The second objective is to
highlight scientific questions and ethical dilemmas
relating to implementation of the guidelines.
Table I. Participants, means and standard deviations (9/SD) of arterial blood pressure (BP, mmHg), body mass index (BMI, kg/m2)
and serum cholesterol (mmol/l), and prevalence of smokers among males and females in the Norwegian Nord-Tro¨ndelag Health Study
1995�/97 (HUNT 2).
Age groups Participants Systolic BP1 Diastolic BP1 BMI2 Cholesterol3 Smokers4 %
Males
20�/24 1761 132.49/12.4 70.49/9.0 24.69/3.5 4.69/0.9 26.5
25�/29 2163 132.89/11.9 73.89/8.8 25.59/3.4 5.09/1.0 27.6
30�/34 2579 132.59/12.4 76.19/9.2 26.19/3.5 5.39/1.0 28.6
35�/39 2820 132.59/12.9 78.39/9.4 26.39/3.3 5.69/1.1 30.4
40�/44 3161 133.69/13.6 81.49/9.8 26.49/3.3 5.99/1.1 35.4
45�/49 3334 136.09/15.3 84.19/10.5 26.89/3.3 6.09/1.1 36.6
50�/54 3064 139.39/17.2 86.29/10.8 27.19/3.5 6.19/1.1 34.4
55�/59 2333 142.59/18.8 86.09/10.9 26.99/3.4 6.29/1.1 32.8
60�/64 2113 146.19/20.7 86.99/11.6 27.19/3.4 6.29/1.1 32.5
65�/69 2232 150.59/22.2 86.89/12.5 26.99/3.6 6.29/1.1 35.4
70�/74 2134 152.09/22.1 85.89/12.4 26.79/3.6 6.29/1.1 32.7
75�/79 1594 154.69/23.2 85.39/13.0 26.79/3.5 6.19/1.2 27.4
Total 29 288
Missing: 1103; 2158; 386; 43008
Females
20�/24 2156 121.39/11.3 69.89/8.3 24.39/4.1 4.89/1.0 29.1
25�/29 2561 120.09/11.6 70.89/8.6 24.99/4.5 5.09/1.0 32.8
30�/34 2917 120.09/12.2 72.19/9.0 25.19/4.3 5.19/1.0 36.1
35�/39 3207 121.49/13.1 74.39/9.5 25.29/4.2 5.29/1.0 40.4
40�/44 3478 125.39/15.2 77.09/10.0 25.49/4.1 5.59/1.0 44.1
45�/49 3566 129.99/17.5 79.19/10.8 26.19/4.3 5.89/1.0 43.3
50�/54 3314 135.79/19.5 81.69/11.2 26.89/4.6 6.29/1.1 37.7
55�/59 2461 140.29/20.2 82.49/11.4 27.09/4.4 6.69/1.2 35.7
60�/64 2292 146.19/22.1 83.19/11.8 27.69/4.8 6.89/1.2 32.9
65�/69 2418 152.29/22.7 84.39/12.5 27.79/4.6 6.99/1.2 31.2
70�/74 2382 157.39/23.3 84.79/13.6 27.89/4.7 6.99/1.3 21.5
75�/79 2064 161.89/24.1 85.19/14.3 27.99/4.7 6.99/1.3 13.2
Total 32816
Missing: 1103; 2297; 389; 44852
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STUDY POPULATION AND METHODS
The present data are derived from a large and
well-organized Norwegian population study, ‘‘The
Nord-Tro¨ndelag Health Study 1995�/97 (HUNT 2)’’
(11). The HUNT 2 study was designed to investigate
the significance of biomedical risk factors. Its
design and methods have been described in detail
elsewhere (11). The overall participation rate in the
HUNT 2 study was 76% among women and 67%
among men (both sexes combined 20�/29 years:
49%; 30�/39 years: 68%; 40�/49 years: 77%; 50�/59
years: 81%; 60�/69 years: 86%; 70�/79 years: 80%).
The present study is based on data from all
participants aged 20�/79 years, in total 62 104 indivi-
duals (29 288 males and 32 816 females) (Table I).
The HUNT 2 population can be considered represen-
tative of the total Norwegian population regarding
demography, socioeconomic factors, morbidity and
mortality (11).
In the HUNT 2 survey, BP was measured on
persons in seated position by specially trained person-
nel using a Dinamap 845XT based on oscillometry.
Cuff size was adjusted after measuring the arm
circumference, and BP was recorded as the mean
values of the second and third of three measurements
performed consecutively at the same visit. Total
cholesterol was measured by an enzymatic colori-
metric cholesterolesterase method (11). In the present
analysis, unfavourably high BP is defined as systolic
blood pressure ]/140 mmHg and/or diastolic BP
]/90 mmHg, or that the person reported taking
antihypertensive medication, regardless of the actual
measures. The cut-off point for unfavourably high
serum cholesterol is ]/5 mmol/l, in accordance with
the guidelines (6).
The SPSS statistical package, version 12.0, was used
for statistical frequency analyses. Age standardization
weight for 20�/79 years was performed using the World
standard (7,12).
All surveys in HUNT 2 were approved by the
Norwegian Data Inspectorate and the Regional Com-
mittee for Ethics in Medical Research. The present
analysis was approved by the steering committee of the
HUNT Research Centre.
RESULTS
Table I gives data regarding the participants and
selected variables underlying CVD risk estimates in
the present study. The point prevalence of individuals
with serum cholesterol and/or blood pressure levels
above the recommended cut-off points increases
with age (Fig. 1), reaching 50% (95% confidence
interval (CI) 47.2�/53.7) by age 24 years, and 90%
(95% CI 88.4�/91.5) by age 49 years. Age-standardized
total prevalence of risk labelling among adults
20�/79 years is 76% (95% CI 74.7�/77.0). Men below
50 years of age have higher combined risk prevalence
than women, whereas women aged 55 years or older
have a slightly higher combined risk prevalence than
men (Table II).
DISCUSSION
Implementation of the European guidelines on CVD
prevention in clinical practice (6) will label three out of
four Norwegian adults aged 20 years and older as in
need of medical counselling and follow-up due to
unfavourably high levels of cholesterol and/or blood
pressure. This finding evokes fundamental scientific
questions and, simultaneously, it depicts ethical di-
lemmas related to medicalization, resource allocation
and sustainability that require an analysis in their own
right (13,14).
The HUNT 2 study included a well-defined popula-
tion with participation rates among the highest
reported in large population studies (11). A
comprehensive non-participation study after the
HUNT 1 survey could not find evidence of a
selection of health measures in the younger
age groups where participation rate was lowest
(11).
Together with the majority of the European
countries, Norway is classified as a ‘‘high risk’’ region
with regard to CVD (6). Compared with other
European high-risk regions in the MONICA
project (third phase, 1992�/94) (7), the HUNT 2
population did not differ significantly in respect of
cholesterol levels and smoking habits. Blood
pressure levels were somewhat higher in the
HUNT 2 population than in most comparable
countries, but lower than in Finland. However,
it is cholesterol levels and not BP alone that ulti-
mately lead to the high prevalence of risk labelling
(Table II).
Risk definitions �/ scientific and ethical dilemmas
Disease prevention and health promotion have been
and will remain two central goals of medicine (14).
Definition of relevant cut-off levels for individual
risk intervention is, however, crucial, and the resulting
preventive tasks should appear meaningful and
manageable from the point of view of practising
clinicians. Norway has one of the world’s longest-
living and healthy-living populations, according to
WHO statistics (15). In such a context, health
professionals might reasonably come to experience
confusion and alienation when instructed to inform a
large majority of people that their cardiovascular
health is not ‘‘good enough’’ according to current
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biomedical standards (16). Failing adherence to clin-
ical guidelines emerges as a logical and likely conse-
quence (2).
Confusion due to flawed concepts or scientific
incoherence?
Our analysis demonstrates that the scientifically
grounded consent which is manifested in the recom-
mendations of the current guidelines would reverse
the biomedical distinction between norm and
deviation, traditionally associated with health and
sickness, to mean the opposite. In our study
population, the ‘‘unhealthy’’ or ‘‘pathological’’
state would acquire the state of the norm, and the
‘‘healthy’’ or ‘‘normal’’ state would become the
exception (Fig. 1). Such a paradoxical medical
scenario could make sense if our study population
was structurally disadvantaged by international
comparison. A positive correlation has repeatedly
been documented between unfavourable socioeco-
nomic conditions and an increased risk of CVD
(17,18). International health statistics do not,
however, indicate that Norwegians are socioeconomi-
cally deprived or in a general health crisis (15). The
‘‘risk epidemic’’ among the HUNT 2 population
should be thoroughly analysed in advance of biome-
dical interventions that involve a large majority of
individuals.
Relation between disease prevention and health
promotion
Current guidelines for prevention of CVD in clinical
practice are based on the scientific presupposition that
individual information regarding medical risk in-
creases a person’s autonomy and sense of control
over her/his life (19). Activities aiming to prevent
disease are thereby automatically considered to be
health promoting. Identification of disease risk in
clinical practice can in some instances incite favour-
able changes in people’s health-related behaviour and
medical prognosis. To what extent consultation-based
lifestyle interventions can be expected to produce
substantial behavioural changes however, is poorly
documented (20). It is also possible that the medical
act of disclosing inherent bodily vulnerabilities to an
asymptomatic person can have negative consequences
(19,21�/24). Before embarking on the project of
implementing the current guidelines in the general
population, it is important to consider that risk
intervention among asymptomatic individuals is an
intellectually demanding, scientifically problematic,
value-laden, and potentially harmful activity.
Dilemmas of risk discourse in the clinical encounter
It is inherently difficult to explain the methodological
premises for the risk factor concept and the statistical
calculations pertaining to a given risk measure in a
meaningful way to a patient �/ even for a physician
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Fig. 1. Point prevalence of individuals 20�/79 years (males and females combined) with unfavourably high blood
pressure (BP) and/or cholesterol levels, as defined by the 2003 European guidelines on cardiovascular disease
prevention in clinical practice.
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who is fairly familiar with this theoretical framework
(19,21�/24). Furthermore, evidence-based medicine
(EBM) does not inform the clinician to what extent
a recommended cut-off point represents a valid
demarcation line in relation to each particular indivi-
dual (21�/26). The concept of EBM operates solely
with rude mathematical abstractions of the human
condition. It regards any given human being as a
random representative for a roughly defined epide-
miological group, and, as such, determinable by
quantifiable measures. If regarded from the point of
view of the humanistic sciences, however, a human
being is above all a particular, subjective, moral, and
interactive being. And it is well documented that a
person’s being-with and belonging-to relationships,
replete with issues of power and resistance, are
essential to health (19,27�/29).
From abstract figure to personal experience
A biomedical cut-off point such as serum cholesterol
5.0 mmol/l is a methodological artefact (2,5). In the
context of the particular consultation, however, a
mathematical abstraction gains normative impact
(30�/33). Figures derived from ‘‘everybody �/ regard-
less of the circumstances’’ acquire the meaning of ‘‘me
�/ here and now’’. The shortage of sound explorations
of how medical communication carrying meanings
such as ‘‘you have a somewhat increased risk of
cardiovascular disease’’ affects people’s understanding
of themselves, their bodies, and their lives should
engender professional concern (21). Medical risk
discourse connects to the existential depths of human
life and is a reminder of human vulnerability and
mortality. There is some evidence that information
about risk of future disease can cast shadows of doubt
and insecurity over people’s lives (21�/24). In an
unfavourable context, focus on disease risk may
thereby undermine an individual’s subjective experi-
ence of integrity, well-being and health (14,19,21).
This fact should be considered in light of epidemio-
logical studies showing that a person’s subjective
perception of being in good health is a strong
predictor of survival (34). There are also clear links
between emotional life and CVD development (35).
Table II. Point prevalence (and 95% CI) of unfavourable blood pressure (BP) levels, cholesterol levels, and combination of these, as
defined by the 2003 European guidelines on cardiovascular disease prevention in clinical practice, among the participants in the
Norwegian Nord-Tro¨ndelag Health Study 1995�/97 (HUNT 2).
Age groups BP ]/140/90 and/or
on antihypertensive
treatment
% (95% CI)
Cholesterol
]/5 mmol/l
% (95% CI)
Combined1
% (95% CI)
Males
20�/24 27.3 (25.2�/29.3) 31.1 (29.0�/33.3) 46.9 (44.5�/49.2)
25�/29 28.8 (26.9�/30.7) 48.7 (46.6�/50.8) 60.3 (58.2�/62.4)
30�/34 27.5 (25.7�/29.2) 62.6 (60.7�/64.5) 71.4 (69.7�/73.2)
35�/39 29.8 (28.1�/31.5) 73.3 (71.6�/74.9) 78.8 (77.3�/80.4)
40�/44 35.2 (33.6�/36.9) 80.0 (78.6�/81.4) 84.9 (83.7�/86.2)
45�/49 44.4 (42.7�/46.1) 84.9 (83.7�/86.1) 90.4 (89.4�/91.4)
50�/54 54.5 (52.8�/56.3) 87.6 (86.4�/88.8) 93.3 (92.4�/94.2)
55�/59 60.2 (58.2�/62.2) 87.8 (86.4�/89.1) 93.7 (92.7�/94.7)
60�/64 68.7 (66.7�/70.7) 88.4 (87.7�/89.8) 95.7 (94.8�/96.6)
65�/69 74.6 (72.8�/76.4) 87.8 (86.4�/89.2) 96.9 (96.1�/97.6)
70�/74 77.1 (75.3�/78.9) 87.7 (86.3�/89.1) 96.5 (95.6�/97.3)
75�/79 79.2 (77.2�/81.2) 85.9 (84.2�/87.6) 96.2 (95.1�/97.1)
Females
20�/24 6.7 (5.7�/7.8) 38.9 (36.8�/40.9) 42.1 (40.0�/44.2)
25�/29 6.8 (5.9�/7.9) 46.0 (44.1�/47.9) 48.4 (46.5�/50.4)
30�/34 8.2 (7.2�/9.2) 51.7 (49.9�/53.3) 54.3 (52.5�/56.1)
35�/39 11.7 (10.6�/12.8) 59.1 (57.4�/60.8) 62.2 (60.5�/63.9)
40�/44 19.7 (18.4�/21.0) 68.9 (67.4�/70.5) 73.1 (71.6�/74.6)
45�/49 30.7 (29.2�/32.2) 80.2 (78.9�/81.5) 85.1 (84.0�/86.3)
50�/54 43.3 (41.6�/45.0) 88.4 (87.3�/89.5) 92.3 (91.3�/93.2)
55�/59 53.8 (51.8�/55.7) 92.7 (91.6�/93.7) 96.1 (95.3�/96.9)
60�/64 64.5 (62.5�/66.4) 95.3 (94.4�/96.1) 97.9 (97.3�/98.5)
65�/69 75.1 (73.4�/76.8) 94.9 (94.0�/95.8) 98.5 (97.9�/98.9)
70�/74 81.8 (80.2�/83.3) 95.9 (95.0�/96.6) 99.2 (98.7�/99.5)
75�/79 86.3 (84.8�/87.8) 95.2 (94.2�/96.1) 99.3 (98.9�/99.6)
1BP ]/140/90 and/or on antihypertensive treatment and/or cholesterol ]/5 mmol/l.
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Evidence of efficacy of guided CVD prevention
under controlled research circumstances implies no
guarantee of effectiveness in everyday clinical practice
(2,36). Nor does it allow any prediction of whether the
intervention, if effective, is defensible, compared with
use of resources for other health needs (2,36).
Adherence to guidelines revisited
Practising clinicians show limited adherence to clinical
guidelines (2,37�/39). This phenomenon has been
termed ‘‘clinical inertia’’ (38), indicating what seems
to be unacceptable professional ignorance or disobe-
dience resulting in low-quality care. Several explana-
tions for this phenomenon have been put forward; of
particular interest for our discussion are: doctors
overestimating the quality of the care they actually
provide, lack of training, and use of ‘‘soft excuses’’ to
avoid intervention (38). The present study allows us to
differentiate and sophisticate this discussion. It in-
dicates that limited concordance with clinical guide-
lines may, rather than revealing professional
shortcomings, also represent a reasonable, profes-
sional decision not to overemphasize bodily risk factor
monitoring at the cost of other topics with major
relevance to people’s health (19,21,37,39,40). The task
of implementing the guidelines evokes fundamental
questions in relation to prioritizing of time and
resources (10) and sustainability of the healthcare
system (14), even in Norway where access to health-
care is excellent by international comparison (15) and
per capita expenditure on health is already among the
highest in the world (15).
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Implementation of the current European guidelines
for prevention of CVD in clinical practice in one of the
world’s longest-living and healthiest-living popula-
tions would lead to identification of an ‘‘unfavour-
able’’ CVD risk profile in three out of four adult
Norwegians. By the rules of formal logic, the
‘‘healthy’’ state, traditionally considered to be the
‘‘normal’’ state, would thereby become the exception.
This finding represents a quest to scrutinize the
theoretical basis upon which the guidelines rest, with
regard to methodology and scientific consistency.
Simultaneously, important ethical dilemmas arise at
the point of guideline implementation. In this paper
we have focused primarily on issues related to
medicalization and risk labelling of asymptomatic
individuals. Our results, however, demonstrate the
need for a comprehensive evaluation of the guidelines
with regard to resource allocation and sustainability
within the healthcare system.
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Estimating the high risk group for cardiovascular disease in the
Norwegian HUNT 2 population according to the 2003 European
guidelines: modelling study
Linn Getz, Johann A Sigurdsson, Irene Hetlevik, Anna Luise Kirkengen, Solfrid Romundstad, Jostein Holmen
Abstract
Objective To estimate the high risk group for cardiovascular
disease in a well defined Norwegian population according to
European guidelines and the systematic coronary risk
evaluation system.
DesignModelling study.
Setting Nord-Tröndelag health study 1995-7 (HUNT 2),
Norway.
Participants 5548 participants of the Nord-Tröndelag health
study 1995-7, aged 40, 50, 55, 60, and 65.
Main outcome measures Distribution of risk categories for
cardiovascular disease, with emphasis on the high risk group.
Main results At age 40, 22.5% (95% confidence interval 19.3%
to 25.7%) of women and 85.9% (83.2% to 88.6%) of men were
at high risk of cardiovascular disease. Corresponding numbers
at age 50 were 39.5% (35.9% to 43.1%) and 88.7% (86.3% to
91.0%) and at age 65 were 84.0% (80.6% to 87.4%) and 91.6%
(88.6% to 94.1%). At age 40, one out of 10 women and no men
would be classified at low risk for cardiovascular disease.
Conclusion Implementation of the 2003 European guidelines
on prevention of cardiovascular disease in clinical practice
would classify most adult Norwegians at high risk for fatal
cardiovascular disease.
Introduction
Mortality from cardiovascular disease has declined considerably
in most European countries since the early 1970s.1 Interventions
to modify risk factors have long been shown to reduce mortality
and morbidity from cardiovascular disease, in both people with
previously unrecognised disease2 and people with established
disease.3 Intervention in people at high risk is an accepted
method for disease prevention. Since the first US Framingham
model for predicting heart disease risk was published in 1991, it
has become ever more widely recommended that doctors in pri-
mary care carry out risk assessment by combining several risk
factors for cardiovascular disease using algorithms. Until recently
most risk equations have been derived from the Framingham
study, but these calculations tended to overestimate risk in the
European context.4 A new European risk scoring system for car-
diovascular disease, based on the first phase of the systematic
coronary risk evaluation (SCORE) project, was presented in
2003.5 The system is based on a pooled dataset of cohort studies
from 12 European countries, among these Norway, and offers a
format for estimating fatal cardiovascular disease risk that is suit-
able for clinical practice.5 The system is embedded in the current
version of the European guidelines on prevention of
cardiovascular disease, issued by the Third Joint Task Force of
European and other Societies on Cardiovascular Disease
Prevention in Clinical Practice in 2003.6 The authoring body
consists of eight European and international medical societies
and experts. The guidelines aim to present all relevant evidence
to facilitate clinical decision making in the primary and second-
ary prevention of cardiovascular disease, which can be adapted
to different political, economic, social, and medical circum-
stances.6
The legal status of clinical guidelines for the prevention of
disease is not fully established,6 but authoritative recommenda-
tions contribute to expert and opinion leaders’ definition of what
constitutes good medical practice. Several studies have, however,
shown clinicians’ limited adherence to medical guidelines for
asymptomatic conditions.6–9 This is the case even in high risk
situations, such as patients with angina pectoris or diabetes mel-
litus.8 This phenomenon, termed “clinical inertia,” has been
partly attributed to too much work, too little time, and “soft rea-
sons to avoid intensification of therapy.”7
Population based data on risk factors for cardiovascular dis-
ease are available for many European regions.10 The 2003 Euro-
pean guidelines, however, provide no estimates of the aggregated
workload associated with implementation of the recommenda-
tions. We recently showed that implementation would result in
three out of four Norwegians aged 20 or older being classed as in
need of counselling because of high cholesterol or blood
pressure levels.11
We estimated the high risk group in the Norwegian popula-
tion participating in the Nord-Tröndelag health study 1995-7
(HUNT 2),12 according to the 2003 European guidelines on pre-
vention of cardiovascular disease.
Materials and methods
The 2003 European guidelines tackle the prevention of athero-
sclerotic disease in general (coronary heart disease, peripheral
artery disease, and cerebrovascular atherosclerotic disease). Risk
is defined in terms of the absolute probability of developing a
fatal cardiovascular event within 10 years, and the threshold for
high risk is defined as ≥ 5%.6 The guidelines 6 specify a list of bio-
medical conditions that classify people at high risk (see box).
These people require maximal clinical attention, with no further
estimation of risk.6 In remaining asymptomatic, apparently
healthy people, risk estimation and counselling should be guided
by the total risk level, as estimated from a chart produced by the
systematic coronary risk evaluation project.
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Figure 2 shows the distribution of risk categories without
extrapolation to age 60. Extrapolation explains 86.0% of the
high risk group after evaluation using the chart among women
aged 55. The values for men are 64.4% at age 50 and 18.7% at
age 55.
Discussion
Implementation of the 2003 European guidelines on prevention
of cardiovascular disease in a well defined Norwegian population
would class four out of 10 women and nine out of 10 men aged
Table 1 Participation rates, means, and prevalence of relevant risk factors among participants in Nord-Tröndelag health study 1995-7 (HUNT 2), Norway.
Values are percentages (numbers) unless stated otherwise
Variable
40 years 50 years 55 years 60 years 65 years
Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
No of participants
(participation rate)
657 (80.8) 624 (69.6) 709 (84.1) 698 (76.0) 554 (85.9) 555 (79.9) 471 (88.9) 411 (80.4) 450 (85.1) 419 (81.7)
Mean (SD) systolic
blood pressure
124.0
(14.5)
133.6
(13.1)
133.1
(19.1)
137.5 (16.9) 138.8
(19.8)
140.6 (17.9) 144.6 (21.1) 144.9 (20.6) 150.7
(23.5)
148.4
(20.4)
Mean (SD) diastolic
blood pressure
76.1 (9.8) 80.8 (9.9) 80.8 (11.2) 85.4 (10.9) 82.8 (11.4) 85.4 (10.8) 82.9 (11.6) 87.0 (11.4) 84.5 (13.0) 86.2 (12.1)
Mean (SD) total
cholesterol
concentration
5.4 (1.0) 5.7 (1.1) 6.1 (1.1) 6.1 (1.1) 6.5 (1.2) 6.2 (1.2) 6.8 (1.3) 6.1 (1.1) 6.8 (1.2) 6.2 (1.1)
Mean (SD) body mass
index
25.4 (4.1) 26.3 (3.4) 26.5 (4.4) 27.0 (3.4) 27.1 (4.4) 27.1 (3.5) 27.8 (5.0) 27.1 (3.3) 27.5 (4.7) 27.1 (3.3)
Smokers 46.1
(281/610)
34.8
(204/586)
38.9
(240/617)
34.1
(220/646)
33.7
(157/466)
32.9
(166/505)
32.5
(123/379)
32.7
(118/361)
32.8
(114/348)
33.9
(122/360)
Total cholesterol ≥5
mmol/l
65.7
(430/654)
76.4
(475/622)
86.7
(615/709)
86.2
(600/696)
91.7
(508/554)
88.6
(491/554)
94.1
(443/471)
86.6
(355/410)
95.3
(429/450)
86.9
(364/419)
Blood pressure ≥140/90
mm Hg and
untreated
15.2
(102/657)
36.0
(224/623)
29.8
(211/709)
41.7
(290/696)
37.3
(206/552)
44.8
(248/554)
42.2
(198/469)
52.1
(214/411)
43.8
(196/448)
46.8
(195/417)
Angina without
myocardial infarction
0.2 (1/657) 0.0 (0/624) 1.3 (9/708) 2.1 (15/698) 1.1 (6/549) 2.5 (14/553) 3.8 (18/469) 4.9 (20/411) 4.5
(20/447)
7.5
(31/414)
First degree relatives
with myocardial
infarction before age
60
15.8
(92/581)
20.7
(105/508)
20.6
(132/640)
17.9
(104/582)
21.8
(108/495)
18.5 (86/464) 19.4 (86/444) 17.7 (63/356) 17.8
(76/426)
18.8
(71/377)
Table 2 Percentages (numbers) of women and men at high risk for cardiovascular disease according to criteria 1 and 2b-c in priority list (see box),
distribution of combined risk categories for cardiovascular disease among remaining individuals according to systematic coronary risk evaluation (SCORE)
chart
40 years 50 years 55 years 60 years 65 years
Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
Priority list:
Established myocardial
infarction or stroke
0.3 (2/657) 0.3 (2/624) 1.4
(10/708)
4.3
(30/698)
1.6 (9/549) 8.2
(45/552)
2.6
(12/467)
9.7
(40/411)
5.9 (26/444) 12.8
(53/415)
Systolic blood
pressure ≥180 mm Hg
or diastolic blood
pressure ≥110 mm Hg
0.5 (3/657) 0.5 (3/624) 2.4
(17/709)
2.1
(15/698)
4.7
(26/553)
2.9
(16/554)
7.2
(34/470)
7.3
(30/411)
14.0 (63/449) 6.2
(26/418)
Cholesterol ≥8 mmol/l 1.1 (7/654) 3.5
(22/622)
6.3
(45/709)
5.5
(38/696)
13.0
(72/554)
5.6
(31/554)
17.8
(84/471)
5.4
(22/410)
16.2 (73/450) 6.2
(26/419)
Diabetes 0.3 (2/657) 1.3 (8/616) 2.3
(16/708)
1.6
(11/696)
2.4
(13/551)
3.8
(21/552)
2.8
(13/468)
4.6
(19/410)
3.8 (17/446) 4.6
(19/415)
Receiving treatment
for hypertension
1.8
(12/655)
1.8
(11/621)
8.1
(57/708)
9.3
(65/696)
14.3
(79/551)
14.4
(80/554)
16.8
(79/469)
17.3
(71/411)
28.3
(127/448)
26.9
(112/417)
Sum high risk* 3.8
(25/657)
7.2
(45/624)
17.8
(126/709)
19.5
(136/698)
29.2
(162/554)
26.7
(148/555)
36.7
(173/471)
33.8
(139/411)
51.1
(230/450)
43.4
(182/419)
SCORE chart for
combined risk among
remaining individuals
with extrapolation†:
Unclassifiable‡ 7.0 (46) 6.4 (40) 10.7 (76) 6.6 (46) 11.7 (65) 5.8 (32) 11.9 (56) 8.0 (33) 8.9 (40) 8.4 (35)
High risk 18.7 (123) 78.7 (491) 21.7 (154) 69.2 (483) 19.3 (107) 64.7 (359) 20.6 (97) 55.7 (229) 32.9 (148) 48.2 (202)
Intermediate risk 61.9 (407) 7.7 (48) 46.5 (330) 4.7 (33) 38.6 (214) 2.9 (16) 30.6 (144) 2.4 (10) 7.1 (32) 0 (0)
Low risk 8.5 (56) 0 (0) 3.2 (23) 0 (0) 1.1 (6) 0 (0) 0.2 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Total sum of high risk
group, according to
priority list and
SCORE chart
22.5
(148/657)
85.9
(536/624)
39.5
(280/709)
88.7
(619/698)
48.6
(269/554)
91.4
(507/555)
57.3
(270/471)
89.5
(368/411)
84.0
(378/450)
91.6
(384/419)
*One or more of following criteria present: myocardial infarction, stroke, antihypertensive treatment, diabetes, cholesterol ≥8 mmol/l, systolic blood pressure ≥180 mm Hg, diastolic blood
pressure ≥110 mm Hg.
†Extrapolation to 60 years for ages 40, 50, and 55 (denominator is number of individuals in each cohort).
‡Mostly explained by missing data on smoking habits.
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12. APPENDICES
12.1	APPENDIX.	English	translation	of	relevant	HUNT	2	survey	questions	
On this page is an English translation (text from HUNT website) of the particular 
HUNT 2 survey questions which are used in Papers IV and V. The original Norwegian 
version of the questionnaires is available at http://www.hunt.ntnu.no.
FROM	QUESTIONNAIRE	1:	CARDIOVASCULAR	DISEASES,	DIABETES
Have	you	had,	or	do	you	have
A myocardial infarction Yes no Age first time
Angina pectoris (heart cramp) Years
A stroke/brain haemorrhage Years
Diabetes (sugar disease) Years
Are	you	taking	medication	for	high	blood	pressure?
Just one cross 
Now 
Did previously, but not now 
Have never taken it 
SMOKING
Do	you	smoke	yourself?   YES NO
Cigarettes daily?  
Cigars/cigarillos daily  
Pipe daily? 
 
Have never smoked daily…… Put a cross  
FROM	QUESTIONNAIRE	2:	ILLNESS	IN	THE	FAMILY	
Put	a	cross	for	the	relatives	who	have	or	have	had	any	of	the	illnesses.	Put	a	
cross	in	„none”	if	none	of	these	relatives	has	had	these	diseases:
Possibly several crosses on each line.
Mother Father Brother Sister Child None
Stroke or cerebral haemorrhage      
Heart attack before age of 60      
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12.2	APPENDIX.	From	Antiquity	 to	 the	 foundations	 of	EBM:	 some	 historical	
notes and personal reflections on the premises for contemporary medical consul-
tations
In the introduction to his book Doctoring, Eric J. Cassell notes that (1997:10):
The fundamental knowledge base for primary care remains the traditional preclini-
cal science of medicine. It is the foundation from which modern Western medicine 
derives its legitimacy. It is the basic source of knowledge about nature as it is ex-
pressed in the body in health and disease. It is about (...) body-as-nature. 
In order to appreciate that, which goes on in consultations between patients and doc-
tors in every-day Western medicine, some basic reading of the history of Western med-
icine has proved helpful to me. In this informal essay, I will outline some historical 
milestones that lead up to medical knowledge and reasoning, as we know it today. In 
addition, I will add some personal reflections. The final destination of this historical 
journey is a previously quoted (see chapter 2.2.4) description of the biomedical way 
of thinking about disease and suffering, as formulated by professor of family medicine 
Ian McWhinney in 1989. My main historical guide has been professor of the social 
history of medicine Roy Porter’s (1926-2002) book The greatest benefit to mankind. A 
medical history of humanity (1998).152 To look further into various details, I have also 
consulted web-based encyclopaedias, in particular the open-access Wikipedia (www.
wikipedia.org).153 As I find US historian of science Thomas Kuhn’s notion of scientific 
paradigm shifts useful to help conceptualise the development of medical theory and 
practice, I will begin this essay with a brief introduction to Thomas Kuhn’s (1922-
1996) works. 
The structure of scientific revolutions 
This is the title of Kuhn’s most renowned work from 1962 (Kuhn 1970). It contains an 
analysis of the history of science and popularised the terms ‘scientific paradigm’ and 
‘paradigm shifts.’ The roots of the book date back to 1947, when Kuhn was asked to 
teach a science class for humanities undergraduates at Harvard University, with a focus 
on historical case studies. Kuhn later said that, until then, “I’d never read an old docu-
ment in science.” What he discovered as he now did this, was how astonishingly unlike 
Aristotle’s Physics was from Isaac Newton’s works. Kuhn came to the conclusion that 
Aristotle’s way of thinking should not be considered as primitive or “bad Newton” 
but, rather, as fundamentally different from Newton’s. With the general acceptance of 
Newton’s mechanistic world-view, alternate ways of thinking and knowing about the 
world, such as those formulated by the ancient Greeks, had been lost.
152 Roy Porter is also author of traditional historical works such as The Cambridge Illustrated History of 
Medicine, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
153 Wikipedia is a multilingual, web-based, free-content encyclopaedia written collaboratively by volunteers. 
The project began in 2001 and is operated by the non-profit Wikimedia Foundation. Articles in Wikipedia 
are regularly cited by the mass media and academia. Editors are encouraged to uphold a policy of “neutral 
point of view” under which notable perspectives are summarized without an attempt to determine an objec-
tive truth. Yet due to its open nature, the status of Wikipedia as an exact reference work has evidently been 
somewhat controversial.
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The aim of science is to find a model that will account for as much of one’s observa-
tions as possible in a coherent framework. But in every community of scientists, there 
are according to Kuhn individuals who are bolder than the rest and occupy themselves 
with observations that do not fit with the current dogmas and challenge long held, tak-
en-for granted assumptions. If in time, solidification and unification of a challenging 
scientific view is achieved, it will replace the old. A paradigm shift has then occurred. 
Some examples of Kuhn-ian paradigm shifts are: the transition from a Ptolemaic cos-
mology to a Copernican one (from 1543, and later promoted by Kepler and Galileo), 
the unification of classical physics by Newton into a coherent mechanical worldview, 
the transition between the worldview of Newtonian physics and the Einsteinian rela-
tivistic worldview, and the development of Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural 
selection, which overturned theories of evolution by inheritance of acquired charac-
teristics. 
The most common criticism of Kuhn, from historians of science, is that the notion 
of a clean paradigm shift only seems to apply when one takes a very abstract view 
of the history of any given theory transition. When looking at the details, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to discern coherent ‘paradigms’ to shift in to or out of. However, 
paradigms do become quite apparent if one examines pedagogical practices such as 
textbooks, and this was largely how Kuhn developed his theory. Once a paradigm shift 
has taken place, textbooks are rewritten, and according to Kuhn, they tend to outline 
the history of science as a process of increasing sophistication which inevitably builds 
up to the currently established understanding of the world. The texts thereby convey 
a tacit belief that in due course, all phenomena will be accounted for in terms of the 
new established framework. Kuhn believes that what scientists spend mostof, if not all 
of, their careers doing, is participating in a process of puzzle solving within a given 
frame. The previous successes of the established paradigm instill great confidence that 
a solution to the puzzle exists, although very hard to find. Kuhn calls this process of 
optimistic puzzling Normal science.
As a paradigm is explored to the limits of its scope, however, anomalies – i.e. failures 
of the current paradigm to take into account observed phenomena - accumulate. Their 
significance is judged by the practitioners of the discipline. Some anomalies may be 
dismissed as errors in observation. Many anomalies ‘dissolve’ spontaneously within 
the established paradigm, with increased scientific refinement and deepening insight. 
The majority of the scientific community will generally oppose any change of mind, 
and, according to Kuhn, this is as it should be. In order to fulfil its potential, a scientific 
community must consist of both people who are bold and people who are conservative. 
But then, if for instance a gifted scientist recognizes the potential of the new or com-
peting paradigm, greater change will occur. Louis Pasteur (1822-1895) is an example 
of a brilliant scientist who opened the door to a new scientific paradigm. Pasteur was 
not the one to propose the germ theory; but he was the one to demonstrate its correct-
ness and convince Europe that it was true. He famously said about scientific progress 
that “Chance favours the prepared mind”.
Opinion is divided on whether or not Kuhn’s theory applies to medicine (McWhinney 
1989). Kuhn himself maintained that paradigm change occurs in applied disciplines 
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and even in sub-disciplines. And Ian McWhinney holds the view that Kuhn’s theory 
fits well with the developments in medicine. 
Milestone I: Scientific observation in the context of healing-by-relation in ancient 
Greece
Western medicine is rooted in Antiquity, and the time when Greek medicine became 
separated from religion around 400 years B.C. Theories of illness and healing thereby 
became independent of the supernatural and started to build upon natural philosophy. 
Greek medicine emphasised the microcosm/macrocosm relationship, the correlations 
between the healthy human body and the harmonies of nature. But the new and ‘sci-
entific’ idea which now emerged was that man was governed by the same natural 
laws as the cosmos. Hippocrates of Cos (460-377 BC) is widely regarded as the most 
outstanding medical doctor of all times. Roy Porter refers to his “Olympian status in 
medicine as the champion of bedside experience.” Hippocrates appealed to reason and 
observation, rather than to rules or supernatural forces. Ideas of disease as a syndrome, 
a constellation of related signs and symptoms, began to emerge in the Hippocratic 
school of medicine. Hippocrates however first and foremost worked in an individually 
oriented cosmology where causes of disease were sought in the realm of the individual 
patient (Blaxter 2004). Hippocratic doctors presented themselves as “friends of the 
sick” and focused more on the individual person’s subjective experience of dis-ease 
than on diseases as phenomena with their own independent existence (ontological en-
tities). In the Hippocratic medical paradigm, disease could not be regarded as separate 
from the suffering person, and the person could not be regarded as separate from his 
or her environment. The cornerstone of healing interventions was diatetica, and in 
this era a “dietary regimen” prescribed by a doctor would involve the person’s entire 
lifestyle. Therapy aimed at treating each patient individually and symptomatically, giv-
ing the healing powers of nature a helping hand. Frequent visits to the patient were 
recommended, as was an expectant clinical attitude. Clinical acuity and prognostic 
skills were highly prized. The Hippocratic Oath honoured trust-based and confiden-
tial clinical relations. It discouraged heroic interventions. A basic rule of Hippocratic 
medicine was to avoid doing harm. The Hippocratic Oath foreshadows the paradigm of 
profession as a morally self-regulating discipline among those sharing craft knowledge 
and committed to serving others. 
The medical heritage of Antiquity, with its emphasis on lifestyle and harmony, re-
mained powerful for many centuries. According to Roy Porter, it was authoritative in 
Western bedside practice until the 18th Century when it was gradually to become chal-
lenged by medical practice grounded on experimental investigation. 
The Greek physician Galen (131-201 AD) who later lived in Rome and served as a 
court physician to emperor Marcus Aurelius (and made many discoveries of anatomy 
by way of vivisection of animals), transmitted the heritage of Hippocratic medicine all 
the way to the European renaissance, which reached its peak in the 15th Century. 
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The main impact of Hippocratic medicine can be summed up as follows: It taught that 
understanding of sickness required understanding of nature. And it carved out a dis-
tinct role for the unselfish and morally responsible physician. 
Reflection 1. How can we conceptualise ‘the art of medicine’ today? 
Before moving more than 1700 years ahead in time, l will mention a paper by Nor-
wegian philosopher Åge Wifstad (Wifstad 2003) who presents German philosopher 
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s (1900-2002) reflections on contemporary and ancient medi-
cine (see also Arnason 2000). In his book The Enigma of Health, Gadamer investigates 
the ancient roots of modern medicine and comes to the conclusion that this medicine 
“itself represents a peculiar kind of practical science for which modern thought no 
longer possesses an adequate concept.” Our dilemma is thereby, that in order to ac-
commodate the original meaning of the concept “the art of medicine,” we would have 
to revert to a way of thinking about nature, which is unfamiliar to us. One may take 
Aristotle’s theory of causality as an illustration. Aristotle recognized four kinds of 
causes – of which the most important was the “final cause.” The final cause was the 
aim or goal of something. Thus, a final cause of rain could be to let plants grow. In the 
ancient Greek world, the art of medicine was the art of restoring natural equilibrium. 
In this creative process, the doctor’s actions would orchestrate the healing forces of 
nature – resulting in his own becoming superfluous. And thus healing would occur in 
such a fashion that the doctor’s art could never be proven – not to himself, or to others. 
Our contemporary notion of technology however implies that the ability to produce 
certain effects in nature can be isolated, objectified, and seen as existing independently 
of context. This ‘new’ way of thinking dates back to the scientists of the Scientific 
Revolution, such as Galileo Galilei. 
Milestone II: The Scientific Revolution and the conceptualisation of “nature-as-clock-
work” 
In Europe around the year 1600, a rapid and fundamental change took place in the 
theoretical outlook regarding nature. This ‘scientific revolution’ can – in a simplified 
fashion, be summarised in connection with four distinctive names: 
Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) is seen as the father of ‘experimentalism.’ He legitimised 
observation, as opposed to pure thinking, as the route to authentic knowledge. Galileo’s 
falling body experiments are prime examples of this. Before his time, the Aristotelian 
belief prevailed that nature should be looked at as it worked on its own. Performing 
experiments would put nature in ‘unnatural’ circumstances, and hence the results of an 
experiment would not agree with the true way nature worked.
Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was an English lawyer, statesman, writer, historian and 
philosopher who projected (what we would now think of as) the mechanical, experi-
mental philosophy, onto the entire natural universe. Bacon suggested a system of “true 
and perfect induction,” which he proposed as the essential foundation of scientific 
method and a necessary tool for the proper interpretation of nature. It can be argued 
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that the modern idea of technological “progress” (in the sense of a steady, cumulative, 
historical advance in applied scientific knowledge) began with Bacon, who maintained 
that knowledge is power. Bacon’s investigative method was put forward in his work 
Novum Organum (the New Organ) in 1620, and was supposed to replace the methods 
put forward in Aristotle’s Organum. 
Robert Boyle (1627-1691) set about regularising Galileo’s experimental work as char-
acterised by his reports of “falling bodies experiments” in a broad manner. Although 
Boyle’s research and personal philosophy had its roots in the alchemical tradition, he 
is widely regarded as the first modern chemist. He also made various great accomplish-
ments in physics (i.e. Boyle’s law). Boyle’s book The Sceptical Chemist (1661) out-
lines chemistry as the science of the composition of substances, not merely an adjunct 
to the arts of the alchemist or the physician. He advanced towards the modern view of 
elements as the indecomposable constituents of material bodies. He further supposed 
that the elements were ultimately composed of particles of various sorts and sizes. 
He was also interested in the chemistry of combustion and respiration, and made ex-
periments in physiology. He was however hampered by the “tenderness of his nature” 
which kept him from doing anatomical dissections, especially of living animals, which 
he otherwise thought to be most instructive. 
Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727), the English physicist, mathematician, astronomer and 
philosopher, has by many been regarded as the most influential scientist ever. In 1687, 
he published the Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, where he described 
universal gravitation and, via his laws of motion, laid the groundwork for classical 
mechanics. A simple illustration of how Newtonian discoveries could affect people’s 
perception of nature is that he was the one to discover that the spectrum of colours 
observed when white light passed through a prism is inherent in the white light – and 
not added by the prism. 
The main impact of the Scientific Revolution is that from now on, experimental natural 
philosophy was thought to offer the most persuasive scientific model.
For a long period to follow, bedside medical practice was quite unaffected by the 
Scientific Revolution. Therapeutic interventions remained grounded in tradition. Ma-
jor milestones were however passed in the area of anatomy and physiology. Andreas 
Vesalius had published his anatomical atlas De humani corporis fabrica (On the Work-
ings of the Human Body) already in 1543; this was the first major anatomy work 
since the time of Galen. William Harvey published his work Exercitatio Anatomica 
de Motu Cordis et Sanguinis in Animalibus (An Anatomical Exercise on the Motion 
of the Heart and Blood in Animals) in 1628, where, based on scientific methodology, 
he argued for the idea that blood was pumped around the body by the heart – before 
returning to the heart and being re-circulated in a closed system. This overturned the 
accepted ancient model which identified venous (dark red) and arterial (brighter and 
thinner) blood, each with distinct and separate functions. 
In the late 17th and early 18th Centuries, medical knowledge was gathered ever more 
in accordance with the new scientific paradigm. Opening up bodies – dead human 
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cadavers and living animal ones – now became the general prescription for true medi-
cal knowledge. The word autopsy (Greek: autopsia) literally means “to see with one’s 
own eyes.” In the late 1660s, the microscope was taken in use, and this advanced the 
reductionistic, mechanical model of living beings even further.
The British physician Thomas Sydenham (1624-89), sometimes referred to as “The 
English Hippocrates,” is known for his careful observations of epidemic disease in 
London. A man with a very scientific mind, he was still sceptical to the idea that learn-
ing about disease should mainly be done by way of dissection. Sydenham told a young 
student that “… my butcher can dissect a joint full and well; young man (…) you must 
go to the bedside…” Having himself observing the effect of one specific remedy (the 
cinchona bark which contains quinine) used against the specific disease pattern known 
as ague (from Latin acuta, literally, sharp fever, i.e. recurrent malaria),154 Sydenham’s 
mind was however prepared for the emerging theory that diseases should be seen as 
entities that existed independently of the sufferer. In the words of Sydenham: “all dis-
ease should be reduced to definite and certain Species… ” (Porter 1997:230). 
From the perspective of medicine, Roy Porter describes philosopher and mathemati-
cian René Descartes (1596-1650) as “the towering thinker of the scientific revolution.” 
As a dedicated spokesman of the emerging mechanical philosophy, Descartes rejected 
the ancient Greek notion of final causes. There were from now on no inherent goals, 
emotion nor intelligence in nature. Where nature had previously been seen as a liv-
ing entity, the Scientific Revolution viewed nature as matter, which follows natural, 
physical laws. Whereas Augustine and many other medieval thinkers understood the 
body as something corpse-like, unless ‘infused’ with soul, Descartes argued that vital-
ity simply arises from the body’s own mechanical processes (Leder 1998). Thereby, 
Descartes compared expressions of life to “a watch or other automaton, when it is 
wound up and contains in itself the corporal principle of those movements” (Descartes 
quoted in Leder 1998:119). To Descartes, as to Bacon, the way of conceptualising the 
world was intertwined with a project of mastery. In Cartesian thinking, there is a direct 
link between “knowing the force and action of fire, water, air, the stars, heavens and 
all other bodies that environ us” and “employing them in all those uses to which they 
are adapted, and thus render ourselves masters and possessors of nature” (Descartes in 
Discourse on Method, quoted in Leder 1998:119). The idea that knowledge grants us 
power over nature was alien to the ancient Greek and medieval thinkers. In a universe 
where a notion of final causes existed, even natural bodies were perceived to be alive 
in a sense, and exhibiting their own intrinsic ends. Descartes´ material world – which 
he called res extensa – was however devoid of all intrinsic subjectivity. Nature could 
thereby be manipulated, shaped and exploited. Drew Leder describes this as “a crucial 
shift from passive contemplation to the active manipulation which characterises the 
modern age” (Leder 1998:120). This step in the history of science links up to the teach-
ings of the philosophers Heidegger and Jonas, who were preoccupied with the way 
modern technology leads us to see nature – and to a certain extent even human beings 
– in terms of standing-reserve, ready for use (see chapter 2.4.2). 
154 Roy Porter states that arguably, this may have been the first effective, specific drug therapy in Western 
medical history.
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One central claim of Descartes was that the immaterial mind and the material body 
causally interact (i.e. mental events cause physical events, and vice versa). Descartes 
never worked out how mind and body interacted, however, but his suggestion was that 
the site of interaction was the pineal gland. The Cartesian “mind-body dualism” is still 
a tacit premise for mainstream biomedical research and practice (Bracken 2002). As 
previously outlined, Drew Leder has written about the fundamental impact of Carte-
sian thinking in modern medicine in the essay “A tale of two bodies: The Cartesian 
corpse and the lived body” (Leder 1992, re-published 1998). 
Reflection 2: “Time to remove the mind-body split.”155 In the closing chapter of his 
renowned book Steps to an ecology of mind, anthropologist Gregory Bateson wrote: 
“When you separate mind from the structure in which it is immanent, such as human 
relationship, the human society, or the ecosystem, you thereby embark, I believe, on 
fundamental error, which in the end will surely hurt you” (Bateson 1972:493). 
Current thinkers (Moerman 2002; Szawarski 2004) believe that human healing pro-
cesses can be conceptualised as composed of three elements:
1. Self-healing (physiological processes)
2. Specific treatment effects (i.e. aspirin, antibiotics), and
3. Contextual effects, which may relate to the so-called placebo effect. This is healing 
which is elicited specifically by experiences of meaning and context, such as a trusting 
doctor-patient relationship. 
The long-time implications of the Cartesian dualism have been to exclude the third 
element from the domain of medical interest. Modern medicine thereby turns its back 
on its most fundamental therapeutical potential. In his latest work (1987), Gregory 
Bateson writes that a science about man that does not even understand the placebo 
phenomenon is on the wrong track. 
The phenomenon of placebo can be seen as an artefact of the biomedical paradigm 
(Ekeland 1997 and 1999). Within a theoretical framework that is not based on the 
premises of Cartesian dualism between body and mind, there would be no placebo 
phenomenon to explain. But in the context of contemporary biomedicine, only mate-
rial causes are considered as real. The physiology of the placebo response can thereby 
be described within the existing paradigm, but the phenomenon cannot be explained 
within the biomedical frame of thinking. In other words, we are dealing with a striking 
anomaly, according to Thomas Kuhn’s terminology. 
Milestone III: Reason will solve every problem known to man: the age of Enlighten-
ment in Europe
The Age of Enlightenment refers to the late 17th and 18th century in European philoso-
phy and a historical intellectual movement, “The Enlightenment”. This time period 
saw a continued rise of empirical philosophical ideas in the tradition of the scientific 
155 This is the title of a BMJ editorial by Bracken and Thomas, 2002.
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revolution, and their application to politics, economy, government and sciences such as 
physics, chemistry, biology and medicine. Newton’s conception of the universe based 
upon natural and rationally understandable laws was at the core of Enlightenment 
ideology. And what is particularly noticeable, is that the Enlightenment movement 
also advocated rationality as a means to establish an authoritative system of ethics, 
aesthetics, and knowledge. As Descartes had said, “the key to the universe is its logi-
cal rather than spiritual order” (Descartes quoted in Gordon 1988:24). The intellectual 
leaders of this movement regarded themselves as courageous and elite and saw their 
purpose as leading the world toward progress and out of a long period of doubtful 
tradition, full of irrationality, superstition, and tyranny. This Enlightenment movement 
came to provide the cultural basis for the American and French Revolutions. 
In accordance with nature as a whole, medical researchers now began to conceptualise 
disease as something orderly and predictable. And medical reasoning disconnected 
itself completely from religion. Disease was now regarded as the result of natural 
mechanism, not of sin or divine punishment, as had been thought for centuries (Gor-
don 1988). In the 18th century, scientific medicine was however far from a uniform 
endeavour. It was characterised by a number of rivalling schools and thoughts. Some 
schools gave more room for so-called vital life-forces than others, who conceptualised 
human health and disease in a purely mechanistic fashion.156 There was agreement, 
however, that medicine was remote from gaining the perfection attained in areas such 
as experimental physics and chemistry.
Although many of the ambitious clinicians of the time acknowledged that Thomas 
Sydenham was right when he said that a good clinician had to know his diseases as 
well as his patients, most of them still made their name as men of letters, philan-
thropists or improvers. But times where now to change, according to Enlightenment 
philosophers. As Bacon had claimed, science and technology would ultimately come 
to enhance man’s control over nature, and social progress, prosperity and conquest of 
diseases would follow. French Enlightenment philosopher, mathematician and politi-
cal scientist Marquis de Condorcet (1743-94) made the following visionary statement 
regarding medicine, typical for this epoch: 
Improvement of medical practice, which will become more efficacious with the 
progress of reason and of the social order, will mean the end of infectious and he-
reditary diseases and illnesses brought by climate, food and working conditions. It 
is reasonable to hope that all other diseases may likewise disappear as their distant 
causes are discovered (Porter 1997:245).
We now pass the milestone where Swedish botanician Karl von Linné created new 
taxonomies for natural history (1735). And in this tradition, ambitious attempts to clas-
sify diseases would follow. One of these was Cullen’s classification system (1785), 
which defined the three general disease categories the pyrexias, the neuroses, and the 
cachexias. His fourth category encompassed local disease (Source: Encyclopaedia 
Britannica 1911 version). In the footsteps of Cullen followed men such as Benjamin 
156 Following in the foosteps of Newton, Duch professor Boerhaave (1668-1738) lead the application of phys-
ics to medicine. Boerhaave perceived that health and sickness could be seen as expressions of forces, weights 
and hydrostatic pressures and saw health as some sort of hydrostatic equilibrium (Porter 1997:246).
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Rush, a founding father of American medicine and a signatory of the US Declaration 
of Independence. Rush added a disease category called hypertension. He was among 
the most eager promoters of copious bloodletting, a therapeutical intervention, which 
inflicted much harm157 until it was finally abandoned, thanks to sceptical and indepen-
dent, academic minds such as the French physician Pierre Louis (see below). 
According to Roy Porter, hardly any 18th century scientific advance helped heal the 
sick directly. And in addition to adverse effects of direct heroic therapeutic actions 
such as blood-letting, the new lying-in hospitals featured dramatic mortality rates for 
reasons that were little understood, – until Hungarian-Austrian Ignaz Semmelweiss 
(1818-1865) figured out that many cases of fatal disease could be prevented by the 
simple and unsophisticated measure of hand washing.158
“Morti Vivos Docent”159 
In the late 1700s, a new type of disease classification emerged, based on morbid anat-
omy. Morbid anatomy in the dead would from now on be regarded as the main clue 
to understanding sickness in the living. Italian Morgagny published his radically new 
classification system in 1761, called De sedibus and causis morborum (On the Sites 
and Causes of Disease). It was based on visual accounts of 700 autopsies. Morgagny 
did not include any speculation about causes. His work received instant recognition, 
and researchers in other countries rapidly followed suit. Patho-anatomical descrip-
tions started to appear in textbooks, describing phenomena such as emphysema, liver 
cirrhosis and ovarian cysts. Around 1800, Paris clinician-pathologist Xavier Bichat 
(1771-1802) published a seminal work on anatomy, introducing the doctrine of tis-
sues (connective, muscle, nerve, etc.). His works laid the foundations for 19th century 
patho-anatomy. In 1801, Bichat advised young doctors that “You may take notes for 
20 years from morning to night at the bedside of the sick, and all will be to you only 
a confusion of symptoms... a train of incoherent phenomena.” Start dissecting bodies, 
he stated, “and this obscurity will soon disappear.” With Michel Foucault’s work The 
Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception in mind, Roy Porter notes 
that “here is the medicine of the all-powerful gaze.” And as Foucault also noted, in this 
era of French hospital medicine, ‘the natural death’ gradually becomes replaced by ‘the 
pathological death.’ Death is no longer perceived as something coming from outside 
life; it was contained within the body, where physiological and pathological process 
battled for supremacy (see Armstrong 1995).
157 On the morning of December 14th 1799, former American president George Washington (otherwise in a 
state of reasonably good health) woke up with an aggressive throat infection, presumably an epiglotitis (in 
today’s terminology). During the day to come, which ended with his death at 10.20 p.m., Washington was 
bled four times; the total amount of blood withdrawn has been estimated to 2,4 litres (Morens DM. Death of 
a president. N Engl J Med 1999;341:1845-50). 
158 The story of Semmelweiss is perhaps the most illustrative example of how authority-based medicine can 
hinder professional progress. Norwegian author Jens Björneboe contemplates this issue in his play Sem-
melweiss (1969).
159 Latin: “The dead teach the living.”
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Milestone IV: The birth of the Clinic
The French revolution and its aftermaths had enormous implications for the develop-
ment of Western medicine as a whole. David Armstrong has described how medicine 
moved from a two-dimensional to a three-dimensional framework at this point in time. 
In traditional bedside medicine until now, the headache or the abdominal pain, as it 
presented itself in the clinical encounter, ‘was’ the patient’s illness. What happens now, 
in French hospital medicine, is that the simple relationship between symptom and ill-
ness/disease will become reconfigured into a three-dimensional framework consisting 
of the patient’s symptoms, the signs observed by the doctor, and the ‘objective’ pathol-
ogy, originally to be established by post mortem examination (Armstrong 1995). 
After the French revolution, the authorities of the ancien régime were rejected, and the 
revolutionary young doctors were men who prized hands-on experience. A distinctive 
and influential school of Paris hospital medicine developed; based on careful, scientific 
observation of patients. Thereby, the individually oriented approach to patients where 
causes of disease were to a high degree sought in the context of personal attributes, 
was once and for all abandoned. In Doctoring (1997:48), Eric J. Cassell underlines that 
“It is difficult to overestimate the brilliance of the Paris physicians of the 1830s, the 
discoverers of scientific medicine.” 
French hospitals had traditionally been religious foundations devoted to tending to 
the sick. In the post-revolution period, patients were to a lesser extent fee-paying, 
and thereby, control to an increasing extent passed from the patient to the doctor. In 
this epoch, the elite physicians turned the hospitals into what Roy Porter describes 
as “scientific machines for investigation of diseases and teaching.” Interest turned to 
pathology, rather than the patient (Blaxter 2004). Poor people had ready access to the 
hospitals, but in many respects they were commodified as “clinical material.” Nuances 
between different, individual patients were not the focus of attention; “the discoverers 
swept away layers of confusing social, psychological, and personal issues as irrelevant 
for scientific medicine” (Cassell 1997:48). The doctor’s task was from now on seen as 
that of establishing the patterns of pathology. ‘The new doctors’ were clinician-pa-
thologists who meticulously documented their findings using the investigative tool of 
clinical-pathological correlation. And they were highly successful in doing so. French 
physician René-Théophile-Hyacinthe Laënnec (1781-1826) was for instance able to 
describe one disease, tuberculosis, in all its facets, without knowing anything about its 
causing agent (Cassell 1997:48). A German physician named Robert Volz (1806-82) is 
however said to have expressed concern over the overall development in Paris hospital 
medicine in this epoch. He noted that “The sick person has become a thing” (Porter 
1997:311).
The ‘objective’ physical examination
In early 19th Century elite Paris medicine, physical examination of living patients grad-
ually attracted more attention. Laënnec invented the stethoscope in 1816, and this event 
can be seen as opening the door to a new medicine of objective physical signs. As one 
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19th Century physician expressed it: “We anatomise by auscultation – if I may say so 
– while the patient is yet alive” (quoted in Leder 1998:120). The stethoscope became 
a symbol of scientific medicine, as it paved the way for the ‘dissection’ of the living 
body, analysing it into its component parts, exposing what is otherwise concealed. This 
development obviously had profound implications for the doctor-patient relationship 
in the future. By bypassing the patient’s unreliable account of symptoms, diagnosis 
could now be rendered more reliable through objective signs (Porter 1997:309). Many 
foreign students received their medical education in Paris in this epoch. Following the 
French example, medical education in many countries now grew more systematic and 
scientific, with a main focus on drilling students in the discipline of diagnosis. 
The shift from reliance upon subjective symptoms – reported by sufferers – to objec-
tive signifiers of disease – reported by clinicians – pointed in direction of yet another 
new branch of medical science; that of pathophysiology. And by the 1850s, the disci-
pline of modern laboratory medicine began to emerge. In this epoch, Rudolf Virchow 
(1821-1902) also did his pioneering work in cellular pathology.
Experiments with drugs and introduction of the numerical method to test treatments
From around 1810, organised experimentation into the action of drugs started. In 
France, François Magendie (1783-1855), a founding father of both experimental 
physiology and experimental pharmacology, carried out groundbreaking experiments 
on the effect of Javanese arrow poison (the active component was later shown to be 
strychnine), morphine, emetics (ipecacuanha), quinine, caffeine, atropine, and several 
other drugs. He also made important discoveries related to the nature of the nerve sys-
tem. Magendie was concerned with the topic of vitalism, the branch of medicine that 
assumed existence of a vital force in living organisms. The force of life, as he saw it, 
would however have to be explained through experiments on living animals. Magend-
ie saw the aims of science as that of replacing phenomena with facts and impressions 
with evidence (Margotta 1996).
In parallel with Magendie’s research, another methodological invention was made 
that came to influence the development of modern medicine strongly. Inspired by the 
quantifying spirit of the Enlightenment, physician Pierre Louis (1787-1872) conceived 
the idea of testing therapies using numerical methods, thus introducing statistics to 
medicine and paving the way for the clinical trial. His ideas were first tested out on 
the therapeutic tradition of blood-letting (phlebotomy). The medical authorities of that 
time did not allow him to leave any patient untreated, so Louis had to compare blood-
letting at various stages of disease. His conclusion was that it did not make people 
better. Apparently, Louis came to the general conclusion that medical interventions of 
the time rarely cured patients, and he came to distrust the extravagant success claims 
made by some of his contemporary colleagues. 
Reflection 4. The “philosophical origins” of Evidence-based medicine. At this point 
in history, the methodological repertoire has in fact been laid out for what came to be 
known as Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) more than a century later. In the introduc-
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tion to the main teaching book on EBM (1997), David Sackett and co-workers write 
that the scientific contributions of French physicians Bichat, Magendie and Louis have 
been among their greatest sources of inspiration. The founders of EBM state that its 
philosophical roots can be found in French hospital medicine. If they truly mean that 
EBM has a philosophical basis, however, this would be a philosophy of human dis-
ease, suffering and healing based upon the following elements (Ekeli 2000): 
• death, the medical gaze, the site, as defined by the autopsy-tradition of Bichat, 
• biomedical facts and evidence, – as defined by Magendie’s experimental ap-
proach, 
• control groups and statistics, – as introduced by Louis.
Diagnostic technology included in the institutional bedside routine
Except for the stethoscope, the clinical medical examination was not much affected by 
technology until the late 1800s. But in 1886, the stethoscope was accompanied by the 
sphygmomanometer developed by Riva-Rocci (see Appendix 4). And thermometry 
– the science of temperature patterns in various diseases – was formally developed in 
large observational studies in the 1860s. The observational tradition of pathology was 
thereby being systematically translated into recordings made by instruments, reinforc-
ing the notion that specific, objective and preferably graphic data were fundamental to 
clinical practice. Roy Porter notes that (1997:346): “By 1900 it was becoming possible 
to understand the patient not by his story, nor even simply through pathological signs 
ascertained by the ‘medical gaze’, but by ceaseless physiological monitoring.” Among 
practicing clinicians, however, there appears to have been some controversy surround-
ing this development, as some believed it to represent a form of clinical de-skilling. 
But in the context of the large hospitals, measuring devices that lent themselves to 
routines (that could in part be delegated to assistant personnel) were now incorporated. 
By 1912, the Massachusetts General Hospital required blood pressure measurements 
at all admissions (Porter 1997:344). Routine use of laboratory tests was also on its way 
to clinical practice. The renowned Sir William Osler (1849-1919) whose humanistic 
and humble spirit is still honoured, described the hospital ward laboratory “as essential 
to the proper equipment of the hospitals as the interns. They are to the physician just as 
the knife and scalpel are to the surgeon” (Porter 1997:347). 
Medicine divided about its future
According to Porter, medicine was becoming “deeply divided about its future” in the 
late 19th Century. One of the important general ideas of the 19th Century was division 
of labour. In clinical practice up to this time, specialised medical procedures such as 
phlebotomy and surgery had been left to workers with a lower rank. The ideal clinician 
had been the generalist, in accordance with the Hippocratic notion that disease was 
best regarded as a constitutional phenomenon, not a local matter. But now, the gen-
eral idea of medical specialisation achieved increasing adherence. Hospital medicine 
was to an increasing extent to become organised according to affected body parts and 
local sites of disease. Specialisation however did encounter scepticism. In 1900, for 
instance, the journal The General Practitioner stated about medical specialists that 
their minds are narrowed, judgement biased and unbalanced by disproportionate 
knowledge of one subject. 
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It was also stated that the patient would suffer because the specialist “knows nothing 
of the constitutional idiosyncrasies of the individual, which are essential to diagnosis 
and treatment” (Porter 1997:388). 
Outside the hospitals, the Hippocratian relationship between physician and patient, 
based on care, courtesy and compassion still stayed alive and relatively well. Private 
medical practice was however market-driven and based on fee-for service. An increas-
ing gap was now developing between the idea of medical practice as something inde-
pendent and personalised, and the idea of organised and coordinated state medicine 
and public health regulation, where doctors would be seen as saviours of humanity or 
as ‘medical police,’ depending on the context. 
Interestingly enough, the emergence of increasing medical specialisation was paral-
leled by the emergence of various, new holistic healing movements who rejected the 
ethos of orthodox reductionist medicine.160 Porter reflects on this time period: “Al-
ternative medicine’s preoccupations highlight the ambiguities in nineteenth-century 
medicine. Its new scientific and professional movement generated counter-trends (…) 
While people wanted their diseases to be cured, they were also seeking far more from 
medicine: explanations of their troubles, a sense of wholeness, a key to the meaning of 
life” (Porter 1997:396). 
Reflection 4: At this point, medical knowledge is soon ready to unchain its therapeuti-
cal powers. There is now only one major chapter missing before the Cartesian mecha-
nist medical knowledge base became comprehensive enough to lay out the premises 
for the therapeutic revolution, an epoch which started in the late 1930s and lasted 
into the 1980s, as outlined in James le Fanu’s book The rise and fall of modern medi-
cine (1999). The missing chapter began as French chemist and microbiologist Louis 
Pasteur confirmed the germ theory of infection in 1878. In a short time, isolation of 
different bacteria and development of various vaccines followed. The scientific area 
of bacteriology immediately came to strengthen the notion that specific causal agents 
lead to specific disease entities. The rational strategy to prevention and treatment of 
disease would thereby be to look for specific biomedical interventions that would re-
move or destroy the causal agent.161
So where do we go from here?
As a discipline, medicine needs to stand on two feet; one biomedical leg and one hu-
manistic leg (Hetlevik 2004), see figure 12.2. In the four centuries since Descartes, the 
scientific medical community has however been exercising the biomedical leg to an ever 
increasing extent, at the expense of the humanistic leg. Medicine is thereby – as I see it, 
and as has been outlined in all papers of this thesis – about to lose its theoretical balance 
as a scientific approach to human disease, suffering and healing (see figure 12.2).
160 A variety of healing movements were established throughout the 1800s. The founder of homeopathy, Hah-
neman, first formulated his methodological principles in Handbook of rational healing in Leipzig in 1810. 
Hydrotherapy (water cure) became increasingly popular throughout Europe in the mid 1800s. Chiropractics 
were established in 1895, etc.
161 Examples of cures (or prevention) for specific causal agents: Pasteur began developing vaccines in 1879. 
The bacteriostatic sulfa drugs were developed in the 1930s. Penicillin was introduced in the clinical setting 
in 1941.
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In 1989, and with reference to Thomas Kuhn’s model, Ian McWhinney described the 
contemporary biomedical model in terms of the Old paradigm (as referred in chapter 
2.2.4). It is in fact quite striking how little the medical model has changed since the 
times of Louis Pasteur: 
Patients suffer from diseases which can be categorised in the same way as other 
natural phenomena. A disease can be viewed independently from the person who is 
suffering from it and from his or her social context. Mental and physical diseases 
can be considered separately, with provision for a group of psychosomatic diseases 
in which mind appears to act on the body. Each disease has a specific causal agent 
and it is a major objective of research to discover them. Given a certain level of 
host resistance, the occurrence of disease can be explained as a result of exposure 
to a pathogenic agent. The physician’s main task is to diagnose the patient’s dis-
ease and to prescribe a specific remedy aimed at resolving the cause or relieving 
the symptoms. (...) The physician is usually a detached observer and the patient a 
passive recipient in this process (McWhinney 1989:46).
As McWhinney points out himself, this model provides a good fit with certain cat-
egories of diseases, and especially those that dominated medical practice in the 19th 
Century, such as infectious diseases and nutritional deficiencies. But in other settings, 
and very notably in contemporary primary care, the deficiencies of the Old scientific 
paradigm are hard to ignore (McWhinney 1989). And McWhinney was bold enough 
already in 1989 to propose a New Paradigm, where: 
Disease is not separated from the person, or the person from his or her environ-
ment. Conventional disease categories are still used as a frame of reference, but 
always in context. All illnesses have both mental and physical components. All 
have multiple causes, although it may be useful to focus therapy on a single causal 
chain. Causation acts not only in a linear but also in a reciprocal function. The 
relationship between doctor and patient has a profound effect on the illness and its 
course (McWhinney 1989:56). 
Final reflection: Towards a medical renaissance? 
What McWhinney is indirectly suggesting with his new paradigm, is that Hippocrates´ 
approach to ‘the vulnerable human condition’ was basically a scientifically sound one. 
And, although Hippocrates´ way of thinking about nature might be considered as 
‘primitive biomedicine’, his overall ‘way of knowing’ about disease, suffering and 
healing was qualitatively different and in some respects more advanced than ours. As 
Heidegger suggested in The question concerning technology (see 2.4.2), we might 
profit from looking better into ancient Greek philosophy. What we need, is perhaps a 
medical renaissance?162
162 Interestingly, the 12th regional European conference for the world association of family doctors (WON-
CA) which is to be held in Florence (the centrum of the Italian renaissance around 1500) in 2006, has the 
slogan Towards medical renaissance. Bridging the gap between biology and the humanities. (www.won-
caeurope2006.org/home/index.htm). 
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Figure	12.2
a: Hippocratic medicine was mainly a humanistic discipline (H) influenced by a new-
born interest for what we today consider as the natural sciences (B). 
b: In contemporary medicine, the B leg may have become too long, seen in comparison 
to its H counterpart, and perhaps also if seen in relation to the practical possibilities and 
resources (marked with a frame). 
c: A better balance between H and B is needed for medicine to progress in a sustainable 
and responsible fashion, within reasonable limits of resource use (the figure is adopted 
from Hetlevik 2004).
END
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12.3	APPENDIX.	Ultrasound	 screening	 for	Down	 syndrome:	 a	 brief	 historical	
overview
Those planning a pregnancy and the professionals who help them all need to en-
sure that relevant risks are addressed using evidence-based methods 
     – Sandy Raeburn, BMJ 2000
Human procreation is deeply embedded in a social, political and cultural context (Oak-
ley 1993; Parens and Asch 2000; Solberg 2003). The use of medical technology in the 
area of obstetrics and fetal medicine will therefore always be intertwined with funda-
mental aspects of human existence and experience. Prenatal testing in general, and 
ultrasound screening of pregnancy in particular, have been debated topics in society at 
large, involving academics far beyond medicine. Few health care workers outside the 
narrow medical expert communities have insight into the complicated issue of prenatal 
screening and diagnostic tests. In fact, most medical doctors appear quite reluctant to 
participate in the debate on prenatal testing (Klein 1998; Getz 2001). In connection 
with the preparation of Paper I in this thesis, I explored the technicalities and ethical 
dilemmas related to prenatal testing to considerable depth (Getz 2002). The present 
chapter contains background information with relevance to Paper I of this thesis. 
The history of ultrasonography in obstetrics dates back to Glasgow in the 1950s where 
ultrasound was being intensively used in relation to heavy engineering projects. By the 
late 1970s, ultrasound had become a common method of fetal surveillance in many 
countries. The first controlled scientific study of obstetric ultrasound was however not 
published until 1980, which was the year when it was suggested that ultrasound should 
become an integrated part of routine antenatal care on an international basis (Oakley 
1986). 
Since the second half of the 1980s, an ultrasound examination has been routinely of-
fered to all pregnant women in second trimester of pregnancy (week 17-20) in many 
Western countries. Whilst ultrasound examination has become an indispensable tool 
in situations where clinical problems arise or are anticipated, the benefit of ultrasound 
screening remained uncertain and subject to much controversy, involving also the 
Norwegian expert community (Eik-Nes et al. 2000).163 Most expectant parents have 
however accepted, and to an increasing extent asked for, ultrasound examinations for 
purposes such as dating the pregnancy, receiving general reassurance, and ‘seeing’ 
the baby (see references in Paper I). Ultrasound is generally considered to be a bio-
logically safe procedure, but a potential for subtle harmful effects cannot be definitely 
excluded (Westin and Bakketeig 2003).
The scope and aims of prenatal ultrasound screening have undergone significant 
changes since it was introduced in the 1980s. The test originally aimed at reducing 
163 In 1995, this was evident at the Norwegian consensus conference on the use of ultrasound in pregnancy 
in 1995. See: Bruk av ultralyd i svangerskapet. Konsensuskonferanse. Rapport Nr 9 fra Komiteen for me-
disinsk teknologivurdering. Norges forskningsråd: Oslo, 1995. (Proceedings from the Norwegian consensus 
conference on use of ultrasound in pregnancy, 1995).
270
obstetric risk, i.e. enhancing medical safety for mother and child, by correcting ges-
tational age, locating the placenta and diagnosing twin pregnancies. As imaging tech-
nology developed, diagnosis of visible, anatomical abnormalities became possible. 
Diagnoses of major anomalies such as a missing brain have been relatively precise 
from the start. Clinical uncertainty and counselling dilemmas have however arisen in 
relation to more subtle findings. This problem was initially high-lighted in a small case 
series published in Lancet in 1985 (Griffiths 1985, see Paper I). As a result of clinical 
training and increasing expertise, some uncertainties would gradually be resolved, but 
then new uncertainties arose instead. In a 1987 Lancet debate paper, an experienced 
ultrasound examiner stated (Furness 1987, see paper I):  
Rapid technological advance means that each machine update shows the observer 
features never recognised before, necessitating a reappraisal of the range of nor-
mal at each stage of pregnancy. (…) It also means that ultrasound publications lag 
substantially behind current knowledge and practice, and exchange of information 
tends to be anecdotal. 
From around 1990, there was a rapidly increasing medical interest in identifying fe-
tuses at increased risk for chromosomal aberrations, particularly Down syndrome, by 
ultrasound in the second trimester of pregnancy. Most fetuses with Down syndrome 
show no distinct anatomical anomalies, but they often exhibit subtle features in the 
grey zone between the ‘normal’ and the ‘pathological’. Attempts to “pin-point” subtle 
anatomical indicators of an increased risk for Down syndrome had started in the 1980s, 
but after 1990 they became more systematic and widespread (see Paper I). The minor 
anatomical changes were now ever more often referred to as soft markers in the scien-
tific literature (illustrations of two soft markers can be found in Paper I).
The ethical dimensions of ultrasound screening in pregnancy are complex. In terms of 
informed consent, the different tests that together constitute a state-of-the-art routine 
prenatal ultrasound examination come as an ‘all-or-none’ package. The tests however 
have fundamentally different motives and moral implications. Few people are likely to 
reject an examination which promises to increase safety for mother and child-to-be. It 
also appears that many expectant parents prefer to be informed about life threatening 
or lethal anomalies in the fetus. Screening for disabling but not lethal chromosomal 
aberrations for which there is no medical ‘treatment’ other than the option to terminate 
the pregnancy is a more demanding issue to consider - both technically and ethically. 
As outlined in Paper I, expectant parents have reported that information about an in-
creased risk for Down syndrome in their child-to-be can be emotionally overwhelming 
(Baillie 2000, see Paper I). The monitor screen will however reveal information related 
to all three agendas simultaneously. If your want to ‘see’ your baby, you also consent 
to the rest. 
In April 1997, a British professor of obstetrics wrote an editorial to the BMJ warn-
ing that he believed detection of ultrasonographic soft markers of fetal chromosomal 
defects could do more harm than good in routine clinical practice (Whittle 1997, see 
Paper I). Reading this editorial was among the events that triggered my personal inter-
est for the subject. Paper I in this thesis documents the chronological development of 
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and analyses the impact of medical activity related to the soft markers, from its begin-
ning in the mid 1980s till its culmination in the late 1990s. The manuscript was first 
submitted to Social Science and Medicine in the fall of year 2000. It concluded that 
during the last decade, the interest in soft markers for fetal chromosomal aberrations 
appeared to have caused considerable harm -- in the form of parental distress and the 
loss of countless wanted, healthy children-to-be in the wake of invasive diagnostic 
testing performed to resolve uncertainty generated by premature application of medi-
cal technology in a routine setting. The four anonymous reviewers, all described to 
us authors as experts in prenatal diagnosis, were not convinced that our analysis was 
valid. At this critical moment, a meta-analysis of the clinical-epidemiological aspects 
of the soft markers was published in the Journal of the American Medical Association 
(JAMA). On the basis of mathematical calculations, the authors presented the same 
conclusion as we did. 
Many of the world’s top experts in prenatal ultrasound are situated in Britain. In the 
UK, screening for anatomical soft markers by second trimester ultrasound was rapidly 
discouraged after the publication of the meta-analysis in JAMA (Reported by the West 
Midlands perinatal institute 2002). In the more complex healthcare environment of the 
USA, counselling dilemmas related to second trimester soft markers were still a hot 
topic at an expert meeting in 2004 which was attended by a correspondent from the 
JAMA. The correspondent asked one of the world’s most renowned experts in the field 
of soft markers (Hampton 2004): 
“But physicians cannot help but see these markers during an ultrasound. So what 
should they tell the parents?”
“By all means, provide information”, says [expert epidemiologists name]. “It’s not 
clear to me though, what information you’re going to provide.” 
In 1986, professor in sociology Ann Oakley summed up an investigation of the history 
of ultrasonography in obstetrics (see chapter 2.4.6) as follows: “I have drawn out the 
historical lesson that there is not nearly enough scientific evaluation of techniques that 
enter clinical practice” (Oakley 1986). This was at the start of the period that was to be 
characterised by “the rise and fall” of second trimester soft markers. 
What is the current state of affairs related to Down syndrome screening by ultrasound 
when this thesis goes to print? Screening is more widespread than ever, but the context 
has changed: During the 1990s, as a direct spin-off effect of the trial and error efforts to 
find useful soft markers in the context of second trimester, British researchers discov-
ered that one of the soft markers that did not work well in the second trimester appeared 
useful in the first trimester of pregnancy. The foundation for a screening test called ‘the 
11-14 week scan’ was thereby laid. And as opposed to second trimester ultrasound 
screening, this early ultrasound screening has been explicitly developed and promoted 
as a screening test for Down syndrome. The main parameter that is measured is called 
nuchal translucency (NT), the maximum thickness of the subcutaneous space between 
the skin and the soft tissues overlying the fetal cervical spine (see illustration in paper 
I). Thickened NT is a relatively sensitive and specific indicator of chromosomal aber-
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rations, but it may also be indicative of other kinds of fetal abnormality such as heart 
defects. The NT-screening test can be further enhanced if ultrasound measurements 
are combined with the results of maternal serum tests (so-called combined screening). 
Women who are test positive (the estimated risk for Down syndrome being higher than 
1:300) are offered invasive diagnostic testing. Invasive testing involves about 1% risk 
for losing the pregnancy. 
A recent multi-centre study of first trimester combined screening for trisomy 21 in the 
United Kingdom involved almost 76 000 pregnancies. The overall detection rate for 
Down syndrome was 90%, with a false-positive rate of 5% (Nicolaides et al 2005). 
Several fetal medicine experts and statisticians are currently involved in theoretical 
modelling of more complex Down syndrome screening programmes with the aim to 
increase the precision of the technology further (Cicero 2003, Nicolaides 2005). 
The medical community has now succeeded in developing a technology that can pre-
vent nine out of ten people with Down syndrome from being born. The risk of losing 
an unaffected pregnancy due to invasive testing is much lower in the context of early 
ultrasound screening than it used to be in the context of amniocentesis based on ma-
ternal age (Getz 2002). This technically safer approach however implies that every 
pregnancy, irrespective of maternal age or previous birth history, must be regarded as 
at risk until screening has been performed. 
Early ultrasound screening is currently being implemented in many countries. In 
2003, the National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE) stated the it is an aim to 
offer combined screening to all pregnant women in the UK by the year 2007 (NHS 
guidelines, issued Oct 6th 2003). In Norway where the policy in relation to prenatal 
diagnosis has been conservative, at least by comparison with the other Nordic coun-
tries and the UK (Getz 2002), the prospect of systematic early ultrasound screening 
has periodically lead to considerable debate, mostly in the media (Solberg 2003). In 
Iceland, early ultrasound examinations are increasingly common, but a formal screen-
ing programme has not been implemented. Opinion leaders in the primary health care 
system have been reluctant to take part in screening ever since the idea was launched 
in 2000. The fetal medicine expert community has twice (last time in May 2005) pre-
sented almost complete drafts of public screening information material to the Icelandic 
experts of primary health care. The drafts have been rejected on the ground that they 
have focused almost exclusively on pathological descriptions and characteristics of 
the medical tests in question, whilst avoiding to address the moral questions which are 
bound to arise in relation to a technology which is developed with the specific aim to 
sort out lives that are not, by medical standards, considered as worthy of living.
The first lawsuit has recently been filed in Denmark against an ultrasound examiner 
after the ‘wrongful’ birth of a child with Down syndrome after early ultrasound screen-
ing.164 A formal screening programme had then existed in the country for about a year. 
So, once the technology which aims to prevent the birth of children with Down syn-
drome has reached a certain level of sophistication, a next ‘generation’ of technology-
164 see www.politiken.dk/VisArtikel.iasp?PageID=401892.
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related moral dilemmas emerges: people who have come to realise that we live in a risk 
society (Beck 1992), and have learnt to take the necessary precautions as responsible 
citizens, are now likely to look at the face of a young child with Down syndrome and 
wonder who is to blame (Marteau and Drake 1995). Was it the mother who did not take 
the test, or was it medical technology that failed? 
END
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12.4	APPENDIX.	Cardiovascular	disease	prevention	in	clinical	practice:	histori-
cal	time-line
As I worked with papers II, IV and V in this thesis, I decided I ought to get a better 
overview of the historical origins of our contemporary way of handling cardiovascular 
disease prevention. I took notes about the subject, and this resulted in a historical time-
line. The list contains events and milestones that I see as important and interesting, 
directly or indirectly, in relation to theory, research and practice in the area of CVD 
prevention. I particularly emphasise the management of hypertension, elevated choles-
terol, and the paradigm of “combined cardiovascular disease risk estimations.” I also 
take notice of emerging psycho-social risk factors that are not (as yet) included in the 
contemporary “EBM” approach to CVD. 
I have not penetrated discussions and controversies concerning exactly what drugs to 
use to achieve treatment targets regarding the risks factors, except that I briefly men-
tion the most recent debate regarding the use of thiazides and beta blockers, versus 
newer and more expensive drugs. 
The topic of cardiovascular disease prevention and its history is a vast subject. I delib-
erately focus on some general trends, from a relative distance and a certain angle. This 
time line should be considered as a draft, and not as a final, authoritative document. 
The timeline may contain errors, as well as omissions of relevant milestones that I am 
simply not aware of. 
SELECTED HISTORICAL EVENTS AND TRENDS 
1827: Recognition that many patients with renal disease have diffuse vascular disease, 
kidney disease, and cardiac hypertrophy (the study does not address blood pressure). 
Ref: Bright R. Cases and observations illustrative of renal disease accompanied with the 
secretion of albuminous urine. Guy’s Hos Rep 1836;1:338-400, see Ventura et al. 2001. 
1896: Riva-Rocci invents the sphygmomanometer (the device for blood pressure 
measurement, in principle as we know it today), enabling easy and non-invasive mea-
surement of blood pressure.
1911-13: Early	studies	describing	cases	of	hypertension. 
Ref: Allbutt TC. An address on arteriosclerosis of the kidneys. BMJ 1911;1:853-922, 
Janeway TC. Nephritic hypertension: clinical and experimental studies. Am J Med Sci 
1913;145:625-35, both referred in Ventura et al. 2001.
1912: Measurement of blood pressure becomes standard procedure at admittance to 
the Massachusetts General Hospital in the USA (See Porter 1997: 344).
1914: German researchers describe the features of “red”	hypertension (essential hy-
pertension with good prognosis) as opposed to “pale”	hypertension (with chronic 
nephritis, retinal damage and a poor prognosis). 
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Ref: Volhard F Fahr T. Die Brightsche Nierenkrankheit: Klinik, Pathologie und Atlas. 
Berlin: Julius Springer, 1914. See Ventura et al. 2001.
1925: The publication of the first English case	report	of	“sudden	death	after	a	heart	
attack	with	severe	crushing	chest	pain.” Source: James Le Fanu’s book The rise and 
fall of modern medicine (1999:323). As noted in relation to the clinical topic of CVD 
in the theoretical introduction to this thesis, we are here at the early beginning of what 
has been called “a modern epidemic of CVD”, see figures in chapter 3.2.
1928: The term	“malignant	hypertension”	appears	 in	 the	English	 literature, in 
connection with a case series including 14 patients who survived 1-44 months. 
Ref: Keith NM et al. The syndrome of malignant hypertension. Arch Int Med 1928;41: 
141-8, see Ventura et al. 2001. 
1930s and 1940s: Period of authoritative recommendation that “…hypertension might 
be an important compensatory mechanism, which we should not tamper with even if 
we know how to control it.” 
Example: White PD. Hypertensive heart disease. In: Hypotension in heart disease. NY: 
Macmillian 1932, p 391-409, see reference list in Ventura et al. 2001. 
1934: Philosopher of science Karl Popper publishes the book Logik der Forschung 
(English: Logic of scientific discovery, 1959 – it is still a classic). Popper	advocated	
falsifiability as the criterion of demarcation for science. The tradition for formula-
tion, testing, and rejection of null hypotheses now begins to develop.
1940s and 50s: “Desperate”	treatment	regimens	for	accelerated/malignant	hyper-
tension. Severe blood pressure elevation associated with subjective symptoms and 
rapid, widespread organ damage (generally with a fatal outcome) is treated with drastic 
diets, major surgery, pyrogens and various drugs. All these heroic regimens have major 
side effects. 
A good review paper on the topic of hypertension treatment in these days is: Ventura 
HO, Mehra MR, Messerli FH. Desperate diseases, desperate measures: tackling malig-
nant hypertension in the 1950s. Am Heart J. 2001 Aug;142(2):197-203.
1940s: US president Franklin	Delano	Roosevelt	(1882-1945)	had	progressing	hy-
pertension from around 1937. He developed left ventricular hypertrophy, congestive 
heart failure, multiple lacunar infarcts, renal failure, and died of a cerebral haemorrhage 
aged 63. Roosevelt was “grossly fatigued… his colour very poor” when attending the 
Yalta conference in February 1945, only eight weeks before he died. Roosevelt’s phy-
sician, Dr. Howard Bruenn, has written that although FDR suffered from high blood 
pressure, there was no evidence that his health impaired his judgment at Yalta. Not ev-
erybody believes that Roosevelts judgement was intact, however (le Fanu 1999:130).
1948: The	Framingham	heart	study	is	established 
The Framingham study included about 5000 individuals aged 30-74 years from the 
small town Framingham outside Boston, USA. The Framingham Offspring Study 
(1971) later came to succeed the original cohort study. A third cohort was included in 
276
2002. The epidemiological quality of the original Framingham study has been criti-
cised for various reasons; a topic I will not go into here. The Framingham heart study 
has resulted in more than 1200 scientific papers. A timeline of Framingham “mile-
stones” can be found at: 
www.nhlbi.nih.gov/about/framingham/timeline.htm.
1950: The ability of Aspirin (synthesized in 1897) to prevent blood clotting is noted by 
a U.S. family physician named Lawrence Craven. He suggests that aspirin might there-
fore reduce the risk of coronary thrombosis, and publishes his hypothesis (in Annals of 
Western Medicine and Surgery 1950;4:95-9, see also le Fanu 1999 who describes this 
story). Nothing happens in the wake of this publication, however. See next milestone 
on “aspirin” in 1971.
1950s and 60s: The famous “Platt	versus	Pickering”	debate	on	the	nature	of	hy-
pertension.	Debate issue: is hypertension a distinct disease entity (ad held by Platt), or 
are people with hypertension simply located on the tail of the blood pressure normal 
distribution curve (as maintained by Pickering). 
Ref: Swales JD. Platt versus Pickering. An Episode in Recent Medical History. Lon-
don: The Keynes Press, 1985. 
1950: Two	general	milestones	in	epidemiology	announce	a	methodologcial	‘para-
digm	shift’:	
1) the randomised controlled drug trial (treatment of tuberculosis, BMJ 1950;Nov 
11:1074-85), and 
2) epidemiological method enabling identification of disease risk factors (the docu-
mentation that smoking causes lung cancer in BMJ 1950;Sept 30: 740-9). 
For discussions of the enormous implications of these methodological advances, see le 
Fanu (1999) and Doll R: Sir Austin Bradford Hill and the progress of medical science. 
BMJ 1992;305:1521-6.
1951-2: US Pentagon-associated pathologists perform autopsies	on	US	soldiers who 
fall in the Korean war and discover that extensive atherosclerotic disease can frequently 
be present in healthy men from the age of 20 – this was until now an unknown fact.
1955: Open	heart	surgery is performed for the first time (this is among the 12 mile-
stones in le Fanu’s (1999) list of medical triumphs in the post-war era).
1955: US	President	Dwight	D.	Eisenhower	(1890-1969)	has	a	“billion-dollar	heart	
attack” whilst playing golf. He was later the same day treated by his personal physi-
cian in his home with amyl nitrate to sniff, and sequentially injected papavarine and 
morphine. The president then fell asleep, but as he had not recovered when he awak-
ened a few hours later, an electrocardiograph was brought to his house. An anterolat-
eral myocardial infarction was confirmed. Eisenhower was then admitted to an army 
hospital, 24 hours after the attack. There, he dwelled in an oxygen tent and received 
heparin i.v. The news of the infarction had a dramatic effect on the country’s financial 
market; the Dow Jones dropped by 6%, a decline that had not been seen since 1929. 
One of USA’s most famous cardiologists attended Eisenhower as a consultant, and a 
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month later he summed up current knowledge regarding risk of myocardial infarctions. 
Many of the risk factors are those we know today, but tobacco use was mentioned as 
something quite unimportant, although in need of further appraisal. (Eisenhower was 
a heavy smoker.) Eisenhower recovered well from his infarction and was back playing 
golf five months later, but did endure a period of anxiety and depression after the event. 
He was re-elected in 1956, then suffered a minor stroke, but completed his second term 
as a president. In 1965, he had another serious MI and retired from public affairs. From 
his first infarction in 1955 until his death at the age of 78, Eisenhower reportedly had 
at least seven MIs and several cardiac arrests. He was one of the first patients to profit 
from the defibrillator, introduced in 1962. Ref: Messerli F et al. Eisenhower’s billion-
dollar heart attack – 50 years later. N Engl J Med 2005;353:1205-7.
1958-61: Open studies document effectiveness	of	treatment	of	malignant	hyperten-
sion.	
1958: Thiazide	antihypertensive	diuretic	drugs	are	introduced. This is a first step 
towards introducing generally safe and tolerable antihypertensive drugs. 
Ref: Freis ED et al. JAMA 1958;166:137-40. 
1960: Smoking	is	found	to	increase	the	risk	of	heart	disease in the context of the 
Framingham heart study.
1960: The formal “coronary care unit” is introduced in hospitals.
1960-1: Hypertension, elevated cholesterol and smoking are defined as the main 
risk	factors	for	ischemic	heart	disease	in	the	Framingham	heart	study.
1960s: Mortality from stroke starts to decline in Norway in the 1950s both for men 
and women aged 55-64 years, and one decade later for men and women aged 65-74 
years; i.e. before hypertension treatment is introduced on a large scale in the health 
care system. 
Ref: Ellekjær H. Epidemiological studies of stroke in a Norwegian population. Inci-
dence, risk factors and prognosis. Dissertation. Trondheim: Tapir, 2000.
1962: A WHO Technical Report Series (No 231) draws attention to the importance of 
controlling arterial hypertension in relation to prevention of ischemic heart disease
1962: The direct current-defibrillator is introduced.
1962: Philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn publishes his book On the Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn 1962), introducing the notions “scientific paradigm”, 
“normal science,” “anomalies” and “paradigm shifts.” This work is briefly outlined in 
Appendix 2.
1964: The first controlled clinical drug trial of non-malignant essential hyperten-
sion	 shows	 that	 treatment	prevents	 strokes. The trial included 61 patients under 
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the age of 60.165 Inclusion criteria were a sustained DBP ≥110 mmHg in an otherwise 
asymptomatic individual with no objective signs of organ damage. This trial appears 
on le Fanu’s (1999) milestone list under the title “The triumph of prevention – the case 
of strokes”. The idea of recommending potentially life-long medical intervention to in-
dividuals who were free from both subjective symptoms and objective signs of organs 
damage when therapy is instituted, motivated by the presence of what could be consid-
ered a disease risk factor only, represents something completely new in medicine. 
Original reference: Hamilton M, Thomson EN. The role of blood pressure control in 
preventing complications of hypertension. The Lancet 1964;Vol I, pp. 235-9.
See also: Beevers DG. The 40th anniversary of the publication in 1964 of the first trial 
of the treatment of uncomplicated, severe hypertension by Hamilton, Thompson and 
Wisniewski. J of Human Hypertension 2004;18:831-833.
1965: Sir Austin Bradford-Hill presents a seminal paper on criteria	for	causality,	as	
viewed	 in	 an	 epidemiological	 context. The criteria were: Strength of association; 
Consistency of association; Specificity of association; Temporality – i.e. exposure 
must precede outcome; Biological gradient; Biological plausibility and Coherence 
with other facts; and – if relevant – Possible to confirm by Experimentation; Analogy 
(i.e. recognition of resembling patterns, such as the educated guess that a new birth 
defect may be caused by exposure to some drug effect in utero). 
Ref: Bradford-Hill A. The environment and disease: Association or causation? Proc R 
Soc Med 1965;58:295-300.
1967: The first Whitehall study is established, including about 18 000 men in the 
UK Civil service. This study came to document that men in the lowest employment 
grades were much more likely to die prematurely than men in the highest grades. The 
Whitehall II study was subsequently set up in 1985 to determine what underlies this 
social gradient in death and disease, and to include women. The Whitehall studies are 
mentioned in the theoretical introduction to this thesis, and some of the research find-
ings will be chronologically listed below.
1967 & 1970: “The	veteran	studies”	provide	further	evidence	that	treatment	of	
hypertension	decreases	CVD	morbidity	and	mortality.	
References: Veterans Administration Cooperation Study Group on Antihypertensive 
agents. Effect of treatment on morbidity in hypertension. 
I. Results in patients with diastolic blood pressure averaging 115-129 mm Hg. JAMA 
1967; 202:1028-34. 
II. Results in patients with mild-moderate hypertension, i.e. diastolic blood pressure 
averaging 90 through 114 mm Hg. JAMA 1970;213:1143-52. 
165 The study recruited one group who received drug treatment (20 females and 10 males), and a control 
group who received no medical intervention (19 females and 12 males). Allocation to the groups was not 
strictly randomised. The nature and intensity of the drug intervention varied considerably among the treated 
subjects. Details are not presented in the paper; it is however stated that a higher proportion of males than 
females achieved ‘good’ blood pressure control, and that this was potentially due to “prejudice in favour of 
therapy in the male”. A total of five cardiovascular disease complications (events) occurred in the treatment 
arm - all of them in female subjects. 16 events occurred in the control arm. The authors´ main conclusion 
was: “It is recommend that males under the age of 60 and with severe sustained hypertension require treat-
ment on this account even though the disorder is symptomless and uncomplicated.”
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The 1960s: Beta-blocker	drugs	are	introduced. Treatment of asymptomatic individ-
uals with hypertension could thereby be regarded an even more realistic possibility.
1970s: A decrease	in	the	epidemic	of	ischemic	heart	disease	begins in the Western 
world, see the figures in chapter 3.2. 
1971: British biochemist (and later Nobel Prize laureate) John Vane documents the 
biochemical pathway underlying aspirin’s effects, by inhibiting prostaglandin synthe-
sis in blood platelets. Reference: Nature: New Biology 1971;231:230-5. (see le Fanu 
1999:469).
1969-1975: Harvard pathologist Mc Cully and co-workers. launch “The homocysteine 
theory of arteriosclerosis,” see for instance Atherosclerosis 1975 Sep-Oct;22(2):215-
27. The hypothesis was first rejected, and Mc Cully lost his position at Harvard, unable 
to find another academic position. It has been argued that the resistance against the 
homocysteine theory was due to its perceived conflict with the cholesterol theory of 
heart disease (see Podell RN Medical Hypothesis 2003;61:340-5). 
1976: Ivan Illich publishes his book “Medical nemesis. Limits to medicine” (Illich 
1976). Here, he introduces the concept of medically induced harm, iatrogenesis, on 
three levels: clinical, social, and cultural iatrogenesis (further described in chapter 
2.3.4).
1976: An increased risk for heart disease after female menopause is documented in the 
Framingham heart study. 
1977: The	First	U.S.	Joint	National	Committee	(JNC)	Reports	on	blood	pressure	
are	issued. Recommendation: Treat if BP remains > 160/95, in particular in people 
under 50 years.
1978: Psychosocial	 factors	 are	 found	 to	 affect	 heart	 disease in the Framingham 
study
1978: WHO (Technical Report Series, 628, written by the WHO expert committee on 
hypertension) defines “Normal BP” ≤140/90, “Borderline BP” = 140-160/90-95, and 
“Hypertension” as BP ≥160/95.
1970s: Trials of primary and secondary prevention of ischemic heart disease using the 
cholesterol lowering drugs clofibrate, nicotinic acid, gemfibrozil, leading to up to 20% 
reduction in coronary heart disease events, but no reduction in mortality.
1978: Haynes, Sackett et al. publish a paper where they demonstrate that “Blood pres-
sure labelling” increases absenteeism from work. Ref: Haynes RB, Sackett DL, Taylor 
DW, Gibson ES, Johnson AL. Increased absenteeism from work after detection and 
labelling of hypertensive patients. N Engl J Med. 1978;299:741-4.
1979: Stott and Davis present their seminal paper on “The exceptional potential in 
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each primary care consultation”, introducing ‘opportunistic health promotion’ as part 
of the good standard consultation (point of departure for Paper III in this thesis).
From the 1970s into the 1990s: Several studies find associations between so-called 
“Type A” personality behaviour, depression and anxiety, psychosocial work character-
istics, social network and social support and coronary heart disease. See an overview 
of this work in a review paper by Hemingway H, Marmot M. Evidence based cardiol-
ogy: psychosocial factors in the aetiology and prognosis of coronary heart disease. 
Systematic review of prospective cohort studies. BMJ 1999;318:1460-7.
1950-70s: Widespread public campaigns	with	 the	message	 that	 “the	Western	diet	
with	its	high	proportion	of	saturated	(animal)	fat	is	highly	pathogenetic.” This par-
ticular epoch is reviewed in a critical 1977 paper in the The New England Journal of 
Medicine titled “Diet-Heart: End of en era” (Mann GV. NEJM 1977; Sept 22: 644-50). 
The era began in the 1950s after a method for characterising the blood lipoproteins 
had been invented. One of the main researchers in this area was Angel Keys who 
published extensively and used data from World Health tabulations to conclude that 
in six countries, experience with coronary heart disease was correlated with available 
food fat. In the NEJM, Mann writes: “In a few years, some combination of urgent need 
of health agencies, oil-food companies and ambitious scientists had transformed the 
fragile [diet-heart] hypothesis into a dogma (…) Physicians were overwhelmed by this 
assault. (…) The diet-heart-propaganda was escalated by a succession of recommenda-
tions from the American heart Association. (…) To be a dissenter was to be unfunded 
because the peer-review system rewards conformity and excludes criticism.” The dis-
putes surrounding the “high fat Western diet” theory are discussed in le Fanu’s book 
(1999) and also in le Fanu J. The case of the missing data. BMJ 2002;325:1490-3.
1982-3: Two	famous	lifestyle	intervention	randomised	controlled	trials:	
–	 the	“MrFit” (Multiple Risk Factor intervention) trial in USA - sponsored by the 
National Heart, Lung and Blood institute and recruiting 12.866 men at high risk (see 
JAMA 1982;248:1465-77), and 
–	“WHO	multi-factorial	trial” (conducted in Europe and recruiting 49.871 men (see 
Eur Heart J 1983;4:141-7). 
Both studies showed very limited if any benefit in terms of effect on hard endpoints 
of intensive intervention involving antihypertensive medication, life style advice with 
lipid-lowering diet and non-smoking advice. 
1984: The LRC (Lipid Research Council) trial. The cholesterol lowering drug cho-
lestyramine is here shown to reduce deaths from heart disease in middle-aged men 
with cholesterol >6,9mmol/l or LDL >5,9 mmol/l. (Ref: The Lipid Research Clinics 
Coronary Primary Prevention (LRC-CPPT) Trial. JAMA 1984;251:351-64, and 365-
74). Some effect was found on CVD endpoints, but no effect was documented on total 
mortality. An insignificant increase was found in deaths from violent causes in the 
intervention group. Cholestyramine is a bile acid reuptake inhibitor that increases the 
excretion of bile acids in the faeces. Treatment appeared to be safe but associated with 
considerable gastrointestinal side effects. The LRC trial was discussed in a Lancet 
editorial (Lancet, Feb 11th 1984) titled “Is reduction of blood cholesterol effective?” It 
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concludes that the sum of evidence that reducing cholesterol with medication reduces 
heart disease in people with high risk is now convincing, and that “Despite the scientif-
ic uncertainties of extrapolation, the benefits that emerged for those at highest risk give 
further support for the case for cholesterol reduction in the population as a whole”. 
Massive campaigns to “know your cholesterol number” and promotion of drug treat-
ment to lower cholesterol start in the wake of this trial, particularly in the USA.
1980s: Several studies indicate that pharmacological treatment of moderate and mild 
hypertension can reduce morbidity from CVD. One such study was the 1985 MRC 
(Medical Research Council) trial of treatment of mild hypertension (Br Med J (Clin 
Res Ed) 1985 Jul 13;29197-104). It was the largest study on blood pressure interven-
tion ever done. It documented that treatment of mild hypertension by thiazide or beta-
blockers reduced stroke rates by 46% if measured as relative risk reduction (absolute 
risk was reduced from 2,6 to 1,4 per 1000 patient years). Treatment did not signifi-
cantly affect overall rates of coronary events, and mortality from all causes was not 
affected. There were in total 248 deaths in the treated group and 253 in the placebo 
group (rates 5.8 and 5.9 per 1000 patient years respectively). 
1985: Thrombolysis after myocardial infarctions is introduced.
1985: The	second	Whitehall	study	is	established, including more than 10.000 ad-
ministrative employees, men and women. The aim is to investigate the social gradient 
present in relation to all major causes of disease, documented in the Whitehall I study. 
The crucial research question is: “How do human values translate into pathology?” 
Some findings with relevance to this thesis will appear below (year 2002-5). See also 
Chapter 2.1.4 in this thesis and the homepage of the Whitehall II study 
(http://www.ucl.ac.uk/whitehallII/).
1986: The	US	CARDIA	(Coronary	Artery	Risk	Development	 in	Young	Adults)	
study is established. It examines how heart disease develops. From 1986 it included 
a group of 5115 black and white men and women aged 18-30 years. The participants 
were selected so that there would be approximately the same number of people in 
subgroups of race, gender, education and age (18-24 and 25-30). The participants were 
asked to participate in follow-up examinations at year 2, 5, 7, 10, 15, and 20 (which is 
now in 2005-6). A majority of the group has been examined at each of the follow-up 
examinations, response rates have been 90-74%. 
See (www.cardia.dopm.uab.edu/index.htm).
1987: The Helsinki	heart	study is published. It involved 4081 healthy men with a 
mean age of 47 years and a total cholesterol as high as 7,5 mmol/l. It showed that 
cholesterol reduction with gemfibrozil (a fibrate) reduces the incidence of coronary 
heart disease (RRR 26%) in men with dyslipidemia. No effect was observed on total 
mortality. The Number Needed to Treat (NNT) in this study is 84 healthy men treated 
for 5 years to prevent one non-fatal myocardial infarction. Ref: Frick MH et al., N Engl 
J Med 1987;317:1237-45.
1987: The US National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute promotes cholesterol-testing 
for all adults. 
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1987: The first statin drug is introduced on the market (lovastatin, Mevacor).
Statins are drugs which inhibit the enzyme HMG-CoA reductase and lower cholesterol 
synthesis in the body.
1988: A hypothesis that chlamydia infection (TWAR) may cause chronic coronary 
heart disease is launched. Ref: Saikku et al. Lancet 1988;2:983-6.
1987-93: Several expert panels in the USA and Europe advocate dietary changes and 
if necessary, drugs to reduce LDL concentration, especially in patients with coronary 
heart disease. By this time, no trial has convincingly shown that lowering of choles-
terol prolongs life. A 1990 review in the BMJ concluded that “the failure of cholesterol 
lowering to affect overall survival justifies a more cautious appraisal of the probable 
benefits of reducing cholesterol concentrations in the general population.” The authors 
are concerned that the reduction in CVD mortality was offset by an increase in death 
from other causes. Ref: Muldoon MF et al. BMJ 1990;301:309-14.
1989: Thomas Moore publishes a book called “Heart failure,” (Random House, 1989) 
where he shows how the National Heart Lung and Blood Institute, the earliest pro-
ponents of cholesterol reduction, has been selective about the research that formed 
the basis of their treatment guidelines. A summary of the book appears in the journal 
Atlantic Monthly (1989;264:no 3) under the title “The Cholesterol Myth.”
1990: High cholesterol is now regarded by many authorities as the main cause of coro-
nary atherosclerosis. See for instance: Gotto AM et al. The cholesterol facts. Circula-
tion 1990;81:1721-33.
1991: EXCEL, the first RCT which addressed the efficacy and safety of lovastatin 
is published. (Bradford RH et al., Arch Int Med 1991;151:43-9). The study included 
8245 patients with moderate hypercholesterolemia. The abstract states that statins ef-
fectively and safely reduce lipid levels (i.e. is effective on surrogate end points). 
1991: The SHEP study (Systolic Hypertension in the Elderly Program). Until the early 
1990s, it was considered that high blood pressure in elderly people (over 65-70 years) 
should not be treated, unless the patient had angina or heart failure that could become 
symptomatically better by use of antihypertensive medication. SHEP was a double 
blind RCT involving about 4700 patients > 60 years with isolated systolic hyperten-
sion (SBP in the range 160-220mmHg and DBP<90mmHg). It tested the diuretic 
chlorthalidone versus placebo over 4,5 years. The results indicate that treatment of 
isolated systolic hypertension reduces strokes. JAMA 1991;265:3255-64.
1991: The	STOP	study (Swedish Trial in Old Patients with Hypertension) was a dou-
ble blind RCT involving around 1600 persons 70-84 years. It tested thiazides, beta 
blockers or both versus placebo. Inclusion criteria were BP >180-230/90, or diastolic 
pressure >105mmHg. The study was stopped prematurely (truncated) after 2.1 year. 
This is the first BP intervention study to document effect of BP treatment on total mor-
tality. Relative risk reduction (RRR) was 43%, Number Needed to Treat (NNT) was 30 
individuals for 2 years. (See Lancet 1991;338:1281-5).
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1991: The first Framingham Heart Study Prediction Score Algorithm is launched. 
The Framingham risk-score system estimates risk for fatal and non-fatal cardiovascu-
lar disease events in men and women.
1992: Geoffrey Rose, arguably the most influential epidemiologist ever in the field of 
cardiovascular disease prevention, publishes his influential book “The strategy of pre-
ventive medicine” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). Here, Rose outlines two 
different approaches in preventive medicine: The population approach (mass strategy) 
on the one hand, and interventions in relation to individuals at particularly high risk 
(high-risk strategy) on the other. 
1992: The previously unpopular “homocysteine theory” of CVD (see 1969-75) 
has a comeback in mainstream medicine. Ref: Stampfer et al. A prospective study 
of plasma homocysteine and risk of myocardial infarction in US physicians. JAMA 
1992;268:877-81. 
1991-2003: “On the favourable effects of diet modification on CVD”: Some highly 
influential papers are published between 1991 and 2003 by RB Singh and co-workers, 
showing that an “Indo-Mediterranean” diet can have a clinically significant cardiopro-
tective effect in relation to CVD. In one study for instance, it appeared that after a MI, 
one year of a low fat, fibre rich diet almost halved the risk of death from all causes. 
See for instance Singh RB et al: Randomised controlled trial of cardioprotective diet 
in patients with recent acute myocardial infarction: results of one year follow up. BMJ 
1992 Apr 18;304(6833):1015-9. Singh et al. continue to publish papers demonstrating 
similar effects, including a paper in the Lancet in 2002. Singh’s data were in 2005 con-
sidered by the BMJ and the Lancet as probably fabricated or falsified (see year 2005).
1992-7: Establishment	of	the	tradition	called	“Evidence	based	medicine”.	
See chapter 2.2.7 in this thesis (including key references).
1993: The	Cochrane	Collaboration	(CC)	is	established, named after epidemiologist 
Archie Cochrane (1909-1988), a British medical researcher who contributed much to 
the development of epidemiology as a science. The CC is an international, non-profit, 
independent organisation, established to ensure that up-to-date, accurate information 
about the effects of healthcare interventions is readily available worldwide. 
See www.cochrane.org.
1993: The JNC	V	guidelines are launched. Hypertension is now considered a major 
risk factor for which treatment is recommended if BP	>	140/90 mmHg.
A good review paper on hypertension treatment up to this point in time is 
Moser M. Evolution of the treatment of hypertension from the 1940s to JNC V. Am J 
Hypertension 1997;10:2S-8S.
1994: Realising that commercial interests may strongly affect researchers’ scientific 
opinions, the British Medical Journal introduces a “Conflicts of interest” statements 
for authors. (The term is later changed to competing interests). Other medical journals 
follow suit in the years to come.
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1994: The	4S	study (Scandinavian Simvastatin Survival Study) included 4444 men 
and women 35-70 years with previous myocardial infarction or angina, i.e. secondary 
prevention. The cholesterol level among participants was in the range of 5,5-8,0 mmol/
l. This study is the first to document efficacy of secondary prevention of coronary heart 
disease with a statin. For the first time, intervention to reduce cholesterol showed 
a	favourable	effect	on	total	mortality (RRR 30%, ARR 3,2% over 5,4 years). The 
reduction of major coronary events was ARR 8,6% in 5,4 years. The effect on major 
events was greater in men than in women, and total mortality was not significantly 
reduced in women. The introduction to the 4S study sums op evidence that is quite 
interesting, in light of the massive campaigns to reduce cholesterol that have by now 
gone on for years. Quote: “Expert panels in Europe and the USA have ... recommended 
dietary changes and, if necessary, addition of drugs to reduce high cholesterol concen-
trations – specifically LDL cholesterol – especially in patients with CHD. However 
these recommendations have been questioned, mainly because no clinical trial has 
convincingly shown that lowering of cholesterol prolongs life.” Ref: Randomised trial 
of cholesterol lowering in 4444 patients with coronary heart disease: The Scandinavian 
Simvastatin Survival Study. Lancet 1994;344:1383-9. 
1994: A combined risk approach to prevention of heart disease is recommended by 
The First Joint European Task Force of European and other Societies on Coronary 
Prevention. Ref: Eur Heart J 1994;15:1300-31. These recommendations build on the 
Framingham risk equation.
1995: The	WOSCOPS	study (West of Scotland Coronary Prevention Study) docu-
ments the efficacy of primary prevention of CVD with a statin. This RCT shows that 
pravastatin significantly reduces the incidence of myocardial infarction and death from 
cardiovascular causes in men with relatively high cholesterol levels. Mortality in the 
treated group was 3,2%, as opposed to 4,1% in the placebo group. The intervention did 
not adversely affect death rates from other causes. The study was funded by Bristol-
Myers Squibb who produces Pravacol (pravastatin). Ref: Shepherd J et al. Prevention 
of coronary heart disease with pravastatin in men with hypercholesterolemia. N Engl 
J Med 1995;333:1301-7.
1994-5:	“The	fetal	origin	of	adulthood	disease	hypothesis”	(also known as “The Fors-
dahl-Barker Hypothesis”) becomes generally known in the medical community (See for 
instance Barker D. Fetal origins of coronary heart disease. BMJ 1995;311:171-4). 
The roots of this hypothesis can be traced to Norwegian physician Anders Forsdahl’s 
research on the population in Finnmark, Norway. He found that trends in the infant 
mortality and living conditions in childhood would predict cholesterol levels and mor-
tality among men later (at age 40-69 years). He concluded that “The findings suggest 
that great poverty in childhood and adolescence followed by prosperity, is a risk factor 
for arteriosclerotic heart disease” (Forsdahl A. Br J Prev Soc Med 1977;31:91-5).
Barker stated that fetal under-nutrition in middle to late gestation, leading to a dispro-
portionate fetal growth, “programmes” the organism biologically so that the risk of 
coronary heart disease in adult life increases. Since the Forsdahl-Barker hypothesis 
was launched, numerous studies have addressed the influence of weight patterns in 
childhood on subsequent CVD.
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The 1990s: A series of new	statin	drugs enter the market. This gives rise to what has 
been called the “statin wars” in the highly competitive marketplace (the term appeared 
in the title of discussion papers in the Lancet in 2003-4). 
1995: Primary angioplasty in the acute phase of cardiac events is introduced. 
1996: The CARDIA study (see 1986) documents that experience of racial	discrimi-
nation	increases	blood	pressure. Ref: Krieger N. Sidney S. Racial discrimination and 
blood pressure: the Cardia Study of young black and white adults. Am J Publ Health 
1996;86:1370-8. 
Around 1996: Evidence is now accumulating that the	effect	on	statins is not simply 
attributable to inhibition of cholesterol synthesis and thereby decreasing cholesterol 
levels, but also to anti-inflammatory effects that reduce development of atheroscle-
rotic process in the vessel walls. See for instance “Statins do more than lower choles-
terol”, a Viewpoint paper by Vaughan C et al, Lancet 1996;348:1079-82. 
1996: It is documented that plasma fibrinogen, a general marker of inflammation as 
well as of haemostasis, is determined by childhood conditions and adult psychosocial 
situation, i.e.: negative life experiences appear to increase fibrinogen levels. Brun-
ner E et al. Childhood social circumstances and psychosocial and behavioural Ref: 
factors as determinants for plasma fibrinogen. Lancet 1996;347:1008-13.
1996: Statins	are	now	called	“miracle	drugs” and their underuse is noted in a semi-
nal paper: Robert WC. The underuse of miracle drugs: the statin drugs are to athero-
sclerosis what penicillin was to infectious disease. Ref: Am J Cardiol 1996;78:377-8. 
1996: Prominent scientists speculate that due to technological advance, heart attacks 
may be “gone with the century.” Brown MS, Goldstein JL. Heart attacks: gone with the 
century. Science 1996;272:629.
1998: The	UKPDS	(UK	Prospective	Diabetes	Study) publications appear: 
Effect of blood pressure control: The conclusion is that “tight” blood pressure control 
in patients with hypertension and type 2 diabetes achieves a clinically important reduc-
tion (RRR 24-47%) in the risk of deaths related to diabetes, complications related to 
diabetes, stroke, progression of diabetic retinopathy, heart failure and deterioration in 
visual acuity. 
The tight intervention group aimed for BP <150/85 mmHg (the achieved group mean was 
144/82), and the control group’s aim was 180/105 (achieving a mean pressure of 154/87). 
See: UK Prospective Diabetes Study Group. Tight blood pressure control and risk of macro-
vascular and microvascular complications in type 2 diabetes. BMJ 1998;317:703-13.
Effect of intensive blood glucose control: The investigators interpret the study in the 
following way: “Since intensive glucose control with metformin appears to decrease 
the risk of diabetes-related endpoints in overweight diabetic patients, and is associated 
with less weight gain and fewer hypoglycaemic attacks than are insulin and sulphonyl-
ureas, it may be the first-line pharmacological therapy of choice in these patients.”
See: Effect of intensive blood-glucose control with metformin on complications in 
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overweight patients with type 2 diabetes (UKPDS 34). UK Prospective Diabetes Study 
(UKPDS) Group Lancet. 1998;352:854-65.
A couple of years later, a debate paper was published in the BMJ by McCormack and 
Greenhalgh, titled “Seeing what you want to see in randomised controlled trials: ver-
sions and perversions of UKPDS data” (BMJ 2000;320:1720-3). The authors state 
that “many authors, journal editors and the wider scientific community interpret the 
UKPDS study as providing evidence of the benefit of intensive glucose control”, but 
the authors underline that this was not a direct finding of the study.
1998: The	second	Framingham	Heart	Study	Prediction	Score	Algorithm is launched. 
1998: The	Second	Joint	European	Task	Force	of	European	and	other	Societies	on	
Coronary	Prevention launches its guidelines (Eur Heart J 1998;19:1434-1503), still 
building on Framingham data.
1990s: It gradually becomes evident in various studies that Framingham risk score 
algorithms tend to overestimate risk in European contexts (see references in Paper V 
of this thesis).
1990s: The pharmaceutical companies become the most profitable industry in the 
USA. 
1998: The	HOT	(Hypertension	Optimal	Treatment)	study is published. HOT in-
cluded nearly 19 000 patients from 26 countries, inclusion criteria were DBP 100-
115mm Hg. The participants were assigned to three different BP treatment targets. 
No notable difference was seen in total mortality or CVD outcome rates between the 
groups. Still, the author’s conclusion is that it is best to reduce BP to 140/85 or lower. 
The study was sponsored by ASTRA who used the results extensively in marketing 
campaigns.
Hansson L et al. Effect of intensive blood -pressure lowering and low-dose aspirin 
in patients with hypertension: principal results of the optimal hypertension treatment 
(HOT) trial. Lancet 1998;351:1755-62. 
1999: The	WHO-ISH	 (International	Society	of	Hypertension)	 issue	new	guide-
lines	on	hypertension (J Hypertens 1999;17:151-83). 
Definitions: hypertension > 140/90; “high normal BP”: 130-39/85-90; normal BP: < 
130/85; optimal BP: < 120/80. In Norway, a group of physicians published a critical re-
view paper of the problems they saw related to these new recommendations: (Hetlevik 
I et al.: Kliniske retningslinjer for hypertensjon [Clinical guidelines for hypertension]. 
Tidsskr Nor Laegeforen 1999;119:3037-41.) Following the release of the WHO guide-
lines, 888 GPs and other medical professionals from 58 nations sign a letter (16 March 
1999) to WHO general director Gro Harlem Brundtland expressing concerns related 
to the “goals of treatment” that young, middle aged and diabetics should have normal 
or optimal blood pressure. Brundtland answers (4 May 1999) that the guidelines had 
been developed by “eminent international experts using the latest information from 
epidemiological studies and randomised controlled trials.” She also acknowledges that 
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the methodology for guideline development is under revision at the WHO. 
(see http://www.uib.no/isf/letter/norsk.htm, http://www.uib.no/isf/letter/reply.htm). 
1999: Psychosocial	factors	and	coronary	heart	disease: a state of the art overview 
paper titled “Evidence based cardiology: Psychosocial factors in the aetiology and 
prognosis of coronary heart disease: systematic review of prospective cohort studies” 
is published by Hemingway H, Marmot M. BMJ 1999;318:1460-7. A psychosocial 
factor is defined as “a measurement that potentially relates psychological phenomena 
to the social environment and to pathophysiological changes.” A key message is that: 
“Prospective cohort studies provide strong evidence that psychosocial factors, particu-
larly depression and social support, are independent aetiological and prognostic factors 
for coronary heart disease.”
1999: “Atherosclerosis – an inflammatory disease”, is the title of a seminal paper 
by Ross R. in N Engl J Med 1999;340:115-26. This paper draws attention to the novel 
concepts of endothelial dysfunction and “inflammatory risk factors” for CVD, such as 
C-reactive protein (CRP) and Interleukin -6 (IL-6). Quote: “the process of atherogene-
sis has been considered by many to consist largely of the accumulation of lipids within 
the artery wall, however it is much more than that. Despite changes in lifestyle and the 
use of new pharmacological approaches to lower plasma cholesterol concentrations, 
cardiovascular disease continues to be the principle cause of death in the USA, Europe 
and much of Asia. In fact, the lesions of atherosclerosis (…) can best be described as 
an inflammatory disease.” 
1999: A special communications paper is published in the JAMA, titled “Avoiding 
the unintended consequences of growth in medical care: how might more be worse?” 
The authors discuss potentials for harm related to increasing medical activity in vari-
ous fields. In particular, they focus on the fact that “If individuals with cholesterol 
levels higher than 5.17 mmol/l are defined as abnormal, more than half the US adult 
(>17 years) population is labelled as diseased.” Ref: Fisher ES, Welch HG. JAMA 
1999;281:446-53. 
2000: Primary results from the ALLHAT (Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering 
treatment to prevent Heart ATtack) trial, investigating major cardiovascular events in 
hypertensive patients randomized to doxazosin vs. the thiazide chlorthalidone. Inves-
tigators´ conclusion: Our data indicate that compared with doxazosin, chlorthalidone 
yields essentially equal risk of CHD death/nonfatal MI but significantly reduces the 
risk of combined CVD events, particularly congestive heart failure, in high-risk hyper-
tensive patients. (JAMA. 2000;283:1967-75). The ALLHAT study came to influence 
guideline development and medical opinion strongly in the time period until 2005. 
For instance, the JAMA later printed an editorial stating that “The verdict from ALL-
HAT: thiazide diuretics are the preferred initial therapy for hypertension.” Ref: JAMA. 
2002;288:3039-42.
2001: The statin	cerivastatin	(marketed	in	1998)	is	withdrawn from the US market 
due to a high reported risk of rhabdomyolysis (muscle destruction leading to renal fail-
ure). The JAMA published a paper on this topic in 2004, titled “Potential for conflict 
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of interest in the evaluation of suspected adverse drug reaction. Use of cerivastatin and 
risk of rhabdomyolysis” Ref: Psaty et al. JAMA 2004;292:2622-2631. Quote: “The 
history of cerivastatin illustrates a flaw in the current US system for SADR (serious 
adverse drug reactions) reporting and monitoring … the asymmetry between the in-
formation available to the company and the information available to physicians and 
patients seems striking …When serious, even rare SADRs such as rhabdomyolysis are 
detected, pharmaceutical companies have a complex and almost insurmountable con-
flict of interest in weighing and interpreting the risks and benefits of various courses 
of action. A subjective element is present in the effort to infer whether or not the oc-
currence of untoward outcomes in particular users of that drug was actually the conse-
quence of that drug. For pharmaceutical companies, this appraisal may be influenced 
both by economic considerations and the emotional investment of those involved in 
the developing process.” The authors conclude that “The US congress should mandate 
and provide adequate support for independent reviews and analysis of post marketing 
data.” 
2002: The PROSPER (PROspective Study of Pravastatin in the Elderly at Risk) lipid 
study (Shepherd J et al. Lancet 2002;360:1623-30). Pravastatin did not reduce total 
myocardial infarction or stroke in the primary prevention group aged 70 years+, but it 
did so in the secondary prevention subgroup (ARR 4,3%, NNT 23 for 3,2 years). Total 
mortality was the same in pravastatin and placebo group, because an increase in cancer 
deaths outweighed the reduction in fatal CVD events. 
2002: The	BMJ	publishes	a	special	issue	on	the	topic	of	medicalisation, titled: “Too 
much medicine?” on 13 April. 
2002: The BMJ publishes a paper titled “Risk	factor	thresholds:	their	existence	un-
der	scrutiny” (Law MR, Wald NJ. BMJ 2002;324:1570-6.). Key message: The	goal	
is	not	to	“normalise”	risk	factors	down	to	a	given	threshold,	but	to	reduce	them	as	
much	as	possible	in	everyone. This would mean treating everybody beyond a certain 
age (such as 55 years) as well as everyone with a history of CVD, irrespective of mea-
sured risk factor levels, instead of close monitoring of selected risk factors. Terms like 
“hypertension” and “hypercholesterolemia” should now be down-played. The same 
argument can be found in the paper “Hypertension – time to move on” by MacMahan 
S et al., Lancet 2005;365:1108-9. 
2002: Publication of the LIFE (Losartan Intervention For Endpoint reduction in hy-
pertension) study, indicating that the drug losartan, an angiotensin II receptor  an-
tagonist named Cozaar, appears to be more favourable than the beta blocker atenolol 
in preventing CVD events, both in patients with and without diabetes. Refs: Lancet 
2002;359: pg 995-1003 and pg. 1004-10.
2002: The ALLHAT-LLT (Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering treatment to prevent 
Heart Attack Trial) is published. In this trial, Pravastatin did not significantly reduce 
total myocardial infarction and total stroke (RR 0.91), nor total mortality (RR 0.99), 
as compared to “usual care” (the difference between the intervention group and usual 
care group involved lower thresholds for drug intervention, so that it tripled the num-
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ber of patients receiving statins). The total number of serious adverse events is not 
reported in the paper. Ref: JAMA 2002;288:2998-3007. 
2002: The MRC/BHF Heart Protection Study (HPS) of cholesterol lowering with sim-
vastatin in 20.536 high-risk individuals: a randomised placebo-controlled trial is pub-
lished in the Lancet (2002;360:7-22). Patients 40-80 years with coronary disease, other 
occlusive arterial disease, or diabetes who are treated with simvastatin experienced 
fewer coronary events than the placebo group, regardless of base-line LDL. All-cause 
mortality was also significantly reduced in this study.
2002: The Lancet publishes a Viewpoint paper by the first author of the WOSCOPS 
study (1995) suggesting	to	abandon	the	“treat-to-target”	strategy	for	cholesterol	
in favour of adopting a “fire and forget” approach. The key message is similar to 
that of the previously mentioned BMJ paper; attempts to treat to ideal targets (Choles-
terol < 5mmol/l or LDL < 3mmol/l) has no sound scientific basis and do not represent 
the best use of restricted resources. It is known that many (most) CVD events occur in 
patients with only modestly elevated disease risk, and that reducing cholesterol con-
centration to a moderate extent by use of small statin doses can be beneficial to many 
more people than those currently considered for therapy. 
Ref: Shepherd J. Resource management in prevention of coronary heart disease: opti-
mising prescription of lipid-lowering drugs. Lancet 2002;359:2271-3.
2003: Two review papers summarise the biomedical evidence base regarding statin 
use. The conflicting conclusions make it difficult for the non-expert to find out what 
is best to do:
1. “Statins can lower LDL cholesterol concentration by an average of 1.8 mmol/l which 
reduces the risk of IHD events by about 60% and stroke by 17%.” Ref: Law MR et al., 
BMJ 2003;326:1423.
2. “The CV benefit has not been reflected in 2 measures of overall health impact, total 
mortality and total serious adverse events. Statins have not been shown to provide an 
overall health benefit in primary prevention trials.” Ref: Therapeutics initative, Uni-
versity of British Columbia, April-May 2003, p. 48. 
2002: An International Network of Cholesterol Sceptics (THINCS) is established, see 
their website at www.thincs.org. “THINCS is a steadily growing group of scientists, 
physicians, other academicians and science writers from various countries. Members 
of this group represent different views about the causation of atherosclerosis and car-
diovascular disease, some of them are in conflict with others, but this is a normal part 
of science. What we all oppose is that animal fat and high cholesterol play a role. The 
aim with this website is to inform our colleagues and the public that this idea is not 
supported by scientific evidence; in fact, for many years a huge number of scientific 
studies have directly contradicted it.” Medical doctor and researcher Uffe Ravnskov, 
a central member of THINCS, has authored the book “The Cholesterol Myths. Expos-
ing the fallacy that saturated fat and cholesterol cause heart disease”. Washington DC: 
New Trends Publishing, 2000.
2003: Publication of the ASCOT-LLA (Anglo-Scandinavian Cardiac Outcomes Trial- 
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Lipid Lowering Arm) study which is stopped prematurely. This is the first study as-
sessing the benefits of cholesterol lowering in the primary prevention of coronary heart 
disease (CHD) in hypertensive patients who are not conventionally deemed dyslipidae-
mic. 10.305 ASCOT participants with non-fasting total cholesterol concentrations 6.5 
mmol/L or less were randomly assigned additional atorvastatin 10 mg or placebo. The 
investigators conclude: “The reductions in major cardiovascular events with atorvastatin 
are large, given the short follow-up time. These findings may have implications for fu-
ture lipid-lowering guidelines.” RRR for nonfatal MI and fatal CHD was 36%, ARR is 
1,1% in 3 years. NNT to avoid one myocardial infarction is 313 patients for one year.
2003: A study documents that social	class	in	childhood	appears	to	be	associated	with	
high	diastolic	and	high	systolic	blood	pressure	in	adult	life. The researchers reported 
stronger evidence of an increase in the effect of childhood social class with age, which 
seems to be largely accounted for by current body-mass index, which is strongly associ-
ated with blood pressure and might itself be affected by early life environment. 
Hardy R et al. Birthweight, childhood social class, and change in adult blood pressure 
in the 1946 British birth cohort. Lancet 2003;362:1178-83.
2003: BMJ	publishes	a	special	issue,	titled:	“Time	to	untangle	doctors	from	drug	
companies” on May 31st. 
2003: The	European	SCORE	risk	estimation	system is presented (see Papers IV 
and V in this thesis). It is based on data from 12 European cohort studies, including 
two from Norway. In total, more than 200 000 individuals are included in the base 
cohort, resulting in almost 3 million person-years of observation. The SCORE system 
addresses risk for fatal cardiovascular disease events. 
2003: The Third Joint European Task Force of European and other Societies on Coro-
nary Prevention issue guidelines	on	CVD	prevention	in	clinical	practice	on	the	ba-
sis	of	the	SCORE	system (Eur Heart J 2003;24:987-1003.) Recommendations: Blood 
pressure should be < 140/80 (and lower in the presence of diabetes). Total cholesterol 
should be < 5mmol/l. See Papers IV and V in this thesis.
2003: Various	new	hypertension	guidelines	are	issued. Common trend is now “the 
lower the better”, treat above 140/90mmHg in everyone, and go lower in diabetes.
In particular, The US Joint National Committee (JNC 7) issues new guidelines: Hyper-
tension is defined as > 140/90, and normal BP as < 120/80. The guidelines introduce 
the category pre-hypertension (BP 120-139/80-89) for which medical advice and sur-
veillance is specifically indicated. The rationale behind this is that “Studies show that 
the risk of death from heart disease and stroke begins to rise at blood pressures as low 
as 115/75 mmHg, and that it doubles for each 20/10 mmHg increase.” 
See Ault A. Latest US hypertension guidelines create new “pre-hypertensive” catego-
ry. Lancet 2003;361:1798.
2003: The	“Polypill”	idea	is	launched	in	a	BMJ	theme	issue on June 28. The main 
research paper in this issue is: Wald NJ and Law MR. A strategy to reduce cardiovas-
cular disease by more than 80%. BMJ 2003;326:1419-23.
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Concept: The Polypill would be designed so as to contain: three different blood pressure 
medications in low doses, a statin, aspirin (platelet inhibitor) and folic acid (according to 
the still controversial homocysteine theory of arteriosclerosis, insufficient dietary intake 
of the B vitamins, folic acid and pyridoxine leads to elevation of blood homocysteine 
which has been found to be associated with development of atherosclerosis.) The indica-
tions for the Polypill would be wide, but in particular, it would be appropriate primary 
prevention in any individual aged 55 years or older. In his column Editor’s choice, BMJ 
Editor Richard Smith writes that BMJ readers should keep this particular issue as a col-
lectors item, as “it is perhaps more than 50 years since we published something as im-
portant (…).” The Polypill papers immediately initiate a debate and lead to critique about 
the way results from individual drugs trials were combined and extrapolations made 
about their potential combined effects, in the absence of evidence from clinical trials. 
In the 2004 BMJ Christmas issue, the concept “polymeal” is introduced with a touch of 
irony under a section called “Limits of medicine.” The authors seriously state that the 
theoretical evidence that a polymeal166 might reduce CVD by 75% in the population is 
theoretically equally strong as the research evidence in favour of the “polypill”. 
Ref: Franco OH et al. BMJ 2004;329:1147-50.
2004: NICE (National Institute of Clinical Excellence in England) hypertension	
guidelines are issued. Hypertension is defined as > 140/90, but treatment is recom-
mended if BP > 160/90, or from 140/90 in the presence of increased CVD risk (as 
specified in the guidelines). The ‘old’ drugs thiazides and beta-blockers are advocated 
as first-line treatment in most patients.
2004: New British	Hypertension	Society	Guidelines	(BHS-IV) are published (see 
Williams B et al. BMJ 2004; 328:634-40). These guidelines aim to adapt the current 
therapeutic approach (as reflected in other guidelines) to the context of the National 
Health Service. In an accompanying BMJ editorial, it is stated that the prevalence of 
hypertension (>140/90) is 42% in the UK population aged 35-64 years, and that the 
condition is controlled only in 10% of the hypertensive population (quoting data from 
Wolf-Maier K et al. in JAMA 2003;289:2420-2 and Hypertension 2004;43:10-17). 
As opposed to the NICE recommendations (see above), these guidelines recommend 
ACE-inhibitors as first-line treatment for younger, non-black patients. 
In the wake of the BHS-IV guidelines, several practicing clinicians wrote letters to the 
BMJ (BMJ 2004;329:569-70). Simple workload estimates were presented, and one 
doctor asked whether the guideline authors had considered the practical implications 
of the guidelines. Another doctor asked where the evidence for the treatment recom-
mendations is, as he finds the BHS’s interpretation of the results of the ALLHAT and 
ASCOT trials unacceptable. A third GP asked “whether the biomedical disease model 
of hypertension had been accepted by the general public”, and a fourth asked how he 
should inform individual patients about potential benefits and harms, as the guidelines 
did not even provide basic information such as estimates of numbers needed to treat. 
He added “As a primary care doctor, I cannot know whether in any individual case I 
am doing more harm or good to my patient in diagnosing hypertension.” 
166 The polymeal would include a regular intake of wine (150 ml/day), fish (114 g, four times a week), dark 
chocolate (100g/day), fruits and vegetables (400g/day), garlic (2,7 g/day), and almonds (68g/day).
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In response to these letters, the BHS-IV guideline authors replied that “If “the real 
world of general practice” cannot meet the challenges of modern health care, so chang-
es in the service delivery are needed.” (BMJ 2004;329:570-1). After a brief comment 
on the data from the ALLHAT and ASCOT studies, they conclude that: “Service rede-
sign, coupled with the effective implementation of current guidance, will continue to 
prove the nation’s cardiovascular health.”
The same BMJ issue where the letters criticising the BHS-IV guidelines appear, features 
an editorial titled “Treating hypertension with guidelines in general practice: Patients 
decide how low they go, not targets”. (Campbell N, Murchie P. BMJ 2004;329:523-4). 
The editorial authors say that 
“Viewed from general practice, it seems that most articles on hypertension begin 
by reminding us of our failures. But is this justified? (…) for individual patients, 
the odds of benefit from small differences in target blood pressure or lipid concen-
trations are low. (…) To reach targets of 130-140, most patients will need up to four 
antihypertensive drugs (…) Current targets are low enough to be unachievable for 
most patients (…) For those who read them [the current guidelines] in detail, new 
levels of unwarranted complexity are to be found. Instead we rely on “user friend-
ly” summaries emphasising (and failing to question) thresholds and targets without 
due reflection on the balance between what is desirable and what is achievable (…) 
Guidelines are based on average findings from selected populations and the opin-
ions of experts on acceptable levels of risk. (…) Surprisingly, the patient’s role in 
deciding his or her own blood pressure targets receives scant attention in guidelines 
for hypertension. (…) Appropriate management of blood pressure should therefore 
be guided by an informed dialogue between patients and doctors and not by blind 
pursuit of blood pressure targets.”
2004: A Norwegian cardiologist and lead investigator of the LIFE, ASCOT and other 
hypertension studies, is being quoted in a major Norwegian commenting on the fact 
that doctors are being guided by Norwegian authorities to prescribe thiazides as the 
first-line drug to patients with uncomplicated hypertension (or specifically state the 
reason, if they choose another drug instead): “The authorities encourage us to take the 
patients lives with rat poison.”  Three medical doctors asked the Ethical committee of 
the Norwegian Medical Association to evaluate the interview. The story has later been 
covered in the News section of the BMJ: Mayor S. Doctors urged to present views in 
an objective way to the media. BMJ 2005;331 (Dec 3rd ): 1289.
2004: “Head	to	head”	statin	trials	and	“the	new	era	of	intensive	statin	therapy”:  
These statin studies are no longer placebo controlled, but comparing high versus low-
er doses of statins, and different statins, in patients with established coronary heart 
disease: The REVERSAL trial concludes that among 654 randomised patients (502 
evaluable by invasive ultrasound) patients with stable coronary heart disease: 80 mg 
atorvastatin is superior to 40 mg pravastatin in limiting progression of atheroma. 
(Nissen SE et al. Effect of intensive compared with moderate lipid-lowering therapy 
on progression of coronary atherosclerosis. JAMA 2004;291:1071-80).
The PROVE-IT trial concludes that 80 mg of atervostatin is superior to 40 mg of 
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pravastatin in (rapidly) reducing cardiovascular events and total mortality. 
(Cannon CP et al. Comparison of intensive and moderate lipid lowering with statins 
after acute coronary syndromes. N Engl J Med 2004;350:350).
An editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine, accompanying the PROVE-
IT study (Topol EJ. Intensive statin therapy – a sea of change in cardiovascular pre-
vention, N Engl J Med 2004; 350:15), states: “Taken together, the REVERSAL and 
PROVE-IT trials herald a shake up of the field (…) a turning point -- that is the new 
era of intensive statin therapy.” The author notes that statins account for the largest 
prescription drug expenditure in the USA at $12.45 billion dollars per year, but that 
only 11 of the 36 million US citizens who should be taking statins according to current 
guidelines are currently taking them.
2004: A 10 years follow-up of the 1994 4S study is published, documenting that the 5 
year use of simvastatin in the original 4S study period was still associated with a sur-
vival benefit 10 years later. Ref: Strandberg TE et al. Lancet 2004;364:771-7. 
2004: Statins	 become	 available	 over	 the	 counter (no prescription needed) in the 
United Kingdom.
2004: Attention is drawn to risk of fetal anomalies in presence of first trimester statin 
exposure. Ref: Edison RJ, Muenke M. N Engl J Med 2004; 350:1579-82.
2004: A large Austrian study on of sex-specific patterns in cholesterol levels on all-
cause and cardiovascular mortality among 67413 men and 82237 women aged 20-95 
years (15 years follow-up 1985-99) found that patterns of cholesterol levels showed 
marked differences between men and women in relation to age and cause of death. The 
role of high cholesterol in predicting death from coronary heart disease could be con-
firmed in men of all ages and in women under the age of 50. In men, across the entire 
age range, although of borderline significance under the age of 50, and in women from 
the age of 50 onward only, low cholesterol was significantly associated with all-cause 
mortality, showing significant associations with death through cancer, liver diseases, 
and mental diseases. 
Ref: Ulmer H et al. Why Eve is not Adam: prospective follow-up in 149650 women 
and men of cholesterol and other risk factors related to cardiovascular and all-cause 
mortality. J Women’s Health 2004;13:41-53.
2004: A US review paper titled “Drug treatment of hyperlipidemia in women” con-
cludes that “For women without CVD, lipid lowering does not affect total or CHD 
mortality. Lipid lowering may reduce CHD events, but current evidence is insufficient 
to determine this conclusively.” Ref: Walsh JME. JAMA 2004;291:2243-52.
2004: In UK, a	contract	linking	GP	payment	to	quality	of	care (as defined by 1050 
attainable points linked to defined quality performance indicators, each point worth 
£120) is implemented. In this contract GPs with registered lists of patients (almost all 
citizens in the UK are registered with a GP) get financial reward for having monitored 
BT and cholesterol in patients with CVD during the previous 15 months, etc. Similarly, 
the higher the percentage of patients whose most recent BP was under 150/90 mmHg, 
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or cholesterol was under 5mmol/l, (both measured referring to the last 15 months), the 
higher the pay. Patients can be excluded from this calculation for specifically defined 
reasons, or if they do not attend an office visit despite three written reminders. 
See for instance: Roland M. Linking physician’s pay to the quality of care – A major 
experiment in the United Kingdom. N Engl J Med 2004;351:1448-54. 
2004: New	US	cholesterol	recommendations	are	issued on the basis of new informa-
tion from the HPS, PROSPER, ALLHAT-LDL, ASCOT-LLA and PROVE-IT studies, 
recommending lower treatment goals for cholesterol: In individuals with high risk, 
LDL-C should be 2,6 mmol/l or lower, in moderate risk: 3,38 or lower; in low risk 
4,16 or lower. Ref: Grundy SM et al. Implications of recent clinical trials for the Na-
tional Cholesterol Education Program Adult Treatment Panel III Guidelines. Circula-
tion 2004;110:227-239. In the wake of this, “The Cholesterol sceptics” send out a press 
release stating that “THINCS´ members are deeply disturbed by the ever-increasing 
pressure to lower blood cholesterol levels, and the underlying commercial interests 
that have distorted scientific research in this area. THINCS warns that statins have 
been excessively ‘hyped’ by the pharmaceutical industry and medical opinion leaders 
who have, unfortunately, become little more than paid advertorials.”
2004: Medical journals agree to demand registration of all clinical trials, to be able to 
counteract publication bias (the fact that trials which show negative results of interven-
tions trials have a tendency not to be published). 
See: Clinical trials registration: A statement from the International Committee of Med-
ical Journal Editors. Lancet 2004; 364: 911-12.
2004: Estimations	of	the	effect	of	unequal	treatment	on	health	in	the	US: 
Abstract: “The US health system spends far more on the “technology” of care (e.g., 
drugs, devices) than on achieving equity in its delivery. For 1991 to 2000, we contrast-
ed the number of lives saved by medical advances with the number of deaths attribut-
able to excess mortality among African Americans. Medical advances averted 176,633 
deaths, but equalizing the mortality rates of Whites and African Americans would have 
averted 886,202 deaths. Achieving equity may do more for health than perfecting the 
technology of care.” Ref: Woolf SH et al. Am J Epidemiol 2004;94:2078-81. 
2004: Various	 prominent	 editors	 and	 authors	 criticise	what	 they	 believe	 to	 be	
undue	medicalisation	and	marketing	by	‘Big	Pharma’
* John Abramson, family physician and teacher at Harvard Medical School publishes 
the book Overdo$ed America. The broken promise of American medicine. (See refer-
ence list).
* Marcia Angell, former editor-in-chief of the New England Journal of Medicine and 
senior lecturer at Harvard Medical School publishes The Truth About the Drug Com-
panies: How They Deceive Us and What to Do About It (New York: Random House). 
* Jerry Kassirer, another former editor-in-chief of the New England Journal of Medi-
cine, argues that the industry has deflected the moral compasses of many physicians in 
the book On the take: how medicine’s complicity with the big business can endanger 
your health. (New York: Oxford University Press). 
* Richard Horton, current editor–in–chief of the Lancet writes: “Journals have devel-
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oped into information laundering operations for the pharmaceutical industry.” (Horton 
R. The Dawn of Mc Science. New York Rev Books 51(4):7-9).
2004: Richard Smith, at the time editor-in-chief of the BMJ gives a talk titled: “Medi-
cal journals are an extension of the marketing arm of pharmaceutical companies”. In 
2005, a paper based on this talk (with the above mentioned title) is published in PloS 
Med 2(5):e139 (open access via www.plosmedicine.org). Quote: “Journal editors are 
becoming increasingly aware of how they are being manipulated and are fighting back, 
but I must confess that it took me almost a quarter of a century editing for the BMJ to 
wake up to what was happening. (…) Editors may thus be peer reviewing one piece 
of a gigantic marketing jigsaw – and the piece they have is likely to be of high techni-
cal quality. (…) An editor may face a frighteningly stark conflict of interest: publish a 
trial that will bring US$ 100 000 of profit or meet the end-of-year budget by firing an 
editor. (…) Journals should stop publishing trials. Instead protocols and results should 
be made available on regulated web sites. (…) Instead of publishing trials, journals 
should concentrate on critically describing them.”
2002-2006: Several	papers	on	social	 inequalities	and	health	are	published	from	
the	Whitehall	II	study.	
It is generally documented that differences in medical care are unlikely to contribute to 
social or ethnic differences in coronary heart disease in the Whitehall II cohort. (BMJ 
200;329:318). Here are some direct quotes from conclusions in Medline abstracts of 
the studies: 
– The results suggest that moderate inflammation and immune activation may be pro-
cesses through which low socioeconomic status increases disease risk. 
(Brain Behav Immun 2003;17:286-95).
– Given the important roles of interleukin-6 and fibrinogen in hypertensive patho-
physiology, these results indicate that psychological stress could promote hypertension 
through stimulating these inflammatory proteins. 
(J Hypertens 2005;23:1001-7). 
– Social position and psychosocial factors are associated with coronary disease, but 
the underlying pathophysiologic mechanisms remain unclear. In a sample of 283 non-
smokers, it was found that social position was inversely associated with interleukin-6 
and C-reactive protein and that participants with mild depression had impaired endo-
thelial function (Am J Cardiol 2003;92:984-7).
– We have demonstrated an “economic difficulties gradient” in coronary events in men 
that is independent of other markers of socioeconomic position and appears to be only 
partially mediated by well-known risk factors in mid-life. 
(Int J Epidemiol 2005;34:640-8.)
– Job control plays an important role in modulating cardiovascular and affective re-
sponses over the working day, and these responses may contribute to increased cardio-
vascular disease risk (J Hypertens 2004;22:915-20).
– [after adjusting for other factors] The level of justice at work remained an indepen-
dent predictor of incident CHD. Conclusion: Justice at work may have benefits for 
heart disease (Arch Int Med 2005;165:2245-51).
– The results indicate that low control at home predicts CHD among women but not 
among men (Soc Sci Med 2004;58:1501-9).
– The experience of psychological distress confers increased risk of CHD in men that 
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is not explained by health behaviours, social isolation or work characteristics. The 
increased risk of CHD associated with psychological distress is not consistently dem-
onstrated in women (Int J Epidemiol. 2002; Feb31(1):248-55).
– Lower socioeconomic status is associated with delayed recovery in cardiovascular 
function after mental stress. Impaired recovery may reflect heightened allostatic load, 
and constitute a mechanism through which low socioeconomic status enhances cardio-
vascular disease risk (Eur Heart J 2002 Nov;23(22):1757-63).
– Stress at work is an important risk factor for metabolic syndrome. The study provides 
evidence for the biological plausibility of the link between psychosocial stressors from 
everyday life and heart disease (Chandola T et al. Chronic stress at work and the meta-
bolic syndrome: prospective study. BMJ 2006; Feb 14; [Epub ahead of print].)
2004: The	Canadian-coordinated	INTERHEART	study, including more than 29.000 
people in 52 countries and from all inhabited continents of the world, found that the 
two most important risk factors are cigarette smoking and an abnormal ratio of blood 
lipids (Apolipoprotein B/Apolipoprotein A-1), which together predicted two-thirds of 
the global risk of heart attack. Additional risk factors are high blood pressure, diabetes, 
abdominal obesity, stress, a lack of daily consumption of fruits and vegetables and a 
lack of daily exercise. Regular consumption of small amounts of alcohol was found to 
be modestly protective. Worldwide, these nine factors collectively predict more than 90 
per cent of the risk of a heart attack. The president of the Canadian Institutes of Health 
Research, said that “This is a landmark study. It suggests that a combination of lifestyle 
changes including stopping smoking, eating a healthier diet and exercising could lead 
to an 80 per cent reduction in the risk of heart attacks … The INTERHEART study 
provides the health research evidence needed to build national and international pro-
grams for the prevention and control of one of the leading cause of death in Canada and 
world-wide.” Ref: Yusuf S et al. Effect of potentially modifiable risk factors associated 
with myocardial infarction in 52 countries (the INTERHEART study): case-control 
study. Lancet. 2004;364:937-52. 
Another INTERHEART publication goes deeper into the theory that psychosocial 
stressors are associated with increased risk for myocardial infarction. Odds ratio for 
MI in the presence of “permanent general stress at work or home” is found to be 2.17 
(CI 1.84-2.55), as compared to absence of general stress. (Rosengren A et al. Asso-
ciation of psychosocial risk factors with risk of acute myocardial infarction in 11.119 
cases and 13.648 controls from 52 countries (the INTERHEART study): case control 
study. Lancet 2004;364:953-62.)
2004: The US ACE	study documents that Adverse	childhood	events	increases	the	
risk	for	CVD. A retrospective US study involving approx. 17 000 participants docu-
ments that adverse childhood experiences, including abuse, neglect, and household 
dysfunction, were significantly associated to development of ischemic heart disease 
in a clear dose-response fashion, with an Odds ratio of 3,6 (95%CI 2.4-5.3) for isch-
emic heart disease among persons with the highest ACE score (Dong M et al. Insights 
into causal pathways for ischemic heart disease: adverse childhood experiences study. 
Circulation 2004;110:1761-6.). The ACE study has been described in the theoretical 
introduction to this thesis. See the ACE study page on the CDC homepage: 
(http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/ace/index.htm).
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2004: A Danish diabetes researcher protests against new recommendations for intense 
multi-pharmacological treatment in diabetes, He believes that “We must make an ef-
fort to draw more differentiated conclusions from these [UKPDS, 4S] and similar re-
search results”. “If a patient with type 2 diabetes is to have 2 anti-diabetic preparations, 
3 antihypertensive drugs, a lipid-lowering agent and treatment for co-existing chronic 
disease, no one can foresee the consequences in the form of side effects and interac-
tions, not to mention the fact that patients do not always take their medications as 
prescribed.” Ref: Olivarius N. Diabetes care today: not everyone should have intensive 
multipharmacological treatment. Scand J Prim health Care 2004;22:67-70.
Sept 2004: Former US president Bill	Clinton	has	a	completely	unexpected	“heart	
scare”, and undergoes quadruple bypass surgery only a few days after his disease is 
recognised. Since Bill Clinton had generally been considered very fit, this event had 
widespread effects in the US healthcare system and also posed many tricky questions 
to the medical community and population in general:
–  Is the following good advice: “If people have a family history there, and high 
cholesterol and high blood pressure,” Clinton said [in an interview with Larry 
King], “they ought to consider the angiogram.” (Gupta S. Clinton’s big test. 
TIME Sept 20 2004;164:77). 
–  Professionals and lay people all wondered: “When I read that President Clinton 
learned for the first time in early September that he had severe heart disease, 
I was shocked. His health must have been monitored as closely as anyone’s. 
How could something this serious have escaped his doctors’ notice? An how 
can someone who looked so healthy and vigorous as he did in July (...) actually 
be living with an unrecognized disease that could take his life at any moment?” 
(Harv Health Lett 2004;30:8).
– “In the days following Bill Clinton’s quadruple bypass last Monday, Dr. Harvey 
S. Hecht, the director of preventive cardiology at Beth Israel Medical Center 
in New York, received twice as many calls as usual from concerned middle-
aged people, largely men. Most of the callers were worried that they might be 
just like Mr. Clinton -- seemingly healthy, cardiological time bombs”. (“Yipes, 
Clinton! That Could Be Me.” New York Times Sept 12th 2004).
– Even the best informed and powerful people make surprising health choices: 
According to The American Journal of Managed Care, Clinton chose to have 
his surgery at a hospital with a published mortality rate that was twice the aver-
age for the State of New York. The author wonders “How can one of the smart-
est presidents, a technocrat, and a healthcare policy wonk ignore this informa-
tion and place his life in the hand of a “statistical outlier”? He then comes to 
the conclusion that “The right decision then involves more than a hospital and 
physician ranking.” (McMahon LF. Am J of Managed Care 2004;Oct:664). 
2005: The infectious disease aetiology for heart disease (TWAR hypothesis, see year 
1988) is deemed unlikely as a cause of heart disease in a review paper. 
Ref: Danesh J. Antibiotics in the prevention of heart attacks. Lancet 2005; 365:365-6.
2005: A US review paper on safety of statins concludes that currently available statins 
are generally safe, given correct prescription, attention to conditions that predispose 
for development of severe myopathy, and attention to drug interactions. It is noted that 
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side effects tend to be dose related, and that this is important to bear in mind now that 
current recommendations go in direction of “the lower, the better”, requiring increas-
ing statin doses. Six statins are currently available by prescription in the US. 
Ref: Grundy SM. The issue of statin safety. Where do we stand? Circulation 
2005;111:3016-9.
2005: The world’s most best-selling drug is Atorvastatin (Lipitor), the sales account for 
half of the manufacturer Pfizer’s annual profits. In a paper titled “Torcetrapib and Ator-
vastatin, should marketing drive the research agenda?” a Harvard professor expresses 
deep concerns about Pfizer’s research on a new type of cholesterol drug (torcetrapib 
– designed to increase HDL). In the on-going clinical trials, the new drug is linked 
to Lipitor in such a way that “current trial design may not optimally meet scientific 
needs of prescribers, the clinical needs of patients, the economical need of payers, or 
the regulatory need of policymakers. But they superbly meet the business needs of 
the sponsor – to create new knowledge in a way that will protect market share of the 
largest company’s most important product. The author calls for research that is inde-
pendent of industrial sponsors (Avorn J. N Eng J Med 2005;352:2573-6).
2005: Revisiting the “fetal	 origins	 of	 adulthood	 disease	 hypothesis” (Forsdahl-
Barker hypothesis, see entry at 1994-5). A BMJ editorial summing up recent evidence 
says: “Although the evidence for an association between impaired fetal growth and in-
creased risk of coronary heart disease is compelling, it is premature to make policy rec-
ommendations in order to increase birth weight. (…) In the future, individual tailoring 
of life-style and pharmacological interventions according to early growth patterns and 
genetic setting may maximise benefits in the prevention of cardiovascular disease.” 
“Attending to the health of women of reproductive age will have a profound impact on 
the wellbeing of their offspring. The importance of this issue closely parallels WHO’s 
World Health Report 2005 – making every mother and child count” (Eriksson JG. The 
fetal origins hypothesis – 10 years on. BMJ 2005;330:1096-7).
The fetal origin hypothesis has generally focused on effects of maternal under/mal-
nutrition as well as placental insufficiency. It remains to be investigated whether low-
weight births that are attributable to psychosocial stress such as racism can have a 
similar programming effect on the predisposition for cardiovascular (or other) disease 
in the offspring as under-nutrition. The CARDIA study has shown that women who are 
exposed to racism have an increased risk of premature and low-birthweight deliveries 
(Mustillo S. Am J Publ Health 2004;94:2125-31). A study in rats showed that maternal 
exposure to stress altered the cardiovascular response pattern to stress in the adult 
offspring in a direction which is associated with CVD in humans (Igosheva N et al. J 
Physiol 2004;557.1:273-285.) 
2005-6: Various findings relate life experience to risk for CVD: 
– It is documented that high levels of phobic anxiety are associated with an increased 
risk of fatal coronary heart disease, particularly from sudden cardiac death. Some, but 
not all of this risk can be accounted for by CHD risk factors associated with phobic 
anxiety. (Albert CM. Circulation. 2005 Feb 1;111(4):480-7.). This association has pre-
viously been demonstrated, but only among men.
– Publications in Circulation on a the link between depression and inflammatory markers: 
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Empana et al. Circulation 2005;111:2299-2305: “These data support an association be-
tween depressive mood with inflammatory markers and suggests that depressive mood is 
related to coronary heart disease even after adjustment for these inflammatory markers.” 
In an editorial titled “Depression and cardiovascular disease. A call for recognition,” 
two cardiologists state that the association between depression and CVD appears to 
be strong, but that the nature of the relationship is still unclear; i.e. to what degree 
depression is a causal risk factor, an associated risk marker, or a secondary event. It 
is also unclear to what extent medical treatment of depression influences prognosis. 
The evidence however indicates that depression does play a significant aetiological 
role. The authors are concerned about the issue being mainly ignored in mainstream 
cardiology: 
“Depression, however, remains largely off the radar screen of cardiac care (…) Un-
fortunately the intense focus on mechanistic relationships appears to be distracting 
from a clinical patient-focused reality (…) Because co-morbid conditions strongly 
influence treatment plans and prognosis, it makes no sense to treat cardiovascular 
disease in a silo” (Rumsfeld JS, Ho M. Circulation 2005;111:250-253).
– A Finnish study on organisational injustice and impaired cardiovascular regulation 
among female employees concludes that “The findings are consistent with the hypoth-
esis that cardiac dysregulation is one stress mechanism through which low perceived 
justice of decision making procedures and interpersonal treatment increases the risk of 
health problems in personnel” (Ref: Elovainio et al. Occup Environmental Med 2006; 
63:141-4.)
2005: Publication of the	 ASCOT-BPLA	 study (the antihypertensive arm of the 
Anglo-Scandinavian Cardiac Outcomes study). This is the largest randomised anti-
hypertensive trial ever conducted in Europe, involving almost 20 000 patients with 
hypertension and at high risk for CVD. Patients were allocated to one of two treat-
ment regimens (i.e. not single drug classes, as in most preceding trials) testing the 
primary hypothesis that “a newer antihypertensive treatment regimen (calcium chan-
nel blocker+/- an ACE inhibitor is more effective than the older regimen (beta-blocker 
+/- a diuretic) in primary prevention of coronary heart disease.” The trial was stopped 
prematurely, when the Data and safety monitoring board reported that patients on the 
atenolol-based regimen were being increasingly disadvantaged. In terms of primary 
heart disease endpoint reduction, the trial did not demonstrate statistically significant 
results, but on the basis of secondary endpoint reduction, the investigators conclude 
that “The amlodipine-based regimen prevented more major cardiovascular events and 
induced less diabetes than the atenolol-based regimen” and that (...) “the results have 
implications with respect to optimum combinations of antihypertensive agents” (Lan-
cet 2005;366:869-71 and 907-13).
When the ASCOT study was published, it created what several commentators call a 
“media hype”; i.e. it received promotional publicity of an extravagant and even con-
trived kind.
2005: Debate over the ASCOT-BPLA trial 
As the only entry on this time-list regarding debates on drug regimens, I will highlight 
the debate which followed the ASCOT study trial, since it raises several questions that 
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are both interesting and typical in the wake of publication of major drug intervention 
studies where major financial interests are involved. 
This can be well exemplified by an editorial in the BMJ (McDougall C et al. BMJ 
2005;331:873-60). It is written by three authors, of whom two state competing finan-
cial interests, and has the title “ASCOT: a tale of two treatment regimens.” The edito-
rial states that “The trial compared strategies combining more expensive newer drugs 
with cheaper older ones.” The editorial states that patients in the “new drug regimen” 
fared significantly better regarding secondary endpoints. These patients also devel-
oped fewer new cases of diabetes type 2. So guidelines on hypertension such as those 
from NICE should now be rewritten.
Several letters to the BMJ Editor disagree with the conclusions of the editorial (the let-
ters can be accessed through the BMJ website). Some examples of arguments: 
– A GP (member of the association “No-free-lunch”) writes: “Newer is always 
better. This editorial uses the word “newer” no less than 7 times as it seeks to 
usher a new era in the politics of hypertension. Oddly enough these “newer” 
medications are some 20 years old so the choice of such provocative language 
is interesting (...) In ASCOT, even if we assume that the observed difference 
between the treatment arms is not merely related to a simple lowering of blood 
pressure of 2.1 mmHg – which is a big IF - the NNT per year to prevent death 
would be around 645 and for any vascular event 220. Diabetes is an arbitrary 
point on a metabolic continuum and therefore any reduction in incidence is 
questionable especially with annual NNT of over 200.” 
– A prescribing team manager writes that “We shouldn’t lose our heads over 
ASCOT”: “ASCOT merely adds to our understanding of the importance of 
managing blood pressure effectively. It does not cancel out the key trials of the 
past. In the same way ALLHAT gives an indication of the benefit of diuretics 
in treating hypertension. ASCOT does not trump ALLHAT and the authors’ as-
sertion that diuretics will become adjunctive treatment is not supported by the 
evidence. The difficulty we have with ASCOT is interpreting the absolute value 
of the results given that the trial itself was stopped before the primary end-point 
reached clinical significance. Had the trial been allowed to continue would it 
have shown a clinically significant difference in the primary end-point? We do 
not know. We should not overlook the importance of some of the secondary 
endpoints but equally we need to see them in context, and appreciate the abso-
lute risk reductions (ARR) and numbers needed to treat (NNT) rather than the 
relative risk reductions (RRR) that the editorial misleadingly quotes:
 All cause mortality: ARR = 0.87%; RRR = 11%; NNT = 115¸ Cardiovascular 
mortality: ARR = 0.83%; RRR = 30%; NNT = 120; Coronary events: ARR = 
1.04% RRR = 13%; NNT = 96; Stroke: ARR = 1.00%; RRR = 29%; NNT = 
100. 
– An expert in prescribing and clinical effectiveness indicates something that 
Richard Smith expressed concern about in 2004 (see above); the fact that treat-
ment doses may be purposefully selected so as to disfavour the “old” one: “I 
am puzzled why, given the evidence base, that a thiazide was not chosen as the 
first-line drug in the ‘old arm’ and when atenolol was chosen, why the dose was 
increased to 100 mg daily. The BNF has, for as long as I can remember, advised 
not to go above 50mg daily as all you do is increase side-effects. How much 
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has this ‘high’ dose of atenolol contributed to new -onset diabetes? It is not sur-
prising therefore that the ‘old arm’ lowered BP less effectively. What happened 
to the third line drug, doxazosin? Was it used more frequently in the atenolol 
arm? Given its poor performance vs. thiazide in ALLHAT, this might be very 
important information. For an alternative view of ASCOT-BPLA, and in my 
opinion a more reasonable one, I would direct readers to http://www.pharmj.
com/pdf/spectrum/pj_20051001_ascot.pdf”. 
– A GP writes: “For the first time I find myself slightly uneasy about what degree 
of competing interests we are supposed to consider among the authors of this 
editorial. It surely makes a difference whether the authors have received a few 
hundred pounds for sacrificing an evening to give a talk sponsored by a drug 
company, or, alternatively, whether the amount over a one or two year period is 
a hundred thousand pounds. The former would not affect my opinion as to the 
independence of their views. The latter amount would. It is certainly helpful to 
know that the authors have competing interests, but to be truly useful to read-
ers I think it is necessary to quantify the size of those competing interests. It is 
not unreasonable to expect transparency in those putting themselves forward as 
opinion formers for the profession.”
2005: “The trial was stopped early for benefit.” A systematic review in the JAMA reports 
that this is becoming an ever more common scenario in the world of medical research: 
Investigators announce in a major medical journal that the drug they’ve been testing 
has proven so effective that they’ve stopped the trial, to provide the drug’s benefit to all 
patients involved. The anchoring author of the JAMA paper is Gordon Guyatt, one of the 
pioneers of EBM. The study analysed 143 RCTs that had been stopped early for benefit, 
of which 92 had been published in 5 high-impact medical journals. The conclusion is 
that it is becoming ever more common to stop major randomised controlled trials early 
“for benefit”, with “clustering of publication in the top general medical journals”. The 
authors note that such truncated trials “often receive considerable attention”, but that the 
information underlying the decision to stop may be quite poorly reported. “We noted 
limited reporting of critical features specific to the decision to stop the trial.” The results 
of truncation however go in direction of “implausibly large treatment effects, particularly 
when the number of events is small. These findings suggest that clinicians should view 
the results of such trials with scepticism.” 
Ref: Montori VM et al. Randomised trials stopped early for benefit. A systematic re-
view. JAMA 2005; 294:2203-9. 
In an interview with Health Day, Guyatt describes the finding as “a real wake –up 
call.” “While pharmaceutical companies may be sincere in their belief that patients 
benefit from stopping the trial early, it also improves the likelihood of marketing your 
drug” (www.healthday.com, Nov 1st 2005).
2005: Scientific fraud – diet and CVD: On July 30, the BMJ published a series of 
papers presenting a strong suspicion that the seminal 1992 BMJ paper on the car-
dioprotective effect of an Indio-Mediterranean diet (Singh RB et al, see year 1991) 
is based on scientific fraud; either data fabrication or falsification. The BMJ states 
that the 1992 paper rapidly became an influential “citation classic”, frequently sited 
in other papers and clinical guidelines. In the same week (July 2005), editor Richard 
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Horton of the Lancet presents a similar concern related to Singh’s 2002 Lancet paper 
on the effectiveness of diet. The 2002 paper on the beneficial effects of diet is included 
in the evidence base of the 2003 European guidelines on CVD prevention (reference 
64 in the full version of the guidelines). 
2005: A UK modelling study titled “How many antihypertensives do patients need 
to achieve target blood pressure” indicates that 54% of hypertensive men aged 35-74 
years and 50% of women will require two to three drugs to reach the target of 140/90. 
23% of men and 35% of women will require four drugs or more. Some patients will 
require as many as seven. (Marshall T. Journal of Human Hypertension 2005;19:317-
9).
2005: More	 on	 the	 homocysteine	 hypothesis	 of	 CVD:	 Intervention	 does	 more	
harm	than	good	
Observational studies have by this time consistently shown that higher plasma homo-
cysteine concentrations are associated with a greater risk of CVD. However, the causal 
relationship between homocysteine and CVD is still unclear. Supplements of vitamin 
B (which is a complex that includes folic acid) have been shown to reduce plasma ho-
mocysteine. According to a classical pathophysiological rationale, vitamin B supple-
ments should thereby decrease cardiovascular risk. (As previously noted, folic acid is 
one of the ingredients in the suggested “Polypill”). A new meta-analysis of 25 trials 
is then published, showing that daily doses of 0,8 g or more of folic acid are needed 
to achieve maximal reduction of homocysteine, 0,2g produce 60% and 0,4% 90% of 
the effect. (Am J Clin Nutr 2005;82:806-12). Then, a meta-analysis is published in the 
BMJ which questions the whole rationale for the homocysteine hypothesis in West-
ern countries, and predicts that it is doubtful that folic acid will prevent CVD (BMJ 
2005;331:1053-6). 
Around the same time, the Norwegian intervention trial NORVIT study which inves-
tigated whether vitamin B supplementation prevents recurrent CVD among more than 
4700 heart attack survivors, is presented. In addition to their standard heart medicines, 
the groups received either daily folic acid (itself a B vitamin), daily vitamin B6, both 
folic acid and vitamin B6 or placebo for three years. The results indicate that no sub-
groups of patients in the NORVIT trial benefited from taking B vitamins. After three 
and a half years, those who had been taking either folic acid or vitamin B6 alone had a 
small increase in the risk of cardiovascular disease (heart attack or stroke), compared 
with those who had received the placebo. However, those who had taken both folic acid 
and vitamin B6 each day had a 20% increased risk of heart attack and stroke, despite 
their homocysteine levels going down by up to 30%. The results also showed there 
was a 40% increase in the risk of new cancers in the group taking folic acid, which the 
researchers said warranted further investigation. Author Professor Kaare Harald Bønaa 
said: “The results of the NORVIT trial are important because they tell doctors that pre-
scribing high doses of B vitamins will not prevent heart disease or stroke. “B vitamins 
should be prescribed only to patients who have B vitamin deficiency.” (Source: BBC 
health news Sept 6th 2005;  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/4218186.stm).
Since vitamin B has recently been promoted for heart patients, and many doctors have 
begun to treat their patients with vitamin B, the NORVIT results aroused much aston-
ishment and got wide media coverage. A heart specialist however thinks that “Mass 
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media have reported and interpreted the preliminary results from NORVIT in a naive 
and unbalanced manner and concluded with a general statement that B-vitamins were 
generally harmful. This has resulted in considerable confusion, anxiety, scepticism 
not only in the general population, but also among doctors”. (Schneede J. Preliminary 
conclusions from the NORVIT study, see www.rondellen.net/evaluation_eng.htm). 
One month later, the smaller-scaled WENBIT (Western Norway B-vitamin Interven-
tion Trial) is stopped, due to the scare created by the presentation of the NORVIT 
study. 
END
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